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THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO.

IN TEN BOOKS.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK BY

H. SPENS, D.D.

WITH A PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ANCIENTS BY THE TRANSLATOR.

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TO THE

EARL OF BUTE.

MY LORD,

THE dignity of the ſubject makes me preſume to inſcribe the following tranſlation to your Lordſhip.

There is a peculiar pleaſure in the ſtudy of ancient manners; and Plato's deſcription of them is both entertaining and inſtructive. His Republic, in particular, is equally diſtinguiſhed for the excellence of the ſubject, and for the elegance of the compoſition. With a noble ſimplicity, and

polite addreſs, it exhibits the moſt natural repreſentations of ſentiments and manners; and, in giving us a finiſhed picture of juſtice, it diſplays ſome maſterly sketches of education, and of polity, of philoſophy, and of the finer arts. Education is here repreſented as the foundation of government, and the finer arts as the handmaids of virtue. The leaſt attention to ſuch principles as theſe, may help to promote the taſte for true politeneſs; and a more thorough acquaintance with them may give us the knowledge of ourſelves, and raiſe the mind to the ſublimeſt contemplations. Though our countrymen cannot be ſuppoſed to be

altogether indifferent about ſo intereſting a philoſophy as that of Plato, yet the patronage of the great may help not a little to recommend it.

The character of a patriot-miniſter, as delineated by Plato, in the Republic, firſt ſuggeſted the idea of a Patron, to whom the following tranſlation might, with propriety, be inſcribed: It is, accordingly, now dedicated to One, in whom the characters of ſtateſman and philoſopher have been diſplay'd in the moſt amiable union; and whoſe integrity and abilities have done theſe nations the moſt important ſervices, and upon the moſt critical occaſions.

Permit me, therefore, My Lord, to teſtify, in this public manner, that, with the greateſt reſpect and gratitude, I am,

MY LORD,

Your Lordſhip's moſt obliged,

and moſt obedient,

humble ſervant,

H. SPENS.

SPEAKERS IN THE REPUBLIC.

SOCRATES.	GLAUCO.
CEPHALUS.	ADIMANTUS.
POLEMARCHUS.	THRASYMACHUS.

The whole is a recital by SOCRATES.

The SCENE is in the houſe of CEPHALUS at PIRAEUM.

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PREFACE.

THE principal design of the following Translation, is to give the English Reader a view of PLATO's sentiments and manner of writing, and to stir up the youth to the study of the Ancients.

It is impossible in a translation of PLATO, to preserve the spirit and elegance of the original; to avoid more material defects, can hardly be expected. But if there be nothing here to merit praise from the lovers of ancient literature, they may probably approve at least of the attempt; and as this celebrated Treatise never appeared in our language before, it may possibly prove acceptable to the English Reader, as well as of some advantage to the youth, in their study of the original.

According to the present method of education, we have hardly opportunity of gaining a thorough acquaintance with the great models of Grecian and Roman literature. After living a few years at an university, we launch into life and business; and seldom think any further of learning, or philosophy. Having in our early days entered into no thorough acquaintance with the Ancients, we come easily to take up prejudices against them: the tutors of the youth may be at great pains to give them just notions of the importance of philosophy; and to kindle in their souls, that love of letters, they feel in their own; which may be accompanied with great influence for a little time; but when their pupils are entered on the world, they frequently hear ancient literature decried; and company and conversation recommended as the only schools of accomplishment. What now are we to imagine our youth are to do in this situation? What charm shall be found of sufficient power to hold them to letters and philosophy, in opposition to those perswasive speeches and examples they daily meet with in the world?

The advocates for the Ancients are very far from despising the advantages of company and polite conversation; nor would they recommend any philosophy but what has the happiest influence on social life: they only wish to renew that friendship which was in ancient times between philosophy and politeness; and to establish

between them the moſt perfect harmony: their ends are ſuppoſed to be the ſame: the knowledge of truth, and the poſſeſſion of happineſs.

We have the good fortune to live under a conſtitution of government where freedom of inquiry is allowed; let us then employ to the beſt advantage, our own underſtandings; and let us reaſon and judge for ourſelves: we are not blindly to follow the wiſeſt of the Ancients; but neither are we to ſhut our ears againſt them, and reject their reaſonings without ſo much as giving them a hearing.

It appears to be a material piece of juſtice, due to the preſent age and to poſterity; to endeavour to promote the moſt perfect knowledge of what the Ancients have left us, concerning philoſophy, and the finer arts; that they may be able to compare the ancient learning with the modern, and to judge for themſelves on the whole. For, if, on the contrary, this knowledge ſhall ceaſe to be cultivated, and the works of the Ancients fall under neglect, and be forgotten; and nothing be held in vogue, but productions of a modern growth, the prevalence of ſuch a taſte might poſſibly contribute as effectually to the extinction of learning, as the Goths and Vandals did of old.

To prevent an evil of this kind, and to recommend philoſophy to the politer part of mankind, are certainly objects worthy of attention. One method that bids fair for reaching theſe valuable ends, is to give the public a view of the Grecian philoſophy, contained in thoſe dialogues, or philoſophic converſations, which were compoſed by able maſters, and which were likewiſe natural repreſentations of the real life and manners of the Ancients, at that time when Greece was in her higheſt glory for her wiſdom and politeneſs, and for her ſciences and arts.

The preſent ſeems to be no improper ſeaſon for making an attempt of this kind; as, in ſome, a laudable taſte for the Ancients is ſtill to be diſcovered, and in others, there appears a generous diſpoſition towards the revival of knowledge, and the love of letters, which are circumſtances that cannot fail to give the higheſt pleaſure to every one who hath at heart the real intereſts of virtue and of mankind.

In ſuch a cauſe every one ſhould readily bear a part, and ſeize with ardour the

favourable ſeaſon of contributing his beſt endeavours to promote that taſte of ancient literature which can alone ſave us from degenerating into barbarity, and prove a ſolid baſis on which all valuable ſcience, and politeneſs can ever be eſtabliſhed.

SECT. II. Under the influence of theſe ſentiments, what is here humbly offered to the Public, is a Tranſlation of THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO. Every one has heard of PLATO's REPUBLIC; every one has a curioſity of knowing ſomething further about it. The Dialogue of PLATO which bears the title of THE REPUBLIC, is, concerning juſtice, or virtue: and ſhows us, 1ſt, What it is that renders a man juſt or what juſtice is. And, 2dly, The intrinſic excellence of juſtice in itſelf; together with the rewards with which it is honoured both here, and in a future ſtate. Though this Treatiſe bears the title of THE REPUBLIC, yet hath it alſo another title more expreſſive of its ſubject, namely, concerning JUSTICE. For this Treatiſe does not ſo immediately relate to politics and civil government as to juſtice in its comprehenſive ſenſe, denoting virtue in general. The method indeed by which PLATO here illuſtrates the nature and effects of juſtice in the individual is by ſhowing its nature and effects in ſociety, ſuppoſing the moſt perfect form of civil government to be an image and repreſentation of that internal conſtitution and government form'd and eſtabliſhed by nature in the mind of a good man. The ſeveral principles or parties in the ſoul he explains by the ſeveral orders in a civil government, and by ſhowing that juſtice is the health, harmony, and good order of the whole, he points out at once its nature and its utility.—The REPUBLIC is one of PLATO's longeſt dialogues, and the ſubject is regularly purſued through the whole ten books into which it is divided. It is handled in an elegant manner, and many things collateral, and in connection with the principal ſubject are moſt delicately touched; ſo that the reader is perpetually delighted with the variety of the matter, the beauty of the illuſtrations, the union of the whole; and in particular, with that genuine air of real life which every where appears, and which renders the works of our Author, ſuperiour, in that reſpect, to almoſt all other human compoſitions.

SECT. III. As the Engliſh Reader may poſſibly deſire to have ſome information

concerning the country through which he is going to travel; and ſome account of the manners of the people to whom he is to be introduced, we ſhall here take notice of a few things, which may help to guide him in his way, and lead him into a more familiar acquaintance with the characters and manners deſcribed in the following Treatiſe.—

The ancient Greeks were not the firſt who made a ſhining figure in the ſciences. Other ſtates had long been eminent for learning, before they were heard of. But if they were not the firſt civilized people, they will readily be allowed to have poliſhed themſelves more than any other, carrying not only the mechanical, but alſo the liberal arts to the higheſt perfection. Greece produced hiſtorians, and poets, orators, and ſtateſmen, philoſophers, and lawgivers, ſuperiour to all the world. Enjoying a happy climate, and conſiſting of a great many free independent ſtates, who were governed by their own laws, and who all ſpoke one and the ſame language, the Grecians were naturally led, by common intereſt, to unite together againſt foreign hoſtility of every kind. In theſe confederacies, as they were animated with ardour in the common cauſe, and with a noble emulation to diſtinguiſh themſelves among their friends and allies, they made glorious ſtands for liberty, and great advances in the finer arts; and in a ſhort ſpace of time became as brave and polite a people as any that are repreſented in the records of hiſtory.

Of all the Grecian ſtates, thoſe of Athens, and Lacedaemon, were the moſt conſiderable; but in their manners and characters they were extremely oppoſite. The conſtitution of each had been modelled anew by a moſt eminent lawgiver; that of Sparta by Lycurgus, that of Athens by Solon. The conſtitution of the former, was a ſort of Ariſtocracy, where power and magiſtracy were in the hands of the beſt, and worthieſt. The other, was a kind of Democracy, where the power was lodged in the people. The laws and diſcipline of the one, were extremely rigid and ſevere; thoſe of the other, the reverſe. The virtue of the one proceeded from a rigid education, which gave them a happy ignorance of vice; and from a ſeverity of diſcipline, which rather drove them by force, than won them by perſwaſion. The virtue of the

other aroſe from a genuine ſenſe of honour, and an innate love of liberty. The one maintained for a conſiderable time a profound reverence for the laws, and whilſt reſpected abroad, long enjoyed at home, a tranquillity undiſturbed by inteſtine commotions. The other, was, like a ſhip, perpetually toſſed by the billows of popular ſedition, and hardly held at anchor by the abilities of her leading men, the wiſdom of her ſenators, and moderation of her judges. Both ſtates in their wars againſt Perſia, in defence of the liberties of Greece, had acquired immortal honour. The Athenians, in particular, at Marathon; and the Spartans, at Thermopylae; and both in the fields of Plataea, where they obtained that celebrated victory, whoſe parallel all the records of paſt times have never yet tranſmitted to the preſent. The national temper of the Spartans was ſlow and cautious; that of the Athenians, was quick, and enterprizing. At Sparta, all were of one character, modeſt and reſerved; and all of one profeſſion, namely, that of arms. At Athens were to be found, men of every profeſſion, and of every character, of the higheſt politeneſs, and of the greateſt inſolence; and in ſhort, of all inconſtancy, and contrariety of manners. Nothing was to be ſeen at Sparta, but military exerciſes, and fatigue, accompanied with the greateſt plainneſs and ſimplicity of life. But at Athens, you ſaw every kind of luxury, and elegance; all the mechanic, all the liberal arts; together with all the ſplendour and magnificence of an opulent and commercial ſtate. An auſtere virtue prevailed in the one; in the other reigned a liberty altogether licentious. The decline of the Spartan glory aroſe from the degeneracy of their rulers, in relaxing the ancient ſeverity of diſcipline; the Athenians loſt the preeminence of Greece, through the extreme licentiouſneſs of the people. When thoſe two ſtates were no longer in dread of the Perſian king, they became careleſs of themſelves, and jealous of one another. The one was formidable on the land; the other, powerful alſo on the land, was ſtill more terrible on the ſeas; and for ſome time the greateſt maritime power in the world. In her unhappy quarrel, almoſt all the ſtates of Greece came to take a part; and according as intereſt or inclination led them, ſided either with the one, or the other. The war laſted long; and in it fell many a brave Greek, whoſe valour might have ſuf-

ficed to have preſerved their independance againſt the growing power of Macedon. Athens was at length conquered by Sparta. Her magnificence was deſtroyed, and tyrants were eſtabliſhed; but ſhe ſoon expelled the tyrants, and recovered her liberties; and having repaired her ruins, ſhe roſe, once more, to a conſiderable height of ſplendour, and majeſty.

In this troubleſome period it was that Socrates lived at Athens. With him were cotemporary, Polygnotus the painter, Phidias the ſtatuary, Thucydides the hiſtorian, the poets Euripides, and Sophocles; the philoſophers, Xenophon and Plato; together with Alcibiades the general, and Pericles, renowned no leſs as an uncorrupted patriot, than as a moſt eloquent, and able ſtateſman.

As the Athenian government was extremely popular, the manners of the citizens grew daily more and more inſolent. The young men of birth and fortune were ambitious of being in offices of power and dignity; and theſe offices were generally conferr'd by the people: hence eloquence became a moſt neceſſary accompliſhment, and every one who was deſirous of power and influence among the people, ſtudied the art of perſwaſion, and applied himſelf to rhetoric. This gave riſe to a ſet of men, who pretended to be teachers of politics, and eloquence, and who undertook for hire, to make any one, in a ſhort time, a conſummate orator, philoſopher, and ſtateſman. Theſe were the Sophiſts, a vain and conceited ſet of men, who were void of all real ability; but by prodigious arrogance, and ſpecious appearances of learning, had the addreſs to impoſe on the unwary youth, and met with the greateſt encouragement, particularly at Athens. Theſe were the inſtructors and tutors of the great, and the opulent. The common people had a ſet of inſtructors of their own, who ſerved them at an eaſy rate; namely the poets; and their rehearſers, and expounders, the rhapſodiſts. As the poets wrote to pleaſe the multitude, they fell in with the current ſuperſtition of the times; and were conſequently the great ſupporters and promoters of the religion of the vulgar; which was extremely idolatrous, and full of the groſſeſt ſuperſtition. Every fable concerning religion, however unbecoming, paſſed current among the populace, and was therefore readily adopted by the poets;

and when once it came to be graced with poetic numbers, it was ſuppoſed to be dictated by the inſpiration of the muſes, and as ſuch, was received, with entire veneration, by the credulous multitude.

Greece had likewiſe produced ſome eminent lawgivers and philoſophers; men of real ability and worth; who by wiſe inſtitutions of government, and juſt maxims of virtue, had endeavoured to civilize and poliſh ſtates, and render men good and virtuous. Between ſuch philoſophers as theſe, and the poets, we are told, there had always been a ſtated oppoſition. It is eaſy to ſee, which of the two, in ſuch a ſtate as that of Athens, would be the greateſt favourites. In every Democracy the people are enemies of the good, whilſt they careſs cunning and ſelf-deſigning men, who, to ſerve their own ends, ſooth the paſſions of others, and give countenance and encouragement to popular vices and corruptions.

Such was the ſtate of the Athenians when Socrates aroſe among them. Now, what encouragement or ſucceſs could in theſe circumſtances, attend a philoſopher of ſo great modeſty and ſimplicity of life? In public offices, he could do little againſt numbers of an oppoſite character: in private life, he could do more; but there, too, he muſt have expected to meet with oppoſition. By his attempts to expoſe the ignorance of the Sophiſts, theſe vain and arrogant men, would of courſe become his enemies. In ſhowing their pupils, that the poſſeſſion of places beyond their capacities, would make them ridiculous, he muſt neceſſarily by ſuch plain dealing have incurred their diſpleaſure. And by expoſing the unhandſome fables of the poets, he muſt in like manner have been ſubject to the reſentment of theſe leaders of the populace in matters of religion. If he were to have any friends or followers at all, they muſt be but a few; ſuch only, who, as our Author expreſſes it, had a divine temper for genuine philoſophy.

This may ſuffice for a general view of that country through which the reader is to paſs, and of the manners of thoſe among whom he is here to be introduced.

Sect. IV. In giving the Engliſh reader a repreſentation of ancient philoſophy, we have made choice of that of Plato, as his philoſophy of all others comes the cloſeſt to

the heart. Long before the days of this celebrated Ancient, philoſophy and literature had made conſiderable progreſs in almoſt every country, where order and civilized manners had been held in any eſteem. In the following Treatiſe, we find ſome of the more eminent lawgivers, philoſophers, and poets, occaſionally mentioned. With reſpect to Greece, Thales and Pythagoras, are generally allowed to have been the heads of the two philoſophic ſchools; Thales, the head of the Ionic, and Pythagoras of the Italic. The former cotemporary with Cyrus who cauſed the city and temple of Jeruſalem to be rebuilt. The latter cotemporary with Brutus who delivered Rome from the tyranny of Tarquin. The grand philoſophic inquiry of theſe, and of all others who pretended to philoſophize, was, concerning the origin, and the cauſe of things; a queſtion, truly worthy of philoſophers, and on the proper ſolution of which, depend many others of the higheſt importance. The firſt philoſophers and lawgivers of Greece, made it their buſineſs to travel into Egypt, and the countries of the Eaſt; which appear to have been eminent ſeats of learning and policy, when Greece was as yet in a ſtate of rudeneſs and barbarity. The learning of Egypt, and of the Eaſt, we find from the earlieſt records of holy writ, to have been of very great antiquity: it is ſaid to have conſiſted both of magic, or a ſuperiour knowledge of nature, and likewiſe of Geometry, and the other ſiſter arts. The magic of Zoroaſter, is repreſented by our Author, in the firſt Alcibiades, to have been nothing elſe but the worſhip of the Gods. According to his account, when Solon was in Egypt, he was told by the Egyptian prieſt, that the Greeks were but mere children with reſpect to the knowledge of antiquity. The firſt method of conveying knowledge is ſaid to have been by tradition; afterwards by hieroglyphics, or natural imitations; and laſt of all, by artificial ſymbols, or letters. The invention of letters, is, by PLATO, aſcribed to Theuth, who was regarded in Egypt as a divinity, and reputed the inventer not only of letters, but likewiſe of arithmetic, geometry, and aſtronomy. From the Egyptians, letters and theſe ſciences are ſuppoſed to have paſſed into Phoenicia, from whence they were afterwards carried into Greece.

It would be a curious ſpeculation, to trace the riſe and progreſs of literature from the

firſt and earlieſt ages of the world, and to obſerve its various revolutions, together with their cauſes, and conſequences: but it is a ſpeculation attended with conſiderable difficulties: what advantages of government, what aids of prieſts, and colleges, what benefit ariſing from libraries containing curious writings, and the works of the earlier Sages, there may have been in different parts, and periods of the world, for the improvement of the ſciences, cannot eaſily be aſcertained: but from the moſt curſory view of hiſtory, it would appear, that learning had, in all ages, been conſiderably indebted to ſuch circumſtances as theſe now mentioned. Beſides, in various ages, and in different ſtates, it will be found, that now and then, an eminent genius aroſe, whoſe ſuperiour energy of mind proved often of more real ſervice to the cauſe of learning than the combined labours of the many.

But whatever progreſs literature may have made, in times and regions moſt remote from our own, and whatever may have been its advantages from the ſtudies, and labours of particular orders, and ſucceſſions of prieſts, and Magi; 'tis to Greece principally, and to that heroic ſpirit of liberty, which animated her confederate ſtates, that we in Europe, are, at this day, indebted, for any ſhare we have of true politeneſs, and valuable ſcience. As early as the ſiege of Troy, the Greeks formed confederacies: their firſt writers were the poets; and their firſt compoſitions, were precepts of morality. To theſe, epic poetry ſucceeded; and the moral of the moſt celebrated poem of this kind, (written four hundred years before Herodotus) was, the maintaining ſacred and inviolable that general union and confederacy of their ſeveral ſtates, on which depended, in ſo great a meaſure, their independency, their liberty, and all their elegant improvements.

It is generally agreed, that Greece had her theology from Egypt, that ancient ſeat of idolatry, and ſuperſtition; and the chief founder of all the religious rites and myſteries among the Greeks, is ſuppoſed to have been Orpheus of Thrace. The religious feſtival mentioned in the beginning of the REPUBLIC, was, in particular, of Thracian origin, from thence it was carried to Athens; and the firſt time this

feſtival was held by the Athenians, Socrates went to be one of the ſpectators, as we are told in the beginning of the following Treatiſe.

Two ſpecies of philoſophy had made conſiderable progreſs in Greece before the days of Socrates. Cicero, who merits high eſteem for his accounts of ancient philoſophy, informs us, that according to the doctrine of Thales, mind was the cauſe of all. But ſome of the philoſophers who ſucceeded him, acknowledged no principle beſides matter in the univerſe; 'till the true philoſophy, being again revived by Anaxagoras, was afterwards by Socrates, Plato, Ariſtotle, and ſome other of the wiſer Ancients, moſt happily reſtored. They taught, that an all perfect mind is the cauſe of all thoſe regular motions, and goodly conſtitutions, ſo conſpicuous in the whole of things. But to this ſupreme cauſe, philoſophers did not always ſufficiently attend. Some of them, in explaining the ſtructure and conſtitution of the univerſe, dwelt much on the phyſical cauſes; and became ſo fond of theſe, as to reſt in them, without going any further, or ever raiſing their thoughts to any original mind, any ſupreme intelligence, and the cauſe of all. Others, who were not ſo inquiſitive into phyſical cauſes, did, nevertheleſs from the contemplation of the regular motions, and fitneſſes of things, conclude all to be the work of an all perfect mind. The ſtudy of phyſical and final cauſes ought always to go hand in hand, they are not to be disjoined.

But without entering further into theſe ſpeculations, let us turn our thoughts to the philoſophy of Socrates, who, to uſe the expreſſion of Cicero, brought down philoſophy from heaven to earth, becauſe he turned the attention of his followers from abſtruſe ſpeculations concerning the material world, to virtue, and the duties of life. In his daily converſations, by oppoſing thoſe falſe pretenders to ſcience, the Sophiſts, he drew on himſelf their deepeſt reſentment; in the mean time his own followers held him in the higheſt admiration. He writ nothing himſelf, but his philoſophy has been tranſmitted to us by two of his diſciples, Xenophon and Plato; each of them delivering the ſame doctrines in a way peculiar to himſelf; the former, in a

plain narrative, and in a manner which is conſidered as a model of the moſt perfect ſimplicity: Plato, in dramatic dialogue, but in a ſtyle enriched with fable, allegory, and every poetical ornament; and flowing in majeſty along, like a mighty river that viſits woods and vallies, cities and palaces, in its various, and winding way.

SECT. V. The poetical and oratorial manner of our Author, being, to the generality, more engaging than the unadorned and ſimple manner of the other diſciple, afforded likewiſe a reaſon for offering to the public this view of antient philoſophy in preference to any other. In our age, when, with the many, the taſte for pleaſure is ſo prevalent, and the prejudice ſo great againſt every thing that has the appearance of philoſophy, a writer is likely to be but ill received, who ſhall venture to entertain the public, with a treatiſe on morals, delivered in a dry didactic manner; which hath derived no aids from dreſs and ornament; in order to ſucceed, he muſt call in aſſiſtance from proper incidents, and characters; from ſtriking images, and allegories, and the like; that he may give his performance thoſe natural charms and graces which are not only highly uſeful; but at preſent, abſolutely neceſſary to recommend ſo grave a ſubject as philoſophy to the general eſteem, or even to procure it a decent reception. Now, in this method, our Author eminently ſurpaſſed all others, and from his example, we may ſee the advantage of it.

If at a time when philoſophy was in far greater requeſt than at preſent, when even ſtateſmen, and princes ſcrupled not to mingle in philoſophic converſations, at their leiſure hours, he found it neceſſary to embelliſh his philoſophic writings with all the ornaments of dramatic dialogue, and poetic compoſition, how much more may theſe ornaments be deemed requiſite, in order to recommend Philoſophy to the preſent age, whoſe purſuit is pleaſure, and whoſe object and end in reading, is amuſement? Now, as the following piece is wholly dialogue, where the Author totally diſappears, and all is ſpoken in the characters of the perſons of the drama, here repreſented, it may be conſidered as a philoſophic play, where there will be found a variety of characters, diſtinctly marked, and properly ſupported, with a vein of humour highly agreeable, and no where elſe to be met with.

Beſides, this manner, is, of all others, the fitteſt to give us a fair repreſentation of the ſentiments of Socrates, as they were at firſt delivered by that philoſopher himſelf. He did not, like the Sophiſts, keep any particular ſchool, or make a gainful trade of his philoſophy, by formal ſet diſcourſes on politics, eloquence or other topics of the kind; but every where, and on all occaſions, made it his buſineſs, with the freedom and eaſe of converſation, to inſtruct his fellow citizens in piety, and virtue: this being the original manner in which this eminent philoſopher delivered his ſentiments, what manner of recording theſe ſentiments, and of tranſmitting them to poſterity, can be ſuppoſed ſo natural, and ſo proper as that of dialogue? It is, indeed, ſaid of PLATO, that he embelliſhed the original diſcourſes of Socrates, with conſiderable additions of his own: be this as it will, the manner of writing he hath choſen, ſeems the moſt naturally to ſuit with the character of his principal hero; and appears of all others the beſt adapted to do juſtice to every part of it; and how well it is ſupported throughout, is obvious to all who are acquainted with his writings.

Add to this, that this manner of dialogue, is peculiarly fitted for the Socratic method of reaſoning, and of communicating inſtruction: as the great aim of the Socratic philoſophy is to lead men into their own hearts, to make them know themſelves, their ignorance and vices; and to excite in them an endeavour to become wiſer and better; no manner of writing ſeems more likely to reach theſe valuable ends, than this of dialogue: by it, they are imperceptibly led to the examination of themſelves; and by little and little, are brought, in a gentle and eaſy manner, to ſpeak from the fund within them; till by a free and familiar converſation with their inward companion, and monitor, they come at length to be rather their own tutors, and inſtructors, than the diſciples of another maſter.

To ſuperficial and impatient readers, the copious manner of our Author's dialogue, may poſſibly appear oftentimes tedious; as it proceeds by ſo ſlow and cautious ſteps, they may imagine that a great deal of time is ſpent on little work, and that the ſubſtance of a page might have been ſaid in a line: but if we duly attend to the advantages ariſing from his manner, they will be found to be ſuch as ſhall ſufficient-

ly repay the trouble of accompanying him through all the ſeveral ſteps of his reaſoning: this method hath a tendency to correct that eagerneſs of coming to a concluſion, which, in the generality of readers, is ſo great a ſource of error; and ſerves to promote in them that valuable habit, of diſtinguiſhing between the apparent, and the real. Beſides, by this manner of writing, the mind comes to be more deeply intereſted: the attention is at once agreeably quickened and relieved. The reaſoning is rendered more obvious to the weaker capacity; and the inſtruction makes the deepeſt and the moſt laſting impreſſion on the heart.

Of the Ancients who have followed the manner of dialogue, in writing on moral ſubjects, we have Cicero, the chief of the Roman philoſophers. Of the Moderns, we have a very few, who, inſpired with a genuine admiration of the celebrated models of antiquity, have happily imitated their method of dialogue in eminent performances, which reflect an honour on the age which produced them.

But the more rarely we meet with any thing in this manner, the more allowable it is to offer, were it only as a piece of novelty, a view of ancient dialogue, and a ſample of thoſe philoſophic converſations which were heretofore in faſhion, among a people the moſt refined and civilized, taken from the repreſentations of them that are tranſmitted to us by the wiſeſt of their Sages.

Sect. VI. The high character of our Author was another reaſon for making choice of him, preferably to any other, in giving a repreſentation of ancient philoſophy. Of all the Sages of antiquity, there is not any one who hath been more highly celebrated, both by ancient and modern writers, who have greatly enriched their own writings, by what they have derived from this ſource.

Some, indeed, of his admirers, by the myſticiſm introduced into their commentaries upon him, have rather occaſioned his falling under ſome neglect, and others have been led to depreciate the whole of his writings, for the ſake of a very few paſſages, that are indeed obſcure: but it is to be conſidered, that there is the greateſt difference between ſuperficially looking into an author, and carefully ſtudying his ſcope, his ſtyle, and the whole of his philoſophy.

If any of the Ancients can be ſaid to have rivalled our Author, it is Ariſtotle, his ſcholar, who writes indeed with ſolidity and preciſion, is full of ſentiment, ſparing of ornaments, and juſtly regarded as the father of criticiſm: but, withal, he is hardly allowed to have done juſtice to his maſter, or the other wiſe men who were before him. In the dark ages, when the chief learning in eſteem conſiſted of the diſtinctions, and ſubtilties of the ſchools, the Stagyrite carried all before him; and his authority was received on an equal footing with that of reaſon itſelf. But when that cloud of ignorance was diſpelled, which had ſo long involved the nations of Europe, this blind deference to the authority of Ariſtotle abated, and our Author, who had for ages been neglected, and forgotten, roſe again to juſt eſteem, and ſeems now to be in a fair way of recovering that high rank in philoſophy which he held in the judgment of Horace, Virgil, Cicero, Quintilian, and other renowned Sages of ancient times.

Thoſe, no doubt, who enjoy the ſuperiour advantages of divine revelation, may be ſuppoſed to find great imperfections in the writings of the ancient moraliſts, when compared with the ſublime diſcoveries of revealed religion. Still, however, we may be allowed to ſay, when we conſider the character of Socrates, and the writings of Plato, that DIVINE PROVIDENCE ſeems to have raiſed up theſe illuſtrious philoſophers, to be advocates for virtue, and to give ſome check to the progreſs of prevailing corruption, and impiety. Various methods of inſtruction appear to have been employed by the ALL-WISE for the reformation of mankind: the learning of Egypt and the Eaſt; the arts and ſciences of Greece—the laws and poliſhed manners of the Romans; the doctrines of the ancient Sages, as well as the precepts of the Jewiſh prophets. Some of theſe methods, encountering with the obſtinate and incorrigible vices of the times, met with mighty oppoſition: thus Jeruſalem killed her prophets; Athens her philoſophers: however their doctrines were not to be ſuppreſſed: they rather ſpread ſo much the more; and now, in theſe diſtant ages and nations, they draw the admiration of the wiſeſt and worthieſt of mankind.

It appears to be but an indiſcreet ſort of zeal for the honour of religion, to aim at

eſtabliſhing it on the ruins of the few, but valuable remains of ancient wiſdom. The Chriſtian religion, no doubt, challenges our higheſt eſteem and veneration, as her inſtitutes are of divine original, and, of all thoſe that were ever beſtowed on mankind, the nobleſt and the beſt: but, at the ſame time, ſome regard and deference are likewiſe due to philoſophy, which, rightly underſtood, is no other than natural religion: and theſe two, are not rivals and adverſaries, but ſiſters and companions, deſcended from the ſame parent, and deſtined for the ſame employment; to make men good and happy; the latter purſuing this end more feebly; the former, with greater energy and ſucceſs.

SECT. VII. This ſuggeſted another reaſon for making choice of the following ſample of ancient philoſophy, that of all the ancient philoſophers, there appears in PLATO's ſentiments, the greateſt conformity with thoſe of Revelation: it may therefore be ſuppoſed to have ſome influence with ſuch as unhappily entertain prejudices againſt our religion, if they ſhall find that ſeveral of its doctrines, which are ridiculed by the falſe pretenders to learning, are no other than what appeared ſolid and important to the moſt eminent philoſophers of ancient times.

Were we to treat of this conformity at large, we ſhould be led to ſpeak of our Author's account of atheiſm, of its cauſes and effects; from what temper of mind it proceeds, and with what character and conduct it is accompanied; as well as lay open his arguments for the exiſtence of Deity: we ſhould exhibit his account of the divine perfections, and his views of Providence, and his ideas of celeſtial aid, together with his ſentiments concerning that preparation of mind which he ſuppoſes requiſite in order to raiſe the ſoul to the juſt contemplation of the Supreme Being: we ſhould unfold his repreſentations of the beauty of virtue, and of our obligations to the practice of it.—A view of his notions of the works of God; their original rectitude: their preſent degeneracy, and the final conſummation of things, might here likewiſe be properly ſubjoined: but the nature of this curſory ſketch permits not the minute diſcuſſion of particulars; otherwiſe it were eaſy to ſhew, from the writings of our Author, the great conformity of his philoſophy with the religion we

profeſs. However, while we are confining the ſubject within proper bounds, it may not be amiſs juſt to mention a few things, ſerving at firſt ſight to lay open to our view the great affinity between the doctrines of our religion, and the ſentiments to be met with in the writings of this renowned Philoſopher, and eſpecially in the following Treatiſe.

It appears, then, worthy of our notice, that, as the Chriſtian religion eſtabliſhes a new ſtate of things, under the notion of a kingdom, whoſe grand object, is the virtue of its ſubjects; ſo in this REPUBLIC, the ſame grand object is propoſed, as the principal ſcope of government. This correſpondence further appears, in that ſentiment which our Author delivers in the following Treatiſe, namely, that we are not to expect, that this perfect model of government can ever be eſtabliſhed among men, without divine aſſiſtance.

Of this nature we may likewiſe conſider, the repreſentation he gives us of the character of the juſt man, and of the circumſtances which he judges requiſite, to ſet off his virtue to the greateſt advantage. In his opinion, the perfectly juſt man, can never thoroughly appear to be ſuch, unleſs he be tried and proved, by the moſt ſevere adverſity. He muſt, at laſt, ſays he, be even crucified. Theſe judicious ſentiments concerning the character of the juſt man, and the indignities and ſufferings by which he muſt needs be tried and proved, are truly worthy of ſo great a philoſopher, who appears to have had the deepeſt inſight into human nature, and the juſteſt ſenſe of the preſent ſtate of mankind. One can hardly reflect on theſe ſentiments of PLATO, without being ready to imagine, that he had a kind of foreſight of what was to befal the juſt one. Surely, if the pretenders to wiſdom of old, had attended to this repreſentation, they could not, well, have taken ſo great offence, at that part of our Saviour's hiſtory which relates to his ſufferings. We ſee here, that, according to the opinion of the wiſeſt of the Ancients, a ſtate of meanneſs and contempt, of ridicule and ſore adverſity, was requiſite in order to the exhibiting to the world, a finiſhed pattern of virtue. Her intrinſic beauty and excellence, they imagined, come to be moſt illuſtriouſly diſplayed, when ſhe is not only ſtript entirely of all ex-

ternal rewards and honours, but alſo loaded with grievous ſufferings and indignities.

Our Author's ſubterraneous cave, ſo elegantly deſcribed, and ſo univerſally known, may be conſidered as another inſtance of a conformity in his ſentiments with thoſe contained in Revelation. It gives us a lively repreſentation of the ignorance and degeneracy of mankind in the preſent ſtate, where numbers are buſied in purſuing after ſhadows, as the only real and ſubſtantial goods; while they neglect the culture of the mind, and never raiſe their ideas to the beauty and perfection of that ſupreme intelligence, which is the origin and the end of all. cave.

In this allegory, ſome opinions are curiouſly touched: the caſe is put, for inſtance, of a perſon deſcending from above into this ſubterraneous abode, to inform the ignorant inhabitants, that all the things which they admired below, were only ſhadows; and that they never could perceive any reality, nor enjoy true good, till they were releaſed from the gloomy dungeon, converted to a right way of thinking, and brought up to inhabit the regions enlivened by the ſun, and bleſt with the influences of the light of day.

Such a meſſenger, our Author imagines, would meet with a very rough and ungracious reception; regarding him as a liar, and deceiver, they would lay violent hands upon him, and put him to death. How wonderful is the correſpondence between theſe ſentiments, and ſome capital tenets in religion; and how ſtriking is the likeneſs!

Our Author gives further repreſentations of our preſent degeneracy, under the alluſion to the ancient fable concerning the marine Glaucus, whom he deſcribes as ſo greatly maimed, and disfigured, that the original form was no longer eaſily to be diſcerned.

The preſent ſtate, our Author, conſiders as not the moſt friendly to philoſophy, or virtue; the philoſophic genius, here, as he ſuppoſes, is like a generous plant, in an unfavourable climate and a barren ſoil. To bring it to perfection, or, even to preſerve it uncorrupted, is extremely difficult. But, that no ſingle one, in the whole of time,

and in the whole of ſpace, was ever preſerved untainted, who, ſays he, will take upon him to affirm?

The ſame correſpondence with revealed religion appears, in our Author's ſentiments concerning the immortality of the ſoul, and a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments.

There are beſides theſe, many other principles to be met with, in the following ſheets, which have no ſmall degree of reſemblance to thoſe of ſacred writ: and coming thus from an ancient philoſopher, they may, poſſibly, with ſome people, have greater influence, than any thing they meet with in Chriſtian divines, and contribute not a little to reconcile them to the doctrines of the inſpired Prophets, and Apoſtles.

Natural and revealed religion, though commonly diſtinguiſhed, may be conſidered as parts of one and the ſame great plan of providence. And whilſt there is perceived a cloſe affinity between them; it muſt be acknowledged there is this remarkable difference: that what the former hath repreſented in a weaker light, and in fainter delineations, the latter hath exhibited in characters the moſt conſpicuous, and with an evidence bright and irreſiſtible. And beſides, gives us additional diſcoveries of divine grace and favour to man.

If according to ſome, the whole philoſophy of antiquity, has derived its origin from divine Revelation, diffuſing itſelf through the nations of the world, by ſome primaeval traditions, it is no wonder if the ſtreams have retained ſome of the virtues of the fountain, whence they flow: nor can it be denied, that conſiderable currents of ſuch primaeval traditions, are to be found in the hiſtory of mankind. Their authority ſtood confeſſed to the renowned Sages of old, who acknowledged their divine original. But whatever be in this, ſomething of a divine philoſophy may be allowed to be the reſult of men's natural powers, duly cultivated and improved. At leaſt, ſomething uncommon and ſurpriſing may be ſuppoſed to be ſtruck out, by perſons of an aſtoniſhing genius, who have been ſeen, now and then, to ariſe; ſpreading glory on the ages which produced them, and communicating renown, as well as knowledge, to the ſtates and nations where they flouriſhed. Nor, is religion on this

account, to be jealous of philoſophy. Indeed, ſhe hath nothing to fear from a fair compariſon, which will be found to iſſue in her favours, and turn to her advantage. Thoſe, who, before they attended to a compariſon, were prejudiced againſt her, come then to be reconciled, and ſuch as were formerly her friends are further confirmed in her intereſts, and better enabled to maintain her cauſe. When religion and philoſophy are thus happily united, they mutually ſupport each other, the philoſopher is glad to find in religion ſo ſtrong a confirmation of his beſt moral ſentiments, and ſuch as pay homage to religion, are the more confirmed in it, by perceiving its principles to be ſo agreeable to ſound philoſophy, and to that univerſal light of reaſon, which has, in all ages, diffuſed its happy influences on the minds of men.

Nothing, either in ancient, or in modern times, has more retarded the progreſs both of religion and philoſophy, than the blind zeal and miſtaken jealouſy of their various partizans, together with the corruptions introduced by their counterfeits. Becauſe a ſpurious philoſophy hath proved an enemy to religion, and a ſpurious religion an enemy to philoſophy, the ignorant in both have been led to believe; and the crafty to pretend to believe, that there was an entire oppoſition between them: but there is, in reality, no ſuch thing. Genuine philoſophy always promotes religion; as genuine religion always encourages philoſophy. The knowledge of ſecond cauſes undoubtedly leads to the knowledge of the firſt; the greater progreſs we make in philoſophy, the more we come to perceive our need of other aid: the more we practiſe according to her dictates; the riper we are for the practice of the Chriſtian virtues.

It would lead us into a wider field than the nature of this Eſſay will admit of, to engage in a full examination of the whole of the Platonic philoſophy, and to ſhow its high conformity with the tenets of revealed religion; otherwiſe, by this diſcuſſion, we might be led to do ſignal juſtice to both; by this, we might at the ſame time be engaged to conſider the defects of philoſophy, and how ſeaſonably religion lends her aid to ſupply the other's imperfections, and likewiſe be diſpoſed to turn our ſpeculations on that variety of means which Divine Providence hath em-

ployed to prepare the world for the reception of our Divine Teacher; ſuch as, the meſſages of the Prophets, the homage of the Eaſtern Magi; the philoſophy of Socrates, the writings of our Author: but, however much ſuch topics may challenge our peculiar attention and regard, to have thus ſlightly touched them, ſhall, at preſent, ſuffice.

Our Author, in ſome of his philoſophic flights, may poſſibly be thought to ſoar too high for the weak eyes of many modern readers to attend him: but it is to be conſidered, that all things are not equally eaſy to be underſtood; and that there are many ſublime ſpeculations which require no ſmall preparation of mind, and no inconſiderable meaſure of practice and experience in them, in order to comprehend them thoroughly: thoſe at leaſt, who are but newly come from the cave which PLATO hath ſo elegantly deſcribed, cannot be ſuppoſed to be able, on the ſudden, to perceive objects that are very reſplendent: their eyes, habituated to obſcurity and darkneſs, will, at firſt, but ill ſuſtain the blaze and ſplendor of day; and ſome conſiderable time of practice and exerciſe will be neceſſary, to confirm their eye-ſight, and qualify them for viewing bright and glorious proſpects.

Beſides, there are difficulties, it muſt be owned, in philoſophy, as well as in religion; to exerciſe the wit, and diſcover the candour of ſober enquirers after truth: Of this nature, for inſtance, may be conſidered what relates to our Author's numbers. numbers in the Eight Book of the REPUBLIC; their difficulty has been celebrated even from the early days of antiquity. Thoſe, in the Timaeus, are more intelligible, being all of the Harmonic kind. Some are of opinion, that poſſibly no more was meant, either by Plato, or Pythagoras, in any of thoſe arithmetical exhibitions, than a kind of ſymbolical method of informing us, that order and proportion run through the whole of things.

marriages. Where he treats of marriages, the Author appears himſelf to have been well aware that ſome parts of his doctrine would hardly be received even by his hearers. He enters on this ſubject with the greateſt difficulty, and reſumes it elſewhere in the Timaeus, in Critias, and in the Laws. The great principle he endeavours to

eſtabliſh, is, that all private affection ought to give way to the public.

However, the point concerning marriages he ſeems afterwards to yield; when, reflecting on the declination and gradual decay of the perfect Republic, he intimates, that no method of generation can poſſibly be eſtabliſhed among men, which ſhall not be liable to much degeneracy, and manifold inconvenience and trouble: but, inſtead of deſcending to particulars, he chuſes to draw a veil over thoſe matters, intimating by numbers, according to the ſymbolical method of inſtruction, uſed by the Pythagoreans, that the intercourſe between the ſexes ought to be under the moſt ſtrict, and perfect regulations.

We ſhall only add on this point, that proper allowance is to be made for the times in which he lived, and the models which he had occaſion to obſerve. And we are to recollect what he frequently tells us, that whatever he ſeems to be eſtabliſhing concerning ſtates and republics, is only to be underſtood, in the way of fable, or allegory, for illuſtrating the nature of juſtice, and its intrinſic excellency in the mind.

The paſſage in the tenth book, concerning the ſpheres, is, indeed, wrapt up in darkneſs and obſcurity; nor will we ſcruple to acknowledge, that the Pythagoreans, and from them our Author, ſometimes delivered their ſentiments in abſtruſe, and myſtical expreſſions: from which it cannot, with candour, be inferred, that they grudged to communicate to others, the knowledge of ſublime and valuable truths. Their meaning, truly, was, to convey ſome of their doctrines, which were difficult to be apprehended, and, perhaps, claſhed with the received and vulgar opinions of the times, to ſuch of their diſciples only, as had abilities to underſtand them: and at the ſame time to guard againſt exhibiting them in too plain a dreſs, for fear of expoſing them to the contempt and ridicule of the ignorant, and the unprepared. Beſides, thoſe paſſages which are obſcure to us, might poſſibly have been abundantly obvious to thoſe who were intimately acquainted with the Pythagorean philoſophy, and its ſymbolical method of exhibiting the knowledge of nature. Be this as it will, we may venture to ſay, that the exceptionable paſſages of PLATO, in point of obſcurity, no way affect the reaſoning, but are introduced only in the way of fable, and up-

on the whole, are fewer than what we meet with, of the kind, in almoſt any other book of equal ſize. In ſhort, his general deſign is moſt obvious; nothing ſeems to be more remarkably the ſcope of the PLATONIC philoſophy, than to raiſe the mind, to the moſt ſublime and ſpiritual ideas of the Supreme Being, and the moſt elevated and amiable ſentiments of virtue.

SECT. IX. The REPUBLIC of PLATO further merits our peculiar attention, on account of the character of the principal actor, whoſe genius and manner it is contrived to exhibit; whilſt at the ſame time the ſecondary characters, or under parts, which are there introduced, ſhew human nature as it is, in all its genuine forms, and various colourings.

Socrates.

The principal hero in the dramatic compoſition, is SOCRATES, perhaps the moſt extraordinary perſon that ever appeared in the Heathen world. In his character, to the greateſt ſimplicity of manners, was joined a genius the moſt commanding, and ſublime. Though obſcure by birth, and all along mean in his circumſtances, he filled with dignity, the higheſt offices in the ſtate, and gained the friendſhip of ſome of the moſt illuſtrious men of Athens. But ſeeing his country diſtracted by the factions of a licentious Democracy, he deſpaired of being able to bring about any thorough reformation in the ſtate; and therefore, withdrawing from politics, he applied himſelf wholly to philoſophy, and the inſtruction of the youth; ſuch of them eſpecially as were of ſuperiour rank, and likely to have weight and influence in public affairs.

He had early applied himſelf to natural philoſophy, but found not that ſatisfaction he expected from the writings of thoſe who were moſt eminent in that profeſſion.

With a peculiar eagerneſs, he had peruſed the writings aſcribed to Anaxagoras, who maintained that MIND was the cauſe of all, expecting to receive, from ſo eminent an author, the moſt ſatisfactory account of the conſtitution of things. But, here, too, he tells us, he was diſappointed: for thoſe writings reſolved all the regularity of nature, into phyſical principles, and not into the wiſdom and goodneſs of

the All-Perfect Mind. Whereas the notion Socrates entertained of natural philoſophy was, that it ought ultimately to terminate in mind.

Anaxagoras, it ſeems, ſtill retained too much of the material philoſophy; and referred more to material than to mental cauſes. Nevertheleſs, the All-Directing Mind was far from being quite diſregarded by this eminent ſage. On the contrary, he was among the firſt of philoſophers, who, denying the influence of chance or of neceſſity, aſcribed the government of the univerſe to a pure and ſimple mind. It was this ſublime philoſophy that animated Pericles with true courage, and relieving him from the terrors of a low and illiberal ſuperſtition, inſpired his ſoul with a generous devotion: nor was this illuſtrious ſtateſman leſs indebted to Anaxagoras in another reſpect; for, according to Plato, it was owing to the inſtructions received from him concerning the proper topics for touching the ſeveral movements of the ſoul, that Pericles came to ſurpaſs all his fellow-citizens in eloquence.

Anaxagoras

Pericles.

But to return to Socrates; having quitted the purſuit of that kind of natural philoſophy, that was currently received in his age, he applied himſelf wholly to the ſtudy of morals, and the inſtruction of his fellow-citizens in the duties of a good life. There never appeared in the world a philoſopher better qualified for theſe purpoſes, or who applied himſelf to them with greater aſſiduity. His genius was penetrating, and his integrity invariable; and while uncommon modeſty adorned his character, a ſpirit of refined raillery, and an exquiſite vein of pleaſantry and good humour, rendered his company and converſation in the higheſt manner entertaining and delightful. In a word, a peculiar ſweetneſs of temper, and gentleneſs of manners, were happily united, in his character, with inflexible firmneſs, and a conſtancy of ſoul that was not to be ſhaken.

In his method of communicating inſtruction, he had a peculiar talent of concealing his ſuperiority, and of making people appear to be inſtructing themſelves. He could handle the moſt important ſubjects with all the freedom and eaſe of familiar converſation. By the air of pleaſantry in his manner, he drew the attention to ſpeculations

of the graveſt kind; and, on proper occaſions, he had recourſe to raillery, to detect all falſe and formal pretences to wiſdom; and to ſhow the folly of impoſture, by ſtripping her of all her diſguiſe.

He all along deſpiſed riches and pleaſures; and accuſtomed himſelf to the greateſt fatigues and hardſhips. To the laws, he was always moſt ſubmiſive, yet reſolutely oppoſed the arbitrary commands of thoſe in the higheſt power. On ſeveral occaſions, he had ſerved his country as a ſoldier; and had behaved in battle with diſtinguiſhed intrepidity.

Ariſtophanes

He likewiſe ſtood the teſt of public ridicule, while he ſaw his character expoſed on the open theatre, by the wit of the comic poet Ariſtophanes. For, by his free cenſures of the poets, ſophiſts, and politicians, he had created himſelf many enemies. At length, when arrived at upwards of ſeventy years of age, on a falſe accuſation they led againſt him, of corrupting the youth, and diſregarding religion, he was tried and condemned, under a licentious democracy. With the greateſt unconcern and boldneſs he pled his own cauſe before his judges; and having pled in vain, he, with compoſure and ſerenity, drunk the poiſon they decreed him.

I have often wondered, ſaith Xenophon, by what arguments the accuſers of Socrates were ever able to perſuade the Athenians that he deſerved to be put to death. The ſame noble diſciple, however, hath told us, that, in ſuch a democracy as that of Athens, the good and the worthy are deſpiſed. Beſides, the great Pericles, who had formerly ſaved Anaxagoras, when condemned to ſuffer death on a ſimilar accuſation, had by this time quitted the ſtage. Had he been living, his authority might have ſaved Socrates from puniſhment, as well as preſerved the Athenians from indelible reproach and infamy; Alcibiades was now no more. Xenophon was then on the Aſiatic expedition. And Plato was too young to be allowed to ſpeak in his maſter's defence. The father of philoſophy himſelf would not deign to flatter his judges, nor allow his friends to buy him off, nor concur with any meaſures they propoſed for his making his eſcape. Theſe, or the like means of ſafety, which on ſo

weighty an occaſion, his diſciples ſuppoſed juſtifiable, to him appeared unhandſome; and therefore diſdaining all evaſions, and ſubterfuges, he choſe rather to die, a public example of ſubmiſſion to the laws.

The Athenians ſoon came to ſee their error in putting to death ſo worthy a citizen. They executed one of his proſecutors, and baniſhed the reſt; and, in honour to his memory, erected his ſtatue at the public expence; and now, at the diſtance of two thouſand years and upwards, his philoſophy, tranſmitted to us by two of his diſciples, Xenophon and our Author, is eſteemed the moſt valuable remains of ancient literature.

Such were the character and fate of Socrates, the principal ſpeaker in the following dramatic compoſition. The whole is his own recital, of perſonated diſcourſes; and if not a real dialogue, at leaſt the hiſtory of a converſation, which paſſed between him and his friends; but ſuch a lively hiſtory, as keeps up the characters and capacities of the various ſpeakers throughout, and exhibits their different tempers, and manners to the life.

Justice.

SECT. X. The ſubject matter of the diſcourſe, is, juſtice, or virtue; whoſe nature, as the Dialogue proceeds, is gradually diſplay'd, together with its intrinſic excellence, independent of all external advantages, nay even when loaded with the greateſt indignities; and finally, its rewards and triumphs, as well in this, as in a future ſtate are exhibited.

The converſation is carried on, with freedom, in the moſt natural and eaſy manner; and various important ſubjects are occaſionally introduced, according as they happen to have affinity with the principal deſign.

PLATO illuſtrates the nature of juſtice in the individnal, by giving a repreſentation of it in a community, and ſhews that the ſeveral orders in ſociety correſpond to the ſeveral powers of the mind, and the different conſtitutions of civil government perfectly correſpond to the ſeveral ſpecies of government in the individual.

Hence, the juſteſt maxims of civil government come to be interſperſed in this Dialogue, and principles are here laid down, diametrically oppoſite to thoſe of ty-

ranny, and arbitrary power. For inſtance; that kings and governours, being eſtabliſhed for the good of the people, ought to make it their principal ſtudy, to promote this end. That the minds of thoſe who are to govern, muſt be indelibly tinctured with juſt ſentiments of religion, and the laws: that they muſt, from their earlieſt years, be formed by the beſt precepts, and examples: that they muſt be tried and proved, both by terrors and pleaſures: that their natural ſagacity muſt be cultivated and ripened by experience: and that it behooves them, thoroughly to underſtand the nature of juſtice, and to riſe in their contemplations to the knowledge of ſupreme intelligence: then, and not till then, according to the maxims eſtabliſhed in this philoſophic Dialogue, are men to enter on the office of governours; and being inveſted with public authority, the happineſs of the community, and not their own advantage, is to be the principal and conſtant object of their attention. Such are the political principles contained in the REPUBLIC, to which we may add, that other celebrated maxim, which our Author hath frequently inculcated; that unleſs kings become philoſophers, or philoſophers be made kings, the miſeries of ſtates ſhall never have an end.

We have likewiſe, in the following Dialogue, a very ſtriking repreſentation given us of tyranny, of the wretchedneſs of the tyrant himſelf, and of the miſery of thoſe over whom he domineers. How judicious this ſentiment is, concerning the tyrant, and the wretchedneſs of his temper, the Roman hiſtorian acknowledges, whilſt he obſerves, that this very repreſentation which PLATO hath given us of a tyrant, was in fact fully verified to the obſervation of mankind, in the character of the Emperor TIBERIUS.

Beſides the moſt ſtriking view of tyranny, our Author further gives us an account of ſeveral other kinds of government, of their reſpective lineage and ſucceſſion, of the order in which they riſe one out of another, and of the character and manner peculiar to each.

He deſcribes at large, that form of government which he eſteems the beſt, where Kings are philoſophers. But as every thing here is liable to degeneracy and cor-

ruption, this perfect form of government ſoon degenerates into what, he ſays, reſembles the Spartan model; where the ambition of being in the magiſtracy, is greater than that of deſerving it; and where the laws are regarded rather from the principle of fear, than love. This again degenerates into Oligarchy; where the magiſtracies and high offices of ſtate, are engroſſed by the rich and opulent, who lord it over their fellow-citizens.

This arbitrary rule of the few, makes a tranſition into another form, ſtill more corrupted and depraved, and introduces Democracy, like a monſter with innumerable heads. The inſolence and wanton humours of the many break down all the bulwarks of public ſafety, and the diſorders of the ſtate are continually increaſed, through a licentious impunity.

Laſt of all, from a fond deſire to eſcape from the evils in which Democracy involves the commonwealth, is derived the origin of Tyranny; where the ſole power is blindly and laviſhly conferred on an individual alone. This, our Author conſiders, as the laſt and the greateſt degeneracy of government; agreeably to this, he deſcribes the unjuſt and tyrannical temper, to be, of all others, the moſt wretched and compleatly miſerable.

The various forms and changes of the Roman government, have fully verified the ſolidity of theſe obſervations; and afford unqueſtionable proofs of the penetration and wiſdom of this eminent philoſopher.

Beſides the judicious reflexions concerning the various kinds of civil government above-mentioned, the Republic alſo contains many excellent remarks on education. Here, this important ſubject is treated with accuracy, and its nature, and its end, are well explained. Without conſulting in the leaſt, the natural genius, and capacity of children, the common way is to deſtine one for arms, another for the law, and a third for trade, or commerce. The conſequences generally prove ſuch as may naturally be expected from ſuch a deſtination. But, according to our Author, a peculiar attention muſt be given to the pupil's capacity and genius; and however elevated by connections, or illuſtrious by birth; yet, if nature hath furniſhed en-

dowments only with a ſparing hand, ſome humble employment is to be aſſigned him. For nature in theſe caſes ſhould never be compelled, but, in all things, her voice is firſt to be conſulted, and her order firſt obeyed. And, therefore, on the other hand; be the pupil's birth, or ſituation ever ſo obſcure, yet if his natural abilities are ſuited to the ſublime parts of erudition, or to publick employments of power and dignity, his, is the genius, which by nature is preeminent, and his education and advancement ſhould proceed accordingly. This is beautifully inforced, in the republic, by a Phoenician fable, ſaid to he delivered by the oracle itſelf; and inculcated with this further declaration, that the ſtate is to periſh, whenever this maxim concerning education comes to be neglected.

Another maxim, here eſtabliſhed, concerning education, is, that in order to engage the youth to learning, gentle and perſuaſive means alone muſt be uſed; but compulſion and force are never to be apply'd. For a free ſpirit is never to be taught any thing by ſlaviſh methods.

With us, education is generally all crowded into the narrow compaſs of a few years, when the pupil is raw and juvenile: no wonder, then, if the ſlight impreſſions of ſuch an education be ſoon worn of by the practice of the world. But education, according to the plan of our divine philoſopher, is to be uniformly carried on throughout the whole of life. The youth are to be inſtructed in arithmetic, geometry, natural philoſophy, and the finer arts not merely for common utilities, and as genteel accompliſhments, but chiefly as being ſubſervient to virtue. All theſe, he conſiders as ſo many ſteps, for conducting them to the knowledge of Deity, and and for eſtabliſhing and confirming them in a good life, which he repreſents as, of all things, the moſt important.

We ſeldom beſtow ſufficient pains, in adapting the quantity and kind of inſtruction, to the years and capacity of the learners; but pour into them all at once, and without any meaſure, the ſtronger, and the weaker, the more ſublime, and the more juvenile ſpecies of learning: the conſequences of which appear in a confuſion of ideas, a ſpirit of diſputation, a conceit of knowledge, and often in the extrava-

gancies of a wild enthuſiaſm. But this great maſter propoſes to give the younger diſciples no more than only a juvenile kind of philoſophy; reſerving what is higher and more ſublime, for the employment of their riper, and more advanced years. This alone may ſuffice, as an anſwer to the charge againſt our author, of giving countenance to myſtic notions, and extravagancies.

The Sophiſts pretended to be able to make any man a philoſopher, and to pour into him wiſdom, as one pours wine into a cask by a funnel. It ſignified little what were his temper, his genius, or capacity: they could give ſight as it were to the blind. But the Socratic way of inſtruction was to make the diſciple inſtruct himſelf; to place him in the proper ſtation for ſeeing with his own eyes, and to remove any obſtructions that affected his organs; or whatever impediment intercepted the proſpect.

Beſides theſe general maxims concerning education, the republic abounds with a variety of uſeful hints, tending to the improvement, not only of the philoſopher, but alſo of the fine gentleman in every profeſſion, nay even of the common artizan. The mariner, the ſoldier, the low mechanic, and the fine artiſt; the orator, the critic, the mathematician, the logician, as well as the philoſopher, and ſtateſman, may, if he will, here, each in his turn, receive ſuch ſolid inſtruction, as if faithfully followed, ſhall naturally lead him to elegance and perfection, in his reſpective art, or profeſſion.

True virtue, according to the Platonic doctrine, depends on the knowledge of deity; and this divine knowledge is the ſtandard of the truly graceful and becoming in life and manners, and throughout the whole of the more elegant arts.

All the various arts and ſciences, according to our Author, are to be uſed as helps and aſſiſtances, to lead the mind to that prime ſcience, and original of all; that, namely, of the Good, and the cauſe of all good.

So cloſe, and intimate, in the opinion of our philoſopher, is the connection between virtue, and the more elegant arts, that without the juſt idea of the former, without eying this idea perpetually, and revering it as a ſtandard. No true

perfection in the more elegant arts can ever be expected, no genuine practice can prevail, nor thorough maſterſhip be acquired: but, on the contrary, ſuch performance ſhall alone prevail, as, on the main, will prove hurtful to the commonwealth.

It is on theſe principles, that our Author baniſhes from his Republic the moſt eminent of all the ancient Poets.

As his poems give unhandſome repreſentations of deity, of heroes, of death, and a future ſtate, he judges them to be not at all calculated to promote virtue; and, of neceſſary conſequence, not to be admitted into a ſtate, whoſe ſole genius and ſpirit was, moral goodneſs; and whoſe citizens were to have virtue as their principal end, and their great and conſtant aim.

SECT. XI. What further recommends this Treatiſe to our eſteem, is that inimitable elegance of compoſition with which it is embelliſhed. This animated Dialogue is beautified with copious illuſtrations borrowed from the common arts, and ſtriking alluſions derived from real life and manners. It is enriched with ſimilies and allegories, and many things curious and entertaining, taken from facts, and fables, of early days; from poetry and tradition, and the whole mythology of the moſt ancient times. Now, on this account likewiſe, our celebrated moraliſt ſeems to be juſtly intitled to uncommon applauſe; ſeeing the aid of every ornament that can be given to diſcourſes on moral ſubjects, muſt be acknowledged to be of real uſe; in order to recommend them to our attention, and give them the firmer hold of our hearts.

We find the great Inſtructor of mankind, conveying his doctrine in this manner; illuſtrating divine ſubjects, by alluſions to common life; by familiar images and compariſons, by parables and proverbs, and by references to traditions and hiſtories of the moſt remote antiquity.

Such ornaments of compoſition are extremely natural, and while they pleaſe and charm the imagination, they at the ſame time convey the moſt ſolid inſtruction to the mind. Thus, for inſtance, in how ſtriking a manner does the apologue of Erus, in the following Treatiſe, repreſent the ſentiments of philoſophers, concerning the rewards of good men in another world, and the puniſhments that await the wicked,

ſpecially tyrants, who abuſing the power with which they are entruſted for the public good, become guilty of oppreſſion, cruelty, and the blackeſt crimes.

SECT. XII. The Tranſlator is fully ſenſible, that to preſent the Public with a verſion of this moſt celebrated piece of ancient philoſophy, is, indeed, a bold, and hazardous attempt; nor, is he ignorant how much it is to its diſadvantage, to exhibit, in an Engliſh dreſs, a performance which was perhaps the maſter-work of the firſt of the Grecian ſages, of one, who wrote in a language, of all others, the moſt refined and elegant, and who is equally remarkable for the dignity of his ſentiments, and the beauty of his compoſition: theſe things are ſo well known to all who can read our Author in his own language, that it is to be feared they will hardly bear to look at his philoſophy in the homely dreſs we have given it: but they who have penetration to diſcern the blemiſhes of a performance of this kind, will have candour likewiſe to make proper allowances for the difficulties attending it. The mere Engliſh readers may poſſibly not be ſo eaſily pleaſed; they will find, in the following work, but little according to the faſhion, and throughout the whole of it, they will ſee a repreſentation of life and manners, very different from their own. But ſurely they may be ſuppoſed to have ſome degree of curioſity to know the manners of other countries; and particularly, to look a little into that philoſophy which prevailed among a people ſo refined as the ancient Athenians. It is to be hoped, that, in this inquiſitive age, there is not wanting altogether, a curioſity of knowing, what were the ſentiments, of the moſt eminent philoſophers of early times, concerning matters of importance. We hear of their ſentiments frequently at ſecond hand. Modern writers, we find, are divided about them; ſome extolling, and others depreciating the whole of ancient wiſdom. Now, no way appears more proper, for ſetting right the judgment of the public, concerning the merit of the renowned Sages of antiquity, than to exhibit ſome of their capital pieces in literal tranſlation. Though Tranſlations of this kind may labour under conſiderable diſadvantages, in point of elegance, yet the genuine repreſentations they contain of ancient ſentiments, and manners, will recommend them to the lovers of nature, and of truth. At firſt, indeed, they may not prove

ſo catching, yet they may probably come to detain the ear the longeſt: add to this, that they may ſerve in ſome meaſure as antidotes, againſt that ſwollen manner of writing, of which we are in imminent danger, through the luxury and licentiouſneſs almoſt inſeparable from ſuch times of proſperity, as the preſent.

One of the beſt ſecurities, againſt this ſwollen manner, and, indeed, againſt every other corruption, is a moſt familiar converſe, eſpecially in youth, with the finiſhed models of ancient literature. For it is hardly poſſible, for one to be frequently and familiarly converſant, with the compoſitions of the beſt and wiſeſt writers of thoſe ancient ſtates, who excelled all the neighbouring nations in wiſdom, and politeneſs, without imbibing imperceptibly ſomewhat of their love of liberty and virtue; together with a certain dignity of ſoul, and grandeur and elevation of ſentiment ſimilar to theirs. Whilſt we peruſe thoſe animated compoſitions which have happily eſcaped the wreck of ſo many ages, and remain the eternal monuments of ancient honour, how muſt we revere that heroic ſpirit of virtue, and liberty, that gave birth to productions ſo beautiful, and permanent! How muſt we be fired with the nobleſt ambition, of aſſerting and maintaining inviolable, theſe higheſt honours of the human race. With virtue and liberty, the finer arts and philoſophy roſe, and flouriſhed. With the loſs of virtue and liberty; all learning and elegance declined and periſhed. So long as the Greeks were animated with public ſpirit, and the firm union, and confederacy of their ſeveral ſtates remained entire, no numbers of Perſian ſlaves were a match for their valour. In vain did Xerxes, in vain did Darius pour aſſembled nations into Greece. The generous and manly ſpirit of the Greeks, triumphed over all, and was invincible. It was then, the more elegant arts, and philoſophy roſe to a prodigious height. But their ſecurity and eaſe ſoon after begot among them envies and jealouſies. Their union and confederacy ſubſiſted no more. So ſoon as they divided, they fell under the power of Macedon.

The Romans were almoſt always engaged in war; and ſeem, for a conſiderable time, to have made little account of philoſophy, and the politer arts: but no ſooner had they an opportunity of admiring a Grecian ſtatue, and of conſidering the other

models of Grecian taſte and literature, than they made a wonderful progreſs in every ſort of elegance; particularly before the laſt period of their Republic, and about the times of Cicero, and his cotemporaries. But the Romans, in the ſame way as the Greeks, were ſoon corrupted by luxury and eaſe. The braveſt Republic in the world, became a prey to the ambition of ſome of her own citizens. Their virtue no longer remaining, their liberty was ſoon loſt. The decline of learning, and of all the more elegant arts, ſpeedily followed. Such, indeed, as had gotten their education under the golden reign of liberty, made a ſhining figure for a while, in the days of Auguſtus, who, through policy, and the influence of a philoſophic prime miniſter, gave literature and the finer arts conſiderable encouragement. But now that liberty was gone, and thoſe were worn out, who had been happily formed under her influence, little of true philoſophy or elegance could be expected to remain for any time. Under the tyranny exerciſed by ſome of the ſucceeding Emperors, ſuch as Tiberius, Nero, and Domitian, the genius and ſpirit of that once manly people, may eaſily be ſuppoſed to have been prodigiouſly cruſhed. Yet even under theſe tyrants, the Stoic philoſophy prevailed. It affects no ſhow; ſtudies no ornaments of eloquence; courts no external honours; deſpiſes equally pleaſures and pains; is ſolely intent on virtuous energies; and hath often bidden defiance to the fierceſt rage of the moſt cruel tyrants. After Domitian, there was a ſucceſſion of ſeveral of the beſt and greateſt princes that ever filled the Imperial throne. Then followed, what was called, a reſtoration of liberty: but it was nothing but the name. This extraordinary good fortune was not able to revive the ſpirit and genius of the people. Their liberty and goodly conſtitution were, in reality, no more. Their general temper daily declined. Though now, and then, a brighter genius aroſe, and ſuch as ſeemed worthy of a better age; ſuch as Tacitus, Pliny, Plutarch, and Quintilian.

Literature, on its decline in Greece, had, for a while, found a ſanctuary in Egypt, under the patronage of the Ptolemys; and was for a conſiderable time highly reſpected by the philoſophers of the Alexandrian ſchool. At length, the blind zeal of ſome converts to Chriſtianity; the barbarity of the Goths and Vandals; together

with the Turkiſh tyranny in the Eaſt, and the Papal ſuperſtition in the Weſt, concurred to deſtroy almoſt all the valuable monuments of both Grecian and Roman literature. Yet amidſt theſe devaſtations, learning was hoſpitably received in Arabia, particularly in the reign of the Great Almanzor. The deſolation continued long in Europe. But, at length a ſpirit of inquiry and of reformation began to revive; the remains of ancient literature were, then, curiouſly ſought after. The art of printing, and the improvements in navigation ſeaſonably helped, to lay open ſeveral treaſures of ancient wiſdom; which had lain long buried during the ignorance of the dark ages. The reformation of religion, mightily contributed to the reſtoration of ſuch of thoſe hidden monuments of learning, as had not totally periſhed through the waſte of time, and the outrage of Barbarians. In this new period, chancellour Bacon appears to have been one of the greateſt promoters of learning and knowledge; and, particularly, to have given, as it were, the plan of thoſe ſocieties for natural knowledge, now happily eſtabliſhed in ſo many of the ſtates of Europe. Theſe ſocieties, together with our univerſities, and the eſtabliſhments of Chriſtianity, are ſome of the bulwarks againſt a return of barbariſm. We have ſeen the civil and religious rights and liberties of mankind, nobly aſſerted, and explained by Biſhop Hoadly. The ancient geometry hath been eminently cultivated by the celebrated Sir Iſaac Newton, and ſucceſsfully employed in explaining many of the phaenomena of nature, and in promoting ſeveral utilities in the common, as well as in the more elegant arts. The architecture, painting, and other elegant arts of the Ancients, have grown into vogue, and are come now to be highly admired and ſtudied: but their ſublime philoſophy, concerning virtue and the conduct of life, an art, of all others, the moſt important, hath hitherto in a great meaſure lain neglected. Dr. Cudworth, however, and one or two more, in the laſt age; beſides a few celebrated writers, in our own, have ſhewn us by their ſhining examples, what may be made of this philoſophy, and have done much to recommend it to modern times. But hitherto their example hath been little imitated. Amidſt wranglings of controverſy, din of arms, diſſipations of pleaſure, buſtle for power, hurry after opulence,

Bacon

and loud and dictatorial ſtrains of other muſes; the calm ſtill voice of this ſober muſe, hath hitherto met with a cold, and indifferent reception. Let us, however, not deſpair of ſeeing better days. Let us appeal from men's firſt thoughts to their ſecond; from their imaginations and paſſions, to their reaſon and intellect; from the many, to the few; from modern faſhions, to ancient models; and from the preſent age, to remote poſterity. Let us look upon the intereſts of literature as intimately connected with thoſe of religion, liberty, and all ſolid and elegant improvements. It is, indeed, ſo eſſential to theſe, that without it, they cannot poſſibly ſubſiſt; but in place of them, we ſhall ſoon come to ſink under ſuperſtition, ſlavery, and barbarity.

To ward off theſe evils, all endeavours are to be employed; and in particular, our utmoſt efforts are to be exerted, to perſuade the great to patronize, the young to imitate; and all, in general, to ſtudy, and admire, thoſe celebrated models of ancient philoſophy and compoſition, which have been the admiration of ſo many centuries, which are ſo ſubſervient to religion, and all our valuable intereſts, and which ſo long as they are regarded, will undoubtedly prove, in a certain meaſure, as a ſalt to the earth.

Our neighbours the French have given us two Tranſlations of PLATO's REPUBLIC into their language. The one publiſhed at London in 1726. The other at Paris in this preſent year 1762. The former is totally void of the ſpirit and manner of the original. The latter is ſo elegant and natural, that nothing can exceed it. The following work was too far advanced, to receive any benefit from that truly elegant performance. By their handſome tranſlations of the great Ancients, and their happy imitations of them, the French have done honour to their country, and ſet a noble example to the reſt of Europe.

The Engliſh Reader never had a better opportunity, of becoming intimately acquainted with the ſublime philoſophy of our Author, than he has at preſent, by means of a moſt elegant Tranſlation of the whole of his works, now publiſhing by the learned Mr. SYDENHAM. In his Tranſlation, and in the Diſſertations and Notes

accompanying it, he diſcovers ſuch extenſive learning, juſt criticiſm, and thorough comprehenſion of PLATO's philoſophy, as muſt render his performance highly acceptable to all lovers of ancient literature. Till that elegant performance appear, or ſome other of the kind; even the following Tranſlation of a part of PLATO, made ſolely from the Edition by FICINUS, may be of ſome uſe, and contribute ſome little, towards reviving a ſpirit of inquiry into ancient learning.

Were thoſe finiſhed models of ancient philoſophy and compoſition, ſtudied and imitated by us, in the manner they ſeem to deſerve; our own, of all modern languages, would readily come to be enriched with the nobleſt writings, and be univerſally acknowledged as unqueſtionably the beſt, and to have the neareſt reſemblance to thoſe of the politeſt nations of antiquity. We certainly have at preſent the neareſt reſemblance to them, in our liberty and goodly conſtitution: and theſe are allowed to be circumſtances which conſiderably affect the character of a people, and the genius of their language. But if, through indolence, or pleaſure, or other corruption of any kind, we ſhall come to be utter ſtrangers to thoſe ancient models, and to the language ſpoken by free men of old, it is to be feared, we may likewiſe come to be ſtrangers to their noble conceptions: or, at leaſt, thoſe ſentiments which naturally belong to free men, being no way confirmed, and animated by a familiar converſe, with what is moſt finiſhed in the kind, ſhall of courſe become more feeble, and languid; whilſt the finical and florid manner, inſenſibly gains on our admiration, and enters into our character, both as men, and as writers.

It is not eaſily to be conceived, how much our liberal youth, might not only enrich their language, and improve their taſte in all the more elegant arts, but likewiſe ennoble their ſentiments with reference to higher matters, by a familiar acquaintance with thoſe models, that are tranſmitted to us from the moſt polite nations of antiquity. The taſte and manner which it behooves a Briton to ſtudy and cultivate ought ſurely to be correſpondent to theſe ineſtimable bleſſings he enjoys, and to thoſe kindred conceptions of illuſtrious nations of old, ſuch as they were in their golden days of liberty.

THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO.

FIRST BOOK.

SOCRATES, GLAUCO, POLEMARCHUS, THRASYMACHUS, ADIMANTUS, CEPHALUS.

SOCRATES.

I WENT down yeſterday to the Piraeum, with Glauco, the ſon of Ariſto, to pay my devotion to the goddeſs; and deſirous, at the ſame time, to obſerve in what manner they would celebrate the feſtival, as they were now to do it for the firſt time. The proceſſion of our own countrymen ſeem'd to me to be indeed beautiful; yet that of the Thracians appeared no leſs proper. After we had paid our devotion, and ſeen the ſolemnity, we were on our way to the city; when Polemarchus, the Son of Cephalus, obſerving us at a diſtance, hurrying home; order'd his boy to run and deſire us to wait for him: and the boy, taking hold of my robe behind; Polemarchus, ſays he, deſires you to wait. I turned about, and aſked, where he was. He is coming up, ſaid he, after you; but do you

wait for him. We will wait, ſaid Glauco; and ſoon afterwards, came Polemarchus, and Adimantus, the brother of Glauco, and Niceratus, the ſon of Nicias, and ſome others as from the proceſſion. Then ſaid Polemarchus; Socrates! you ſeem to me to be hurrying to the city. You judge, ſaid I, not amiſs. You ſee us, then, ſaid he, how many there are of us. Why do I not? Therefore, now, you muſt either be ſtronger than theſe, or you muſt ſtay here. Is there not, ſaid I, one way ſtill remaining? May we not perſuade you, that you muſt let us go? Can you be able to perſuade ſuch as will not hear? By no means, ſaid Glauco. Then, as we are not to hear, determine accordingly. But you do not know, ſaid Adimantus, that there is to be an illumination, in the evening, on horſeback to the goddeſs. On horſe-back, ſaid I, that is new. Are they to have torches, and give them to one another, contending together with their horſes? or how do you mean? Juſt ſo, reply'd Polemarchus. And beſides, they will perform a nocturnal ſolemnity, worth ſeeing. For we ſhall riſe after ſupper, and ſee the nocturnal ſolemnity, and ſhall be there with many of the youth, and converſe together: But do you ſtay and do not do otherwiſe. It ſeems proper, then, ſaid Glauco, we ſhou'd ſtay. Nay, if it ſeem ſo, ſaid I, we ought to do it. We went home therefore to Polemarchus's houſe; and there we found, both Lyſias, and Euthydemus, brothers of Polemarchus; likewiſe Thraſymachus the Chalcedonian, and Charmantides the Paeoneian, and Clitipho the ſon of Ariſtonimus; Cephalus the father of Polemarchus was likewiſe in the

houſe; he ſeemed to me to be pretty well advanced in years, for I had not ſeen him of a long time. He was ſitting crown'd, on a certain couch and ſeat; for he had been offering ſacrifice in the hall. So we ſate down by him; for ſome ſeats were placed there in a circle. Immediately, then, when Cephalus ſaw me, he ſaluted me, and ſaid; Socrates! you do not often come down to us to the Piraeum, nevertheleſs you ought to do it, for were I ſtill able eaſily to go up to the city, you ſhou'd not need to come hither, but we wou'd be with you: But now you ſhou'd come hither more frequently: for I aſſure you, that with relation to myſelf, as the pleaſures reſpecting the body become inſipid; the deſire and pleaſure of converſation increaſe. Do not fail, then, to make a party often with theſe youths, and come hither to us, as to your friends and old acquaintance. And, truly, ſaid I, Cephalus! I take pleaſure in converſing with thoſe who are well advanced in years; for it appears to me proper, that we learn from them, as from perſons who have gone before us, what the road is, which it is likely we have to travel; whether rough and difficult; or plain and eaſy. And I would gladly learn from you, as you are now arrived at that time of life, which the poets call, the threſhold of old-age; what your opinion of it is; whether you look on it, as the moſt grievous part of life, or what you think of it? And, I will tell you, Socrates! ſaid he, what is really my opinion; for we frequently meet together in one place; ſeveral of us, who are of the ſame age, obſerving the old proverb: now, moſt of us, when aſſembled,

lament their ſtate, when they feel a want of the pleaſures of youth, and call to their remembrance the pleaſures of love, thoſe of drinking and feaſting, and ſome others, akin to theſe: and they expreſs indignation, as if they were bereaved of ſome mighty things; in thoſe days, they ſay, they lived well, but now they do not live at all: ſome of them too, bemoan the contempt which old-age meets with from their acquaintance: and, on this account alſo, they lament old-age, which is to them the cauſe of ſo many ills. But theſe men, Socrates! ſeem not to me to blame the real cauſe; for, if this were the cauſe, I likewiſe ſhould have ſuffered the ſame things on account of old-age; and all others, even as many as have come to theſe years: whereas I have met with ſeveral who are not thus affected; and particularly was once with Sophocles the poet, when he was aſked by one, How, ſaid he, Sophocles! are you affected towards the pleaſures of love; are you ſtill able to enjoy them? Softly, friend! reply'd he, moſt gladly, indeed, have I eſcaped from theſe pleaſures, as from ſome furious and ſavage maſter. He ſeem'd to me to ſpeak well at that time, and no leſs ſo now: for, certainly, there is in old age, a deal of peace and freedom from ſuch things; for when the appetites ceaſe to be vehement, and are become eaſy; what Sophocles ſaid, certainly happens; we are delivered from very many, and thoſe too, furious maſters. But with relation to theſe things, and thoſe likewiſe reſpecting our acquaintance, there is one and the ſame cauſe; which is, not old-age, Socrates! but manners: For, if indeed they are diſcreet

and moderate, even old-age is but moderately burdenſome: if not, both old-age, Socrates! and youth, are grievous to ſuch. Being delighted to hear him ſay theſe things, and wanting him to diſcourſe further; I urged him, and ſaid, I fancy, Cephalus! the generality will not agree with you in thoſe things; but will imagine that you bear old-age eaſily, not from manners, but from poſſeſſing much wealth; for the rich, ſay they, have many conſolations. You ſay true, reply'd he, they do not agree with me; and there is ſomething in what they ſay; but however, not ſo much as they imagine. But the ſaying of Themiſtocles was juſt; who, when the Seriphian reviled him, and ſaid, that he was honoured, not on his own account, but on that of his country, reply'd; that neither would himſelf have been renowned, had he been a Seriphian; nor would he, had he been an Athenian. The ſame ſaying is juſtly applicable to thoſe who are not rich, and who bear old-age with uneaſineſs: That neither would the worthy man, were he poor, bear old-age quite eaſily; nor would he who is unworthy, though enriched, ever be agreeable to himſelf. But, whether Cephalus! ſaid I, was the greater part of what you poſſeſs, left you; or have you acquired it? Somewhat, Socrates! reply'd he, I have acquired: as to money-getting I am in a medium between my grandfather, and my father: for my grandfather of the ſame name with me, who was left almoſt as much ſubſtance as I poſſeſs at preſent, made it many times as much again; but my father Lyſanias, made it yet leſs than it is now: I am ſatisfied if I leave

my ſons here, no leſs, but ſome little more than I received. I aſked you, ſaid I, for this reaſon, becauſe you ſeem to me to love riches moderately; and thoſe generally do ſo, who have not acquired them: but thoſe who have acquired them, are doubly fond of them: for, as poets love their own poems, and as parents love their children, in the ſame manner, thoſe who have enriched themſelves, value their riches as a work of their own, as well as for the utilities they afford; for which riches are valued by others. You ſay true, reply'd he. It is entirely ſo, ſaid I. But further, tell me this; what do you imagine, is the greateſt good, derived from the poſſeſſion of much ſubſtance? What, probably, ſaid he, I ſhall not perſuade the generality of. For, be aſſured, Socrates! continued he, that after a man begins to think he is ſoon to die; he feels a fear and concern about things which before gave him no uneaſineſs: for thoſe ſtories concerning a future ſtate, which repreſent that the man who hath done injuſtice here, muſt there be puniſhed; though formerly ridiculed, do then trouble his ſoul with apprehenſions that they may be true; and the man, either through the infirmity of old-age, or as being now more near thoſe things, views them more attentively; he becomes therefore full of ſuſpicion and dread; and conſiders, and reviews, whether he hath, in any thing, injured any one. He then, who findeth in his life, a great deal of iniquity, and is wakened from ſleep, as children by repeated calls, is afraid and lives in miſerable hope. But the man, who is not conſcious of any iniquity,

Still pleaſing hope, ſweet nouriſher of age!
Attends;-----

as Pindar ſays: This, Socrates! he hath beautifully expreſſed; that, whoever lives a life of juſtice, and holineſs,

Sweet hope, the nouriſher of age, his heart
Delighting, with him lives; which moſt of all
Governs the many veering thoughts of man.

ſo that he ſays well, and very admirably; wherefore, for this purpoſe, I deem the poſſeſſion of riches to be chiefly valuable; not to every man, but to the man of worth: for the poſſeſſion of riches contributes conſiderably to free us from being tempted to cheat or deceive; and from being obliged to depart thither in a terror; when either indebted in ſacrifices to God, or in money to man. It hath many other advantages beſides; but, for my part, Socrates! I deem riches to be moſt advantageous to a man of underſtanding, chiefly in this reſpect. You ſpeak moſt handſomely, Cephalus! reply'd I. But with reſpect to this very thing, Juſtice; whether ſhall we call it, truth, ſimply, and, the reſtoring of what one hath received from another? Or ſhall we ſay, that the very ſame things may ſometimes be done juſtly, and ſometimes unjuſtly? My meaning is this: Every one would ſome how, own; that if a man ſhould receive arms from his friend who was of a ſound mind, it would not be proper to reſtore ſuch things, if he ſhould demand them when mad; nor would the reſtorer be juſt; as little would he, who, to a man in ſuch a condition, ſhould willingly tell all the truth. You ſay

right, reply'd he. This, then, to ſpeak the truth, and reſtore what one hath received, is not the definition of juſtice? It is not, Socrates! reply'd Polemarchus, if at leaſt we may give any credit to Simonides. However that be, I give up, ſaid Cephalus, this converſation to you; for I muſt now go to take care of the ſacred rites. Is not Polemarchus, ſaid I, your heir? Certainly, reply'd he, ſmiling, and went off to the ſacred rites. Tell me, then, ſaid I, you who are heir in the converſation, what is it, which, according to you, Simonides ſays ſo well, concerning juſtice? That to give every one his due, is juſt, reply'd he; in ſaying this, he ſeems to me to ſay well. It is, indeed, ſaid I, not eaſy to diſbelieve Simonides, for he is a wiſe and divine man; but what his meaning may be in this, you, Polemarchus, probably know it, but I do not; for it is plain he does not mean what we were ſaying juſt now; that, when one depoſites with another, any thing, it is to be given back to him when he aſks for it again in his madneſs: yet what hath been depoſited, is in ſome reſpect, at leaſt, due; is it not? It is. But yet, it is not at all, by any means, then, to be reſtored, when any one aſks for it in his madneſs. It is not, reply'd he. Simonides then as it ſhould ſeem, ſays ſomething different from this, that to deliver up what is due, is juſt? Something different, truly, reply'd he: for he thinks that friends ought to do their friends ſome good, but no ill. I underſtand, ſaid I. He who reſtores gold depoſited with him, if to reſtore and receive it be hurtful, and the reſtorer and receiver be friends, doth not give what is due. Is not this what you

alledge Simonides ſays? Surely. But what? are we to give our enemies too, what may chance to be due to them? By all means, reply'd he, what is due to them; and from an enemy, to an enemy, there is due, I imagine, what is fitting, that is, ſome evil. Simonides, then, as it ſhould ſeem, reply'd I, expreſſed what is juſt, enigmatically, and after the manner of the poets; for he well underſtood, as it appears, that this was juſt, to give every one what was fitting for him, and this he called his due. But, what, ſaid he, is your opinion? Truly, reply'd I, if any one ſhould aſk him thus; Simonides! what is the art, which, diſpenſing to certain perſons ſomething fitting and due, is called Medicine? What would he anſwer us, do you think? That art, ſurely, reply'd he, which diſpenſeth drugs, and preſcribes regimen of meats and drinks to bodies. And what is the art, which, diſpenſing to certain things ſomething fitting and due, is called Cookery? The art, which gives ſeaſonings to victuals. Be it ſo. What then is that art which diſpenſing to certain perſons, ſomething fitting and due, may be called Juſtice? If we ought to be any way directed, Socrates! by what is ſaid above, the art which diſpenſeth good offices to friends, and injuries to enemies. To do good, then, to friends, and ill to enemies, he calls juſtice? It ſeems ſo. Who, then, is moſt able to do good to his friends, when they are diſeaſed, and ill, to his enemies, with reſpect to ſickneſs, and health? The Phyſician. And who, when they ſail, with reſpect to the danger of the ſea? The Pilot. But as to the juſt man, in what buſineſs, and with reſpect to

what action, is he moſt able to ſerve his friends, and to harm his enemies? It ſeems to me, in fighting in alliance with the one, and againſt the other. Be it ſo. But, ſurely, the phyſician is uſeleſs, Polemarchus! to thoſe, at leaſt, who are not ſick? It is true. And the pilot, to thoſe who do not ſail? He is. And is the juſt man, in like manner, uſeleſs to thoſe who are not at war? I can by no means think that. Juſtice, then, is uſeful likewiſe in time of peace. It is. And ſo is agriculture. Is it not? It is. Towards the poſſeſſion of grain? Certainly. And is not ſhoemaking likewiſe uſeful? It is. Towards the poſſeſſion of ſhoes, you will ſay, I imagine. Certainly. But what, now? For the uſe, or poſſeſſion of what, wou'd you ſay that juſtice were uſeful in time of peace? For co-partnerſhips, Socrates! You call co-partnerſhips, joint companies, or what elſe? Joint companies, certainly. Whether, then, is the juſt man, or the dice-player, a good, and uſeful co-partner, for playing at dice. The dice-player. But, in the laying of tiles or ſtones, is the juſt man a more uſeful, and a better partner, than the maſon? By no means. In what joint company now, is the juſt man a better co-partner than the harper, as the harper is better than the juſt man for touching the ſtrings of a harp? In a joint company about money, as I imagine. And yet it is likely, Polemarchus! that with regard to the making uſe of money, when it is neceſſary jointly to buy or ſell a horſe, the jokey, as I imagine, is then the better co-partner. Is he not? He wou'd appear ſo. And with reſpect to a ſhip, the ſhip-wright, or ſhip-maſter? It wou'd ſeem ſo. When

then is it, with reſpect to the joint application of money, that the juſt man is more uſeful than others? When it is to be depoſited, and be ſafe, Socrates! Do you not mean, when there is no need to uſe it, but to let it lye? Certainly. When, then, money is uſeleſs, juſtice is then uſeful with regard to it. It ſeems ſo. And when a pruning-hook is to be kept, juſtice is uſeful, both for a community, and for a particular perſon: but when it is to be uſed, the art of vine-dreſſing is uſeful. It appears ſo. And you will ſay, that when a buckler, a harp, is to be kept, and not to be uſed; then juſtice is uſeful; but when they are to be uſed, then the military, and the muſical art. Of neceſſity. And with reference to all other things, when they are to be uſed, juſtice is uſeleſs, but when they are not to be uſed, it is uſeful. It ſeems ſo. Juſtice, then, my friend! can be no very important matter, if it is uſeful only in reſpect of things which are not to be uſed; but let us conſider this matter; is not he who is the moſt dextrous at ſtriking, whether in battle, or in boxing; the ſame likewiſe, in defending himſelf? Certainly. And is not he who is dextrous in warding off, and ſhunning a diſtemper, moſt dextrous too in bringing it on? So I imagine. And he too the beſt guardian of a camp, who can ſteal the councils, and the other operations of the enemy? Certainly. Of whatever, then, any one is a good guardian, of that likewiſe he is a dextrous thief. It ſeems ſo. If, therefore, the juſt man be dextrous in guarding money, he is dextrous likewiſe in ſtealing. So it wou'd appear, ſaid he, from this reaſoning. The juſt

man, then, hath appeared to be a ſort of thief; and you ſeem to have learned this from Homer; for he admires Autolycus, the grandfather of Ulyſſes, by his mother, and ſays, that he was diſtinguiſhed beyond all men for thefts, and oaths. It ſeems, then, according to you, and according to Homer, and Simonides, that juſtice is a ſort of thieving, for the profit, indeed, of friends, and for the hurt of enemies. Did not you ſay ſo? No, by no means; nor, indeed, do I know any longer what I ſaid; yet I ſtill think that juſtice profits friends, and hurts enemies. But, whether do you pronounce ſuch to be friends, as ſeem to be honeſt? or, ſuch as are ſo, though they do not ſeem; and in the ſame way as to enemies? It is reaſonable, ſaid he, to love thoſe whom a man deems to be honeſt; and to hate thoſe whom he deems to be wicked. But do not men miſtake in this; ſo as that many who are not honeſt, appear ſo to them, and many contrary-wiſe? They do miſtake. To ſuch, then, the good are enemies, and the bad are friends. Certainly. But, however, it is, then, juſt for them, to profit the bad; and to hurt the good. It appears ſo. But the good are likewiſe juſt, and ſuch as do no ill. True. But, according to your ſpeech, it is juſt to do ill to thoſe who do no ill. By no means, Socrates! reply'd he; for the ſpeech ſeems to be wicked. It is juſt, then, ſaid I, to hurt the unjuſt, and to profit the juſt. This ſpeech appears more handſome than the other. Then, it will happen, Polemarchus! to many, to as many, indeed, of mankind, as have miſjudged; that it ſhall be juſt to hurt their friends, who

are really bad; and to profit their enemies, who are really good; and ſo we ſhall ſay the very reverſe, of what we affirmed Simonides ſaid. It does, indeed, ſaid he, happen ſo. But, let us define again; for we ſeem not to have rightly defined a friend and an enemy. How were they defined, Polemarchus? That he who ſeems honeſt, is a friend. But how ſhall we now define, ſaid I? That he who ſeems, reply'd he, and likewiſe is honeſt, is a friend; but he who ſeems honeſt, yet is not; ſeems, yet is not a friend. And the diſtinction about an enemy to be the very ſame. The good man, according to this ſpeech, will, as it ſeems, be the friend; and the wicked man, the enemy. Yes. Do you now require us, to deſcribe what is juſt, as we did before, when we ſaid it was juſt to do good to a friend, and ill to an enemy? Or ſhall we add to the definition, and now ſay, that it is juſt to do good to a friend, when he is good; and hurt to an enemy, when he is ill? This laſt, ſaid he, ſeems to me to be perfectly well expreſſed. Is it, then, ſaid I, the part of a juſt man to hurt any man? By all means, ſaid he, he ought to hurt the wicked, and his enemies. But, do horſes, when they are hurt, become better or worſe? Worſe. Whether, in the virtue of dogs, or of horſes? In that of horſes. And, do not dogs, when they are hurt, become worſe in the virtue of dogs, and not of horſes? Of neceſſity. And ſhall we not in like manner, my friend! ſay, that men, when they are hurt, become worſe in the virtue of a man? Certainly. But is not juſtice the virtue of a man? Of neceſſity this likewiſe. Of neceſſity then, friend! thoſe

men who are hurt, muſt become more unjuſt. It ſeems ſo. But can muſicians, by muſic, make men unmuſical? It is impoſſible. Or horſemen, by horſemanſhip, make men unſkilled in horſemanſhip? It cannot be. Or can the juſt, by juſtice, make men unjuſt; or in general can the good, by virtue, make men wicked? It is impoſſible. For, it is not, as I imagine, the effect of heat, to make cold, but of its contrary. Yes. Nor is it the effect of drought, to make moiſt; but its contrary. Certainly. Neither is it, the part of a good man, to hurt; but of his contrary. It appears ſo. But, the juſt is good. Certainly. Neither, then, is it the part of a juſt man, Polemarchus! to hurt either friend, or any other, but the part of his contrary, the unjuſt man.

In all reſpects, ſaid he, you ſeem to me, Socrates! to ſay true. If, then, any one ſays, that it is juſt to give every one his due, and thinks this with himſelf, that hurt is due to enemies from a juſt man, and profit to his friend; he was not wiſe who ſaid ſo, for he ſpoke not the truth. For it hath no where appeared to us, that any juſt man hurts any one. I agree, ſaid he. Let us jointly contend, then, ſaid I, if any one ſhall ſay, that Simonides, a Bias, a Pittacus, ſaid ſo; or any other of thoſe wiſe and happy men. I am ready, ſaid he, to join in the fight. But do you know, ſaid I, whoſe ſaying I fancy it is, That it is juſt to profit friends, and hurt enemies? Whoſe, ſaid he? I fancy it is the ſaying of Periander, or Perdiccas, or Xerxes, or Iſmenius, the Theban; or ſome other rich man, who thought himſelf able to

do a great deal. You ſay moſt true, ſaid he. Be it ſo, ſaid I. But as this hath not appeared to be juſtice, nor juſt, what elſe may one ſay that it is?

Thraſymachus frequently, during our reaſoning, ruſh'd in the midſt, to lay hold of the diſcourſe; but was hindered by thoſe who ſate by, who wanted to hear the converſation to an end. But when we pauſed, and I had ſaid theſe things, he was no longer quiet; but, collecting himſelf, as a wild beaſt, he came upon us, as if he wou'd have torn us in pieces. Both Polemarchus and I, being frightened, were thrown into the utmoſt conſternation: But he, roaring out in the midſt; What trifling, ſaid he, Socrates! is this, which long ago poſſeſſes you; and why do you, thus play the fool together, yielding mutually to one another? But, if you truly want to know what is juſt, aſk not queſtions only; and value yourſelf in confuting when any one anſwers you any thing; (knowing this, that it is eaſier to aſk, than to anſwer;) but anſwer yourſelf, and tell what it is you call juſt. And you are not to tell me, that it is what is fit; nor what is due, nor what is profitable, nor what is gainful, nor what is advantageous; but, what you mean, tell plainly, and accurately; for I will not allow it, if you ſpeak ſuch trifles as theſe. When I heard this, I was aſtoniſhed, and looking at him, was frightened; and, I ſhould have become ſpeechleſs, I imagine, if I had not perceived him before he perceived me: But I had obſerved him, firſt, when he began to grow fierce, at our reaſoning; ſo that I was now able to anſwer him, and ſaid, trembling: Thraſymachus! be

not hard on us, for, if we miſtake in our inquiries, Polemarchus, and I, be well aſſured, that we miſtake unwittingly: For, think not, that in ſearching for gold, we would never wittingly yield to one another in the ſearch, and mar the finding it; but, that ſearching for juſtice, an affair far more valuable than a great deal of gold, we ſhould yet fooliſhly yield to each other; and not labour, friend! with the utmoſt ardour, that we may diſcover what it really is: But I am afraid we are not able to diſcover it: It is more reaſonable then, that we be pitied, than be uſed hardly by you who are men of ability! Having heard this, he laugh'd aloud, in a very coarſe manner, and ſaid: By Hercules! this is Socrates's wonted irony: This, I both knew, and foretold to theſe, here; that you never incline to anſwer if any one aſk you any thing. You are a wiſe man, therefore, Thraſymachus! ſaid I. For you knew well, that if you aſked any one; How many is twelve; and, when you aſk, ſhould tell him, before. You are not, friend! to tell me that twelve is twice ſix; nor that it is three times four; nor that it is four times three; for I will not admit it, if you trifle in ſuch a manner; I fancy it is plain to you that no man would anſwer one aſking in ſuch a way. But if he ſhould ſay to you. Wonderful Thraſymachus! How do you mean? May I anſwer in none of thoſe ways you have told me; not even though the real and true anſwer happen to be one of them; but I am to ſay ſomething elſe than the truth? Or, how is it you mean? What would you ſay to him in anſwer to theſe things? If they were alike, I ſhould

give an anſwer; but how are they alike? Nothing hinders it, ſaid I; but, though they were not alike, but ſhould appear ſo to him who was aſked, would he the leſs readily anſwer what appeared to him; whether we forbad him or not? And, will you do ſo now, ſaid he? Will you ſay in anſwer ſome of theſe things which I forbid you to ſay? I ſhould not wonder I did, ſaid I, if it ſhould appear ſo to me on inquiry. What then, ſaid he, if I ſhall ſhow you another and a better anſwer, beſides all theſe about juſtice; what will you deſerve to ſuffer? What elſe, ſaid I, but what is proper for the ignorant to ſuffer; and it is proper for them to learn ſome where from a wiſe man. I ſhall therefore deſerve to ſuffer this. You are pleaſant now, ſaid he, but together with the learning, do you pay money likewiſe. Shall it not be after I have got it, ſaid I? There is for you, ſaid Glauco; ſo, as to money, Thraſymachus! Say on; for all of us will advance for Socrates. I truly imagine ſo, ſaid he, that Socrates may go on in his wonted manner; not anſwer himſelf, but when another anſwers, he may take up the diſcourſe, and confute. How, ſaid I, moſt excellent Thraſymachus! can one anſwer? In the firſt place, when he neither knows, nor ſays he knows; and, then, if he have any opinion about theſe matters, he is forbid by no mean man to advance any of his opinions. But it is more reaſonable that you ſpeak, as you ſay you know, and can tell us: Do not decline, then, but oblige me in anſwering, and do not grudge to inſtruct Glauco here, and the reſt of the company. When I had ſaid this; both Glauco, and the reſt

of the company intreated him, not to decline it. And, Thrafymachus appeared plainly defirous to fpeak, in order to gain applaufe; reckoning he had a very fine anfwer to make; yet pretended to be earneft that I fhould be the anfwerer, but at laft he agreed: And then; this, faid he, as the wifdom of Socrates, unwilling himfelf to teach, he goes about learning from others, and gives no thanks for it. That, indeed, I learn from others, faid I, Thrafymachus! is true; but, in faying that I do not give thanks for it, you are miftaken. I pay as much as I am able: And I am only able to commend them; for money I have not; and how readily I do this, when any one appears to me to fpeak well; you fhall perfectly know this moment, when you make an anfwer; for, I imagine you are to fpeak well. Hear, then, faid he, for I fay, that what is juft, is nothing elfe but the advantage of the more powerful. But, why do not you commend? You are unwilling. Let me learn firft, faid I, what you fay; for as yet I do not underftand it. The advantage of the more powerful, you fay is what is juft. What, at all, is this you fay now, Thrafymachus! For you, certainly, do not mean fuch a thing as this; If Polydamus, the wreftler, be more powerful than we; and if beef be beneficial for his body, that this food is likewife both juft and advantageous for us, who are weaker than he. You are moft impudent, Socrates! and lay hold of my fpeech on that fide where you may do it the greateft hurt. By no means, moft excellent Thrafymachus! faid I, but tell more plainly what is your meaning. Do not

you, then know, ſaid he, that with reference to ſtates, ſome are tyrannical; others, democratical; and others, ariſtocratical? Why are they not? And is not the governing part in each ſtate the more powerful? Certainly. And every government makes laws for its own advantage; a democracy, democratic laws; a tyranny, tyrannic; and others, the ſame way. And when they have made them, they give out that to be juſt for the governed, which is advantageous for themſelves; and they puniſh the tranſgreſſor of this as one acting contrary both to law, and juſtice. This, then, moſt excellent Socrates! is what I ſay, that, in all ſtates, what is juſt, and what is advantageous for the eſtabliſhed government, are the ſame; it hath the power. So that it appears to him who reaſons rightly; that, in all caſes, what is the advantage of the more powerful, the ſame is juſt. Now, I have learned, ſaid I, what you ſay. But whether it be true, or not; I ſhall endeavour to learn. What is advantageous, then, Thraſymachus! you yourſelf have affirmed, to be likewiſe juſt; though you forbid me to give this anſwer; but, indeed, you have added to it, that of the more powerful. Probably, ſaid he, but a ſmall addition. It is not yet manifeſt, whether it is ſmall or great; but it is manifeſt that this is to be conſidered, whether you ſpeak the truth; ſince I too, acknowledge, that what is juſt, is ſomewhat that is advantageous: But you add to it, and ſay, that it is that of the more powerful. This, I do not know, but it is to be conſidered. Conſider then, ſaid he. That, ſaid I, ſhall be done. And, tell me, do not you ſay, that it

is juſt to obey governours? I ſay ſo. Whether are the governours in the ſeveral ſtates infallible? or are they capable of erring? Certainly, ſaid he, they are liable to err. Do they not, then, when they attempt to make laws, make ſome of them right, and ſome of them not right? I imagine ſo. To make them right, is it not to make them advantageous for themſelves; and to make them not right, diſadvantageous? Or what is it you mean? Entirely ſo. And what they enact, is to be obſerved by the governed, and this is what is juſt? Why not? It is, then, according to your reaſoning, not only juſt, to do what is advantageous for the more powerful; but alſo, to do the contrary, what is not advantageous. What do you ſay, reply'd he? The ſame, I imagine, that you ſay yourſelf: But let us conſider better: Have we not acknowledged, that governours in enjoining the governed to do certain things, may ſometimes miſtake what is beſt for themſelves; and that what the governours enjoin, is juſt for the governed to do. Have not theſe things been acknowledged? I think ſo, ſaid he. Think, alſo, then, ſaid I, that you have acknowledged, that it is juſt to do what is diſadvantageous to governours, and the more powerful; ſince governours unwillingly enjoin what is ill for themſelves; and, you ſay, that it is juſt for the others to do what theſe enjoin. Muſt it not then, moſt wiſe Thraſymachus! neceſſarily happen; that, by this means, it may be juſt to do the contrary of what you ſay? For that which is the diſadvantage of the more powerful, is ſometimes enjoined the inferiors to do? Yes, indeed Socrates! ſaid Po-

lemarchus, theſe things are moſt manifeſt. Yes, if you bear him witneſs, ſaid Clitipho. What need, ſaid I, of a witneſs? For Thraſymachus himſelf acknowledges that governours do indeed ſometimes enjoin what is ill for themſelves; but that it is juſt for the governed to do theſe things. For it hath, Polemarchus! been eſtabliſhed by Thraſymachus, to be juſt to do what is enjoined by the governours; and he hath likewiſe, Clitipho! eſtabliſhed that to be juſt, which is the advantage of the more powerful; and, having eſtabliſhed both theſe things, he hath acknowledged likewiſe, that the more powerful ſometimes enjoin the inferiors and governed to do what is diſadvantageous for themſelves; and, from theſe conceſſions, the advantage of the more powerful can no more be juſt than the diſadvantage. But, ſaid Clitipho, he ſaid the advantage of the more powerful; that is, what the more powerful judged to be advantageous to himſelf; that this was to be done by the inferior, and this he eſtabliſhed as juſt. But, ſaid Polemarchus, it was not ſaid ſo. There is no difference, Polemarchus! ſaid I. But if Thraſymachus ſays ſo now, we ſhall allow him to do it. And tell me, Thraſymachus! was this what you meant to ſay was juſt? The advantage of the more powerful, ſuch as appeared ſo to the more powerful, whether it is advantageous, or is not. Shall we ſay that you ſpoke thus? By no means, ſaid he. For, do you imagine, I call him the more powerful, who misjudgeth at the time he misjudgeth? I imagined, ſaid I, you ſaid this, when you acknowledged that governours were not infallible;

but that in ſome things they even erred. You are a ſycophant, ſaid he, in reaſoning, Socrates! For do you now call him who miſtakes about the management of the ſick, a phyſician; as to that very thing in which he miſtakes? or, him, who miſtakes in reaſoning, a reaſoner, when he errs, and with reference to that very error? But, I imagine, we ſay, in common language, that the phyſician erred; that the reaſoner erred, and the grammarian: Thus, however, I imagine, that each of theſe, as far as he is what we call him, errs not at any time: So that, according to accurate diſcourſe, (ſince you diſcourſe accurately) none of the artiſts errs: for, he who errs, errs by departing from ſcience; and, in this, he is no artiſt: So that no artiſt, or wiſe man, or governour, errs; in ſo far as he is a governour. Yet any one may ſay, the phyſician erred; the governour erred: Imagine, then, it was, in this way, I now anſwered you. But the moſt accurate anſwer is this. That the governour, in as far as he is governour, errs not; and, as he does not err, he enacts that which is left for himſelf; and this is to be obſerved by the governed: So that what I ſaid from the beginning, I maintain, is juſt. To do what is the advantage of the more powerful. Be it ſo, ſaid I, Thraſymachus! ſeem I to act the ſycophant? Certainly, indeed, ſaid he. For you imagine that I ſpoke, as I did, inſidiouſly, and to abuſe you. I know it well, ſaid he, but you ſhall gain nothing by it; for whether you abuſe me, in a concealed manner, or otherwiſe, you ſhall not be able to overcome me by your reaſoning. I ſhall not attempt it, ſaid I, happy

Thraſymachus! But, that nothing of this kind may happen to us again; define, whether you ſpeak of a governour, and the more powerful, according to common talk, or, according to accurate diſcourſe; as you now ſaid; whoſe advantage, as he is the more powerful, it ſhall be juſt for the inferior to obſerve. I ſpeak of him, ſaid he, who, in the moſt accurate diſcourſe, is governour. For this, now, abuſe me, and act the ſycophant, if you are able. I do not ſhun you; but you cannot do it. Do you imagine me, ſaid I, to be ſo mad as to attempt to ſhave a lyon; and act the ſycophant with Thraſymachus? You have now, ſaid he, attempted it, but with no effect. Enough, ſaid I, of this. But tell me, with reference to him, who, accurately ſpeaking, is a phyſician; whom you now mentioned; whether is he a gainer of money, or one who taketh care of the ſick? and ſpeak of him who is really a phyſician. One who taketh care, ſaid he, of the ſick. But, what of the pilot, who is a pilot, truly? Whether is he the governour of the ſailors, or a ſailor? The governour of the ſailors. That, I imagine, is not to be minded, that he ſails in the ſhip; nor, that he is called a ſailor; for, it is not for his ſailing, that he is called pilot, but for his art, and his governing the ſailors. True, ſaid he. Is there not then ſomething advantageous to each of theſe? Certainly. And is it not for this purpoſe, ſaid I, that art hath had its riſe, to ſeek out and afford to each thing its advantage? For this purpoſe, ſaid he. Is there, now, any thing elſe advantageous to each of the arts, but to be the moſt perfect poſſible? How aſk

you this? As if you aſked me, ſaid I, whether it ſufficed the body to be body; or, if it ſtood in need of any thing? I would ſay, that it ſtood in need of ſomething elſe. For this reaſon, is the medicinal art invented, becauſe the body is infirm, and is not ſufficient for itſelf, in ſuch a ſtate; in order therefore to afford it things for its advantage, for this purpoſe, art hath been provided. Do I ſeem to you, ſaid I, to ſay right, or not, in ſpeaking in this manner? Right, ſaid he. But, what, now? This medicinal art itſelf, or any other, is it imperfect, ſo long as it is wanting in a certain virtue? As the eyes, when they want ſeeing; and the ears, hearing; and, for theſe reaſons, have they need of a certain art, to perceive, and afford them, what is advantageous for theſe purpoſes? And is there, ſtill, in art itſelf, ſome imperfection; and, does every art ſtand in need of another art, to perceive what is advantageous to it, and this ſtand in need of another, in like manner, and ſo on, to infinity? Or ſhall each art perceive what is advantageous to itſelf; and ſtand in need neither of itſelf, nor of another, to perceive what is for its advantage, with reference to its own imperfection. For there is no imperfection, nor error, in any art. Nor does it belong to it to ſeek what is advantageous to any thing, but to that of which it is the art. But it is, itſelf, infallible, pure, being in the right. So long as each art is, an accurate whole, whatever it is. And conſider now, according to that accurate diſcourſe, whether it be thus, or otherwiſe. Thus, ſaid he, it appears. The medicinal art, then ſaid I, does not conſider what is advan-

tageous to the medicinal art, but to the body. Yes, ſaid he. Nor the art of managing horſes, what is advantageous for that art; but what is advantageous for horſes. Nor does any other art conſider what is advantageous for itſelf, (for it hath no need,) but what is advantageous for that of which it is the art? So, reply'd he, it appears. But, Thraſymachus! the arts rule, and govern that of which they are the arts. He yielded this, but with great difficulty. No ſcience, then, conſiders the advantage of the more powerful, nor enjoins it; but that of the inferior, and of what is governed. He conſented to theſe things at laſt, though he attempted to contend about them, but afterwards he conſented. Why, then ſaid I, no phyſician, ſo far as he is a phyſician, conſiders what is advantageous for the phyſician, nor enjoins it; but what is advantageous for the ſick: for it hath been agreed, that the accurate phyſician is one who taketh care of ſick bodies, and not an amaſſer of wealth. Hath it not been agreed? He aſſented. And likewiſe that the accurate pilot is the governour of the ſailors, and not a ſailor? It hath been agreed. Such a pilot, then, and governour will not conſider and enjoin what is the advantage of the pilot, but what is advantageous to the ſailor, and the governed. He conſented, with difficulty. Nor, yet, Thraſymachus! ſaid I, does any other in any government, as far as he is a governour, conſider or enjoin his own advantage, but that of the governed, and of thoſe to whom he miniſters; and, with an eye to this, and to what is advantageous and ſuitable to this, he both ſays what he ſays;

and does what he does. When we were at this part of the diſcourſe, and it was evident to all the definition of what was juſt, ſtood now on the contrary ſide; Thraſymachus, inſtead of making anſwer; Tell me, ſaid he, Socrates! have you a nurſe? What, ſaid I, ought you not rather to anſwer, than aſk ſuch things? Becauſe, ſaid he, ſhe neglects you when your noſe is ſtuff'd, and does not wipe it when it needs it, you who underſtand neither what is meant by ſheep, nor by ſhepherd. For what now is all this, ſaid I? Becauſe you think that ſhepherds, and neatherds, ought to conſider the good of the ſheep, or oxen, to fatten them, and to miniſter to them, having in their eye, ſomething other than their maſter's good and their own. And you fancy that thoſe who govern in cities, thoſe who govern truly, are ſome how otherwiſe affected towards the governed, than one is towards ſheep; and that they are attentive, day and night, to ſomewhat elſe, than this, how they ſhall be gainers themſelves; and ſo far are you from the notion of juſt, and of juſtice; and of unjuſt, and injuſtice; that you do not know that both juſtice and juſt, are, in reality, a foreign good, the advantage of the more powerful, and of the governor; but, properly, the hurt of the ſubject, and inferior; and injuſtice is the contrary. And juſtice governs ſuch as are truly ſimple and juſt; and the governed do what is for the governour's advantage, he being more powerful, and miniſtring to him, promote his happineſs; but by no means their own. You muſt thus conſider it, moſt ſimple Socrates! that, on all occaſions, the juſt man gets leſs than

the unjuſt. Firſt, in co-partnerſhips with one another, where the one joins in company with the other; you never can find, on the diſſolving of the company, the juſt man gets more than the unjuſt, but leſs: Then, in civil affairs, where there are taxes to be paid from equal ſubſtance; the juſt man pays more, the other leſs. But when there is any thing to be gained, the one gains nothing, the other a great deal: For, when each of them governs in any public magiſtracy, this, if no other loſs befals the juſt man, that his domeſtic affairs, at leaſt, are in a worſe ſituation through his neglect; and, that he gains nothing from the public, becauſe he is juſt: Add to this, that he comes to be hated by his domeſtics, and acquaintance, when at no time he will ſerve them, beyond what is juſt: But all theſe things are quite otherwiſe with the unjuſt; ſuch an one, I mean, as I now mentioned; one who has it greatly in his power to become rich. Conſider him, then, if you would judge, how much more it is for his private advantage to be unjuſt, than juſt, and you will moſt eaſily underſtand it if you come to the moſt finiſhed injuſtice; ſuch as renders the unjuſt man moſt happy, but the injured, and thoſe who are unwilling to do injuſtice, moſt wretched; and, that is, tyranny; which takes away the goods of others, both by ſecret fraud, and by open violence; both things ſacred and holy, both private and public, and theſe not by degrees, but all at once. In all particular caſes of ſuch crimes, when one, committing injuſtice, is not concealed, he is puniſhed; and ſuffers the greateſt ignominy. For

according to the ſeveral kinds of the wickedneſs they commit, they are called ſacrilegious, robbers, houſe-breakers, pilferers, thieves. But when any one, beſides theſe thefts of the ſubſtance of his citizens, ſhall ſteal and enſlave the citizens themſelves; inſtead of thoſe ugly names, he is called happy, and bleſt; not by his citizens alone, but likewiſe by others, as many as are informed that he hath committed the moſt conſummate wickedneſs. For, ſuch as revile wickedneſs, revile it not becauſe they are afraid of doing, but becauſe they are afraid of ſuffering, unjuſt things. And thus, Socrates! injuſtice, when in ſufficient meaſure, is both more powerful, more free, and hath more abſolute command than juſtice: and, (as I ſaid at the beginning,) the advantage of the more powerful, is juſtice; but injuſtice is the profit and advantage of one's ſelf. Thraſymachus having ſaid theſe things, inclined to go away; like the Bath-keeper after he had poured into our ears this rapid and long diſcourſe. Theſe, however, who were preſent, would not ſuffer him, but forced him to ſtay, and give account of what he had ſaid. I too, myſelf, earneſtly entreated him, and ſaid: Divine Thraſymachus! after throwing in upon us ſo ſtrange a diſcourſe, do you intend to go away, before you teach us, ſufficiently, or learn yourſelf, whether the caſe be as you ſay, or otherwiſe? Do you imagine you attempt to determine a ſmall matter, and not the guide of life, by which, each of us, being conducted, may lead the moſt happy life. But, I imagine, ſaid Thraſymachus, that this is otherwiſe. You ſeem, truly, ſaid I, to care nothing for

us; nor to be any way concerned, whether we ſhall live well, or ill, whilſt we are ignorant of what you ſay you know: But, good Thraſymachus! be readily diſpoſed to ſhow it alſo to us, nor will the favour be ill placed, whatever you ſhall beſtow on ſo many as are of us. And I, for my own part, tell you, that I am not perſuaded, nor do I think that injuſtice is more profitable than juſtice; not although it ſhould be permitted to exert itſelf, and be no way hindered from doing whatever it ſhould incline. But, good Thraſymachus! let him be unjuſt, let him be able to do unjuſtly, either in ſecret, or by force, yet will you not perſuade me at leaſt that injuſtice is more profitable than juſtice, and probably ſome other of us here is of the ſame mind, and I not ſingle. Convince us then, bleſt Thraſymachus! that we imagine wrong, when we value juſtice more than injuſtice. But how, ſaid he, ſhall I convince you? For, if I have not convinced you by what I have ſaid already, what ſhall I further do for you? Shall I enter into your ſoul, and put my reaſoning within you? God forbid, ſaid I, you ſhall not do that. But, firſt of all, whatever you have ſaid, abide by it: or, if you do change, change openly; and do not deceive us. For, now, you ſee Thraſymachus! (for let us ſtill conſider what is ſaid above,) that when you firſt defined the true phyſician, you did not afterwards think it needful that the true ſhepherd, ſhould, ſtrictly, upon the like principles, keep his flock; but you fancy, that as a ſhepherd, he may feed his flock, not regarding what is beſt for the ſheep, but as ſome glutton, who is going to

feaſt on them, at ſome entertainment; or yet to diſpoſe of them as a merchant; and not a ſhepherd. But the ſhepherd-art hath certainly no other care, but of that for which it is ordained, to afford it what is beſt: for its own affairs are already, ſufficiently, provided for; ſo as to be in the very beſt ſtate while it needs nothing of the ſhepherd-art. In the ſame manner, I, at leaſt, imagined, there was a neceſſity for agreeing with us in this, that every government, in as far as it is government, conſiders what is beſt for nothing elſe, but for the governed, and thoſe under its charge; both in political, and private government. But do you imagine that governours in cities, ſuch as are truly governours, govern willingly? Truly, ſaid he, as for that, I not only imagine it, but am quite certain. Why now, ſaid I, Thraſymachus! do you not perceive, as to all other governments, that no one undertakes them willingly, but they aſk a reward; as the profit ariſing from governing, is not to be to themſelves, but to the governed? Or, tell me this now? do not we ſay that every particular art, is, in this diſtinct, in having a diſtinct power? And, now, bleſt Thraſymachus! anſwer not differently from your ſentiments, that we may make ſome progreſs. In this, ſaid he, it is diſtinct. And, does not each of them, afford us a certain diſtinct advantage, and not a common one? As the medicinal, affords health; the pilot-art, preſervation in ſailing; and the others, in like manner. Certainly. And does not the mercenary art, afford a reward, for this is its power? Or, do you call both the medicinal art, and the pilot art, one and the

ſame? Or, rather, if you will define them accurately, as you propoſed; though one, in piloting, recover his health, becauſe ſailing agrees with him, you will not, the more, on this account, call it, the medicinal art? No, indeed, ſaid he. Nor will you, I imagine, call the mercenary art, the medicinal; though one, in gaining a reward, recover his health. No, indeed. What now? Will you call the medicinal, the mercenary art, if one, in performing a cure, gains a reward? No, ſaid he. Have we not acknowledged, then, that there is a diſtinct advantage of every art? Be it ſo, ſaid he. What is that advantage, then, with which all artiſts, in common, are advantaged? It is plain, it muſt be in uſing ſomething common to all, that they are advantaged by it. It ſeems ſo, ſaid he. Yet, we ſay, that artiſts are profited, in receiving a reward, ariſing to them from the increaſe of a lucrative art. He agreed, with difficulty. Hath not, then, every one this advantage, in his art, the receiving a reward. Yet, if we are to conſider accurately, the medicinal art produceth health, and the mercenary art a reward; maſonry, a houſe, and the mercenary art accompanying it, a reward. And all the others, in like manner, every one produceth its own work, and advantageth that for which it was ordained; but, if it meet not with a reward, what is the artiſt advantaged by his art? It does not appear, ſaid he. But, does he then no ſervice, when he works without reward? I think, he does. Is not this, then, now, evident; Thraſymachus! that no art, nor government provideth what is advantageous for itſelf; but, as

I ſaid long ago, provides, and enjoins, what is advantageous for the governed; having in view, the profit of the inferior, and not that of the more powerful. And, for theſe reaſons, friend Thraſymachus! I likewiſe ſaid, now, that no one is willing to govern, and to undertake to rectify the ills of others, but aſks a reward for it; becauſe, whoever will perform the art handſomely, never acts what is beſt for himſelf, in ruling according to art, but what is beſt for the governed; and, on this account, it ſeems, a reward muſt be given to thoſe who ſhall be willing to govern; either money, or honour; or puniſhment, if they will not govern. How ſay you ſo, Socrates! ſaid Glauco; two of the rewards, I underſtand; but this puniſhment, you ſpeak of, and here you mention it in place of a reward, I know not. You know not, then, ſaid I, the reward of the beſt of men, on account of which the moſt worthy govern, when they conſent to govern. Or, do you not know; that to be ambitious, and covetous, is both deem'd a reproach, and really is ſo? I know, ſaid he. For thoſe reaſons, then, ſaid I, good men are not willing to govern, neither for money, nor for honour; for they are neither willing to be called mercenary, in openly receiving a reward for governing, nor to be called thieves, in taking clandeſtinely, from thoſe under their government; as little are they willing to govern for honour, for they are not ambitious.----Of neceſſity then there muſt be laid on them a fine, that they may conſent to govern. And hence, it ſeems, it hath been accounted diſhonourable to enter on government willingly, and not

by conſtraint. And the greateſt part of the puniſhment is to be governed by a naughty perſon, if one himſelf is not willing to govern: and the good ſeem to me to govern from a fear of this, when they do govern: and then, they enter on the government, not as on any thing good, or as what they are to reap advantage by, but as on a neceſſary taſk, and finding none better than themſelves, nor like them to entruſt with the government: Since, it would appear, that if there was a city of good men, the conteſt would be, not to be in the government, as at preſent it is, to govern: And, hence, it would be manifeſt, that he who is indeed the true governour, doth not aim at his own advantage, but at that of the governed; ſo that every underſtanding man would rather chuſe to be ſerved, than to have trouble in ſerving another. This, therefore, I, for my part, will never yield to Thraſymachus; that juſtice is the advantage of the more powerful; but this we ſhall conſider afterwards. What Thraſymachus ſays now, ſeems to me of much more importance; when he ſays, that the life of the unjuſt man is better, than that of the juſt. You, then, Glauco, ſaid I, which ſide do you chuſe; and which ſeems to you moſt agreeable to truth? The life of the juſt, ſaid he, I, for my part, deem to be the more profitable. Have you heard, ſaid I, how many good things Thraſymachus juſt now enumerated in the life of the unjuſt? I heard, ſaid he, but am not perſuaded. Are you willing, then, that we ſhould perſuade him, (if we be able any how to find arguments,) that there is no truth in what he ſays? Why not, ſaid he.

City of good men

If then, ſaid I, pulling on the other ſide, we advance argument for argument, how many good things there are in being juſt, and then again, he on the other ſide, we ſhall need a third perſon to compute and eſtimate what each ſhall have ſaid on either ſide; and likewiſe need ſome judges to determine the matter. But, if, as now, aſſenting to one another, we conſider theſe things; we ſhall be both judges and pleaders ourſelves. Certainly, ſaid he. Which way, then, ſaid I, do you chuſe? This way, ſaid he. Come then, ſaid I, Thraſymachus! anſwer us from the beginning. Do you ſay that complete injuſtice, is more profitable than complete juſtice? Yes, indeed, I ſay ſo, reply'd he. And the reaſons for it, I have told. Come, now, do you ever affirm any thing of this kind concerning them? Do you call one of them, virtue; and the other, vice? Why not? Is not, then, juſtice, virtue; and injuſtice, vice? Very likely, ſaid he, moſt pleaſant Socrates! after I ſay that injuſtice is profitable; but juſtice, is not; What then? The contrary, ſaid he. Is it juſtice, you call vice? No, but I call it, altogether genuine ſimplicity. Do you, then, call injuſtice, cunning? No, ſaid he, but I call it, ſagacity. Do the unjuſt ſeem to you, Thraſymachus! to be both prudent, and good? Such, at leaſt, ſaid he, as are able to do injuſtice in perfection; ſuch as are able to ſubject to themſelves ſtates, and nations; but you probably imagine, I ſpeak of thoſe who cut purſes: Even ſuch things as theſe, he ſaid, are profitable, if concealed; but ſuch only as I now mentioned are of any worth. I underſtand, ſaid I, what you want to ſay: But

this, I have wondered at, that you ſhould deem injuſtice to be a part of virtue, and of wiſdom; and juſtice among their contraries. But, I do deem it altogether ſo. Your meaning, ſaid I, is now more determined, friend! and it is no longer eaſy for one to find what to ſay againſt it: for, if, when you had ſet forth injuſtice as profitable, you had ſtill allowed it to be vice, or ugly; as ſome others do, we ſhould have had ſomething to ſay, ſpeaking according to the received opinions: But now, it is plain, you will call it beautiful and powerful; and all thoſe other things you will attribute to it, which we attribute to the juſt man, ſince you have dared to claſs it, with virtue and wiſdom. You conjecture, ſaid he, moſt true. But, however, I muſt not grudge, ſaid I, to purſue our inquiry ſo long as I imagine you ſpeak as you think; for to me you plainly ſeem now, Thraſymachus! not to be in irony; but to ſpeak what you think concerning the truth. What is the difference to you, ſaid he, whether I think ſo, or not; if you do not confute my reaſoning? None at all, ſaid I. But endeavour, further, to anſwer me this likewiſe; Does a juſt man ſeem to you deſirous to have more than another juſt man? By no means, ſaid he; for otherwiſe he ſhould not be courteous, and ſimple, as we now ſuppoſed him. But what? will he not deſire it in a juſt action? Not even in a juſt action, ſaid he. But, whether would he deem it proper to exceed the unjuſt man; and count it juſt? or would he not? He would, ſaid he, both count it juſt, and deem it proper; but would not be able for it. That, ſaid I, I do not aſk. But, whe-

ther a juſt man would neither deem it proper, nor incline to exceed a juſt man, but would deem it proper to exceed the unjuſt? This laſt, ſaid he, is what he would incline to do. But what would the unjuſt man do? Would he deem it proper to exceed the juſt man, even in a juſt action? Why not, ſaid he, he who deems it proper to exceed all others. Will not, then, the unjuſt man deſire to exceed the unjuſt man likewiſe, and in an unjuſt action; and contend that he himſelf receive more than all others? Certainly. Thus, we ſay, then, ſaid I, the juſt man does not deſire to exceed one like himſelf, but one unlike. But the unjuſt man deſires to exceed both one like, and one unlike himſelf. You have ſpoke, ſaid he, perfectly well. But, ſaid I, the unjuſt man is both wiſe and good; but the juſt man is neither. This, too, ſaid he, is well ſaid. Is not, then, ſaid I, the unjuſt man, like the wiſe and the good; and the juſt man, unlike? Muſt he not, ſaid he, be like them, being ſuch an one as we have ſuppoſed; and he who is otherwiſe, be unlike them? Excellently. Each of them is indeed ſuch, as thoſe he reſembleth. What elſe, ſaid he? Be it ſo, Thraſymachus! Call you one muſical, and another unmuſical? I do. Which of the two, call you wiſe; and which unwiſe? I call the muſical, wiſe, and the unmuſical, unwiſe. Is he not good, in as much as he is wiſe; and ill in as much as he is unwiſe? Yes. And what as to the phyſician? Is not the caſe the ſame? The ſame. Do you imagine, then, moſt excellent Thraſymachus! that any muſician, in tuning a harp, wants to exceed, or deems proper to have more ſkill,

than a man who is a muſician, with reference to the intention or remiſſion of the ſtrings? I am not of that opinion. But what ſay you of exceeding a man who is no muſician? Of neceſſity, ſaid he, he will deem it proper to exceed him. And what as to the phyſician? In preſenting a regimen of meats, or drinks, does he want to exceed another phyſician, in medical caſes? No indeed. But to exceed one who is no phyſician? Yes. And as to all ſcience, and ignorance, does any one appear to you intelligent, who wants to graſp at, or do, or ſay more than another intelligent in the art; and not to do the ſame things, in the ſame affair, which one equally intelligent with himſelf doth? Probably, there is a neceſſity, ſaid he, it be ſo. But what, as to him who is ignorant; will not he want to exceed the intelligent, and the ignorant both alike? Probably. But the intelligent, is wiſe? I ſay ſo. And the wiſe, is good? I ſay ſo. But the good, and the wiſe, will not want to exceed one like himſelf; but the unlike, and contrary? It ſeems ſo, ſaid he. But the evil, and the ignorant, wants to exceed both one like himſelf, and his oppoſite? It appears ſo. Why, then, Thraſymachus! ſaid I, the unjuſt deſires to exceed both one unlike, and one like himſelf. Do not you ſay ſo? I do, ſaid he. But the juſt man will not deſire to exceed one like himſelf, but one unlike? Yes. The juſt man, then, ſaid I, reſembles the wiſe, and the good; and the unjuſt reſembles the evil, and the ignorant. It appears ſo. But we acknowledged, that each of them was ſuch as that which they reſembled. We acknowledged ſo, indeed.

The juſt man, then, hath appeared to us to be good and wiſe; and the unjuſt to be ignorant and ill. Thraſymachus, now, confeſſed all theſe things; not eaſily, as I now narrate them; but dragg'd, and with difficulty; and prodigious ſweat, it being now ſummer ſeaſon. And, I, then, ſaw, but never before, Thraſymachus bluſh. After we had acknowledged that juſtice was virtue, and wiſdom; and injuſtice, was vice, and ignorance: Well, ſaid I, let this remain ſo. But, we ſaid likewiſe that injuſtice was powerful. Do not you remember, Thraſymachus? I remember, ſaid he. But what you now ſay, does not pleaſe me: and I have ſomewhat to ſay concerning it, which I well know you would call declaiming; if I ſhould advance it; either, then, ſuffer me to ſay what I incline; or, if you incline to aſk, do it; and I ſhall anſwer you, " be it ſo" as to old women, telling ſtories; and ſhall aſſent, and diſſent. By no means, ſaid I, contrary to your own opinion. Juſt to pleaſe you, ſaid he; ſince you will not allow me to ſpeak. But do you want any thing further? Nothing, truly, ſaid I: but if you are to do thus, do; I ſhall aſk. Aſk then. This, then, I aſk, which I did juſt now; (that we may in an orderly way ſee through our diſcourſe,) of what kind is juſtice, compared with injuſtice; for, it was ſurely ſaid that injuſtice was more powerful, and ſtronger than juſtice. It was ſo ſaid, juſt now, reply'd he. But, if juſtice be both virtue, and wiſdom, it will eaſily, I imagine, appear to be likewiſe more powerful than injuſtice; ſince injuſtice is ignorance; of this, now, none can be ignorant. But I am willing, for

my own part, Thraſymachus! to conſider it not ſimply in this manner; but ſome how thus. Might you not ſay that a ſtate was unjuſt; and attempted to enſlave other ſtates unjuſtly, and did enſlave them; and had many ſtates in ſlavery under itſelf? Why not, ſaid he: and the beſt ſtate will chiefly do this, and ſuch as is moſt completely unjuſt. I underſtand, ſaid I, that this was your ſpeech; but I conſider this in it. Whether this ſtate, which becomes more powerful than the other ſtate, ſhall hold this power without juſtice; or muſt it of neceſſity be with juſtice? With juſtice, ſaid he, if, indeed, as you now ſaid, juſtice be wiſdom; but if, as I ſaid, with injuſtice. I am much delighted, ſaid I, Thraſymachus! that you do not merely aſſent, and diſſent; but that you anſwer ſo handſomely. I do it, ſaid he, to gratify you. That is obliging in you. But, gratify me in this, likewiſe, and tell me; do you imagine, that a city, or camp, or robbers, or thieves, or any other community, ſuch as jointly undertakes to do any thing unjuſtly, is able to effectuate any thing if they injure one another? No, indeed, ſaid he. But, what, if they do not injure one another; will they not do better? Certainly. For injuſtice, ſome how, Thraſymachus! brings ſeditions, and hatreds, and fightings among them; but juſtice affords harmony, and friendſhip. Does it not? Be it ſo, ſaid he, that I may not differ from you. You are very obliging, moſt excellent Thraſymachus! But tell me this. If this be the work of injuſtice, wherever it is, to create hatred; will it not then, when happening among free men,

and ſlaves, make them hate one another, and grow ſeditious, and become impotent to do any thing together in company? Certainly. But what, in the caſe of injuſtice, between any two men? Will they not differ, and hate, and become enemies to one another, and to juſt men? They will become ſo, ſaid he. If, now, wonderful Thraſymachus! injuſtice be in one; whether does it loſe its power, or will it no leſs retain it? Let it, ſaid he, no leſs retain it. Does it not, then, appear to have ſuch a power, as this? That, wherever it is, whether in a city, or tribe, or camp, or wherever elſe, in the firſt place, it renders it unable for action in itſelf, through ſeditions and differences; and, beſides, makes it an enemy to itſelf, and to every opponent, and to the juſt? Is it not thus? Certainly. And when injuſtice is in one man; it will have, I imagine, all theſe effects, which it is natural for it to produce. In the firſt place, it will render him unable for action, whilſt he is in ſedition and diſagreement with himſelf; and, next, as he is an enemy both to himſelf, and to the juſt. Is it no ſo? Yes. But, the Gods, friend! are likewiſe juſt. Let them be ſo, ſaid he. The unjuſt man, then, Thraſymachus! ſhall be an enemy alſo to the Gods; and the juſt man, a friend. Feaſt yourſelf, ſaid he, with the reaſoning boldly; for I will not oppoſe you, that I may not render myſelf odious to theſe Gods. Come, then, ſaid I! and complete to me this feaſt; anſwering as you was doing juſt now: for the juſt already appear to be wiſer, and better, and more powerful to act; but the unjuſt are not able to act any

thing with one another: And what we ſaid with reference to thoſe who are unjuſt, that they are ever at any time able ſtrenuouſly to act jointly together; this we ſpoke not altogether true, for they would not ſpare one another; being thoroughly unjuſt; but it is plain, that there was in them, juſtice, which made them refrain from injuring one another, and thoſe of their party; and by this juſtice they performed, what they did. And they ruſhed on unjuſt actions, through injuſtice; being half wicked; ſince thoſe who are compleatly wicked, and perfectly unjuſt, are likewiſe perfectly unable to act. This, then, I underſtand, is the caſe, with reference to theſe matters; and not as you were eſtabliſhing at firſt. But, whether the juſt live better than the unjuſt, and are more happy; (which we propoſed to conſider afterwards,) is now to be conſidered: and they appear to do ſo even at preſent, as I imagine, at leaſt, from what hath been ſaid. Let us, however, conſider it further. For the diſcourſe is not about an accidental thing, but about this, in what manner we ought to live.

Conſider, then, ſaid he. I am conſidering, ſaid I, and tell me; does there any thing ſeem to you, to be the work of a horſe? Yes. Would you not call that the work of a horſe, or of any one elſe, which one doth with him only, or in the beſt manner? I do not underſtand, ſaid he. Thus, then: Do you ſee with any thing elſe, but the eyes? No, indeed. What now, could you hear with any thing but the ears? By no means. Do we not juſtly, then, call theſe things, the works of theſe? Cer-

tainly. But what could not you with a ſword, a knife, and many other things, cut off a branch of a vine? Why not. But, with nothing, at leaſt, I imagine, ſo handſomely, as with a pruning hook, which is made for that purpoſe: Shall we not then ſettle this, to be its work? We ſhall then ſettle it. I imagine, then, you may now underſtand better what I was aſking; when I enquired; whether the work of each thing, were not that which it alone performs, or performs in the beſt manner. I underſtand you, ſaid he, and this does ſeem to me to be the work of each thing. Be it ſo, ſaid I. And is there not likewiſe a virtue belonging to every thing, to which there is a certain work aſſigned? But let us go over, again, the ſame things: We ſay there is a work belonging to the eyes? There is. And is there not a virtue alſo belonging to the eyes? A virtue alſo. Well, then, was there any work of the ears? Yes. Is there not then a virtue alſo? A virtue alſo. And, what as to all other things? Is it not thus? It is. But, come, could the eyes ever handſomely perform their work, not having their own proper virtue; but, inſtead of virtue, having vice? How could they, ſaid he, for you probably mean, their having blindneſs, inſtead of ſight. Whatever, ſaid I, be their virtue, for I do not aſk this; but, whether it be with their own proper virtue, they handſomely perform their own proper work; whatever things are performed; and by their vice, unhandſomely? In this, at leaſt, ſaid he, you ſay true. And will not the ears, likewiſe; when deprived of their virtue, perform their work ill? Certainly. And,

do we ſettle all other things, according to the ſame reaſoning? So I imagine. Come, then, after theſe things, conſider this. Is there, belonging to the ſoul, a certain work; which, with no one other being whatever, you can perform; ſuch as this, to care for, to govern, to conſult, and all ſuch things; is there any other than the ſoul, to whom we may juſtly aſcribe them, and ſay they properly belong to it? No other. But what, of this? To live; ſhall we ſay it is the work of the ſoul? Moſt eſpecially, ſaid he. Do not we ſay, then, that there is ſome virtue of the ſoul, likewiſe? We ſay ſo. And ſhall, then, the ſoul, ever at all, Thraſymachus! perform her works handſomely, whilſt deprived of her proper virtue? Or, is this impoſſible? It is impoſſible. Of neceſſity, then, an ill ſoul, muſt, in a bad manner, govern, and take care of things; and a good ſoul perform all theſe things well. Of neceſſity. But did not we agree, that juſtice was the virtue of the ſoul; and injuſtice, its vice? We did agree. Why, then, the juſt ſoul, and the juſt man, ſhall live well; and the unjuſt, ill. It appears ſo, ſaid he, according to your reaſoning. But, ſurely, he who lives well, is both bleſſed, and happy; and he who does not, is the oppoſite. Why not? The juſt, then, is happy; and the unjuſt, miſerable. Let them be ſo, ſaid he. But it is not advantageous, to be miſerable; but to be happy. Certainly. At no time, then, bleſt Thraſymachus! is injuſtice more advantageous than juſtice. Thus, now, Socrates! ſaid he, have you been feaſted in Diana's feſtival. By you, truly, I have, Thraſymachus! ſaid I; ſince you

are grown meek, and have ceaſed to be troubleſome: I have not feaſted, handſomely, owing to myſelf; and not to you: But as voracious gueſts, ſnatching ſtill what is bringing before them, taſte of it before they have ſufficiently enjoyed what went before; ſo I, as I imagine, before I have found what we firſt enquired into, what juſtice is; have left this; hurrying to enquire concerning it, whether it be vice, and ignorance; or wiſdom, and virtue: And, a diſcourſe afterwards falling in, that injuſtice was more profitable than juſtice, I could not refrain from coming to this, from the other: So that, from the dialogue, I have now come to know nothing: for whilſt I do not know what juſtice is; I ſhall hardly know whether it be ſome virtue, or not; and whether he who poſſeſſes it, be unhappy, or happy.

THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

THE SECOND BOOK.

WHEN I had ſaid theſe things, I imagined that the debate was over; but this it ſeems was only the introduction. For Glauco, as he is on all occaſions moſt courageous, ſo truly at that time did not approve of Thraſymachus, in giving up the debate: but ſaid, Socrates! deſire you to ſeem to have perſuaded us; or to have perſuaded us in reality; that in every reſpect it is better to be juſt than unjuſt? I would chuſe, ſaid I, to do it in reality, if it depended on me. You do not then, ſaid he, do what you deſire. For, tell me, does there appear to you any good of this kind; ſuch as we would chuſe to have; not regarding the conſequences, but embracing it for its own ſake? As joy, and ſuch pleaſures as are harmleſs; though nothing elſe ariſes afterwards from theſe pleaſures, than that the poſſeſſion gives us delight. There ſeems to me, ſaid I, to be ſomething of this kind. But what? is there ſomething too, which we both love for its own ſake, and alſo for what ariſes from it? As wiſdom, ſight, and health: for we ſome how embrace theſe things, on both accounts. Yes, ſaid I. But do you perceive, ſaid he, a third ſpecies of good, among which is bodily labour, to be healed when ſick, to practiſe phyſick, or other lucrative employment; for we ſay, thoſe things are troubleſome; but that they profit us; and we

ſhould not chuſe theſe things for their own ſake, but on account of the rewards, and thoſe other advantages which ariſe from them. There is then, indeed, ſaid I, likewiſe this third kind. But what now? in which of theſe, ſaid he, do you place juſtice? I imagine, ſaid I, in the moſt handſome; which, both on its own account, and account of what ariſes from it, is deſired by the man who is in purſuit of happineſs. It doth not, however, ſaid he, ſeem ſo to the generality; but to be of the troubleſome kind, which is purſued for the ſake of glory, and on account of rewards and honours; but, on its own account, is to be ſhunned, as being difficult. I know, ſaid I, that it ſeems ſo; and, it was in this view, that Thraſymachus a while ago deſpiſed it, and commended injuſtice; but, it ſeems, I am one of thoſe who are dull in learning. Come, then, ſaid he, hear me likewiſe, if this be agreeable to you: for Thraſymachus ſeems to me, to have been charmed by you, like an adder, ſooner than was proper; but, with reſpect to myſelf, the proof hath not come out hitherto to my ſatisfaction, in reference to neither of the two: for I deſire to hear, what each is, and what power it hath, by itſelf, when in the ſoul; letting alone the rewards and the conſequences ariſing from them. I will proceed, therefore, in this manner, if it ſeem proper to you: I will renew the ſpeech of Thraſymachus; and, firſt of all, I will tell you, what they ſay juſtice is, and whence it ariſeth; and, ſecondly, that all thoſe who purſue it, purſue it unwillingly; as neceſſary, but not as good: Thirdly, that they do this reaſonably;

for, as they ſay, the life of an unjuſt man is much better than that of the juſt. Although, for my own part, to me, Socrates! it doth not yet appear ſo; I am, however, in doubt; having my ears ſtunned in hearing Thraſymachus, and innumerable others. But I have never, hitherto, heard from any one, as I incline, a diſcourſe concerning juſtice, as being better than injuſtice: I want, then, to hear it commended, as it is in itſelf; and, I moſt eſpecially imagine, I ſhall hear this from you: wherefore, pulling oppoſitely, I ſhall ſpeak in commendation of an unjuſt life; and, in ſpeaking, ſhall ſhew you in what manner I want to hear you condemn injuſtice, and commend juſtice. But ſee, if what I ſay be agreeable to you. Extremely ſo, ſaid I. For what would any man of underſtanding delight more to ſpeak, and to hear of frequently.

You ſpeak moſt handſomely, ſaid he. And hear what, I ſaid, I was firſt to ſpeak of: what juſtice is, and whence it ariſes: for, they ſay, that, according to nature, to do injuſtice, is good; but to ſuffer injuſtice, is bad: But that the evil which ariſes from ſuffering injuſtice, is greater than the good which ariſes from doing it; ſo that after men had done one another injuſtice, and likewiſe ſuffered it, and had experienced both; it ſeemed proper to thoſe who were not able to ſhun the one, and chuſe the other; to agree among themſelves, neither to do injuſtice, nor to be injured. And that hence laws begun to be eſtabliſhed, and their compacts; and that which was enjoined by law, they denominated lawful, and juſt;

and that this is the origin, and eſſence of juſtice. Being in the middle between what is beſt, when he who does injuſtice is not puniſhed; and of what is worſt, when the injured perſon is unable to puniſh; and that juſtice, being thus in the middle of both theſe, is deſired, not as good, but is held in honour from an imbecillity in doing injuſtice. For the man who had ability to do ſo, would never, if really a man, agree with any one, either to injure, or to be injured, for otherwiſe he were mad. This, then, Socrates! and of ſuch a kind as this, is the nature of juſtice, and this, as they ſay, is its origin. And, we ſhall beſt perceive that theſe who purſue it, purſue it, unwillingly; and from an impotence to injure; if we imagine in our mind ſuch a caſe as this: Let us give liberty to each of them, both to the juſt, and to the unjuſt; to do whatever they incline; and then let us follow them, obſerving how their inclination will lead each of them: We ſhould, then, find the juſt man, with full inclination, going the ſame way with the unjuſt; through a deſire of having more than others. This, every nature is made to purſue as good, but by law is forcibly led to an equality. And the liberty which I ſpeak of, may be chiefly of this kind; if they happened to have ſuch a power, as they ſay happened once to Gyges, the progenitor of Lydus: for, they ſay, that he was the hired ſhepherd of the then governour of Lydia; and that a prodigious rain and earthquake happening, part of the earth was rent, and an opening made in the place where he paſtured her flocks; that when he beheld, and wonder-

Gyges's Ring.

ed, he went down, and ſaw many other wonders, handed down to us in way of tradition, and a brazen horſe likewiſe, hollow and with doors; and, on looking in, he ſaw within, a dead body larger in appearance, than that of a man; which had nothing elſe upon it, but a gold ring, on its hand; which ring he took off, and came up again. That when there was a convention of the ſhepherds, as uſual, for reporting to the king what related to their flocks, he alſo came, having the ring. And whilſt he ſate with the others, he happened to turn the ſtone of the ring to the inner part of his hand, and when this was done, he became inviſible to thoſe who ſate by, and they talked of him as abſent: That he wondered, and again handling his ring, turned the ſtone outward; and on this became viſible: And that, having obſerved this, he made trial of the ring, whether it had this power; and that it happened, that on turning the ſtone inward, he became inviſible, and on turning it outward, he became viſible. That perceiving this, he inſtantly got himſelf made one of the embaſſy to the king, and, that on his arrival, he debauched his wife; and, with her, aſſaulting the king, killed him, and poſſeſſed the kingdom: If, now, there were two ſuch rings, and the juſt man had the one, and the unjuſt the other; none, it ſeems, would be ſo adamantine as to perſevere in juſtice, and dare to refrain from the things of others, and not to touch them; whilſt it was in his power to take, even from the Forum, without fear, whatever he pleaſed; to enter into houſes, and embrace any one he pleaſed; to

kill, and to looſe from chains, whom he pleaſed; and to do all other things with the ſame power as a God among men: Acting, in this manner, he is no way different from the other; but both of them go the ſame road. This, now, one may ſay, is a ſtrong proof, that no one is juſt from choice, but by conſtraint; as it is not a good, merely in itſelf; ſince every one does injuſtice, wherever he imagines he is able to do it; for every man imagines that injuſtice, is, to the particular perſon, more profitable than juſtice; and he imagines juſtly, according to this way of reaſoning: Since if any one with ſuch a liberty, would never do any injuſtice, nor touch the things of others, he would be deemed by men of ſenſe, to be the moſt wretched, and moſt void of underſtanding; yet would they commend him before one another; impoſing on each other, from a fear of being injured. Thus much, then, concerning theſe things. But with reference to the difference of their lives, whom we ſpeak of; we ſhall be able to diſcern aright, if we ſet, apart, by themſelves, the moſt juſt man, and the moſt unjuſt, and not otherwiſe; and, now, what is this ſeparation? Let us take from the unjuſt man, nothing of injuſtice; nor, of juſtice, from the juſt man: But let us make each of them perfect, in his own profeſſion: And, firſt, as to the unjuſt man; let him act as the able artiſts; as a complete pilot, or phyſician, he comprehends the poſſible, and the impoſſible in the art; the one, he attempts; and the other, he lets alone; and, if he fail in any thing, he is able to rectify it: So, in like manner, the unjuſt man,

attempting pieces of injuſtice, in a dextrous manner, let him be concealed; if he want to be exceedingly unjuſt; but, if he be caught, let him be deemed worthleſs. For the moſt complete injuſtice, is to ſeem juſt, not being ſo: We muſt give, then, to the completely unjuſt, the moſt complete injuſtice; and not take from him, but allow him, whilſt doing the greateſt injuſtice, to procure to himſelf the higheſt reputation for juſtice; and, if in any thing he fail, let him be able to rectify it: And let him be able to ſpeak ſo as to perſuade, if any thing of his injuſtice be ſpread abroad: Let him be able to do by force, what requires force, through his courage, and ſtrength, and by means of his friends, and his wealth: And having ſet him up ſuch an one as this, let us place the juſt man beſide him, in our reaſoning, a ſimple and ingenuous man; deſiring, according to Aeſchylus, not the appearance, but the reality of goodneſs: Let us take from him the appearance of goodneſs; for, if he ſhall appear to be juſt, he ſhall have honours, and rewards; and thus it may be uncertain whether he be ſuch for the ſake of juſtice, or on account of the rewards and honours: Let him be ſtrip'd of every thing but juſtice; and be made quite contrary to the other; whilſt he doth no injuſtice, let him have the reputation of doing the greateſt; that he may be tortur'd for juſtice, not yielding to reproach, and ſuch things as ariſe from it, but may be immoveable 'till death; appearing, indeed, to be unjuſt, through life, yet being really juſt; that ſo, both of them, arriving at the utmoſt pitch, the one, of juſtice; and the other, of

injuſtice; we may judge which of them is the happier. Strange! ſaid I, friend Glauco! how ſtrenuouſly you clean up each of the men, as a ſtatue, which is to be judged of. As much, ſaid he, as I am able: whilſt, then, they continue to be ſuch, there will not, as I imagine, be any further difficulty to obſerve what kind of life remains to each of them. It muſt, therefore, be told. And, if poſſibly, it ſhould be told with greater ruſticity, imagine not, Socrates! that it is I who tell it, but thoſe who commend injuſtice preferably to juſtice; and they will ſay theſe things: That the juſt man, being of this diſpoſition, will be ſcourged, tormented, fettered, have his eyes burnt, and, laſtly, having ſuffered all manner of evils, will be crucified; and he ſhall know, that he ſhould not deſire the reality, but the appearance of juſtice: And that it is much more proper to pronounce that ſaying of Aeſchylus, concerning the unjuſt man: For they will in reality ſay, that the unjuſt man, as being in purſuit of what is real; and living, not according to the opinion of men, wants not to have the appearance, but the reality of injuſtice.

Reaping the hollow furrow of his mind,
Whence all his glorious councils bloſſom forth.

In the firſt place, he holds the magiſtracy in the ſtate, being thought to be juſt; next he marries wherever he inclines; and matches his children with whom he pleaſes; he joins in partnerſhip, and company, with whom he inclines; and, beſides all this, he will ſucceed in all his projects for gain; as he doth not ſcruple to do injuſtice; when then he engages in competitions, he will

both in private, and in public, ſurpaſs and exceed his adverſaries; and, by this means, he will be rich, and ſerve his friends, and hurt his enemies: and he will amply, and magnificently, render ſacrifices, and offerings to the Gods, and will honour the Gods, and ſuch men as he chuſes, much better than the juſt man. From whence, they reckon, that it is likely he will be more beloved of the Gods, than the juſt man. Thus, they ſay, Socrates! that both with Gods, and men, there is a better life prepared for the unjuſt man, than for the juſt. When Glauco had ſaid theſe things, I had a deſign to ſay ſomething in reply. But his brother Adimantus ſaid; Socrates! you do not imagine there is yet enough ſaid on the argument. What further then? ſaid I. That hath not yet been ſpoken, ſaid he, which ought moſt eſpecially to have been mentioned. Why, then, ſaid I, the proverb is; A brother is help at hand. So do you aſſiſt, if he has failed in any thing. Though what hath been ſaid by him, is ſufficient to throw me down, and make me unable to ſuccour juſtice.

You ſay nothing, reply'd he. But hear this further. For we muſt go through all the arguments oppoſite to what he hath ſaid, which commend juſtice, and condemn injuſtice, that what Glauco ſeems to me to intend may be more manifeſt. Now, parents ſurely tell and exhort their ſons, as do all thoſe who have the care of any, that it is neceſſary to be juſt; not commending juſtice in itſelf, but the honours ariſing from it; that whilſt a man is reputed to be juſt, he may get by this reputation, ma-

giftracies, and marriages, and whatever Glauco juſt now enumerated as the conſequence of being reputed juſt: But theſe men carry this matter of reputation ſomewhat further; for throwing in the approbation of the Gods, they have unſpeakable bleſſings to enumerate to holy perſons; which, they ſay, the Gods beſtow. As the generous Heſiod, and Homer, ſay; the one, that the Gods cauſe the oaks to produce to juſt men,

Acorns at top, and in the middle bees;
Their woolly ſheep are laden with their fleece;

and a great many other good things, of the ſame nature. In like manner, the other,

The blameleſs king, who holds a godlike name,
Barley, and wheat, his black mold brings him forth;
With fruit his trees are laden; and his flocks
Bring forth with eaſe; the ſea affords him fiſh.

But Muſaeus, and his ſon, tell us that the Gods, give juſt men more ſplendid bleſſings than theſe; for, carrying them, in his poem, into the other world; and, ſetting them down in company with holy men at a feaſt prepared for them; they crown them, and make them paſs the whole of their time, in drinking, deeming eternal inebriation, the fineſt reward of virtue. But ſome carry the rewards from the Gods, ſtill further; for they ſay that the offspring of the holy, and the faithful, and their childrens children ſtill remain. With theſe things, and ſuch as theſe, they commend juſtice. But the unholy and unjuſt, they bury in the other world, in a kind of mud; and compel them to carry water in a ſieve: and,

making them even whilſt alive, to live in infamy. Whatever puniſhments were aſſigned by Glauco to the juſt, whilſt they were reputed unjuſt; theſe they aſſign to the unjuſt, but no others they mention. This, now, is the way in which they commend, and diſcommend them ſeverally: But beſides this, Socrates! conſider another kind of reaſoning concerning juſtice, and injuſtice; mentioned both privately and by the poets: for all of them, with one mouth, celebrate temperance, and juſtice, as, indeed, excellent; but yet difficult, and laborious: and intemperance and injuſtice, as, indeed, pleaſant, and eaſy to attain; but, by opinion only, and, by law, abominable: And they ſay, that for the moſt part, unjuſt actions are more profitable than juſt. And they are gladly willing, both in public, and private, to pay honour to wicked rich men, and ſuch as have power of any kind, and to pronounce them happy, but to contemn and overlook thoſe who are any how weak and poor; even whilſt they acknowledge them to be better than the others: But of all theſe ſpeeches, the moſt marvellous are thoſe concerning the Gods, and virtue: as if, even, the Gods gave to many good men, misfortunes, and an evil life; and to contrary perſons, a contrary fate: And mountebanks and prophets, frequenting the gates of the rich, perſuade them, that they have a power, granted them by the Gods, of expiating by ſacrifices, and ſongs, with pleaſures, and with feaſtings, if any injuſtice hath been committed by any one, or his forefathers: And if he want to blaſt any enemy; at a ſmall expence, he ſhall injure the juſt, in the

ſame manner as the unjuſt; by certain blandiſhments, and bonds, as they ſay, perſuading the Gods, to ſuccour them: And to all theſe diſcourſes, they bring the poets, as witneſſes; who, mentioning the proneneſs to vice, ſay;

How vice at once, and eaſily is got;
The way is ſmooth, and very nigh it dwells;
Sweat, before virtue, by the Gods is placed,

and a certain long, and ſteep way. Others make Homer witneſs how the Gods, are prevailed on by men, becauſe he ſays,

-----The Gods themſelves are turn'd
With ſacrifices, and appeaſing vows;
Libation, and with fat, men, them perſuade;
Praying when one tranſgreſſes, and offends.

They ſhew, likewiſe, a great many books of Muſaeus, and Orpheus, the offspring, as they ſay, of the moon, and of the Muſes; according to which they perform their ſacred rites, perſuading not only private perſons, but ſtates likewiſe; that there are abſolutions, and purgations from iniquities, by means of ſacrifices and ſportive pleaſures; and this, for the benefit both of the living, and of the dead: theſe they call the myſteries, which abſolve us from evils there; but that dreadful things await ſuch who do not offer ſacrifice. All theſe, and ſo many things of the kind, friend Socrates! being ſaid of virtue and vice, and their reward both with men, and Gods; what do we imagine the ſouls of our youth do, when they hear them; ſuch of them as are of good birth, and able as it were to ruſh into all theſe things which are ſaid, and from

all to deliberate in what ſort of character, and in what ſort of road one may beſt paſs through life? He might likely ſay to himſelf; according to that of Pindar,

Whether ſhall I, the lofty wall
Of juſtice, try to ſcale;
Or, hedged within the winding maze
Of vice, ſtill ſhall I dwell?

For, according to what is ſaid, though I be juſt, if I be not reputed ſo, there ſhall be no profit, but manifeſt troubles, and puniſhments. But the unjuſt man, who procures to himſelf the character of juſtice, is ſaid to have a divine life. Since then the appearance ſurpaſſes the reality, as wiſe men demonſtrate to me, and is the primary part of happineſs, ought I not to turn wholly to it; and to draw round myſelf as a covering, and picture, the image of virtue; but to draw after me the cunning and verſatile fox of the moſt wiſe Archilochus? But, ſays one, it is not eaſy, being wicked, always to be concealed: Neither is any thing elſe eaſy (will we ſay) which is great. But, however, if we would be happy, thither let us go, where the ſteps of the reaſonings lead us. For, in order to be concealed, we will make conjurations, and aſſociations together; and there are maſters of perſuaſion, who teach a popular and political wiſdom; by which means, whilſt partly by perſuaſion, and partly by force, we ſeize more than our due, we ſhall not be puniſhed. But, ſurely, to be concealed from the Gods, or to overpower them, is impoſſible.

If then they be not at all, or care not about human

affairs, we need not have any concern about being concealed: but if they really are, and care for us, we neither know, nor have heard of them otherwiſe, than from traditions; and from the poets who write their genealogies; and theſe very perſons tell us, that they are to be moved, and perſuaded by ſacrifices, and appeaſing vows, and offerings. Both of which, we are to believe, or neither: If then, we are to believe both; we may do injuſtice, and of the fruits of our injuſtice, offer ſacrifice; if we be juſt, we ſhall indeed be unpuniſhed by the Gods; but then, we ſhall not have the gains of injuſtice: but if we be unjuſt, we ſhall make gain; and after we have tranſgreſſed and offended, we ſhall appeaſe them by offerings, and come off unpuniſhed: but we ſhall be puniſhed in the other world, for our unjuſt doings here; either we ourſelves, or our childrens children: but, friend! will the reaſoner ſay, the myſteries can do much; the Gods are exorable, as ſay the mightieſt ſtates, and the children of the Gods, the poets; who are alſo their prophets, who declare that theſe things are ſo. For what reaſon then, ſhould we ſtill prefer juſtice before the greateſt injuſtice; which if we ſhall attain to, with any deceiving appearance, we ſhall fare according to our mind, both with reference to Gods and men, both living and dying, according to the ſpeech now mentioned, of many and excellent men? From all which hath been ſaid, by what means ſhall one incline to honour juſtice, who hath any ability of fortune or of wealth, of body, or of birth; and not laugh when he hears it commended. So

that, though one were able even to ſhew, what we have ſaid to be falſe, and fully underſtood that juſtice is better; he hath however, great allowance ſurely to give; and is not angry at the unjuſt; for he knows, that unleſs one from a divine temper, abhors to do injuſtice, or from acquired knowledge, abſtain from it, of others no one is willingly juſt; but either through cowardice, old age, or ſome other weakneſs condemns the doing injuſtice, when unable to do it. That it is ſo, is plain. For the firſt of theſe who gets it in his power, is the firſt to do injuſtice, as far as he is able. And the reaſon of all this, is no other than that from whence all this diſcourſe proceeded, Socrates! becauſe, rare friend! of you all, as many as call yourſelves the commenders of juſtice, beginning from thoſe ancient heroes, of whom any accounts are left to the men of the preſent time; no one hath at any time condemned injuſtice, nor commended juſtice, otherwiſe than regarding the reputations, honours, and rewards, ariſing from them: but no one hath hitherto ſufficiently examined, neither in poetry nor in proſe-diſcourſe, either of them, in itſelf; and ſubſiſting by its own power, in the ſoul of him who hath it; and concealed from both Gods and men: how that the one is the greateſt of all the evils, which the ſoul hath within it, and juſtice the greateſt good: For if it had thus from the beginning been ſpoken of by you all; and you had ſo perſuaded us from our youth; we would not need to watch over our neighbour, leſt he ſhould do us injuſtice, but every man would have been the beſt guardian over him-

ſelf, afraid, leſt in doing injuſtice, he ſhould dwell with the greateſt evil. Theſe things, now Socrates! and probably much more than theſe, Thraſymachus or ſome other might ſay of juſtice and injuſtice, inverting their power, diſagreeably as I imagine, for my own part: But I, (for I want to conceal nothing from you) being deſirous to hear you on the oppoſite ſide, ſpeak the beſt I am able, pulling the contrary way. Do not, therefore, only ſhew us in your reaſoning, that juſtice is better than injuſtice; but, in what manner, each of them by itſelf, affecting the mind, is, the one, evil; and the other, good. And take away all opinions, as Glauco likewiſe enjoined: for if you do not take away the falſe opinions on both ſides, and add the true ones; we will ſay you do not commend juſtice, but the appearance; nor condemn being unjuſt, but the appearance; and that you give it as your advice to be unjuſt when concealed; and that you aſſent to Thraſymachus, that juſtice is a foreign good; the profit of the more powerful; and that injuſtice is the profit and advantage of one's ſelf; but unprofitable to the inferior. Wherefore, now, after that you have acknowledged that juſtice is among the greateſt goods, ſuch as are worthy to be poſſeſſed for what ariſes from them, and much more in themſelves, and for their own ſake; ſuch as, ſight, hearing, wiſdom, health, and ſuch other goods, as are real in their own nature, and not merely in opinion; in the ſame manner commend juſtice; how, in itſelf, it profits the owner, and injuſtice hurts him. And leave to others to commend the re-

wards, and opinions; for, I could bear with others, in this way, commending juſtice, and condemning injuſtice, celebrating and reviling their opinions, and rewards; but not with you, (unleſs you deſire me) becauſe you have paſſed the whole of life, conſidering nothing elſe but this. Shew us, then, in your diſcourſe, not only that juſtice is better than injuſtice; but, in what manner, each of them by itſelf affecting the owner, whether he be concealed, or not concealed from Gods, and men, is, the one, good, and the other evil.

On hearing theſe things, as I always indeed liked the diſpoſition of Glauco, and Adimantus; ſo, at that time, I was perfectly delighted; and ſaid; It was not ill ſaid, concerning you, ſons of that worthy man! by the lover of Glauco, who wrote the beginning of the Elegies, when celebrating your behaviour, at the battle of Megara, he ſaid;

Ariſto's ſons! of an illuſtrious man,
The race divine------

This, friends! ſeems to be well ſaid; for you are truly affected in a divine manner, if you are not perſuaded that injuſtice is better than juſtice, and yet are able to ſpeak thus for it: And, to me, you ſeem, truly, not to be perſuaded; and I reaſon from the whole of your other behaviour, ſince, according to your preſent ſpeeches at leaſt, I ſhould diſtruſt you: But the more I can truſt you, the more I am in doubt, what argument I ſhall uſe. For I can neither think of any aſſiſtance I have to give; (for I ſeem to be unable, and my mark is, that you do not accept of what I ſaid to Thraſymachus, when, I imagined,

I ſhow'd that juſtice was better than injuſtice;) nor yet can I think of giving no aſſiſtance; for I am afraid leſt it be an unholy thing, to deſert juſtice when I am preſent, and ſee it accuſed, and not aſſiſt it whilſt I breathe, and am able to ſpeak. It is beſt then to ſuccour it, in ſuch a manner as I can. Hereupon Glauco, and the reſt entreated me, by all means, to aſſiſt, and not give over the diſcourſe; but to ſearch thoroughly what each of them is, and which way the truth lies, as to their reſpective advantage. I, then, ſaid what appeared to me: That the inquiry we were attempting, was not contemptible; but was that of one who was ſharp-ſighted, as I imagined. Since then, ſaid I, we are not very expert, it ſeems proper to make the inquiry concerning this matter, in ſuch a manner, as if it were ordered thoſe who are not very ſharp-ſighted, to read ſmall letters at a diſtance; and one ſhould afterwards underſtand, that the ſame letters, are greater ſomewhere elſe, and in a larger field; it would appear eligible, I imagine, firſt to read theſe, and thus come to conſider the leſſer, if they happen to be the ſame. Perfectly right, ſaid Adimantus. But what of this kind, Socrates! do you perceive in the inquiry concerning juſtice? I ſhall tell you, ſaid I. Do not we ſay, there is juſtice in one man, and there is likewiſe juſtice, in a whole ſtate? It is certainly ſo, reply'd he. Is not a ſtate, a greater object than one man? Greater, ſaid he. It is likely, then, that juſtice ſhould be greater in what is greater; and be more eaſy to be underſtood: We ſhall, firſt, then, if you incline, inquire what it is, in

ſtates; and, then, after the ſame manner, we ſhall conſider it in each individual; contemplating the ſimilitude of the greater, in the idea of the leſſer. You ſeem to me, ſaid he, to ſay right. If then, ſaid I, we contemplate, in our diſcourſe, a ſtate exiſting, ſhall we not perceive its juſtice and injuſtice exiſting? Perhaps, ſaid he. And, is there not ground to hope, if this exiſts, that we ſhall more eaſily find what we ſeek for? Moſt certainly. It ſeems, then, we ought to attempt to ſucceed; for, I imagine, this to be a work of no ſmall importance. Conſider then. We are conſidering, ſaid Adimantus, and do you no otherwiſe. A city, then, ſaid I, as I imagine, takes its riſe from this, that none of us happens to be ſelf-ſufficient, but is indigent of many things; or, do you imagine there is any other origin of building a city? None other, ſaid he. Thus then, one taking in one perſon, for one indigence; and another, for another; as they ſtand in need of many things, they aſſemble into one habitation, many companions and aſſiſtants; and to this joint-habitation, we give the name city, do not we? Certainly. And they mutually exchange with one another; each judging that if he either gives, or takes in exchange, it will be for his advantage. Certainly. Come, then, ſaid I, let us, in our diſcourſe, make a city from the beginning. And, it ſeems, our indigence hath made it. Why not? But the firſt and the greateſt of wants, is the preparation of food, in order to ſubſiſt and live. By all means. The ſecond is of lodging. The third, of cloathing; and ſuch like. It is ſo. But, come, ſaid I,

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how ſhall the city be able to make ſo great a proviſion? ſhall not one be a huſbandman, another a maſon, ſome other a weaver; or, ſhall we add to them a ſhoemaker; or ſome other of thoſe who miniſter to the neceſſaries of the body? Certainly. So that the moſt indigent city might conſiſt of four, or five men? It ſeems ſo. But, what now? muſt each of thoſe do his work for them all in common: As the huſbandman, being one, ſhall he prepare food for four; and conſume quadruple time, and labour, in preparing food, and ſharing it with others; or, neglecting them, ſhall he for himſelf alone, make the fourth part of this food, in the fourth part of the time; and, of the other three parts of time, ſhall he employ one in the preparation of a houſe; the other, in that of cloathing; the other, of ſhoes; and not give himſelf trouble in ſharing with others; but do his own affairs by himſelf?

Adimantus ſaid; and probably, Socrates! this way is more eaſy than the other. No, certainly, ſaid I; it were abſurd. For whilſt you are ſpeaking, I conſider that we are born not perfectly reſembling one another; but differing in diſpoſition; one, being fitted for doing one thing; and another, for doing another: Does it not ſeem ſo to you? It does. But, what now? Whether will one do better, if being one, he works in many arts, or in one? When in one, ſaid he. But this, I imagine, is alſo plain; that if one miſs the ſeaſon of any work, it is ruined. That is plain. For, I imagine, the work will not wait upon the leiſure of the workman; but, of neceſſity, the

workman muſt attend cloſe upon the work, and not in way of a by-job. Of neceſſity. And hence it appears, that more will be done, and better, and with greater eaſe, when every one does but one thing, according to their genius, and in proper ſeaſon, and freed from other things. Moſt certainly, ſaid he. But we need certainly, Adimantus! more citizens than four, for thoſe proviſions we mentioned: For the huſbandman, it would ſeem, will not make a plough for himſelf, if it is to be handſome; nor yet a ſpade, nor other inſtruments of agriculture; as little will the maſon; for he, likwiſe, needs many things: and in the ſame way the weaver, and the ſhoemaker, likewiſe. Is it not ſo? True. Joiners, then, and ſmiths, and other ſuch workmen being admitted into our little city, make it throng. Certainly. But it would be no very great matter neither, if we did not give them neatherds likewiſe, and ſhepherds, and thoſe other herdſmen; in order that both the huſhandmen may have oxen for ploughing, and that the maſons, with the help of the huſbandmen, may uſe the cattle for their carriages: and that the weavers likewiſe, and the ſhoemakers may have hides and wool. Nor yet, ſaid he, would it be a very ſmall city, having all theſe. But, ſaid I, it is almoſt impoſſible to ſet down ſuch a city in any ſuch place, as that it ſhall need no importations. It is impoſſible. It ſhall then certainly want others ſtill, who may import from another ſtate what it needs. It ſhall want them. And ſurely this ſervice would be empty, if it carry out nothing, which theſe want, from whom they

import what they need themſelves. It goes out empty in ſuch a caſe, does it not? To me, it ſeems ſo. But the city ought not only to make what is ſufficient for itſelf; but ſuch things and ſo much alſo, as may anſwer for thoſe things they need. It ought. Our city, then, certainly, wants a great many more huſbandmen and other workmen? A great many more. And other ſervants beſides, to import and export the ſeveral things: and theſe are merchants, are they not? Yes. We ſhall then want merchants likewiſe? Yes, indeed. And if the merchandiſe is by ſea, it will want many others; ſuch as are ſkilful in ſea affairs. Many others, truly. But what, as to the city within itſelf? How will they exchange with one another, the things which they have each of them worked; and for the ſake of which, making a community, they have built a city? It is plain, ſaid he, in ſelling, and buying. Hence we muſt have a mercat-place, and money, as a ſymbol, for the ſake of exchange. Certainly.

If now the huſbandman, or any other workman, bring any of his work to the mercat, but come not at the ſame time with thoſe who want to make exchange with him, muſt he not be ſet idle from his work, ſitting in the mercat? By no means, ſaid he. But there are ſome, who obſerving this, ſet themſelves to this ſervice; and, in well-regulated cities, they are moſtly ſuch as are weakeſt in their body, and unfit to do any other work. There they are to attend about the mercat, to give money in exchange for ſuch things as any may want to ſell;

and things in exchange for money to ſuch as want to buy. This indigence, ſaid I, procures our city a race of ſhop-keepers; for do not we call ſhop-keepers, thoſe, who, fixed in the mercat, ſerve both in ſelling and buying; but ſuch as travel to other cities, we call merchants? Certainly.

There are ſtill, as I imagine, certain other miniſters, who, though unfit to ſerve the public in things which require underſtanding, have yet ſtrength of body ſufficient for labour, who, ſelling the uſe of their ſtrength, and calling the reward of it, hire, are called, as I imagine, hirelings: are they not? Yes, indeed. Hirelings, then, are, it ſeems, the complement of the city? It ſeems ſo. Hath our city now, Adimantus! already ſo encreaſed upon us, as to be complete? Perhaps. Where, now, at all, ſhould juſtice, and injuſtice be in it; and, in which of the things that we have conſidered, does it appear to exiſt? I do not know, ſaid he, Socrates! if it be not in a certain uſe, ſome how, of theſe things, with one another. Perhaps, ſaid I, you ſay right. But we muſt conſider it, and not weary. Firſt, then, let us conſider, after what manner, thoſe who are thus procured, ſhall be ſupported. Is it any other way, than by making bread, and wine, and cloaths, and ſhoes, and building houſes: in Summer, indeed, they will work for the moſt part, without cloaths, and ſhoes; and, in Winter, they will be ſufficiently furniſhed with cloaths and ſhoes, they will be nouriſhed, partly with barley, making meal of it, and partly with wheat, making loaves, boiling part, and toaſting part,

putting fine loaves and cakes over a fire of ſtubble, or over dried leaves, and reſting themſelves on couches, ſtrawed with ſmilax, and myrtle leaves, they and their children will feaſt, drinking wine, and crown'd, and ſinging to the Gods, they will pleaſantly live together, begetting children, not beyond their ſubſtance, guarding againſt poverty or war.

Glauco, replying, ſays; You make the men to feaſt, as it appears, without meats. You ſay true, ſaid I; for I forget that they ſhall have meats likewiſe. They ſhall have ſalt, and olives, and cheeſe; and they ſhall boil bulbous roots, and herbs of the field; and we ſet before them deſerts of figs, and vetches, and beans; and they will toaſt at the fire, myrtle berries; and the berries of the beech-tree; drinking in moderation; and thus paſſing their life in peace and health; and dying, as is likely, in old age, they will leave to their children another ſuch life. If you had been making, Socrates! ſaid he, a city of hogs, what elſe would you have fed them with, but with theſe things? But how ſhould we do, Glauco! ſaid I? What is uſually done, ſaid he. They muſt, as I imagine, have their beds, and tables, and meats, and deſerts, as we now have, if they are not to be miſerable. Be it ſo, ſaid I, I underſtand you. We conſider, it ſeems, not only how a city may exiſt; but how a luxurious city; and, perhaps, it is not amiſs; for, in conſidering ſuch an one, we may probably ſee how juſtice, and injuſtice, have their origin in cities. But the true city ſeems to me to be ſuch an one as we have deſcribed; like one who is heal-

thy; but if you incline that we likewiſe conſider a city that is corpulent; nothing hinders it. For theſe things will not, it ſeems, pleaſe ſome; nor this ſort of life ſatiſfy them; but there ſhall be beds, and tables, and all other furniture; ſeaſonings, ointments, and perfumes, miſtreſſes, and confections, and various kinds of all theſe. And we muſt no longer conſider as alone neceſſary what we mentioned at the firſt; houſes, and cloaths, and ſhoes, but painting too, and all the curious arts muſt be ſet a-going, and carving, and gold, and ivory; and all theſe things muſt be got, muſt they not? Yes, ſaid he. Muſt not the city, then, be larger? For that healthy one is no longer ſufficient, but is already full of luxury, and of a croud of ſuch as are no way neceſſary to cities; ſuch as all kinds of ſportſmen, and the imitative artiſts, many of them imitating in figures, and colours; and others in muſic: poets too, and their miniſters, rhapſodiſts, actors, dancers, undertakers, workmen of all ſorts of inſtruments; and what hath reference to female ornaments, as well as other things. We ſhall need likewiſe many more ſervants. Do not you think they will need pedagogues, and nurſes, and tutors, hair-dreſſers, barbers, victuallers too, and cooks? And further ſtill, we ſhall want ſwine-herds likewiſe; of theſe, there were none in the other city, (for there needed not) but, in this, we ſhall want theſe, and many other ſorts of herds likewiſe; if any eats the ſeveral animals, ſhall we not? Why not? Shall we not then, in this manner of life, be much more in need of phyſicians, than formerly? Much more. And the coun-

try, which was then ſufficient to ſupport the inhabitants, will, inſtead of being ſufficient, become too little; or how ſhall we ſay? In this way, ſaid he. Muſt we not then encroach upon the neighbouring country; if we want to have ſufficient for plough and paſture, and they, in like manner, on us; if they likewiſe ſuffer themſelves to accumulate wealth to infinity; going beyond the boundary of neceſſaries? There is great neceſſity for it, Socrates! Shall we, afterwards, fight, Glauco! Or, how ſhall we do? We ſhall certainly, ſaid he. But we ſay nothing, ſaid I, whether war does any evil, or any good; but this much only, that we have found the origin of war; from whence, moſt eſpecially, ariſe the greateſt miſchiefs to ſtates, both private and public. Yes, indeed. We ſhall need, then, friend! ſtill a larger city; not for a ſmall, but for a large army, who, in going out, may fight with thoſe who aſſault them, for their whole ſubſtance, and every thing we have now mentioned. What, ſaid he, are not theſe ſufficient to fight? No; if you, at leaſt, ſaid I, and all of us, have rightly agreed, when we form'd our city: and we agreed, if you remember, that it was impoſſible for one to perform many arts handſomely. You ſay true, ſaid he. What then, ſaid I, as to that conteſt of war; does it not appear to require art? Very much, ſaid he. Ought we then to take more care of the art of ſhoe-making, than of the art of making war? By no means. But we charged the ſhoemaker neither to undertake, at the ſame time, to be a huſbandman, nor a weaver, nor a maſon, but a ſhoemaker; that the work of that art may

be done for us handſomely: and, in like manner, we allotted to every one of the reſt, one thing; to which the genius of each led him, and what each took care of, freed from other things, to do it well, applying to it the whole of his life, and not neglecting the ſeaſons of working. And now, as to the affairs of war, whether is it of the greateſt importance, that they be well performed? Or, is this ſo eaſy a thing, that one may be a huſbandman, and likewiſe a ſoldier; and ſhoemaker; or be employed in any other art; but not even at cheſs, or dice, can one ever play ſkilfully, unleſs he ſtudy this very thing from his childhood, and not make it a by-work. Or, ſhall one, taking a ſpear, or any other of the warlike arms, and inſtruments, become inſtantly an expert combatant, in an encounter in arms, or in any other relating to war? And, ſhall the taking up of no other inſtrument make a workman, or a wreſtler, nor be uſeful to him, who hath neither the knowledge of that particular thing, nor hath beſtowed the ſtudy ſufficient for it? Such inſtruments, ſaid he, would truly be very valuable.

By how much then, ſaid I, this work of guards is one of the greateſt importance; by ſo much it ſhould require the greateſt leiſure from other things, and likewiſe the greateſt art and ſtudy. I imagine ſo, reply'd he. And, ſhall it not likewiſe require a competent genius for this profeſſion? Why not? It ſhould, ſurely, be our buſineſs, as it ſeems, if we be able, to chuſe, who and what kind of geniuſes, are competent for the guardianſhip of the city. Ours, indeed. We have, truly, ſaid I, under-

taken no mean buſineſs; but, however, we are not to deſpair; ſo long, at leaſt, as we have any ability. No indeed, ſaid he. Do you think then, ſaid I, that the genius of a generous whelp, differs any thing, for guardianſhip, from that of a generous youth? What is it you ſay? It is this. Muſt not each of them be acute in the perception, ſwift to purſue what they perceive, and ſtrong likewiſe if there is need to conquer what they ſhall catch? There is need, ſaid he, of all theſe. And, ſurely, he muſt be brave likewiſe, if he fight well. Why not? But will he be brave, who is not ſpirited; whether it is a horſe, a dog, or any other animal? Or, have you not obſerved, that the ſpirit is ſomewhat unſurmountable and invincible; by the preſence of which, every ſoul is, in reſpect of all things whatever, unterrified, and unconquerable? I have obſerved it. It is plain then, what ſort of a guard we ought to have, with reference to his body. Yes. And with reference to his ſoul, that he ſhould be ſpirited. This, likewiſe, is plain. How then, ſaid I, Glauco! will they not be ſavage towards one another, and the other citizens, being of ſuch a temper? No, truly, ſaid he, not eaſily. But yet, it is neceſſary, that towards their friends, they be meek; and fierce towards their enemies; for otherwiſe they will not wait till others deſtroy them; but they will prevent them, doing it themſelves. True, ſaid he. What then, ſaid I, ſhall we do? Where ſhall we find, at once, the weak and the magnanimous temper? For the meek diſpoſition, is ſome how, oppoſite to the ſpirited. It appears ſo. But, however, if he be deprived of either

of theſe, he cannot be a good guardian: for, it ſeems to be impoſſible: and thus, it appears, that a good guardian is an impoſſible thing. It ſeems ſo, ſaid he. After heſitating, and conſidering what had paſt: Juſtly, ſaid I, friend! are we in doubt: for we have departed from that image which we firſt eſtabliſhed. How ſay you? Have we not obſerved, that there are truly ſuch tempers as we were not imagining, who have theſe oppoſite things? Where then? One may ſee it in other animals, and not a little in that one with which we compared our guardian. For this, you know, is the natural temper of generous dogs; to be moſt mild towards the domeſtics, and their acquaintance; but the reverſe to thoſe they know not. It is ſo. This, then, ſaid I, is poſſible: and it is not againſt nature, that we require our guardian to be ſuch an one. It ſeems not. Are you, further, of this opinion, that he who is to be our guardian, ſhould, beſides being ſpirited, be a philoſopher likewiſe? How, ſaid he; for I do not underſtand you? This, likewiſe, ſaid I, you will obſerve in the dogs; and it is worthy of admiration in the brute. As what? He is angry at whatever unknown perſon he ſees, though he hath never got any harm from him before; but he is fond of whatever acquaintance he ſees, though he hath never at any time received any good from him. Have you not wondered at this? I never, ſaid he, much attended to it before; but, that he doth this, is plain. But indeed, this affection of his nature, ſeems to be an excellent diſpoſition, and truly philoſophical. As how? As,

ſaid I, it diſtinguiſhes betwen a friendly, and unfriendly aſpect; by nothing elſe, but this; that it knows the one, but is ignorant of the other. How now, ſhould not this be deemed the love of learning, which diſtinguiſhes what is friendly, and what is foreign, by knowledge and ignorance; It can no way be ſhewn, why it ſhould not. But however, ſaid I, to be a lover of learning, and a philoſopher, are the ſame. The ſame, ſaid he. May we not, then, boldly ſettle it; that in man too, if any one is to be of a mild diſpoſition towards his domeſtics, and acquaintance, he muſt be a philoſopher, and a lover of learning? Let us ſettle it, ſaid he. He then, who is to be a good and worthy guardian for us, of the city; ſhall be a philoſopher, and ſpirited, and ſwift, and ſtrong, in his diſpoſition. By all means, ſaid he. Let then our guardian, ſaid I, be ſuch an one. But, in what manner, ſhall theſe be educated for us, and inſtructed? And will the conſideration of this, be of any aſſiſtance in perceiving that, for the ſake of which we conſider all elſe? In what manner juſtice and injuſtice, ariſe in the city; that we may not omit a neceſſary part of the diſcourſe; nor conſider what is ſuperfluous? The brother of Glauco ſaid; I, for my part, greatly expect that this inquiry will be of aſſiſtance to that. Truly, ſaid I, friend Adimantus! it is not to be omitted, though it ſhould happen to be ſomewhat tedious. No truly. Come then, let us, as if we were talking in the way of fable, and at our leiſure, educate theſe men in our reaſoning. It muſt be done. What, then, is the education? Or, is it difficult

Philosopher.

to find a better, than that which was found long ago; which is, exercise, for the body; and music, for the mind? It is, indeed. Shall we not then, first, begin with instructing them in music, rather than in exercise? Why not? When you say, music; you mean discourses; do you not? I do. But, of discourses, there are two kinds; the one, true; and the other, false. There are. And they must be educated in them both, and first in the false. I do not understand, said he, what you mean. Do not you understand, said I, that we first of all tell children fables? And this part of music, some how, to speak in the general, is false; yet there is truth in them; and we accustom children to fables, before their exercises. We do so. This, then, is what I meant, when I said, that children were to begin music, before their exercises. Right, said he. And do you not know, that the beginning of every work, is of the greatest importance, especially to any one young and tender; for then, truly, in the easiest manner, is formed, and taken on the impression, which one inclines to imprint, on every individual? It is entirely so. Shall we then suffer the children to hear any kind of fables composed by any kind of persons; and to receive, for the most part, into their minds, opinions contrary to those we judge they ought to have, when they are grown up? We shall by no means suffer it. First of all then, we must preside over the fable-makers. And whatever beautiful fable they make, must be chosen; and what are otherwise must be rejected; and we shall persuade the nurses and mothers to tell the children such

fables, as ſhall be choſen; and to faſhion their minds by fables, much more than their bodies by their hands. But the moſt of what they tell them at preſent, muſt be thrown out. As what, ſaid he? In the greater ones, ſaid I, we ſhall ſee the leſſer likewiſe. For the faſhion of them muſt be the ſame; and both the greater, and the leſſer, muſt have the ſame kind of power. Do not you think ſo? I do, ſaid he. But I do not at all underſtand which you call the greater ones. Thoſe, ſaid I, which Heſiod, and Homer tell us; and the other poets. For they compoſed falſe fables to mankind; and told them as they do ſtill. Which, ſaid he, do you mean; and what is it you blame in them? That, ſaid I, which, firſt of all, and, moſt eſpecially ought to be blamed; when one does not falſify handſomely. What is that? When one, in his compoſition, gives ill repreſentations of the nature of Gods, and heroes: as a painter, drawing a picture, no way reſembling what he wanted to paint. It is right, ſaid he, to blame ſuch things as theſe. But how have they failed, ſay we, and as to what? Firſt of all, with reference to that greateſt lye, and matters of the greateſt importance, he did not lye handſomely, who told how Uranus did what Heſiod ſays he did; and then again how Saturn puniſhed him, and then what Saturn did, and what he ſuffered from his ſon; although they were true, yet I ſhould not imagine they ought to be ſo plainly told to the unwiſe and the young; but ought much rather to be concealed. But if there were a neceſſity to tell them, they ſhould be heard in ſecrecy, by as few as poſſible; after

they had ſacrificed not a hog, but ſome great, and wonderful ſacrifice, that thus the feweſt poſſible might chance to hear them.

Theſe fables, ſaid he, are indeed truly hurtful. And not to be mentioned, Adimantus! ſaid I, in our city. Nor is it to be ſaid in the hearing of a youth, that he who does the moſt extreme wickedneſs, does nothing ſtrange; nor he, who, in every ſhape, puniſhes his unjuſt father, but does the ſame as the firſt and the greateſt of the Gods. No truly, ſaid he; theſe things do not ſeem to me proper to be ſaid. Nor, in the general, ſaid I, how Gods war with Gods; and plot and fight againſt one another; (for they are not true,) if, at leaſt, thoſe who are to guard the city for us, ought to account it the moſt ſhameful thing, to hate one another, on ſlight grounds. As little ought we to tell, in fables, and embelliſh to them, the fights of the giants; and many other various feuds both of the Gods, and heroes, with their own kindred and relations: But if we are at all to perſuade them, that, at no time, doth one citizen hate another, and that it is unholy; ſuch things as theſe are rather to be ſaid to them immediately when they are children, by the old men and women, and by thoſe well advanced in life; and the poets are to be obliged to compoſe agreeably to theſe things. Juno, fettered by her ſon, and Vulcan thrown down from heaven by his father, for going to aſſiſt his mother, when beaten, and all thoſe fights of the Gods, which Homer hath compoſed, muſt not be admitted into the city; whether they be compoſed in way of allegory, or without al-

legory; for the young perſon is not able to judge, what is allegory, and what is not; but whatever opinions he receiveth at ſuch an age are difficult to be waſhen out, and are immoveable. On theſe accounts, one would imagine, that, of all things, we ſhould endeavour that what they are firſt to hear, be compoſed in the moſt handſome manner for exciting them to virtue. There is reaſon for it, ſaid he. But, if any one now ſhould aſk us, concerning theſe; what they are, and what kind of fables they are, which ſhould we name? And I ſaid; Adimantus! you and I are not poets at preſent; but founders of a city; and it belongs to the founders to know the models, according to which the poets are to compoſe their fables; contrary to which if they compoſe they are not to be tolerated; but it belongs not to us to make fables for them. Right, ſaid he. But as to this very thing, the models concerning theology, which are they? Some ſuch as theſe, ſaid I. God is alway to be repreſented ſuch as he is; whether one repreſent him in epic, in ſong, or in tragedy. This ought to be done. Is not God eſſentially good, and is he not to be deſcribed as ſuch? Without doubt. But nothing which is good is hurtful; is it? It doth not appear to me. Does, then, that which is not hurtful, ever do hurt? By no means. Does that which does no hurt, do any evil? Nor this neither. And what does no evil, cannot be the cauſe of any evil. How can it? But what? Good is beneficial. Yes. It is, then, the cauſe of welfare? Yes. Good, therefore, is not the cauſe of all things, but the cauſe of thoſe things which

are in a right ſtate; but is not the cauſe of thoſe things which are in a wrong. Entirely ſo, ſaid he. Neither, then, can God, ſaid I, ſince he is good, be the cauſe of all things, as the generality ſay, but he is the cauſe of a few things to men; but of many things, he is not the cauſe: for our good things are much fewer than our evil; and, no other is the cauſe of our good things, but of our evils, we muſt not make God the cauſe, but ſeek for ſome other. You ſeem to me, ſaid he, to ſpeak moſt true. We muſt not, then, ſaid I, take it, neither from Homer, nor any other poet, treſpaſſing ſo fooliſhly, with reference to the Gods; and ſaying, how,

Two coffers on Jove's threſhold ſtand, and both
Are full of lots; one good, the other ill;
The man whoſe lot, Jove mingles out of both,
Sometimes by ill is rul'd, ſometimes by good.
Whoſe lot is otherwiſe, of ill unmix'd;
Him o'er the ſacred earth, dire famine drives.

Nor that Jupiter is the diſpenſer of our good and evil. Nor if any one ſay, that the violation of oaths, and treaties, violated by Pandarus, was done by Minerva and Jupiter, ſhall we commend it. Nor that diſſenſion among the Gods, and judgment by Themis, and Jupiter. Nor yet muſt we ſuffer the youth to hear what Aeſchylus ſays; how,

Whenever God inclines to raze
A houſe, himſelf contrives a cauſe.

But, if any one make poetical compoſitions, in which are theſe iambics, the ſufferings of Niobe, of the Pelopi-

des, or the Trojans, or others of a like nature, we muſt either not ſuffer them to ſay they are the works of God; or, if of God, we muſt find that reaſon of them which we now require, and we muſt ſay that God did what was juſt and good; and that they were better'd by being chaſtiſed: but we muſt not ſuffer a poet to ſay, that they are miſerable who are puniſhed; and that it is God who does theſe things. But if they ſay that the wicked, as being miſerable, needed correction; and that, in being puniſhed, they were profited by God, we may ſuffer them. But to ſay, that God, who is good, is the cauſe of ill to any one; this, we muſt, by all means oppoſe, nor ſuffer any one to ſay ſo in his city, if he want to have it well-regulated. Nor ſuffer any-one, neither young nor old to hear ſuch things told in fable, neither in verſe, nor proſe; as they are neither agreeable to holineſs, to be told, nor profitable to us, nor conſiſtent together.

I vote along with you, ſaid he, in this law, and it pleaſes me. This, then, ſaid I, may be one of the laws and models with reference to the Gods: by which it ſhall be neceſſary that thoſe who ſpeak, and who compoſe, ſhall compoſe and ſay that God is not the cauſe of all things, but of good. Yes, indeed, ſaid he, it is neceſſary. But what as to this ſecond law? Think you that God is a buffoon, and inſidiouſly appears, at different times, in different ſhapes; ſometimes like himſelf; and, at other times, changing his appearance into many ſhapes; ſometimes deceiving us, and making us conceive falſe opinions of him? Or, do you imagine him to be

ſimple, and of all the leaſt departing from his proper appearance? I cannot, at preſent, at leaſt, reply'd he, ſay ſo. But what as to this? If any thing be changed from its appearance, is there not a neceſſity that it be changed by itſelf, or by another? Undoubtedly. Are not theſe things which are in the beſt ſtate, leaſt of all changed, and moved by any other thing? As the body, by meats and drinks, and labours; and every vegetable by tempeſts and winds; and ſuch like accidents: Is not the moſt ſound, and vigorous, leaſt of all changed? Why not? And as to the ſoul itſelf, will not any perturbation from without, leaſt of all diſorder and change the moſt brave and wiſe? Yes. And ſurely, ſome how, all veſſels which are made, and buildings, and veſtments, according to the ſame reaſoning, ſuch as are properly worked, and in a right ſtate, are leaſt changed by time, or other accidents? They are ſo, indeed. Every thing then, which is in a good ſtate, either by nature, or art, or both, receives the ſmalleſt change from any thing elſe. It ſeems ſo. But God, and all the divine conduct, are in the beſt ſtate. Why not. In this way then, God ſhould leaſt of all have many ſhapes. Leaſt of all, truly. But ſhould he change and alter himſelf? It is plain, ſaid he, if he be changed at all. Whether then ſhould he change himſelf to the better, and to the more handſome, or to the worſe, and the more deformed? Of neceſſity, reply'd he, to the worſe; if he be changed at all; for we ſhall never at any time ſay, that God is any way deficient with reſpect to beauty, or excellence. You ſay

moſt right, ſaid I. And this being ſo; do you imagine, Adimantus! that any one, either of Gods, or men, would willingly make himſelf any way worſe? It is impoſſible, ſaid he. It is impoſſible, then, ſaid I, for a God to deſire to change himſelf; but, each of them, being moſt fair and good, continues always, to the utmoſt of his power, invariably in his own form. This appears to me, at leaſt, ſaid he, wholly neceſſary. Let not, then, ſaid I, moſt excellent Adimantus! any of the poets tell us, how the Gods;

-------Like various foreign travellers dreſt,
And various forms aſſuming, viſit ſtates.

Nor let any one belye Proteus, and Thetis. Nor bring in Juno, in tragedies or other poems, as having tranſformed herſelf like a prieſteſs, and collecting for the gracious ſons of Inachus the Argive River. Nor let them tell us many other ſuch lyes. Nor let the mothers, perſuaded by them, affright their children, telling the ſtories wrong; how that certain Gods go about all night,

Reſembling various gueſts, of various climes.

that they may not, at one and the ſame time, blaſpheme againſt the Gods, and render their children more daſtardly. By no means, ſaid he. But are the Gods, ſaid I, ſuch, as, though, in themſelves, they never change; yet make us imagine they appear in various forms; deceiving us, and playing the mountebanks? Perhaps, ſaid he. But what, ſaid I, can a God cheat; holding forth a phantaſm, either in word or deed? I do not know, ſaid he. Do not you know, ſaid I, that what is truly a cheat, if

one can ſpeak ſo, all, both Gods and men, abhor. How do you ſay, reply'd he. Thus, ſaid I, that, to offer a cheat to the chiefeſt part of themſelves, and that about their chiefeſt intereſts, is what none willingly incline; but, of all things, every one is moſt afraid of having got a cheat there. Neither as yet, ſaid he, do I underſtand you. Becauſe, ſaid I, you fancy I am ſaying ſome great matter: but I am ſaying, that to cheat the ſoul concerning realities, and to be ſo cheated, and to be ignorant; and, there, to have got and to keep a cheat, is, what every one, would leaſt of all, chuſe; and a cheat in the ſoul, is, what they moſt eſpecially hate. Moſt eſpecially, ſaid he. But this, as I was now ſaying, might, moſt juſtly be called a true cheat; ignorance, in the ſoul of the cheated perſon: ſince a cheat, in words, is but a kind of imitation of what the ſoul feels; and an image, afterwards ariſing, and not altogether a pure cheat. Is it not ſo? Entirely. But this real lye, is not only hated of the Gods, but of men likewiſe. So it appears. But, what now? The cheat, in words; when hath it ſomething of utility, ſo as not to deſerve hatred? Is it not when employed towards our enemies; and ſome even of thoſe called our friends; when, in madneſs, or other diſtemper, they attempt to do ſome miſchief; in that caſe, for a diſſuaſive, as a drug, it is uſeful. And, in thoſe fables we were now mentioning, as we know not how the truth ſtands concerning ancient things, making a lye reſembling the truth we render it uſeful, as much as poſſible. It is, ſaid he, perfectly ſo. In which then of

theſe caſes, is a lye uſeful to God? Whether does he make a lye, reſembling the truth, as being ignorant of ancient things? That were ridiculous, ſaid he. God is not, then, a lying poet. I do not think it. But ſhould he make a lye from fear of his enemies? Far from it. But, on account of the folly, or madneſs of his kindred? But, ſaid he, none of the fooliſh, and mad, are the friends of God. There is then no occaſion at all for God to make a lye. There is none. The divine and Godlike nature is then, in all reſpects, without a lye? Altogether, ſaid he. God, then, is ſimple, and true, both, in word and deed; neither is he changed himſelf, nor does he deceive others; neither by viſions, nor by diſcourſe, nor by the pomp of ſigns, neither when we are awake, nor when we ſleep. So it appears, ſaid he, to me at leaſt, whilſt you are ſpeaking. You agree then, ſaid I, that this ſhall be the ſecond model, by which we are to ſpeak, and to compoſe concerning the Gods: that they are neither mountebanks to change themſelves; nor to miſlead us by lyes, either in word, or deed? I agree. Whilſt then we commend many other things in Homer, this we ſhall not commend, the dream ſent by Jupiter to Agamemnon; neither ſhall we commend Aeſchylus, when he makes Thetis ſay, that Apollo had ſung at her marriage, that

A comely offspring ſhe ſhou'd raiſe,
From ſickneſs free, of lengthen'd days:
Apollo, ſinging all my fate,
And praiſing high my Godlike ſtate,

Rejoic'd my heart; and 'twas my hope,
That all was true Apollo ſpoke:
But he, who, at my marriage feaſt,
Extoll'd me thus, and was my gueſt;
He, who did thus, my fate explain,
Is he, who now my ſon hath ſlain.

When any one ſays ſuch things as theſe of the Gods, we ſhall ſhew diſpleaſure, and not afford the chorus: nor ſhall we ſuffer teachers to make uſe of ſuch things in the education of the youth; if our guardians are to be godly, and divine men, as far as it is poſſible for man to be. I agree with you, ſaid he, perfectly, as to theſe models; and we may uſe them as laws.

THE END OF THE SECOND BOOK.

THE THIRD BOOK.

These things indeed then, ſaid I, and ſuch as theſe, are, as ſeems, what are to be heard, and not heard, concerning the Gods, immediately from childhood, by thoſe who are to honour the Gods, and their parents, and who are not to deſpiſe friendſhip with one another. And, I imagine, reply'd he, that theſe things have appeared aright. But, what now? If they are to be brave, muſt not theſe things be narrated to them, and ſuch other likewiſe as may render them leaſt of all afraid of death? Or, do you imagine, that any one can ever be brave, whilſt he hath this fear within him? Not I, truly, ſaid he. But, what? do you imagine that any one can be void of a fear of death, whilſt he imagines that there is another world, and that it is dreadful; and, that in battles he will chuſe death before defeat, and ſlavery? By no means.

We ought, then, as appears, to give orders likewiſe to thoſe who undertake to diſcourſe about fables of this kind; and to entreat them, not to reproach thus in general, the things of the other world, but rather to commend them; as they ſay neither what is true, nor what is profitable to thoſe who are to be ſoldiers. We ought, indeed, ſaid he. Beginning then, ſaid I, at this verſe; we ſhall leave out all of ſuch kind, as this;

I'd rather, as a ruſtic ſlave, ſubmit

To ſome mean man, who had but ſcanty fare;
Than govern all the wretched ſhades below.

And, that,

The houſe, to mortals, and immortals, ſeems
Horrible, and ſqualid; and what Gods abhor;

And,

O wretched! in the manſions of the grave,
Is there a ſoul, and ſhape, but ne'er a mind

And,

Alone are wiſe----the ſhades all flutter round;

And,

The ſoul fled from the body, to the grave;
And, leaving youth, and manhood, wail'd its fate.
And,---the ſoul, like ſmoke, down to the ſhades,
Went howling;------

And,

As when, in hollow of a ſpacious cave,
The owls fly, ſcreaming; if one chance to fall
Down from the rock, they all confuſedly fly;
So theſe together howling went;-----

We ſhall beg Homer, and the other poets, not to take it amiſs, if we raze theſe things, and ſuch as theſe; not, that they are not poetical, and pleaſant to many to be heard; but the more poetical they are; the leſs ought they to be heard by children, and men who ought to be free, and more afraid of ſlavery, than of death. By all means, truly. Further, are not all dreadful, and frightful names about theſe things, likewiſe to be rejected? Cocytus, and Styx, thoſe below, and the dead, and ſuch other appella-

tions, in this ſtyle, ſuch as terrify all who hear them. Theſe may perhaps ſerve ſome other purpoſe, but we are afraid for our guardians; leſt, by ſuch a terror, they be rendered more effeminate, and ſoft than they ought to be. We are rightly afraid of it, ſaid he. Are theſe then to be taken away? They are. And they muſt ſpeak, and compoſe, on a contrary model. That is plain. We ſhall take away likewiſe the bewailings and lamentations of illuſtrious men. This is neceſſary, if what is above, be ſo. Conſider then, ſaid I, whether we rightly take away, or not. And do not we ſay, that the worthy man will imagine that to die is not a dreadful thing to the worthy man whoſe companion he is? We ſay ſo. Neither then will he lament over him, at leaſt, as if his friend ſuffer'd ſomething dreadful. No, indeed. And we ſay this likewiſe, that ſuch an one is moſt of all ſufficient in himſelf, for to live happily, and, in a diſtinguiſhed manner from others, is, leaſt of all, indigent. True, ſaid he. It is to him, then, the leaſt dreadful, to be deprived of a ſon, a brother, wealth, or any other of thoſe things. Leaſt of all, indeed. So that he will, leaſt of all, lament; but endure, in the mildeſt manner, when any ſuch misfortune befals him. Certainly. We ſhall rightly then take away the lamentations of famous men, and aſſign them to the women, but not to the better ſort, and to ſuch of the men as are daſtardly; that ſo thoſe whom we propoſe to educate for the guardianſhip of the country, may diſdain to make lamentations of this kind. Right, ſaid he. We ſhall again then entreat Homer,

and the other poets, not to ſay in their compoſitions, that Achilles the ſon of a Goddeſs,

Lay ſometimes on his ſide, and then anon,
On back ſupine; then, prone; then, riſing up;
Lamenting wander'd on the barren ſhore.

Nor, how,

------With both his hands,
He pour'd the burning duſt upon his head;

nor the reſt of his lamentation, and bewailing; ſuch and ſo great as he hath compoſed. Nor that Priamus, ſo near to the Gods, ſo meanly ſupplicated, and rolled himſelf in the dirt: "Calling on every ſoldier, by his name."

But ſtill much more muſt we entreat them, not to make the Gods, at leaſt, to bewail, and ſay;

Oh! wretched I, in bearing worthieſt ſon.

And, if they are not, thus, to bring in the Gods; far leſs ſhould they dare to repreſent the greateſt of the Gods, in ſo unbecoming a manner as this;

How dear a man, around the town, purſu'd,
Mine eyes behold! and grieved is my heart;
Ah me! 'tis fated, that Patroclus kill
Sarpedon; whom, of all men, moſt I love.

For, if, friend Adimantus! our youth ſhould ſeriouſly hear ſuch things as theſe, and not laugh at them as ſpoken moſt unſuitably; hardly ſhould any one think it unworthy of himſelf, of himſelf being a man, or check himſelf, if he ſhould happen either to ſay or to do any thing of the kind; but without any ſhame or endurance would, on ſmall ſufferings, ſing many lamentations, and

moans. You ſay moſt true, reply'd he. They muſt not, therefore, do in this manner, as our reaſoning now hath ſhow'd us; which we muſt believe, till ſome one perſuade us by ſome better. They muſt not, indeed. But, ſurely, neither ought we to be given to exceſſive laughter; for where one gives himſelf to violent laughter, ſuch a diſpoſition commonly requires a violent change. It ſeems ſo, ſaid he. Nor if any one ſhall repreſent worthy men, as overcome of laughter, muſt we allow it, much leſs if he thus repreſent the Gods. Much leſs, indeed, ſaid he. Neither, then, ſhall we receive ſuch things as theſe from Homer, concerning the Gods;

Exceſſive laughter roſe among the Gods,
When they beheld, lame Vulcan hurrying round.

This is not to be admitted, according to your reaſoning. If you incline, ſaid he, to call it my reaſoning; this, indeed, is not to be admitted. But, ſurely, the truth is much more to be valued. For if lately we reaſoned aright, and, if indeed, a lye be unprofitable to the Gods; but uſeful to men, in way of a drug, it is plain that ſuch a thing is to be entruſted only to the phyſicians, but not to be touched by private perſons. It is plain, ſaid he. It belongs, then, to the governours of the city, if to any others, to make a lye with reference either to enemies, or citizens, for the good of the city; but none of the reſt muſt venture on ſuch a thing. But, for a private perſon to tell a lye to ſuch governours; we will call it the ſame, and even a greater offence, than for the patient to tell a lye to the phyſician; or for the man who learns his exer-

ciſes, not to tell his maſter the truth as to the indiſpoſitions of his body: or for one not to tell the pilot, the real ſtate of things, reſpecting the ſhip and ſailors, in what condition himſelf, and the other ſailors are. Moſt true, ſaid he. But if you find in the city, any one elſe, making a lye,

-------Of thoſe who artiſts are,
Or prophet, or phyſician, or who make
The ſhafts of ſpears-------

you ſhall puniſh them, as introducing a practice ſubverſive, and deſtructive of the city, as of a ſhip. We muſt do ſo; if, indeed, it is upon ſpeech that actions are compleated. But what? ſhall not our youth have need of temperance? Certainly. And are not ſuch things as theſe, the principal parts of temperance? that they be obedient to their governours; that the governors themſelves be temperate in drinking, feaſting, and in venereal pleaſures. And we ſhall ſay, I imagine, that ſuch things as theſe are well ſpoken, which Diomed ſays in Homer;

Sit thou in ſilence, and obey my ſpeech.

And what follows; thus,

The Greeks went on in ſilence, breathing force;
Revering their commanders;-------

and ſuch like. Well ſpoken. But what as to theſe? Thou drunkard with dogs eyes, and heart of deer; and all of this kind; are theſe, or ſuch other juvenile things, which any private perſon may ſay againſt their governours, ſpoken handſomely? Not handſomely. For I do not ima-

gine, that when they are heard, they are fit to promote temperance in the youth; and though they may afford a pleaſure of a different kind, it is no wonder. But what do you think? Juſt the ſame way, ſaid he. But what ſay you of this? To make the wiſeſt man ſay, that he thinks it the moſt handſome thing of all,

------When tables are all full
Of meats and fleſhes, and the butler bears
The wine in flagons, and fills up the cups:

Is the hearing of this proper for the youth, towards having the command of himſelf? Or yet this?

Moſt miſerable it is,
To die of famine, and have adverſe fate.

Or that Jupiter, through deſire of love-pleaſures, eaſily forgetting all thoſe things which he alone awake revolved in his mind, whilſt other Gods and men were aſleep; was ſo ſtruck on ſeeing Juno, as not to chuſe to come into the houſe, but wanted to embrace her in the field; telling he is poſſeſſed with ſuch deſire, as exceeded what he felt, on their firſt coming together,

------Hid from their parents dear.

Nor yet how Mars and Venus were bound by Vulcan, and other ſuch things. No, truly, ſaid he. Theſe things do not ſeem fit. But, if any inſtances of ſelf-denial, ſaid I, with reſpect to all theſe things be told, and practiſed by eminent men, theſe are to be beheld, and heard. Such as this.

He beat his breaſt, and thus he chid his heart;
Bear up, my heart! who heavier fate haſt born.

By all means, ſaid he, we ſhould do thus. Neither muſt we ſuffer men to receive bribes, nor to be covetous. By no means. Nor muſt we ſing to them, that,

Gifts gain the Gods, and venerable Kings.

Nor muſt we commend Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, as if he ſpoke in moderation, in counſelling him to accept of preſents, and aſſiſt the Greeks; but without preſents, not to deſiſt from his wrath. Neither ſhall we commend Achilles, nor approve of his being ſo covetous, as to receive preſents from Agamemnon; and likewiſe a ranſom to give up the dead body of Hector; but not to incline to do it otherwiſe. It is not right, ſaid he, to commend ſuch things as theſe. I grudge, ſaid I, for Homer's ſake, to ſay it; that neither is it lawful that theſe things, at leaſt, be ſaid againſt Achilles, nor that they be believed, when ſaid by others; how that he ſpoke thus to Apollo;

Me, thou haſt injur'd; thou, far-ſhooting God!
Of all the moſt deſtructive, but reveng'd,
I, ſure, ſhou'd be, were I poſſeſs'd of power.

And how diſobedient he was to the river, though a divinity, and was ready to fight; and again; he ſays to the river Sperchius, with his ſacred locks;

Thy lock, to great Patroclus, I cou'd give;
Who now is dead;-------

Nor are we to believe he did this. And the dragging Hector round the ſepulchre of Patroclus, and the ſlaughtering the captives at his funeral pile, that all theſe things are true, we will not ſay; nor will we ſuffer our people to be perſuaded; that Achilles, the ſon of a Goddeſs, and

of Peleus, the moſt temperate of men, and the third from Jupiter, and educated by the moſt wiſe Chiron, was full of ſuch diſorder, as to have within him, two diſtempers oppoſite to one another; the illiberal and covetous diſpoſition; and a contempt both of Gods and of men. You ſay right, reply'd he. Neither, ſaid I, let us be perſuaded of theſe things; nor ſuffer any to ſay, that Theſeus, the ſon of Neptune, and Perithous, the ſon of Jupiter, ruſhed ſo upon horrible rapines, nor that any child of other deity, nor any hero would dare to do horrible, and impious deeds: ſuch as the lies of the poets aſcribe to them: but let us compel the poets, either to ſay, that theſe are not the actions of theſe perſons; or, that theſe perſons are not the children of the Gods: And not to ſay both.

Nor let us ſuffer them to attempt to perſuade our youth, that the Gods create evil: and that heroes are no way better than men. For, as we ſaid formerly, theſe things are neither holy, nor true: for, we have elſewhere ſhown, that it is impoſſible, that evil ſhould proceed from the Gods. Why not? And theſe things are truly hurtful, to the hearers, at leaſt. For every one will forgive himſelf his own naughtineſs, when he is perſuaded, that even the near relations of the Gods, do and have done things of the ſame kind: ſuch as are near to Jupiter,

Who, on the top of Ida, have up-rear'd
To parent Jupiter, an altar;------

And,

Whoſe Godlike blood, is not yet quite extinct.

On which accounts, all ſuch fables muſt be ſuppreſs'd:

leſt they create in our youth, a powerful habit of wickedneſs. We muſt do ſo, reply'd he, by all means. What other ſpecies of diſcourſes, ſaid I, have we ſtill remaining; now whilſt we are determining, what ought to be ſpoken, and what not? We have already mentioned in what manner we ought to ſpeak of the Gods, and likewiſe of daemons, and heroes; and likewiſe of what relates to another world. Yes, indeed. Should not then what yet remains, ſeem to be concerning men? It is plain. But, it is impoſſible for us, friend! to regulate this at preſent. How? Becauſe, I imagine, we will ſay, that the poets, and orators, ſpeak amiſs, concerning the greateſt affairs of men. How that the moſt of men are unjuſt; and, notwithſtanding, they are happy; and that the juſt are miſerable; and that it is profitable for one to do unjuſtly, when he is concealed: and that juſtice is gain indeed to others; but the loſs of the juſt man himſelf: theſe, and innumerable other ſuch things, we will forbid them to ſay; and enjoin them to ſing, and compoſe in fable, the contrary to theſe. Do not you think ſo? I know it well, ſaid he. If, then, you acknowledge, that I ſay right; ſhall I not ſay that you have acknowledged, what all along we ſeek for? You judge right, ſaid he. Shall we not then acknowledge, that ſuch diſcourſes are to be ſpoken concerning men; whenever we ſhall have found out what juſtice is; and, how, in its nature, it is profitable to the juſt man, to be ſuch; whether he appear to be ſuch, or not? Moſt true, reply'd he. Concerning the diſcourſes, then, let this ſuffice. We muſt now

conſider, as I imagine, the manner of diſcourſe. And then we ſhall have completely conſidered, both what is to be ſpoken, and the manner how. Here, Adimantus ſaid; but I do not underſtand what you ſay. But, reply'd I, it is needful you ſhould. And, perhaps, you will rather underſtand it, in this way. Is not every thing told by the mythologiſts, or poets, a narrative of the paſt, preſent, or future? What elſe, reply'd he. And do not they execute it, either by ſimple narration, or imitation, or by both? This, too, reply'd he, I want to underſtand more plainly. I ſeem, ſaid I, to be a ridiculous and obſcure inſtructor. Therefore, like thoſe who are unable to ſpeak, I will endeavour to explain, not the whole; but, taking up a particular part, ſhow my meaning, by this particular; and, tell me; do not you know the beginning of the Iliad? Where the poet ſays, that Chryſes entreated Agamemnon, to ſet free his daughter; but that he was diſpleaſed, that Chryſes, when he did not ſucceed, prayed againſt the Greeks to the God. I know. You know, then, that, down to theſe verſes;

-------The Grecians all he pray'd;
But chief the two commanders, Atreus' ſons.

the poet himſelf ſpeaks, and does not attempt to divert our attention elſewhere; as if any other perſon were ſpeaking: but what he ſays after this, he ſays, as if he himſelf were Chryſes, and endeavours as much as poſſible to make us imagine, that the ſpeaker is not Homer, but the prieſt, an old man; and, that in this manner, he hath compoſed almoſt the whole narrative of what happened at Troy, and

in Ithaca, and all the adventures in the whole Odyſſey: It is certainly ſo, reply'd he. Is it not then narration, when he tells the ſeveral ſpeeches; and likewiſe when he tells what interveens between the ſpeeches? Why not? But when he makes any ſpeech, in the perſon of another, do not we ſay, that then he aſſimulates his ſpeech, as much as poſſible, to each perſon, he introduces as ſpeaking? We ſay ſo, why do not we? And is not the aſſimulating one's ſelf to another, either in voice, or figure, the imitating him to whom one aſſimilates himſelf? Why not? In ſuch a manner as this then, it ſeems, both he and the other poets perform the narrative by means of imitation. Certainly. But if the poet did not at all conceal himſelf, his whole action and narrative would be without imitation: And, that you may not ſay, you do not again underſtand, how this ſhould be, I ſhall tell you, if Homer, after telling, how Chryſes came with his daughter's ranſom, beſeeching the Greeks, but chiefly the kings, had ſpoken afterwards, not as Chryſes, but ſtill as Homer; you know it would not have been imitation, but ſimple narration. And it would have been ſome how thus; (I ſhall ſpeak without metre, for I am no poet;) the prieſt came, and prayed; that the Gods might grant they ſhould take Troy, and return ſafe; and begged them to reſtore him his daughter, accepting the preſents, and revering the God. When he had ſaid this; all the reſt ſhew'd reſpect, and conſented; but Agamemnon was enraged, charging him now to be gone, and not to return again; leſt his ſceptre and the garlands of the God, ſhould

be of no avail; and told him, that before he would reſtore his daughter, ſhe ſhould grow old with him in Argos: but ordered him to be gone, and not to irritate him, that he might get home in ſafety. The old man, upon hearing this, was afraid, and went away in ſilence. And when he was retired from the camp, he made many ſupplications to Apollo; rehearſing the names of the God, and putting him in mind, and beſeeching him, that if ever he had made any acceptable donation, in the building of temples, or the offering of ſacrifices, in return of theſe, to avenge his tears upon the Greeks with his arrows. Thus, ſaid I, friend! the narration is ſimple, without imitation. I underſtand, ſaid he. Underſtand then, ſaid I, that the oppoſite of this happens, when one taking away the poets part between the ſpeeches, leaves the ſpeeches themſelves. This, ſaid he, I likewiſe underſtand, that the manner of tragedies is of ſuch a kind. You apprehend perfectly well, ſaid I. And, I imagine, I now make plain to you, what I could not before; that in poetry, and likewiſe in mythology, one kind is wholly by imitation, ſuch as you ſay tragedy, and comedy are; and another kind, by the narration of the poet himſelf: and you will find this kind moſt eſpecially in the Dithyrambus: and another again by both; as in Epic poetry, and in many other caſes beſides, if you underſtand me. I underſtand now, reply'd he, what you meant before. And, remember too, that before that, we were ſaying, that we had already mentioned what things were to be ſpoken; but that it yet remained to be conſidered,

in what manner they were to be ſpoken. I remember, indeed. This, then, is what I was ſaying; that it were neceſſary we agreed, whether we ſhall ſuffer the poets to make narratives to us in the way of imitation; or, partly in the way of imitation, and partly not; and, what in each way; or if they are not to uſe imitation at all. I conjecture, ſaid he, you are to conſider, whether we ſhall receive tragedy, and comedy, into our city, or not. Perhaps, reply'd I, and ſomething more too: for I do not as yet know, indeed; but wherever our reaſoning, as a gale, bears us, there we muſt go. And truly, ſaid he, you ſay well. Conſider this, now, Adimantus! whether our guardians ought to practiſe imitation, or not. Or does this follow from what is above? That each one may handſomely perform one buſineſs, but many, he cannot: Or, if he ſhall attempt it, in graſping at many things, he ſhall fail in all; ſo as to be remarkable in none. Why ſhall he not? And is not the reaſon the ſame concerning imitation? That one man is not ſo able to imitate many things well, as one. He is not. Hardly then ſhall he perform any part of the more eminent employments, and at the ſame time imitate many things, and be an imitator; ſince the ſame perſons are not able to perform handſomely imitations of two different kinds, which ſeem to reſemble each other; as, for inſtance, they cannot ſucceed both in comedy and tragedy: Or did you not lately call theſe two, imitations? I did, and you ſay true, that the ſame perſons cannot ſucceed in them. Nor can they, at the ſame time, be rhapſodiſts and actors.

True. Nor can the ſame perſons be actors in comedies and in tragedies. And all theſe are imitations, are they not? Imitations. The genius of man ſeems to me, Adimantus! to be ſhut up within ſtill leſſer bounds than theſe; ſo that it is unable to imitate handſomely many things, or do theſe very things, of which even the imitations are the reſemblances. Moſt true, ſaid he. If therefore we are to hold to our firſt reaſoning, that our guardians, unoccupied in any manufacture whatever, ought to be the moſt accurate manufacturers of the liberty of the city, and to mind nothing but what hath ſome reference to this; it were ſurely proper, they neither did, nor imitated any thing elſe. But if they ſhall imitate at all, to imitate immediately from their childhood, ſuch things as are correſpondent to theſe; brave, temperate, holy, free men, and all ſuch things as theſe. But neither to do, nor to be deſirous in imitating things illiberal or baſe; leſt, from imitating, they come to be really ſuch. Or, have you not obſerved, that imitations, if from earlieſt youth, they be continued onwards for a long time, are eſtabliſhed into the manners, and natural temper, both with reference to the body, and voice, and likewiſe the underſtanding? Very much ſo, reply'd he. We will not ſurely allow, ſaid I, thoſe we profeſs to take care of, and who ought to be good men, to imitate a woman, either young, or old; either reviling her huſband, or quarreling with the Gods, or ſpeaking boaſtingly, when ſhe imagines herſelf happy. Nor yet to imitate her in her misfortunes, ſorrows, and lamentations, when ſick, or

in love, or in child-bed labour. We ſhall be far from permitting this. By all means, reply'd he. Nor to imitate man, or maid-ſervants in doing what belongs to ſervants. Nor this, neither. Nor yet to imitate naughty men, as it ſeems, ſuch as are daſtardly; and do the contrary of what we have now been mentioning; reviling and railing at one another; and ſpeaking abominable things either drunk or ſober, or any other things ſuch as perſons of this ſort are guilty of, either in words, or actions, either with reſpect to themſelves, or one another. Neither muſt they accuſtom themſelves to reſemble mad-men, in words or actions. Even the mad and wicked are to be known, both the men and the women; but none of their actions are to be done, or imitated. Moſt true, ſaid he. But what? ſaid I, are they to imitate ſuch as work in braſs, or any other handicrafts, or ſuch as are employed in rowing boats, or ſuch as command theſe; or any thing elſe appertaining to theſe things? How can they, ſaid he, as they are not to be allowed to give application to any of thoſe things? But what? ſhall they imitate horſes neighing, or bulls lowing, or rivers murmuring, or the ſea roaring, or thunder, and all ſuch like things? We have forbidden them, ſaid he, to be mad, or to reſemble mad men. If then I underſtand, reply'd I, what you ſay, there is a certain kind of ſpeech, and of narration, in which he who is truly a good and worthy man, expreſſes himſelf when it is neceſſary for him to ſay any thing; and another kind again, unlike to this, which he who hath been born and educated in an oppoſite manner, al-

ways poſſeſſeth, and in which he expreſſeth himſelf. But of what kind are theſe? ſaid he. I imagine, ſaid I, that the worthy man, when he comes in his narrative to any ſpeech or action of a good man, will willingly tell it, as if he were himſelf the man; and will not be aſhamed of ſuch an imitation; moſt eſpecially when he imitates a good man, acting prudently, and without a ſlip, and failing ſeldom, and but little, through diſeaſes, or love, drunkenneſs, or any other misfortune. But, when he comes to any thing unworthy of himſelf, he will not be ſtudious to reſemble himſelf to that which is worſe, unleſs for a ſhort time, when it produces ſome good; but will be aſhamed, both as he is unpractiſed in the imitation of ſuch characters as theſe, and likewiſe, as he grudges to degrade himſelf, and ſtand among the models of baſer characters, diſdaining it in his mind, and doing it only for amuſement. It is likely, ſaid he. He will not then make uſe of ſuch a narrative as we lately mentioned, with reference to the compoſitions of Homer: but his compoſition will participate of both imitation, and the other narrative; and but a ſmall part of it imitation, in a great deal of plain narrative. Do I ſeem to ſay any thing, or nothing at all? You expreſs, reply'd he, perfectly well, what ought to be the model of ſuch an orator. And, on the other hand, will not the man, ſaid I, who is not ſuch an one, the more naughty he is, be the readier to rehearſe every thing whatever; and ſhall not think any thing unworthy of him; ſo that he ſhall undertake to imitate every thing in earneſt; and likewiſe in preſence of many;

and ſuch things likewiſe as we now mentioned; thunderings, and noiſes of winds, and tempeſts, and of axles, and wheels, and trumpets, and pipes, and whiſtles, and ſounds of all manner of inſtruments, and voices of dogs too, and of ſheep, and of birds. And the whole expreſſion of all theſe things, ſhall be by imitation in voices, and geſtures, having but a ſmall part of it, narration. This too, ſaid he, muſt happen of neceſſity. Theſe now, ſaid I, I called the two kinds of diction. They are ſo, reply'd he. But has not the one of theſe ſmall variations; and, if the orator afford the becoming harmony, and meaſure to the diction, where he ſpeaks with propriety, the diſcourſe is almoſt upon one, and the ſame manner, and in one harmony; for the variations are but ſmall, and in a meaſure which accordingly is ſome how ſimilar. It is, indeed, reply'd he, entirely ſo. But what as to the other kind? Does it not require the contrary, all kinds of harmony, all kinds of meaſure, if it be to be naturally expreſſed, as it hath all ſorts of variations? It is perfectly ſo. Do not, now, all the poets, and ſuch as ſpeak in any kind, make uſe of either one, or other of theſe models of diction, or of one compounded of both? Of neceſſity, reply'd he. What then ſhall we do, ſaid I? Whether ſhall we admit into our city all of theſe; or one of the unmixed, or the one compounded? If my opinion, reply'd he, prevail; that uncompounded one, which is imitative of what is worthy. But, ſurely, Adimantus! the mixed is pleaſant, at leaſt. And the oppoſite of what you chuſe is by far the moſt pleaſant to children, and pedagogues, and

the crowd. It is moſt pleaſant. But you will not likely, ſaid I, think it ſuitable to our government, becauſe with us no man is to mind two or more employments, but to be quite ſimple, as every one does one thing. It is not indeed ſuitable. Shall we not then find, that in ſuch a city alone, a ſhoemaker is only a ſhoemaker, and not a pilot along with ſhoe-making, and that the huſbandman is only a huſbandman, and not a judge along with huſbandry, and that the ſoldier is a ſoldier, and not a money-maker beſides; and all others, in the ſame way? True, reply'd he. And it would appear, that if a man, who, through wiſdom, were able to become every thing, and to imitate every thing, ſhould come into our city, and ſhould want to ſhow us his poems; we ſhould revere him as a ſacred, admirable and pleaſant perſon; but we ſhould tell him, that there is no ſuch perſon with us in our city, nor is there any ſuch allowed to be: and we ſhould ſend him out to ſome other city, pouring oil on his head, and crowning him with wool: but we uſe a more auſtere poet, and mythologiſt, for our advantage, who may imitate to us the diction of the worthy manner; and may ſay whatever he ſays, according to thoſe models, which we eſtabliſhed by law at firſt, when we undertook the education of our ſoldiers. So we ſhould do, reply'd he, if it depended on us. It appears, ſaid I, friend! that we have now thoroughly diſcuſſed that part of muſic reſpecting oratory, and fable: for we have already told what is to be ſpoken, and in what manner. It appears ſo to me likewiſe, ſaid he. Does it not yet remain, ſaid I, that we ſpeak of the man-

ner of ſong, and of melodies? It is plain. May not any one find out, what we muſt ſay of theſe things; and of what kind theſe ought to be, if we are to be conſiſtent with what is above-mentioned? Here Glauco laughing ſaid; But I appear, Socrates! to be a ſtranger to all theſe matters; for I am not able at preſent, to gueſs at what we ought to ſay: I ſuſpect however. You are certainly, ſaid I, fully able to ſay this in the firſt place, that melody is made up of three things, of ſentiment, harmony, and meaſure. Yes, reply'd he, this I can ſay. And that the part which conſiſts in the ſentiment differs in nothing from that ſentiment which is not ſung, in this reſpect, that it ought to be done upon the ſame models, as we juſt now ſaid, and in the ſame manner. True, ſaid he. And ſurely then, the harmony and meaſure ought to correſpond to the ſentiment. Why not? But we obſerved there was no occaſion for wailings, and lamentations in compoſitions. No occaſion, truly. Which then are the wailing harmonies? Tell me, for you are a muſician. The mixt Lydian, reply'd he, and the ſharp Lydian; and ſome others of this kind. Are not theſe then, ſaid I, to be rejected; for they are unprofitable even to women, ſuch as are worthy, and much more to men? Certainly. But drunkenneſs is moſt unbecoming our guardians; and effeminacy and idleneſs. Why not? Which then are the effeminate and goſſiping harmonies? The Ionic, reply'd he, and the Lydian, which are called relaxing. Can you make any uſe of theſe, my friend, for military men? By no means, reply'd he.----But, it ſeems,

you have yet remaining the Doric and the Phrygian. I do not know, ſaid I, the harmonies; but leave that harmony, which may, in a becoming manner, imitate the voice and accents of a truly brave man, going on in a military action, and every rough adventure; and bearing his fortune in a determinate and perſevering manner, when he fails of ſucceſs, goes againſt wounds, or deaths, or falls into any other diſtreſs: and that kind of harmony likewiſe, which is ſuited to what is peaceable; where there is no violence, but all voluntary; where one either perſuades, or beſeeches any one, about any thing, either God by prayer, or man by inſtruction, and admonition; or, on the other hand, where one ſubmits himſelf to another, who beſeeches, inſtructs, and perſuades: and, upon all theſe things, acts according to intelligence; and does not behave haughtily; demeaning himſelf ſoberly, and moderately; gladly embracing whatever befalleth: leave then theſe two harmonies; the vehement, and the gentle; which, in the moſt handſome manner, imitate the voice of the misfortunate, and of the fortunate; of the moderate, and of the brave. You deſire, reply'd he, to leave no others but thoſe I now mentioned. We ſhall not then, ſaid I, have any need of a great many ſtrings, nor a variety of harmony in our ſongs and melodies. It appears to me, reply'd he, we ſhall not. We ſhall not breed, then, ſuch workmen as make harps and ſpinets, and all thoſe inſtruments which have many ſtrings, and a variety of harmony. No, as appears. But what? Will you admit into your city, ſuch workmen as

make pipes, or pipers; for, are not the inſtruments which conſiſt of the greateſt number of ſtrings, and have all ſorts of harmony, imitations of the pipe? It is plain, reply'd he. There is left you ſtill, ſaid I, the lyre and the harp, as uſeful for your city, and there might likewiſe be ſome reed for ſhepherds in the fields. Thus reaſon, ſaid he, ſhows us. We then, reply'd I, do nothing ſtrange, if we prefer Apollo, and Apollo's inſtruments, to Marſyas, and the inſtruments of that eminent muſician. Truly, reply'd he, we do not appear to do it. And I ſwear, ſaid I, we have unawares cleanſed again our city, which we ſaid was become luxurious. And we have wiſely done it, reply'd he. Come then, ſaid I, and let us cleanſe what remains; for what concerns the meaſure, ſhould be ſuitable to our harmonies: that our citizens purſue not ſuch meaſures as are diverſified, and have a variety of cadencies; but obſerve what are the meaſures of a decent and manly life, and whilſt they obſerve theſe, to make the foot and the melody ſubſervient to ſentiment of ſuch a kind; and not the ſentiment ſubſervient to the foot and melody. But what theſe meaſures are, is your buſineſs to tell, as you have done the harmonies. But, truly, reply'd he, I cannot tell. That there are three ſpecies of which the notes are compoſed, as there are four in ſounds, whence the whole of harmony, I can ſay, as I have obſerved it: but which are the imitations of one kind of life, and which of another, I am not able to tell. But theſe things, ſaid I, we muſt conſider with Damon's aſſiſtance. What notes are ſuitable to illiberality and in-

ſolence, to madneſs or other ill diſpoſition; and what notes are proper for their oppoſites. And I remember, but not diſtinctly, to have heard him calling a certain warriour, compoſite, a dactyle, and heroic meaſure; ornamenting him I do not know how, making him equal above, and below, in breadth and length, and called one, as I imagine, Iambus; and another, Trochaeus. He adapted, beſides, the lengths and ſhortneſſes: and, in ſome of theſe, I believe, he blamed and commended the meaſure of the foot, no leſs than the numbers themſelves, or ſomething compounded of both; for I cannot ſpeak of theſe things; for theſe things, as I ſaid, are to be thrown over upon Damon: to ſpeak diſtinctly on theſe matters, would require no ſmall diſcourſe: do not you think ſo? Not a ſmall one, truly. But can you determine this, that the propriety and impropriety correſponds to the good, or ill meaſure? Why not? But, with reſpect to the good or ill meaſure, the one correſponds to handſome expreſſion, conforming itſelf to it; and the other to the reverſe. And, in the ſame way, as to the harmonious, and the diſcordant; ſince the meaſure and harmony are ſubſervient to the ſentiment, as hath been now ſaid; and not the ſentiment to theſe. Theſe indeed, ſaid he, are to be ſubſervient to the ſentiment. But what? ſaid I, as to the manner of expreſſion, and as to the ſentiment itſelf, muſt it not correſpond to the temper of the ſoul? Why not? And all other things correſpond to the expreſſion. Yes. So that the beauty of expreſſion, fine conſonancy, and propriety, and excellence of numbers, are ſubſervient to

the good diſpoſition; not that ſtupidity, which in complaiſant language we call good temper; but an underſtanding truly adorned with a beautiful and fine temper. By all means, reply'd he. Muſt not theſe things be always purſued by the youth if they are to mind their buſineſs? They are indeed to be purſued. But painting too is, ſome how, full of theſe things; and every other workmanſhip of the kind; and weaving is full of theſe, and carving, and architecture, and all workmanſhip of every kind of veſſels: as is, moreover, the nature of bodies, and of all vegetables: for, in all theſe, there is propriety, and impropriety: and the impropriety, diſcord, and diſſonance, are the ſiſters of ill expreſſion, and ill ſentiment; and their oppoſites are the ſiſters, and imitations of ſober and good ſentiment. 'Tis entirely ſo, reply'd he. Are we then to give injunctions to the poets alone, and oblige them to work into their poems the image of the good ſentiment; otherwiſe not to compoſe at all with us; or are we to enjoin all other workmen likewiſe; and reſtrain this ill, undiſciplined, illiberal, indecent manner, that they exhibit it neither in the repreſentations of animals, in buildings, nor in any other workmanſhip; or, that he who is not able to do this, be not ſuffered to work with us. Leſt our guardians, being educated in the midſt of ill repreſentations, as in an ill paſture, whereby every day plucking, and eating a deal of different things, by little and little they contract, imperceptibly, ſome mighty evil in their ſoul. But we muſt ſeek out ſuch workmen, as are able by the help of a good natural genius,

to trace the nature of the beautiful, and the decent: that our youth, dwelling, as it were, in a healthful place, may be profited at all hands; whence, from the beautiful works, ſomething will be conveyed to the ſight and hearing, as a breeze bringing health from ſalutary places; imperceptibly leading them on directly from childhood, to the reſemblance, friendſhip, and harmony with right reaſon. They ſhould thus, ſaid he, be educated in the moſt handſome manner by far. On theſe accounts, therefore, Glauco! ſaid I, is not education in muſic of the greateſt importance, becauſe that the meaſure and harmony enter, in the ſtrongeſt manner, into the inward part of the ſoul; and moſt powerfully affect it, introducing decency along with it into the mind, and making every one decent if he is properly educated; and the reverſe if he is not. And, moreover, becauſe the man who hath here been educated as he ought, perceives in the quickeſt manner whatever workmanſhip is defective, and whatever execution is unhandſome, or whatever productions are of that kind, and, being diſguſted in a proper manner, he will praiſe what is beautiful, rejoicing in it; and receiving it into his ſoul, be nouriſhed by it, and become a worthy and good man: but whatever is ugly, he will in a proper manner deſpiſe, and hate, whilſt yet he is young, and before he is able to underſtand reaſon; and, when reaſon comes, ſuch an one as hath been thus educated, will embrace it, recognizing it perfectly well, from its intimate familiarity with him. It appears to me, reply'd he, that education in muſic is for the ſake

of ſuch things as theſe. Juſt as with reference to letters, ſaid I, we are then ſufficiently inſtructed, when we are not ignorant of the elements, which are but few in number, wherever they are concerned; and when we do not deſpiſe them more or leſs as unneceſſary to be obſerved; but, by all means, give diligence to underſtand them thoroughly, as it is impoſſible for us to be men of letters, till we do thus. True. And if the images of letters appeared any where, either in water, or in mirrors, ſhould we not know them before we knew the letters themſelves; or does this belong to the ſame art and ſtudy? By all means. Is it indeed then, according as I ſay? that we ſhall never become muſicians, neither we ourſelves, nor thoſe guardians we ſay we are to educate, before we underſtand the images of temperance, fortitude, liberality, and magnificence, and the other ſiſter virtues, and, on the other hand again, what is the reverſe of theſe, which are every where to be met with; and obſerve them whereſoever they are, both the virtues themſelves, and the images of them, and deſpiſe them neither in ſmall, nor in great inſtances; but let us believe that this belongs to the ſame art and ſtudy. There is, ſaid he, great neceſſity for it. Muſt not then, ſaid I, the perſon who ſhall have in his ſoul fine diſpoſitions, and in his appearance whatever is proportionable, and correſponding to theſe, partaking of the ſame impreſſion, be the moſt beautiful ſpectacle to any one who is able to behold it? Exceedingly ſo. But what is moſt beautiful, is moſt deſirable. Why not? He who is muſical ſhould ſurely love thoſe

men who are moſt eminently of this kind, but if one be unharmonious he ſhall not love him. He ſhall not, reply'd he, if the perſon be any way defective as to his ſoul; if, indeed, it were in his body, he would bear with it, ſo as to be willing to aſſociate with him. I underſtand, ſaid I, that your favourites are, or have been of this kind. And I agree to it. But tell me this. Is there any communion between temperance and exceſſive pleaſure? How can there, ſaid he, for this pleaſure diſcompoſeth no leſs than grief. But hath it communion with any other virtue? By no means. But what, hath it communion with inſolence and intemperance? Moſt of all. Can you mention a greater and more vehement pleaſure, than that reſpecting ſenſual love? I cannot, ſaid he, nor yet one that is more furious. But the right love is of ſuch a nature as to love the beautiful, and the handſome, in a temperate and a muſical manner. Certainly. Nothing then which is furious, or akin to intemperance, is to approach to a right love. Neither muſt pleaſure approach to it, nor muſt the lover, and the perſons he loves, have communion with it, where they love, and are beloved in a right manner. No, truly, ſaid he, they muſt not, Socrates! approach to theſe. Thus, then, as appears, you will eſtabliſh by law in the city which is to be ſettled; that the lover is to love, to converſe, and aſſociate with his loves, as with his ſon, for the ſake of virtue, if he gain the conſent: and as to every thing beſides, that every one ſo converſe with him whoſe love he ſollicites, as never at all to appear to aſſociate for any

thing beyond what is now mentioned; and, that, otherwiſe, he ſhall undergo the reproach of being unmuſical, and unacquainted with the beautiful. It muſt be thus, reply'd he. Does then, ſaid I, the diſcourſe concerning muſic ſeem to you to be finiſhed? For it hath terminated, where it ought to terminate: as the affairs of muſic ought, ſome how, to terminate in the love of the beautiful. I agree, ſaid he. But after muſic, our youth are to be educated in exerciſe. But what? It is ſurely neceſſary, that in this likewiſe, they be accurately diſciplined, from their infancy, through the whole of life. For the matter, as I imagine, is, ſome how, thus: but do you alſo conſider. For I indeed do not imagine that whatever body is ſound, doth, by its own virtue, render the ſoul, good; but, contrarywiſe, that a good ſoul, by its virtue, renders the body the beſt which is poſſible: but how does it appear to you? In the ſame manner to me, likewiſe, reply'd he. If, then, when we have ſufficiently cultivated the underſtanding, we ſhall commit to it, the accurate management of the concerns of the body; ſhall not we, as we are only laying down models, (that we may not enlarge) act in a right manner? Entirely ſo. We ſay then, that they are to abſtain from drunkenneſs; for it is more allowable to any, than to a guardian, to be drunk, and not to know where he is. It were ridiculous, ſaid he, that the guardian ſhould ſtand in need of a guardian. But what as to meats? For theſe men are wreſtlers in the nobleſt combat: Are they not? They are. Would not then the bodily plight of the wreſtlers be

proper for ſuch as theſe? Probably. But, ſaid I, it is of a drouſy kind, and tickliſh as to health: or, do you not obſerve, that they ſleep out their life; and, if they depart but a little from their appointed diet, ſuch wreſtlers become greatly and extremely ſick. I perceive it. But ſome more elegant exerciſe, ſaid I, is requiſite for our military wreſtlers; who, as dogs, ought to be wakeful, and to ſee, and to hear in the moſt acute manner; and, in their expeditions, to put up with many changes of water and of food, of heat and of cold, that ſo they may not have a tickliſh ſtate of health. To me it appears ſo. Is not then the beſt exerciſe a kind of ſiſter to the ſimple muſic, which we a little ago deſcribed? How do you ſay? That the exerciſe is to be ſimple and moderate, and of that kind moſt eſpecially which pertaineth to war. Of what kind? Even from Homer, ſaid I, one may learn theſe things: for you know, that, in their warlike expeditions, at the entertainments of their heroes, he never feaſts them with fiſhes, and that even whilſt they were by the ſea at the Helleſpont, nor yet with boiled fleſhes, but only with roaſt, as what ſoldiers can moſt eaſily get: for, in ſhort, one can every where more eaſily make uſe of fire, than carry veſſels about with them. Yes indeed. Neither does Homer, as I imagine, any where, make mention of ſeaſonings: and this is what the other wreſtlers underſtand, that the body, which is to be in good habit, muſt abſtain from all theſe things. They rightly underſtand, ſaid he, and abſtain. You do not then, friend! as appears, approve of the Syracuſian

table, and the Sicilian variety of meats: ſince this other appears to you to be right? I do not, as appears. You will likewiſe diſapprove of a Corinthian girl, as a miſtreſs, for them who are to be of a good habit of body. By all means, truly. And likewiſe of thoſe delicacies, as they are reckoned, of Attic confections. Of neceſſity. For all feeding and dieting of this kind, if we compare it to melody and ſong, which are compoſed in a harmony and meaſure diverſified all manner of ways, ſhall not the compariſon be juſt? Why not? And doth not the diverſity, in that caſe, create intemperance; and here, diſeaſe? But ſimplicity as to muſic, creates in the ſoul, temperance; and, as to exerciſe, creates health in the body. Moſt true, ſaid he. And when intemperance and diſeaſes multiply in the city, ſhall we not have many halls of juſtice and of medicine opened? And the arts of juſtice and of medicine be in requeſt, when many free perſons ſhall earneſtly apply to them? Why not? But can you pitch upon any greater mark of an ill and baſe education in a city, than that there ſhould be need of phyſicians and ſupreme magiſtrates, and that not only for the contemptible and low handicrafts, but for thoſe who boaſt of having been educated in a liberal manner? Or, doth it not appear to be baſe, and a great ſign of want of education, to be obliged to obſerve juſtice pronounced on us by others, as our maſters and judges, and to have no ſenſe of it in ourſelves? Of all things, this, reply'd he, is the moſt baſe. And do you not, ſaid I, deem this to be more baſe ſtill; when one not only ſpends a great part of life in

courts of juſtice, as defendant and plaintiff; but, from his ignorance of the beautiful, imagines that he becomes renowned for this very thing; as being dextrous in doing injuſtice, and able to turn himſelf through all ſorts of windings, and uſing every ſort of ſubterfuge, thinks to get off, ſo as to evade juſtice; and all this, for the ſake of ſmall and contemptible things: being ignorant, how much better and more handſome it were, ſo to regulate his life as not to ſtand in need of a ſleepy judge? This, reply'd he, is ſtill more baſe than the other. And to ſtand in need of the medicinal art, ſaid I, not on account of wounds, or ſome epidemical diſtempers incident, but through ſloth, and ſuch a diet as we mentioned, filled with rheums and wind, like lakes; obliging the ſkilful ſons of Eſculapius, to invent new names to diſeaſes, ſuch as dropſies and catarrhs: Do not you think this abominable? Theſe are truly, reply'd he, very new and ſtrange names of diſeaſes. Such, ſaid I, as were not, I imagine, in the days of Eſculapius: and I conjecture ſo from this, that when Eurypylus was wounded at Troy, and was getting Pramnian wine to drink with a deal of flour in it, with cheeſe added to it; (all which ſeem to be phlegmatic,) the ſons of Eſculapius neither blamed the woman who preſented it, nor reprehended Patroclus who had preſented the cure: And ſurely the potion, ſaid he, is abſurd for one in ſuch a caſe. No, ſaid I, if you conſider, that as they tell us, the deſcendants of Eſculapius did not, before the days of Herodicus, practiſe this method of cure, now in uſe, which puts the patient on a

regimen: But Herodicus, being a teacher of youth, and, at the ſame time, infirm in his health, mixing exerciſe and medicine together, he made himſelf moſt uneaſy in the firſt place, and afterwards many others beſides. As how, ſaid he? In procuring to himſelf, ſaid I, a lingering death; for, whilſt he was conſtantly attentive to his diſeaſe, which was mortal, he was not able, as I imagine, to cure himſelf; though, neglecting every thing beſides, he was ſtill uſing medicines; and thus he paſſed his life, ſtill in the greateſt uneaſineſs, if he departed in the leaſt from his accuſtomed diet; and, through this wiſdom of his, ſtruggling long with death, he arrived at old-age. A mighty reward, ſaid he, he reaped of his art! Such as became one, ſaid I, who did not underſtand that it was not from ignorance or inexperience of this method of cure, that Eſculapius did not diſcover it to his deſcendants; but, becauſe that he knew, that in all well regulated ſtates, there was ſome certain work enjoined every one in the city, which was neceſſary to be done; and no one allowed to have the leiſure of being ſick the whole of life, and attentive only to the taking of medicines. This we may pleaſantly obſerve in the caſe of labouring people; but we do not obſerve it in the caſe of the rich, and ſuch as are counted happy. How, ſaid he? A ſmith, reply'd I, when he falls ſick, thinks it fit to take from the phyſician ſome potion, to throw up his diſeaſe, or purge it downwards, or, by means of cauſtic or amputation, to get quit of the trouble: but, if any one preſcribe for him a long regimen, putting caps on his head, and

other ſuch things, he quickly tells him, that he hath not leiſure to lye ſick, nor doth it avail him to live in this manner, attentive to his trouble, and negligent of his proper work; and ſo, bidding ſuch a phyſician farewel, he returns to his ordinary diet; and, if he recovers his health, he continues to manage his own affairs; but if his body be not able to ſupport, he dies, and is freed from troubles. It ſeems proper, ſaid he, for ſuch an one to uſe the medicinal art in this manner. Is it not, ſaid I, becauſe he hath a certain buſineſs, which, if he doth not perform, it is not for his advantage to live? It is plain, reply'd he. But the rich man, as we ſay, hath no ſuch work allotted him, from which, if he be obliged to refrain, life is not worth the having. He is ſurely ſaid at leaſt to have none. For you do not, ſaid I, attend to what Phocylides ſays; that one ought ſtill, whilſt there is life, to practiſe virtue. I think, reply'd he, we attended to that formerly. Let us by no means, ſaid I, differ from him in this. But let us inform ourſelves, whether this exceſſive attention to one's diſeaſe is to be the buſineſs of the rich; and that life is not worth keeping, if he does not give this attention. For that ſuch a life is indeed a hinderance of the mind's application to maſonry and other arts; but, with reſpect to the exhortation of Phocylides, it is no hinderance. Yes, truly it is, ſaid he, and that in the greateſt degree, when this exceſſive care of the body goes beyond proper exerciſe. Neither does it agree with attention to private oeconomy, or military expeditions, or ſedentary magiſtracies in the city. But what

is of the greateſt moment is, that ſuch application to health is ill fitted for any ſort of learning, and enquiry, and ſtudy, by one's ſelf, whilſt one is perpetually dreading certain pains and ſwimmings of the head, and blaming philoſophy as occaſioning them; ſo that where there is this attention to health, it is a great obſtacle to the practice of virtue and improvement in it: for it makes us always imagine that we are ill, and always complain of the body. That is likely, ſaid he. And ſhall we not ſay that Eſculapius too underſtood theſe things, when, to perſons of a healthful conſtitution, and ſuch as uſed a wholſome diet, but were afflicted by ſome particular diſeaſe, to theſe and to ſuch a conſtitution, he preſcribed medicine, repelling their diſeaſes by drugs, and inciſions, and enjoined them their accuſtomed diet, that the public might ſuffer no damage? But he did not attempt, by extenuating, or nouriſhing diet, to cure ſuch conſtitutions as were wholly diſeaſed within; as it would but afford a long and miſerable life to the man himſelf, and the deſcendants which would ſpring from him would probably be of the ſame kind: for he did not imagine the man ought to be cured who could not live in the ordinary courſe, as he would be neither profitable to himſelf, nor to the ſtate. You make Eſculapius, ſaid he, a politician. It is plain, ſaid I. And his ſons may ſhow that he was ſo. Or do you not ſee, that at Troy they excelled in war, and likewiſe practiſed medicine in the way I mention? Or do not you remember, that when Menelaus was wounded by Pandarus, they

Waſh'd off the blood, and ſoft'ning drugs applied.
but, as to what was neceſſary for him, to eat or drink afterwards, they preſcribed for him no more, than for Eurypylus: deeming external applications ſufficient to heal men, who, before they were wounded, were healthful, and moderate in their diet, whatever mixture they happened to have drunk at the time. But they judged, that, to have a diſeaſed conſtitution, and to live an intemperate life, was neither profitable to the men themſelves, nor to others. And that their art ought not to be employed on theſe; nor to miniſter to them, not even though they were richer than Midas. You make, ſaid he, the ſons of Eſculapius truly ingenious. It is proper, reply'd I: though, in oppoſition to us, the writers of tragedy, and Pindar, call indeed Eſculapius, the ſon of Apollo, but ſay that he was prevailed on by gold, to undertake the cure of a rich man, who was already in a deadly ſtate; for which, truly, he was even ſtruck with a thunderbolt: but we, agreeably to what hath been formerly ſaid, will not believe them as to both theſe things; but will aver, that if he was the ſon of the God, he was not given to filthy lucre; or, if he were given to filthy lucre, he was not a ſon of the God. Theſe things, ſaid he, are moſt right. But what do you ſay, Socrates! as to this? Is it not neceſſary to provide good phyſicians for the ſtate? and muſt not theſe, moſt likely, be ſuch who have been converſant with the greateſt number of healthy and of ſickly people? And theſe, in like manner, be the beſt judges, who have been converſant with

all ſorts of diſpoſitions? I mean now, ſaid I, thoſe who are very good. But do you know whom I deem to be ſuch? If you tell me, reply'd he. I ſhall endeavour to do it, ſaid I; but you enquire, in one queſtion, about two different things. As how, ſaid he? Phyſicians, reply'd I, would become moſt expert, if, beginning from their infancy, they would, in learning the art, be converſant with the greateſt number of bodies, and theſe the moſt ſickly; and laboured themſelves under all manner of diſeaſes, and, by natural conſtitution, were not quite healthful; for it is not by the body, I imagine, that they cure the body; (elſe their own bodies could at no time be admitted to be of an ill conſtitution,) but they cure the body by the ſoul; which, whilſt it is of an ill conſtitution, is not capable to perform well any cure. Right, ſaid he. But the judge, friend! governs the ſoul by the ſoul; which, if from its childhood it hath been educated with bad ſouls, and hath been converſant with them, and hath, itſelf, done all manner of evil, it is not able to come out from among them, ſo as, accurately, by itſelf, to judge of the evils of others; as happens in the diſeaſes of the body; but it muſt, in its youth, be unexperienced, and unpolluted with evil manners, if it means to be good and beautiful itſelf, and to judge ſoundly of what is juſt. And hence the virtuous, in their youth, appear ſimple, and eaſily deceived by the unjuſt, as they have not, within themſelves, diſpoſitions ſimilar to thoſe of the wicked. And ſurely this at leaſt, ſaid he, they do often ſuffer extremely. For which reaſon, ſaid I, the

good judge, is not to be a young man, but an old, having been late in learning wickedneſs, what it is; perceiving it, not as a kindred poſſeſſion, reſiding in his own ſoul, but as a foreign one, in the ſouls of others; which he hath for a long time ſtudied, and hath underſtood what ſort of an evil it is, by the help of ſcience, rather than by proper experience. Such an one, ſaid he, is like to be the moſt able judge. And likewiſe, a good one, ſaid I, which was what you required. For he who hath a good ſoul, is good. But the other, notable and ſuſpicious man, who hath committed many pieces of iniquity himſelf, when indeed he converſeth with his like, being thought to be ſubtle and wiſe, he appears a notable man, being extremely cautious, having an eye to thoſe models which he hath within himſelf; but when he approacheth the good, and the more aged, he appears fooliſh, ſuſpicious out of ſeaſon, and ignorant of integrity of manners, as having within no models of ſuch a kind: but, however, being more frequently converſant with the wicked than with the wiſe, he appears, both to himſelf and others, to be more wiſe, rather than more ignorant. This, ſaid he, is perfectly true. We muſt not, therefore, ſaid I, look for ſuch an one to be a wiſe and good judge, but the former one: for indeed vice can never at all know both itſelf and virtue. But virtue, where the temper is inſtructed by time, ſhall attain to the knowledge of both itſelf and vice. This one, then, and not the wicked, as it appears to me, is the wiſe man. And I, reply'd he, am of the ſame opinion. Will you not then eſtabliſh

in the city ſuch a method of medicine as we have mentioned, along with ſuch a method of judicature, as ſhall carefully preſerve for you thoſe of your citizens, who are of goodly conſtitutions, both in mind and in body; and with reſpect to thoſe who are otherwiſe, ſuch as are ſo in their bodies, they ſhall ſuffer to die, but ſuch as are of naughty and incurable conſtitutions in their ſoul, theſe they ſhall themſelves put to death. This, ſaid he, hath appeared to be beſt, both for thoſe who ſuffer it, and for the city. And it is plain, ſaid I, that your youth will be afraid of needing this juſticiary, whilſt they are employed in that ſimple muſic, which, we ſay, generateth temperance. Why will they not, ſaid he? And, according to the very ſame ſteps of reaſoning, the muſician who takes a fancy to perform exerciſes, will chuſe to do it, ſo as not to require any medicine, unleſs there be neceſſity. I imagine ſo. And he will perform his exerciſes, and his labours, ſtudying the ſprightlineſs of his temper, and the animating it, rather as bodily vigour. And not as the other wreſtlers, who take meats and drinks to promote bodily ſtrength. Moſt right, ſaid he. Why then, ſaid I, Glauco! they who propoſe to teach muſic and exerciſe, propoſe theſe things, not for what the generality imagine, to cure the body by the one, and the ſoul by the other. What then, reply'd he? They ſeem, ſaid I, to propoſe them both chiefly on the ſoul's account. As how? Do not you perceive, ſaid I, how theſe are affected as to their underſtanding, who have all their life been converſant in exerciſes, but have never applied to

what is muſical; or how theſe are affected who have lived in a method the reverſe of this? Whom, ſaid he, do you ſpeak of? Of ruſticity, ſaid I, and fierceneſs, and again of ſoftneſs and mildneſs. I know, ſaid he, that theſe who are converſant in nothing but mere exerciſes, turn out to be more ruſtic than is becoming: and they again, who mind muſic alone, are more ſoft than is for their honour. And ſurely, ſaid I, this ruſticity, at leaſt, may generate a ſprightlineſs of temper; and when rightly diſciplined, may turn to fortitude; but when carried further than is becoming, may, as is likely, be both more fierce and troubleſome. So I imagine, ſaid he. But what? Doth not the philoſophic temper partake of the mild; and when this diſpoſition is carried too far, may it not prove more ſoft than is becoming; but, when rightly diſciplined, be really mild and comely? Theſe things are ſo. But we ſay that our guardians ought to have both theſe diſpoſitions. They ought. Ought not then theſe to be adapted to one another? Why not? And the ſoul in which they are thus adapted is temperate and brave. Certainly. But the ſoul in which they are not adapted, is cowardly and ſavage. Extremely ſo. And when one yields up himſelf to be ſoothed with the charms of muſic, and pours into his ſoul through his ears, as through a pipe, thoſe we denominated the ſoft, effeminate, and plaintive harmonies, and ſpends the whole of his life chanting and raviſhed with melody, ſuch an one, at the firſt, if he have any thing high ſpirited, ſoftens it like iron, and from being uſeleſs and fierce, renders it

profitable. But when he ſtill perſiſting, does not deſiſt, but enchants his ſoul, after this, it melts and diſſolves him, till it thoroughly ſoften his ſpirit, and cut out, as it were, the nerves of his ſoul, and render him an effeminate warriour. It is certainly ſo indeed, ſaid he. But if, ſaid I, he had from the beginning a ſpiritleſs temper, this he quickly effectuates, but if high ſpirited, it renders the mind weak, and eaſily turned, ſo as inſtantly to be enraged at trifles, and again the rage is extinguiſhed: ſo that from being high ſpirited, they become outrageous and paſſionate, full of the moroſe. So indeed it happens. But what now? If one labour much in exerciſes, and feaſt extremely well; but apply not to muſic and philoſophy; ſhall he not, in the firſt place, being in good plight of body, be filled with courage and ſpirit; and become more courageous than he was before? Certainly ſo. But what? When he doth nothing elſe; nor participates in any thing which is muſic like, though there were any love of learning in his ſoul, as it neither taſtes of any ſtudy, nor bears a ſhare in any inquiry nor reaſoning, nor any thing beſides, which is muſical, muſt it not become feeble, and deaf and blind, as his perceptions are neither awakened, nor nouriſhed, nor refined? Juſt ſo. Such an one then becomes, as I imagine, a reaſon-hater, and unmuſical; and by no means can be perſuaded to any thing by reaſoning, but is carried to every thing by force and ſavageneſs, as a wild beaſt, and thus he lives in ignorance and barbarity, out of meaſure, and unpoliſhed. It is, ſaid he, entirely ſo. Correſpond-

ing then to theſe two tempers, I would ſay, that ſome God, as appears, hath given men two arts; thoſe of muſic and exerciſe, in reference to the ſprightly and the philoſophic temper; not for the ſoul and body, otherwiſe than as a by-work, but for that other purpoſe, that thoſe two tempers might be adapted to one another; being ſtretched and ſlackened to the proper pitch. So indeed it appears. Whoever then ſhall, in the moſt handſome manner, mingle exerciſe with muſic, and have theſe in the juſteſt meaſure in his ſoul, him we ſhall moſt properly call the moſt completely muſical, and of the beſt harmony; far more than the man who adjuſts to one another muſical ſtrings. Moſt reaſonably, ſaid he, Socrates! Shall we not then, Glauco! always have need of ſuch a preſident for our ſtate, if our government is to be preſerved? We ſhall moſt eſpecially have need of this. Thoſe then may be the models of education and diſcipline. For why ſhould one go over the dances, the huntings of wild beaſts, both with dogs, and with nets, the wreſtlings, and the horſe-races proper for ſuch perſons, for it is quite manifeſt that theſe naturally follow of courſe, and it is no difficult matter to find them out. It is indeed, ſaid he, not difficult. Be it ſo, ſaid I. But what follows next? What was next to be determined by us. Was it which of theſe ſhall govern, and be governed? What elſe? Is it not plain, that the elder ought to be governours, and the younger to be the governed? It is plain. And is it not likewiſe plain, that the beſt of them are to govern? This too is plain. But are not the beſt huſbandmen the moſt

aſſiduous in agriculture? They are. If now our guardians are the beſt, will they not be moſt vigilant over the city? They will. Muſt we not, for this purpoſe, make them prudent, and able, and careful likewiſe of the city? We muſt do ſo. But one would ſeem to be moſt careful of that which he happens to love. Undoubtedly. And one ſhall moſt eſpecially love that, to which he thinks the ſame things are profitable, which are ſo to himſelf, and with whoſe good eſtate he thinks his own connected; and where he is of a contrary opinion, he will be contrarywiſe affected. Juſt ſo. We muſt chuſe then from the other guardians ſuch men as ſhall moſt of all others appear to us, on obſervation, to do with the greateſt chearfulneſs, through the whole of life, whatever they think advantageous for the ſtate, and what appears to be diſadvantageous, they will not do by any means. Theſe are the moſt proper, ſaid he. It truly appears to me, that they ought to be obſerved through every ſtage of their life, if they be tenacious of this opinion, ſo as that neither fraud nor force make them inconſiderately throw out this opinion; that they ought to do what is beſt for the ſtate. What throwing out do you mean, ſaid he? I will tell you, ſaid I, an opinion ſeemeth to me to go out of the underſtanding voluntarily or involuntarily. A falſe opinion goes voluntarily from the mind which unlearns it; but every true opinion goes involuntarily. The caſe of the voluntary one, reply'd he, I underſtand; but that of the involuntary I want to learn. What now? Do not you think, ſaid I, that men are involuntarily deprived of

good things; but voluntarily of evil things? Or is it not an evil to miſs of the truth, and a good to form true opinion? Or does it not appear to you, that to conceive of things as they really are, is to form true opinion? You ſay rightly indeed, reply'd he. They do ſeem to me to be deprived unwillingly of true opinion. Do not they then ſuffer this, either in the way of theft, flattery, or force? I do not now, ſaid he, underſtand you. I ſeem, ſaid I, to ſpeak theatrically. But, I ſay, thoſe have their opinions ſtolen away, who are perſuaded to change their opinions, and thoſe who forget them; in the one caſe, they are imperceptibly taken away by time, and in the other by reaſoning. Do you now underſtand in any meaſure? Yes. And thoſe, I ſay, have their opinions forced from them, whom grief or agony obliges to change them. This, ſaid he, I underſtand, and you ſay right. And thoſe, I imagine, you will ſay, are beguiled out of their opinions, who change them, being bewitched by pleaſure, or ſeduced by fear, being afraid of ſomething. It ſeems, ſaid he, that every thing beguiles which deceives us. That then which I was now mentioning muſt be ſought for: who are the beſt guardians of this opinion; that, that is to be done which is beſt for the ſtate: and they muſt be obſerved immediately from their childhood, ſetting before them ſuch pieces of work, in which they may moſt readily forget ſuch a principle, and be deluded; and he who is mindful, and hard to be deluded, is to be choſen, and he who is otherwiſe, is to be rejected. Is it not ſo? Yes. And we muſt appoint them trials of labours and

of pains, in which we muſt obſerve the ſame things. Right, ſaid he. Muſt we not, ſaid I, appoint them a third conteſt, that of the mountebank kind; and obſerve them as thoſe do, who when they lead on young horſes againſt noiſes and tumults, obſerve whether they are frightened. So muſt they, whilſt young, be led into dreadful things, and again be thrown into pleaſures, trying them more than gold in the fire, whether one is hard to be beguiled with mountebank tricks, and appear compoſed amidſt all, being a good guardian of himſelf, and of that muſic which he learned, ſhowing himſelf in all theſe things to be in juſt meaſure and harmony. Being of ſuch a kind as this, he would truly be of the greateſt advantage both to himſelf and to the ſtate. And the man, who in childhood, in youth, and in manhood, hath been thus tried, and hath come out pure, is to be appointed governour and guardian of the ſtate; and honours are to be paid him whilſt alive, and when dead he ſhould receive the higheſt rewards of public funeral and other memorials. And he who is not ſuch an one is to be rejected. Of ſuch a kind, Glauco! ſaid I, as it appears to me, is to be the choice and eſtabliſhment of our governours and guardians, as in a ſketch and not accurately. And I, ſaid he, am of the ſame opinion. Is it not then truly moſt juſt, to call theſe the moſt complete guardians, both with reference to enemies abroad, and to friends at home; ſo as that the one ſhall not have the will, nor the other have the power to do any miſchief? And the youth (whom we now called guardians) will be allies

and auxiliaries to the decrees of the governours. I imagine ſo, reply'd he. What now, ſaid I, may be the contrivance of thoſe lies, which are made on occaſion, and of which we were lately ſaying that it is a moſt generous part in making lies, to perſuade the governours themſelves moſt eſpecially; or if not theſe the reſt of the ſtate? What ſort do you mean? Nothing new, ſaid I, but ſomewhat Phoenician, which hath frequently happened heretofore, as the poets tell us, and have perſuaded us, but hath not happened in our times, nor do I know if ever it ſhall happen: to perſuade one of it ſurely requires a ſubtle perſuaſion. How like you are, ſaid he, to one who grudges to ſpeak out! I ſhall appear, ſaid I, to grudge with very good reaſon after I tell it. Speak, ſaid he, and do not fear. I ſpeak then, though I know not with what courage, and uſing what expreſſions, I ſhall tell it. And I ſhall attempt, firſt of all, to perſuade the governours themſelves, and the ſoldiers, and afterwards the reſt of the ſtate. How that whatever things we educated and inſtructed them in, ſeemed to happen to them, and to befal them all as dreams; but that they were in truth at that time formed, and educated within the earth, both they themſelves, and their armour and their other utenſils likewiſe fabricated. And after that they were completely faſhioned, the earth, who is their mother, brought them forth; and now they ought to be affected towards the country where they are, as to their mother and nurſe; to defend her, if any invade her; and to conſider the reſt of the citizens as being their brothers, and ſprung from

their mother earth. It was not without reaſon, ſaid he, that a while ago you was aſhamed to tell this falſhood. I had truly reaſon, ſaid I. But hear however the reſt of the fable. All of you now in the ſtate are brothers, (as we ſhall tell them in way of fable;) but the God, when he formed you, mixed gold in the formation of ſuch of you as are able to govern; therefore are they the moſt honourable. And ſilver, in ſuch as are auxiliaries; and iron and braſs in the huſbandmen and other handicrafts. As you are all of the ſame kind, you, for the moſt part, reſemble one another: and it ſometimes happens, that of the gold is generated the ſilver, and of the ſilver there is a golden deſcendant; and thus every different way are they generated of one another. The God gives in charge, firſt of all, and chiefly to the governours; that of nothing are they to be ſo good guardians, nor are they ſo ſtrongly to keep watch over any thing as over their children; to know what of thoſe principles is mixed in their ſouls, and if their deſcendant ſhall be of the brazen or iron kind, they ſhall by no means have compaſſion; but aſſigning him honour proportioned to his natural temper, they ſhall puſh him down to the craftſmen or huſbandmen. And if again any from among theſe ſhall be born of a golden or ſilver kind, they ſhall pay them honour, and prefer them; thoſe to the guardianſhip, and theſe to the auxiliary rank: it being pronounced by the oracle, that the ſtate is then to periſh, when iron or braſs ſhall have the guardianſhip of it. Have you now any contrivance to perſuade them of this fable? None, ſaid he, to

perſuade theſe men themſelves; but I can contrive how that their ſons and poſterity, and all mankind afterwards, ſhall believe it. Even this, ſaid I, would do well towards making them more concerned about the ſtate, and one another; for I almoſt underſtand what you ſay. And this truly will lead the ſame way as the oracle. But let us, having armed theſe earth-born ſons, lead them forwards under their leaders, and when they are come into the city, let them conſider where it is beſt to place their camp, ſo as beſt to keep in order thoſe who are within, if any one ſhould want to diſobey the laws; and likewiſe defend againſt thoſe without, if any enemy, as a wolf, ſhould come upon the fold. And when they have marked out their camp, and performed ſacrifices to the proper Divinities, let them erect their tents: or, how are they to do? Juſt ſo, ſaid he. Shall they not be ſuch as may be ſufficient to defend them, both from winter and ſummer? Why not? for you ſeem, ſaid he, to mean houſes. Yes, ſaid I, but military ones; not ſuch as are coſtly. What do you ſay, reply'd he, is the difference between the one and the other? I will endeavour, ſaid I, to tell you; for, of all things, it is the moſt dreadful, and the moſt ſhameful to ſhepherds, to breed ſuch kind of dogs, and in ſuch a manner, as auxiliaries of the flocks, as either, through intemperance or famine, or ſome other ill diſpoſition, the dogs themſelves ſhould attempt to hurt the ſheep; and, inſtead of dogs, reſemble wolves. That is dreadful, ſaid he, why is it not? Muſt we not then, by all means, take care leſt our allies do ſuch a thing towards our citizens,

as they are more powerful; and, inſtead of generous allies, reſemble ſavage lords? We muſt take care, ſaid he. Would they not be prepared, as to the greateſt part of the care, if they were really well educated? But they are ſo at leaſt, reply'd he. And I ſaid: that is not proper to be confidently affirmed, friend Glauco! but that is proper which we were now ſaying, that they ought to have good education, whatever it is, if they are to have what is of the greateſt conſequence towards rendering them mild, both among themſelves, and towards thoſe who are guarded by them. Very right, ſaid he. Beſides then this education, any one of underſtanding would ſay, that their houſes, and all their other ſubſtance, ought to be ſo contrived, as not to hinder their guardians from being the very beſt of men, and not to ſtir them up to injure the other citizens. And he will ſay true. If then they intend to be ſuch, conſider ſaid I, whether they ought to live and dwell in ſome ſuch manner as this: Firſt then, let none poſſeſs any ſubſtance privately, unleſs there be the greateſt neceſſity for it: next, let none have any dwelling, or ſtore-houſe into which, whoever inclines, may not enter: as for neceſſaries, let them be ſuch as temperate and brave warriours may require; and as they are inſtituted by the other citizens, let them receive ſuch a reward of their guardianſhip, as to have neither overplus nor deficiency at the year's end. Let them have public meals, as in encampments, and live in common. They muſt be told, that they have from the Gods a divine gold and ſilver at all times in their ſouls; and

have no need of the human. And that it were profane to pollute the poſſeſſion of the divine kind, by mixing it with the poſſeſſion of this mortal gold; becauſe the money of the vulgar hath produced many wicked deeds, but that of theſe men is incorruptible. And of all the men in the city, they alone are not allowed to handle, nor to touch gold nor ſilver; nor to bring it under their roof; nor carry it about with them; nor to drink out of ſilver or gold: and that thus they are to preſerve themſelves and the ſtate. But whenever they ſhall poſſeſs lands, and houſes, and money in a private way, they ſhall become ſtewards and farmers inſtead of guardians, hateful lords inſtead of allies to the other citizens, hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted againſt, they ſhall paſs the whole of their life. Much oftener, and more afraid of the enemies from within than from without, they and the reſt of the ſtate haſtening ſpeedily to deſtruction. For all which reaſons, ſaid I, let us affirm, that our guardians are thus to be conſtituted with reference both to their houſes, and to other things. And let us ſettle theſe things by law. Shall we? By all means, ſaid Glauco.

THE END OF THE THIRD BOOK.

THE FOURTH BOOK.

ADIMANTUS hereupon replying, what now, Socrates! ſaid he, will you ſay in your own defence, if one ſhall ſay that you do not make theſe men very happy, though it is owing to theſe men that the city really exiſts, yet they enjoy no advantage in the city, ſuch as others do who poſſeſs lands, build beautiful and large houſes, purchaſe ſuitable furniture, offer ſacrifices at their own expence, give public entertainments to ſtrangers, and poſſeſs what you was now mentioning, gold and ſilver, and every thing which is reckoned to contribute towards the rendering men happy. But one may readily ſay, that, like hired auxiliaries, they ſeem to poſſeſs nothing in the city but the employment of keeping guard. Yes, ſaid I, and that too only for their maintenance, without receiving, as all others do, any reward beſides. So that they are not allowed ſo much as to travel privately any where abroad, though they ſhould incline it; nor to beſtow money on others, nor to ſpend it in ſuch other methods as theſe do who are counted happy. Theſe and many ſuch things you leave out of the accuſation. But let theſe things too, ſaid he, be charged againſt them. You aſk then, what we ſhall ſay in our defence? I do. Whilſt we go on in the ſame road, we ſhall find, as I imagine, what may be ſaid: for we ſhall ſay, that it were nothing ſtrange,

if theſe men, even in theſe circumſtances, ſhould be the happieſt poſſible; yet it was not with an eye to this, that we eſtabliſhed the city; to have any one tribe in it remarkably happy beyond the reſt; but that the whole city might be in the happieſt condition; for we judged, that in ſuch an one we ſhould moſt eſpecially find juſtice, and injuſtice in the city the worſt eſtabliſhed: and that upon thoroughly examining theſe, we ſhould determine what we have for ſome time been in queſt of. Now then, as I imagine, we are forming a happy ſtate, not picking out ſome few perſons to make them alone happy; but are eſtabliſhing the univerſal happineſs of the whole: and we ſhall next conſider a ſtate which is the reverſe. As if then we were painting human figures, and one approaching ſhould blame us, ſaying, that we do not put the moſt beautiful colours on the moſt beautiful parts of the creature; for that the eyes, the moſt beautiful part, were not painted with purple, but with black; would not we ſeem to ſay tolerably well, in our defence to him, when we ſaid, wonderful critic! Do not imagine, that we ought to paint the eyes beautiful, in ſuch a way as that they would not appear to be eyes, and ſo with reference to all other parts. But conſider, whether in giving each particular part its due, we make the whole beautiful. And ſo now, do not oblige us to confer ſuch a happineſs on our guardians as ſhall make them any thing rather than guardians: for we know too how to array the huſband-men in rich and coſtly robes, and to enjoin them to cultivate the ground only with a view to

pleaſure; and in like manner, thoſe who make earthen ware, to lye at their eaſe by the fire, to drink and feaſt, neglecting the wheel, and working only ſo much as they incline: and we know how to confer a felicity of this nature on every individual, in order to render the whole ſtate happy: but do not adviſe us to act after this manner; ſince, if we obey you, neither would the huſbandman really be a huſbandman, nor the potter be a potter; nor would any other really be of any of thoſe profeſſions of which the city is compoſed. But, as to others, it is leſs matter; for when ſhoe-makers become bad, and are degenerate, and profeſs to be ſhoe-makers, when they are not, no great miſchief happens to the ſtate: but when the guardians of the law and of the ſtate are not ſo in reality, but only in appearance; you ſee how they entirely deſtroy the whole conſtitution; if they alone ſhall have the privilege of an affluent and happy life: if we then are for appointing men who ſhall be really guardians of the city, the leaſt of all hurtful to it; and he who makes the objection, is for having them rather as certain farmers, and as in a feſtival-meeting, not in a city, certain public entertainers, indulging in jollity, he muſt mean ſomething elſe than a city: we muſt then conſider whether we eſtabliſh guardians with this view, that they may have the greateſt happineſs; or if we eſtabliſh them with a view to the happineſs of the whole city, let us ſee whether this takes place; and let us oblige theſe allies and guardians to do this, and we muſt perſuade them they ſhall thus become the beſt performers of their own particular work; and we muſt deal with all others

in the ſame manner. And thus the whole city being increaſed, and well conſtituted, let us allow the ſeveral tribes to participate of happineſs as their natures admit. You ſeem to me, ſaid he, to ſay well. Shall I appear to you, ſaid I, to ſpeak right in what is akin to this? What is that? Conſider whether other artificers are corrupted by theſe things, ſo as to be made bad workmen. What things do you mean? Riches, ſaid I, and poverty. As how? Thus does the potter, after he becomes rich, ſeem ſtill to mind his art? By no means, ſaid he. But will he not become more idle and careleſs than formerly? Much more ſo. Shall he not then become a more unſkilful potter? Much more ſo likewiſe, ſaid he. And ſurely being unable through poverty to furniſh himſelf with tools, or any thing elſe requiſite to his art, his workmanſhip ſhall be more imperfectly executed, and his ſons or thoſe others whom he inſtructeth ſhall be inferior artiſts. How ſhould they not? Through both theſe now, poverty and riches, the workmanſhip in the arts is rendered leſs perfect, and the artiſts themſelves become leſs expert. It appears ſo. We have then it ſeems diſcovered other things, which our guardians muſt by all means watch againſt, that they may nowiſe eſcape their notice, and ſteal into the city. What kind of things are theſe? Riches, ſaid I, and poverty: as the one is productive of luxury, idleneſs, and a love of novelty; and the other, beſides a love of novelty, is illiberal, and productive of miſchief. They are entirely ſo, ſaid he. But conſider this, Socrates! how ſhall our city be able to engage in

war, ſince ſhe is poſſeſſed of no money, eſpecially if ſhe be obliged to wage war againſt a great and opulent ſtate. It is plain, ſaid I, that to fight againſt one of this kind is ſomewhat difficult; but to fight againſt two is a more eaſy matter. How ſay you, reply'd he? Firſt of all now, ſaid I, if they have at all occaſion to fight, will they not, being expert in the art of war, fight againſt rich men? They will, ſaid he. What then, ſaid I, Adimantus! do not you think that one boxer, who is fitted out in the beſt manner poſſible for this exerciſe, is eaſily able to fight againſt two who are not expert boxers, but, on the contrary, are rich and unweildy? He would not eaſily fight with both at once, ſaid he? No. Though he had it in his power to retire a little, and then turn on the one who ſhould be the furtheſt advanced towards him, and ſtrike him, and by doing this frequently in the ſun and heat, might not a perſon of this kind eaſily defeat many ſuch as theſe? To be ſure, ſaid he, that would be no great wonder. But do not you think that the rich have more knowledge and experience of boxing than of the military art? I do, ſaid he. Eaſily then, as it plainly appears, will our boxers combat with double and triple their number. I will agree with you, ſaid he; for you ſeem to me to ſay right. But what if they ſhould ſend an ambaſſy to another ſtate, informing them of the true ſituation of the affair, telling we make no uſe of gold or ſilver, neither is it lawful for us to uſe them, but with you it is lawful; if then you become our allies in the war, you will receive the ſpoils of all the other ſtates: do you imagine that

any, on hearing theſe things, would chuſe to fight againſt ſtrong and reſolute dogs, rather than in alliance with the dogs to fight againſt fat and tender ſheep? I do not think it; but if the riches of others be amaſſed into one ſtate, ſee that it does not endanger that which is poor. You are happy, ſaid I, that you imagine any other deſerves to be called a ſtate beſides ſuch an one as we have eſtabliſhed. Why not, ſaid he? We muſt give others, ſaid I, a more magnificent appellation; for each of them conſiſts of many ſtates, and is not one, as is ſaid in way of irony; for there are always in them two parties at war with each other, the poor and the rich; and in each of theſe again there are very many: to which, if you apply as to one, you are miſtaken entirely; but if, as to many, you put one part in poſſeſſion of the goods and power of another, or even deliver up the one to the other, you ſhall always have the many for your allies, and the few for enemies. And ſo long as your ſtate ſhall continue temperately, as now eſtabliſhed, it ſhall be the greateſt. I do not ſay it ſhall be accounted ſo, but ſhall be really the greateſt; though its defenders were no more than one thouſand: for one ſtate ſo great you will not eaſily find, neither among the Greeks nor Barbarians, but many which are accounted many times larger than ſuch an one as this. Are you of a different opinion? No truly, ſaid he. Might not this then, ſaid I, be the beſt mark for our rulers how large to make the city, and what extent of ground to mark off for it, in proportion to its bulk, without minding any

thing more? What mark, ſaid he? I imagine, ſaid I, this one. So long as the city, on its increaſe, continues to be one; ſo long it may be increaſed, but not beyond it. Very right, ſaid he. Shall we not then lay this further injunction on our guardians, to take care by all means that the city be neither ſmall nor great, but of moderate extent, and be one city. We ſhall probably, ſaid he, enjoin them a trifling affair. A more trifling affair ſtill than this, ſaid I, is that we mentioned above, when we obſerved, that if any deſcendant of the guardians be naughty, he ought to be diſmiſſed to the other claſſes; and if any deſcendant of the others be worthy, he is to be raiſed to the rank of the guardians: and this was intended to ſhow that all the other citizens ought to apply themſelves each to that particular art for which he hath a natural genius, that ſo every one minding his own proper work, may not be many, but be one; and ſo likewiſe the whole ſtate may become one, and not be many. This indeed, ſaid he, is ſtill a more trifling matter than the other. We do not here, ſaid I, good Adimantus! as one may imagine, enjoin them many and great matters, but ſuch as are all trifling, if they take care of one grand point, as the ſaying is, or rather that which is ſufficient in place of the grand. What is that, ſaid he? Education, ſaid I, and nurture; for if, being well educated, they become temperate men, they will eaſily ſee through all theſe things, and ſuch other things as we omit at preſent, reſpecting women, marriages, and the propagation of the ſpecies. For theſe things ought

all, according to the proverb, to be made entirely common among friends. That, ſaid he, would be the righteſt way. And ſurely, ſaid I, if once a Republic is ſet a-going, it proceeds happily, increaſing as a circle. And whilſt good education and nurture are preſerved, they produce good geniuſes; and good geniuſes, partaking of ſuch education, produce ſtill better than the former, as well in other reſpects, as with reference to propagation, as in the caſe of other animals. It is likely, ſaid he. To ſpeak then briefly this, the guardians of the ſtate muſt oppoſe, that it may not, eſcaping their notice, hurt the conſtitution; nay, above all things, they muſt guard againſt this, not to make any innovations in the exerciſe and muſic, contrary to the eſtabliſhed order of the ſtate; but to maintain this order as much as poſſible. Being afraid leſt that whilſt one ſays that poetical expreſſion,

------Men moſt admire that ſong,
Which hath the moſt of novelty,

one ſhould frequently imagine, that the Poet means not new ſongs, but a new method of the ſong, and ſhould commend this. Such a thing is neither to be commended nor admitted: for to receive a new kind of muſic is to be guarded againſt, as endangering the whole of the conſtitution: for never are the meaſures of muſic altered without the greateſt politic laws, according to Damon, with whom I agree. You may place me likewiſe, ſaid Adimantus, among thoſe who are of that opinion. We muſt erect then, ſaid I, ſome barrier as would ſeem, ſomewhere here, for our guardians themſelves, with regard to

muſic. A tranſgreſſion here, ſaid he, eaſily indeed ſteals in imperceptibly. It does, ſaid I, in the way of diverſion, and as productive of no miſchief. For neither indeed does it produce any other, ſaid he, but that becoming familiar by degrees it inſenſibly runs into the manners and purſuits; and from thence, in intercourſe of dealings one with another, it becomes greater; and from this intercourſe, it enters into laws and policies with a deal of impudence, Socrates! till at laſt it overturn all things, both private and public. Well, ſaid I, let it be allowed to be ſo. It appears ſo to me, reply'd he. Ought not then our children, as I ſaid at the beginning, to receive directly from their infancy an education more agreeable to the laws of the conſtitution, becauſe if their education be ſuch as is contrary to law, and the children be of ſuch a nature themſelves, it is impoſſible that they ſhould ever grow up to be worthy men, and obſervant of the laws. Why is it not, ſaid he? But when handſome amuſements are appointed them from their infancy, and when, by means of the muſic, they embrace that amuſement which is according to law; (contrarywiſe to thoſe others) this muſic attends them in every thing elſe, and grows with them, and raiſeth up in the city whatever formerly was fallen down. It is true indeed, ſaid he. And theſe men, ſaid I, diſcover thoſe eſtabliſhments which appear trifling, and which thoſe others deſtroyed altogether. What eſtabliſhments? Such as theſe, ſilence of the younger before the elder, which is proper; and the giving them place, and riſing up before them, and re-

verence of parents: likewiſe what ſhaving, what clothes, ſhoes, with the whole dreſs of the body, and every thing elſe of the kind. Are you not of this opinion? I am. But to eſtabliſh theſe things by law, would, I imagine, be a ſilly thing, nor is it done any where, nor would it ſtand, though eſtabliſhed both by word and writing. For how is it poſſible? It ſeems then, ſaid I, Adimantus, that a man's character and conduct will always be according to his education, let him apply himſelf afterwards to what he will; or does not the like always produce the like? Why not? And we may ſay, I imagine, that at laſt it arrives at ſomewhat complete and vigorous, either good, or what is the reverſe. Why not, ſaid he? I would not then, ſaid I, for theſe reaſons, as yet, undertake to ſettle by law ſuch things as theſe. Right, ſaid he. But what truly now, ſaid I, as to thoſe laws relative to matters of exchange, and to their traffic one with another at mercat, and if you pleaſe, their traffic likewiſe among their handicrafts, their ſcandals, bodily hurt, and raiſing of lawſuits; their inſtitution of judges, and likewiſe ſuch impoſts and payments of taxes as may be neceſſary either at mercats or at ſhores, or in general whatever laws are municipal, civil, or of the marine, or what other laws there may be of this kind; ſhall we dare to eſtabliſh any of theſe? It is improper, ſaid he, to preſcribe theſe to good and worthy men: for they will eaſily find out the moſt of them, ſuch as ought to be eſtabliſhed by law. Yes, ſaid I, friend! if at leaſt God grant them the preſervation of the laws we formerly explained. And if not,

ſaid he, they will ſpend the whole of their life, making and amending many ſuch laws as theſe, imagining that they ſhall thus attain to that which is beſt. You ſay that ſuch as theſe ſhall lead a life, ſaid I, like thoſe who are ſick, and at the ſame time, unwilling, through intemperance, to quit an unwholſome diet. Entirely ſo. And theſe truly muſt live very pleaſantly! For though they deal with phyſicians, they gain nothing; but render their diſeaſes greater, and more complex; and they ſtill hope, that when any one recommends any medicine to them, they ſhall, by means of it, be made whole. This is entirely the ſituation of ſuch diſeaſed perſons as theſe. But what, ſaid I, is not this pleaſant in them? to count that man the moſt hateful of all, who tells them the truth: that, 'till one give over drunkenneſs, and gluttony, and unchaſte pleaſure, and lazineſs, neither drugs nor cauſtics, nor amputations, nor charms, nor applications, nor any other ſuch things as theſe, will be of any avail. That, ſaid he, is not quite pleaſant; for to be enraged at one who tells us what is right, hath nothing pleaſant in it. You are no admirer, ſaid I, as it would ſeem, of this ſort of men. No truly. Neither then, though the whole of the city, (as we were lately ſaying) ſhould do ſuch a thing, would you commend them: or, is not the ſame thing, which is done by theſe people, done by all thoſe cities, which, being ill-governed, enjoin their citizens not to alter any part of the conſtitution; for that whoever ſhall do ſuch a thing is to be put to death. But that whoever ſhall with greateſt chearfulneſs pay reve-

rence to thoſe who govern in this faſhion, and ſhall gratify them in the moſt obſequious manner; and anticipating their deſires, be moſt dextrous in ſatisfying them, ſhall be reckoned both worthy and wiſe in matters of higheſt importance; and be held by them in the greateſt honour? They ſeem to me at leaſt, ſaid he, to do the very ſame thing, and by no means do I commend them. But what again as to thoſe who deſire to have the management of ſuch ſtates, and are even fond of it, are you not delighted with their courage and dexterity? I am, ſaid he, excepting ſuch as are impoſed on by them, and fancy that they are really politicians, becauſe they are commended as ſuch by the multitude. How do you mean? Do you not pardon thoſe men, ſaid I? Or do you even think it is poſſible for a man who cannot meaſure himſelf, when he hears many other ſuch men telling, that he is four cubits, not to believe this of himſelf? It is impoſſible, ſaid he. Then be not angry in this caſe; for ſuch men as theſe are of all the moſt ridiculous, always making laws about ſuch things as we now mentioned, and always amending; they imagine that they ſhall find ſome period of theſe frauds reſpecting commerce, and thoſe other things I now ſpoke of, being ignorant that they are in reality attempting to deſtroy a hydra. They are ſurely, ſaid he, doing nothing elſe. I imagine then, ſaid I, that a true law-giver ought not to give himſelf much diſturbance about ſuch a ſpecies of laws and police, either in an ill or well-regulated ſtate; in the one, becauſe it is unprofitable and of no avail; in the other,

becauſe any one can find out ſome of the laws, and others of them flow of courſe from the habits ariſing from their early education. What part then of the inſtitutions of law, ſaid he, have we yet remaining? And, I ſaid, that to us indeed there is nothing remaining; but however to the Delphian Apollo, there remains the greateſt, nobleſt, and moſt important of legal inſtitutions. Of what kind, ſaid he? The inſtitutions of temples, ſacrifices, and other worſhip of the Gods, Daemons, and heroes; likewiſe the depoſiting the dead, and what other rites ought to be performed to them, ſo as to make them propitious. For truly ſuch things as theſe, we ourſelves neither know, nor, in founding the ſtate, will we intruſt them to any other, if we be wiſe, nor will we make uſe of any other interpreter, beſides our own God. For this God is the ſupreme interpreter to all men in theſe things, who interpreteth to them ſitting on the middle of the earth. And it is well eſtabliſhed, ſaid he, and we muſt do accordingly. Thus now, ſon of Ariſto, ſaid I, is the city eſtabliſhed for you. And, in the next place, having procured ſome how ſufficient light, do you yourſelf obſerve, and call on your brother and on Polemarchus, and theſe others to aſſiſt us, if by any means we may at all perceive where juſtice is, and where injuſtice; and in what reſpect they differ from each other: and which of them the man ought to acquire, who propoſes to himſelf to be happy, whether he be concealed or not concealed both from Gods and men. But you ſay nothing to the purpoſe, reply'd Glauco; for you yourſelf promiſed to inquire into

this, deeming it impious for you not to aſſiſt the cauſe of juſtice by every poſſible means. It is true, ſaid I, what you put me in mind of, and I muſt do accordingly. But it is proper that you too ſhould aſſiſt in the inquiry. We ſhall do ſo, ſaid he. I hope then, ſaid I, to find it out in this manner. I imagine that our city, if it be rightly eſtabliſhed, is perfectly good. Of neceſſity, ſaid he. Then it is plain, that it is wiſe, and brave, and temperate, and juſt. It manifeſtly is ſo. Which ever then of theſe we ſhall find in it, ſhall there not remain behind that which is not found? Why not? For as if we were in queſt of one, of any other four, in any thing whatever, if we diſcovered this one at the firſt, we would be ſatisfied; but if we ſhould firſt diſcover the other three from this itſelf, that which we were inquiring after would be known; for it is plain it would be no other but that which remained. You ſay right, ſaid he. Since then there are in our ſtate thoſe four above-mentioned, ſhall we not inquire about them, according to the ſame manner? It is plain we ought. Firſt of all then, to me at leaſt, wiſdom appears to be conſpicuous in it; and concerning it, there appears ſomething very uncommon. What is that, ſaid he? Surely this city which we have deſcribed appears to me to be wiſe, for its councils are wiſe; are they not? They are. And ſurely this very thing, the ability of counſelling well, is plainly a certain ſcience; for men no where counſel well through ignorance, but through ſcience. It is plain. But there are many and various ſpecies of ſcience in the ſtate. Why

are there not? Is it then from the ſcience of the carpenters, that the ſtate is to be denominated wiſe and well-counſelled? By no means from this, ſaid he, is it ſaid to be wiſe, but to be mechanical. Is then the ſtate to be denominated wiſe, when it conſults wiſely through its knowledge in utenſils of wood, how to have theſe in the beſt manner poſſible? Nor this neither. But what, is it for its knowledge of theſe in braſs, or for any thing elſe of this kind? For none of theſe, ſaid he. Nor yet for its knowledge of the fruits of the earth is it ſaid to be wiſe, but to be ſkilled in agriculture. It ſeems ſo to me. But what, ſaid I, is there any ſcience among any of the citizens in this city which we have founded, which deliberates, not about any particular thing in the city, but about the whole, how it may, in the beſt manner, behave towards itſelf, and towards other cities? There is truly. What is it, ſaid I, and among whom is it to be found? This very guardianſhip, ſaid he, is it, and it is among theſe governours, whom we lately denominated complete guardians. What now do you denominate the ſtate on account of this knowledge? Well-counſelled, ſaid he, and really wiſe. Whether then, ſaid I, do you imagine the braſs-ſmiths, or theſe true guardians, will be moſt numerous in the ſtate? The braſs-ſmiths, ſaid he, will be much more numerous. And of all, ſaid I, as many as having any knowledge, are of any account, will not theſe guardians be the feweſt in number? By much. From this ſmalleſt tribe then, and part of the ſtate, and from that preſiding and governing knowledge in it, is the whole

city wiſely eſtabliſhed according to nature, and this tribe as appears is by nature the ſmalleſt, to whom it belongeth to ſhare in this knowledge, which of all others ought alone to be denominated wiſdom. You ſay, reply'd he, perfectly true. This one, then, of the four, we have found, I know not how, both what it is, and in what part of the ſtate it reſides. And it ſeems to me, ſaid he, to be ſufficiently deſcribed. But ſurely as to fortitude, at leaſt, it is no difficult matter, both to find out itſelf, and the particular part of the city in which it reſides, on account of which virtue, the city is denominated brave. As how? Doth any one, ſaid I, call a city brave or cowardly, with reference to any other, than that particular part of it which makes war, and fights in its defence? No one, ſaid he, calls it ſuch, with reference to any other part. For I do not imagine, ſaid I, that the other tribes who are in it, whether they be cowardly or brave, have power to render the city either the one or the other. No indeed. The city then is brave likewiſe in one particular part of itſelf, becauſe it hath within it a power of ſuch a nature as ſhall always preſerve their opinions about things which are dreadful, that they are both theſe very things, and of the very ſame kind which the law-giver inculcated on them in their education? Do not you call this fortitude? I have not, ſaid he, entirely comprehended what you ſay; but tell it over again. I call fortitude, ſaid I, a certain preſervative. What ſort of preſervative? A preſervative of opinion formed by law in a courſe of education about things which are dreadful,

what theſe are, and of what kind: I called it a preſervative at all times, becauſe they were to preſerve it in pains and in pleaſures, in deſires and fears, and never to caſt it off; and, if you pleaſe, I ſhall liken it to what in my opinion it bears a near reſemblance. I am pleaſed. Do not you know then, ſaid I, that the dyers, when they want to dye their wool, ſo as to be a purple colour, out of all the colours, they firſt make choice of the white; and then, with no ſmall preparation, they prepare and manage it, ſo as beſt of all to take on the pureſt colour, and thus they dye it: and whatever is tinged in this manner, is of an indelible dye; and no waſhing, neither without or with ſoap, is able to take away the pure colour: but ſuch wool as is not managed in this manner, you know what ſort it proves; whether one is dying other colours, or this one, without the due preparation beforehand. I know, ſaid he, that they are eaſily waſhen out, and are ridiculous. Imagine then, that we too, according to our ability, were aiming at ſuch a thing as this, when we were chuſing out our ſoldiers, and were inſtructing them in muſic and exerciſe: and do not imagine we had any thing elſe in view, but that, in obedience to us, they ſhould in the beſt manner imbibe the laws as a colour; in order that their opinion about what is dreadful, and about other things, might be indelible, both by means of natural temper, and ſuitable education: and that theſe waſhes, however powerful in effacing, may not be able to waſh away their dye, pleaſure, which is more powerful in effecting this than all ſoap and aſhes,

pain and fear, and desire, which exceed every other cosmetic. Such a power now, and perpetual preservation of right opinion, and such as is according to law, about things which are dreadful, and which are not, I call and constitute fortitude, unless you offer something else. But I offer, said he, nothing else: for you seem to me to reckon that such right opinion of these things, as arises without education, is both savage and servile; and not at all according to law, and you call it something other than fortitude. You say most true, said I. I admit then, that this is fortitude. Admit it further, said I, to be political fortitude; and you shall admit rightly; but if you please, we shall inquire about it more perfectly another time; for, at present, it is not this, but justice we were seeking; and with regard to the inquiry concerning this, it hath, in my opinion, been carried far enough. You speak very well, said he. There yet remains, said I, two things in the city which we must search out: both temperance, and that for the sake of which we have been searching after all the rest, to wit justice. By all means. How now can we find out justice, that we may not be further troubled about temperance? I truly neither know, said he, nor do I wish it to appear first, if we are to drop altogether the consideration of temperance; but if you please to gratify me, consider this before the other. I am indeed pleased, said I, if I be not doing an injury. Consider then, said he. We must consider, reply'd I, and as it appears from this point of view, it seems to resemble symphony and harmony more than those things former-

ly mentioned. How? Temperance, ſaid I, is ſome how a kind of ſymmetry, and a government, as they ſay, of certain pleaſures and deſires, and to appear ſuperior to one's ſelf, I do not know how, and other ſuch things are mentioned as characters of it; are they not? Theſe are the principal characters of it, ſaid he. Is not then the expreſſion ſuperior to one's ſelf ridiculous? For he who is ſuperior to himſelf, muſt ſome how be likewiſe inferior to himſelf; and the inferior be the ſuperior; for the ſame perſon is ſpoken of in all theſe caſes. Why not? But to me, ſaid I, the expreſſion ſeems to denote, that in the ſame man, with reſpect to his ſoul, there is one part better, and another worſe; and that when the part more excellent in its nature is that which governs the inferior part, this is called being ſuperior to himſelf, and expreſſes a commendation; but when through ill education, or any kind of converſe, that better part, which is ſmaller, is conquered by the crowd, the worſe part; this, by way of reproach, both expreſſes blame, and denotes the perſon thus affected to be inferior to himſelf, and altogether licentious. So it appears, ſaid he. Obſerve then, ſaid I, our new city, and you ſhall find one of theſe in it: for you will own, it may juſtly be ſaid to be ſuperior to itſelf, if where the better part governs the worſe, that ſtate is ſaid to be temperate and ſuperior to itſelf. I obſerve, ſaid he, and you ſay true. And ſurely one may find a great many and various deſires and pleaſures and pains more eſpecially among children and women and domeſtics, and among the greateſt and moſt naughty part

of thoſe who are called free. It is perfectly ſo. But the ſimple and the moderate deſires, and ſuch as are truly governed with underſtanding and the judgment of right opinion, you will meet with both in the few, and of the beſt natural temper, and of the beſt education. True, ſaid he. And do not you ſee thoſe things in our city, that there too the deſires of the many, and of the baſer part, are governed by the deſires and by the prudence of the ſmaller and more moderate part. I ſee it, ſaid he. If then any city ought to be called ſuperior to pleaſures and deſires, and to itſelf, this one is to be called ſo. By all means, ſaid he. And is it not on all theſe accounts temperate? Very much ſo, ſaid he. And if in any other city there is the ſame opinion in the governours, and the governed about this point, who ought to govern, it is to be found in this one, do not you think ſo? I am ſtrongly of that opinion. In whom then of the citizens will you ſay, that temperance reſides, when they are thus affected in the governours, or the governed? In both of them ſome how, ſaid he. You ſee then, ſaid I, that we juſtly conjectured of late that temperance reſembles a kind of harmony. For what? Becauſe not as fortitude and wiſdom, which reſide each of them in a certain part, the one of them making the city wiſe, and the other courageous, not after this manner doth it render the city temperate; but it is naturally diffuſed through the whole, connecting the weakeſt, and thoſe in the middle, all in one ſymphony, either as to wiſdom if you will, or if you will in ſtrength, or in ſubſtance, or in any other of thoſe

things; ſo that moſt juſtly may we ſay, that this concord is temperance: a ſymphony of that which is naturally the worſe and the better part, with reference to this, which of them ought to govern in the city, and in every individual. I am entirely, ſaid he, of the ſame opinion. Be it ſo then, ſaid I. There are now three things in the city it would ſeem clearly diſcovered: but now with reſpect to that other ſpecies which remains, by which the city partakes of virtue; what at all can it be? Is it not plain that it is juſtice. It is plain. Ought we not now, Glauco, like ſome huntſmen, to ſurround the thicket carefully, attending, leſt juſtice ſome how eſcape, and diſappearing, remain undiſcovered. For it is plain that ſhe is ſomewhere here. Look and be eager to perceive her, if any how you ſpy her ſooner than I, and point her to me. I wiſh I could, ſaid he; but if you employ me as an attendant rather, and one who is able to perceive what is pointed out to him, you will treat me perfectly well. Follow, ſaid I, after you have offered prayers along with me. I will do ſo; only, ſaid he, lead you the way. To me this ſeems, ſaid I, to be a place ſome how of difficult acceſs, and ſhady: It is truly dark, and difficult to be ſcrutinized; we muſt however go on. We muſt go, ſaid he. I then perceiving, ſaid, Iö! Iö! Glauco! we ſeem to have ſomewhat which appears to be a footſtep; and I imagine that ſomething ſhall not very long eſcape us. You tell good news, ſaid he. We are truly, ſaid I, of a ſlow diſpoſition. As how? It appears, happy friend! to have been long ſince rolling at our feet, from the beginning, and

we perceived it not, but made the moſt ridiculous figure, like thoſe who ſeek ſometimes for what they have in their hand, ſo we did not perceive it, but were looking ſomewhere off at a diſtance, and in this way perhaps it eſcaped us. How do you ſay, reply'd he? Thus, ſaid I, that we ſeem to me to have been ſpeaking and hearing of it long ſince, and not to underſtand ourſelves, that in ſome meaſure we expreſſed it. A long preamble to one who is eager to hear. Hear then, ſaid I, if I ſay any thing. For that which we at firſt eſtabliſhed, when we regulated the city, as what ought always to be done, that, I imagine, or a ſpecies of it, is juſtice. For we ſomewhere eſtabliſhed it, and often ſpoke of it, if you remember; that every one ought to apply himſelf to one thing relating to the city to which his genius was naturally moſt adapted. We did ſpeak of it. And that to do one's own affairs, and not to be pragmatical, is juſtice. This we have both heard from many others, and have often ſpoken of it ourſelves. We have indeed ſpoken of it. This then, friend! ſaid I, appears to be in a certain manner juſtice: to do one's own affairs. Do you know whence I conjecture this? No, but tell, ſaid he. Beſides thoſe things we have already conſidered in the city, viz. temperance, fortitude and wiſdom; this, ſaid I, ſeems to remain, which gives power to all theſe both to have a being in the ſtate, and whilſt they exiſt in it, to afford it ſafety; and we ſaid too, that juſtice would be that which would remain, if we found the other three. There is neceſſity for it, ſaid he. But if, ſaid I, it be neceſſary to judge

which of theſe, when ſubſiſting in the city, ſhall in the greateſt meaſure render it good; it would be difficult to determine, whether the agreement between the governours and the governed, or the maintaining of ſound opinion by the ſoldiers about what things are dreadful, and what are not; or wiſdom and guardianſhip in the rulers; or whether this, when it exiſts in the city, renders it in the greateſt meaſure good, viz. when child and woman, bond and free, artificer, magiſtrate and ſubject, when every one does their own affairs, and is not pragmatical. It is difficult to determine, ſaid he, why is it not? This power then, by which every one in the city performs his own office, is co-rival it ſeems for the perfection of the city, along with its wiſdom, temperance, and fortitude. Extremely ſo, ſaid he. Will you not then conſtitute juſtice to be this co-rival with theſe, for the perfection of the city? By all means. Conſider it likewiſe in this manner, whether it ſhall thus appear to you. Will you injoin the rulers to give juſt deciſions in judgment? Why not? But will they give juſt judgment, if they aim at any thing preferable to this, that no one ſhall have what belongs to others, nor be deprived of his own? No, but they can only give juſt judgment, when they aim at this. And do they not aim at this as being juſt? Yes. And thus juſtice is acknowledged to be the habitual practice of one's own proper and natural work. It is ſo. See then if you agree with me. If a carpenter take in hand to do the work of a ſhoemaker, or a ſhoemaker the work of a carpenter, or exchange either their utenſils or prices, or if the

ſame man take in hand to do both, and all elſe be exchanged; do you imagine the ſtate would be any way greatly injured? Not very much, ſaid he. But I imagine, that when one who is a craftſman, or who is born to any lucrative employment, ſhall afterwards, being puffed up by riches, by the mob, or by ſtrength, or any other ſuch thing, attempt to go into the rank of counſellor and guardian, when unworthy of it; and when theſe ſhall exchange utenſils and prices with one another; or when the ſame man ſhall take in hand to do all theſe things at once; then I imagine you will be of opinion, that this interchange of theſe things, and this variety of employments practiſed by one is the deſtruction of the ſtate. By all means. Pragmaticalneſs then in theſe three ſpecies, and their change into one another, is the greateſt hurt to the ſtate, and may moſt juſtly be called its naughtineſs. It may ſo truly. But will not you ſay that injuſtice is the greateſt ill of the ſtate? Why not? This then is injuſtice. But let us again ſpeak of it in this manner. When the craftſman, the auxiliary, and the guardian-band do their proper work, each of them doing their own work in the city; this is the contrary of the other, that is juſtice, and renders the city juſt. It ſeems to me, ſaid he, to be no otherwiſe than thus. But let us not, ſaid I, affirm it very ſtrongly: but if it ſhall be allowed us, that this ſpecies of theſe, when it enters into any individual, is likewiſe juſtice in him, we ſhall then be agreed; (for what ſhall we ſay?) if not, we ſhall conſider ſomething elſe. But now let us finiſh that ſpeculation,

which we thought proper, when we judged, that if we attempted firſt to contemplate juſtice in ſome of the greater objects which poſſeſs it, it would more eaſily be ſeen in one man; and a city appeared to us to be the moſt proper object of this kind. And ſo we eſtabliſhed the very beſt one we could, well knowing that juſtice would be in a good one. Let us now transfer and apply to a ſingle perſon, what hath there appeared to us with reſpect to a whole city: and if the ſame things correſpond, it ſhall be well; but if any thing different appear in the individual, going back again to the city, we ſhall put it to the proof; and inſtantly conſidering them, when placed by one another, and ſtriking them, we ſhall make juſtice ſhine out as from flints; and when it is become manifeſt, we ſhall firmly eſtabliſh it among ourſelves. You ſay quite in the right way, ſaid he, and we muſt do ſo. Why then, ſaid I, when we denominate any thing the ſame, though different in degrees, is it diſſimilar in that reſpect in which we call it the ſame, or is it ſimilar? It is ſimilar, ſaid he. The juſt man then, ſaid I, will differ nothing from the juſt city, according to the idea of juſtice, but will be ſimilar to it. He will be ſimilar to it, ſaid he. But indeed with reſpect to this inquiry, the city at leaſt appeared then to be juſt, when the three ſpecies of diſpoſitions in it did each of them its own work, viz. the temperate, the brave, and the wiſe, by virtue of their own proper natures, and not according to any other affections and habits. True, ſaid he. And ſhall we not, friend, judge it proper, that the individual, who hath in

his ſoul the ſame principles, (viz. temperance, fortitude, wiſdom,) ſhall, from having the ſame affections with thoſe in the city, be called by the ſame names. By all means, ſaid he. We have again, rare friend, fallen into no mean ſpeculation concerning the ſoul; whether it hath in it thoſe three principles or not. Into no mean one, as I imagine, ſaid he. And it is likely, Socrates! that the common ſaying is true, that things excellent are difficult. It appears, ſaid I. But know well, Glauco! that according to my opinion we ſhall never comprehend this matter accurately, in the methods we are now uſing in theſe reaſonings, for the road leading to it is greater and longer; we may however, it is likely, ſpeak of it in ſuch a manner as may be worthy of our former diſquiſitions and ſpeculations. Is not that deſirable, ſaid he. This would ſatisfy me for my own part at preſent at leaſt. This, ſaid I, ſhall to me too be quite ſufficient. Do not then give over, ſaid he, but purſue your inquiry. Are we not then under a neceſſity, ſaid I, of acknowledging that there are in every one of us the ſame principles and diſpoſitions which are in the city; for from no where elſe did they get thither? For it were ridiculous if one ſhould imagine that the iraſcible diſpoſition did not ariſe from the individuals in cities, who have this blemiſh, as thoſe of Thrace, Scythia, and in ſome meaſure almoſt all the higher region; and the ſame thing may be ſaid with reſpect to the love of learning, which one may chiefly aſcribe to this country; or with reference to the love of riches, which we may ſay prevailed eſpecially among the Pheni-

cians and the inhabitants of Egypt. Very much ſo, ſaid he. This then is ſo, ſaid I; nor is it difficult to be known. No indeed. But this is difficult to determine, whether we perform each of theſe by the ſame power; or, as they are three, we perform one by one power, and another by another; that is, we learn by one; we are angry by another; and by a certain third, we deſire thoſe pleaſures relating to nutrition and propagation, and the other pleaſures of affinity to theſe. Or do we in each of theſe, when we apply to them, act with the whole ſoul? Theſe things are difficult to be determined in a manner worthy of the ſubject. So it ſeems to me, ſaid he. Let us then, in this manner, attempt to determine theſe things, whether they are the ſame with one another or different. How are we to do it? It is plain, that one and the ſame thing cannot at one and the ſame time, do or ſuffer contrary things in the ſame reſpect, and with reference to the ſame object; ſo that if we any where find theſe circumſtances exiſting among them, we ſhall know that it was not one and the ſame thing, but ſeveral. Be it ſo. Conſider then what I am ſaying. Proceed, reply'd he. Is it poſſible for the ſame thing to ſtand and to be moved at once in the ſame reſpect? By no means. Let us ſettle this more accurately ſtill; leſt, as we proceed, we be any way uncertain about it. For if one ſhould ſay, that when a man ſtands, yet moveth his hands and his head, that the ſame perſon at once ſtandeth and is moved, we would not, I imagine, think it proper to ſpeak in this manner; but that one part of him ſtood, and ano-

ther part was moved. Would not we ſpeak in this manner? In this manner. But if one who ſays theſe things, ſhould, in a more jocoſe humour ſtill, and factiouſly cavilling alledge, that tops ſtand wholly, and are moved at once, when their centre is fixed on one point, and they are whirled about; or that any thing elſe going round in a circle in the ſame poſition doth this; we would not admit it; as it is not in the ſame reſpect that they ſtand ſtill and are moved: but we would ſay, that they have in them the perpendicular and the periphery; and that with relation to the perpendicular, they ſtood: (for towards no ſide they declined) but with relation to the periphery, they moved in a circle. But when its perpendicularity declineth either to the right or left hand forwards or backwards, whilſt it is at the ſame time whirling round; then in no reſpect doth it ſtand. Very right, ſaid he. Nothing then of this kind ſhall move us, when it is ſaid: nor ſhall any one perſuade us, as if any thing, being one and the ſame thing, could do and ſuffer contraries at one and the ſame time, with reference to the ſame object, and in the ſame reſpect. He ſhall not perſuade me, ſaid he. But however, ſaid I, that we may not be obliged to be tedious in going over all theſe quibbles, and in evincing them to be falſe; let us proceed on this ſuppoſition; that ſo it is; after we have agreed, that if at any time theſe things appear otherwiſe than as we now ſettle them, we ſhall yield up again all we ſhall gain by it. It is neceſſary, ſaid he, to do ſo. Would not you then, ſaid I, deem theſe things among thoſe which

are oppoſite to one another; whether they be actions or paſſions, for in this there is no difference; to aſſent, to wit, and to diſſent, to deſire to get a thing, and to reject it; to bring towards one's ſelf, and to puſh away? I would deem theſe, ſaid he, among the things which are oppoſite to each other. What then, ſaid I, with reſpect to thirſting, to hungering, and, in general, with reſpect to all the paſſions; and further, to deſire, to will, and all theſe, may they not ſomehow be placed among thoſe ſpecies which have now been mentioned? As for example, will you not always ſay, that the ſoul of one who has deſire goes out after that which it deſires, or bringeth near to it that which it wiſheth to have. Or again, in ſo far as it wants ſomething to be afforded it, like one who only ſees an object, intimates by ſigns, to have it brought near, deſiring the actual poſſeſſion of it. I would ſay ſo. But what, to be unwilling, not to wiſh, nor to deſire, ſhall we not deem theſe of the ſame kind, as to puſh away from the ſoul, and drive off, and every thing elſe, which is oppoſite to the former? Why not? This being the caſe, ſhall we ſay there is ſome ſpecies of the deſires? And that the moſt conſpicuous are to thirſt, and to hunger? We ſhall ſay ſo, reply'd he. Is not the one the deſire of drinking, and the other of eating? Yes. Is it then, when conſidered as thirſt, a deſire in the ſoul of ſomething further than of drink? It is according to the nature of the thirſt. Is there then a thirſt of a hot drink, or of a cold, of much or of little, or in ſhort of ſome particular kind of drink; for if there be any heat accompanying the thirſt,

it readily occaſions a deſire of a cold drink, but if cold accompanies it, then there is excited a deſire of a warm drink; if the thirſt be great, through many circumſtances, it occaſions a deſire of a great drink, but if ſmall, a deſire of a ſmall one; but the deſire itſelf to thirſt never creates the deſire of any thing elſe, but of drink itſelf, as its nature prompteth; and in like manner of the appetite of hunger with relation to meat. Thus every deſire, ſaid he, in itſelf is of that alone of which it is the deſire; but to be a deſire of ſuch or ſuch a particular ſpecies, are adventitious circumſtances. Let not then any one, ſaid I, create us any trouble, as if we were inadvertent; that no one deſired drink, but good drink; or meat, but good meat; for indeed all men deſire that which is good. If then thirſt be a deſire, it is of what is good; whether it be of drink, or of whatever elſe it is the deſire. And in the ſame way of all the other deſires. Perhaps, reply'd he, the man who ſhould mention theſe things would ſeem to ſay ſomething material. But however, ſaid I, whatever things are of ſuch a nature, as to belong to any genus, have a general reference to the genus; but each particular of theſe refers to a particular ſpecies of that genus. I have not underſtood you, ſaid he. Have you not underſtood, ſaid I, that greater is of ſuch a kind as to be greater than ſomewhat? Yes indeed. Is it not greater than the leſſer? Yes. And that which is conſiderably greater than that which is conſiderably leſſer; is it not? Yes. And that which was formerly greater than that which was formerly leſſer; and

that which is to be greater than that which is to be leſſer? What elſe, ſaid he? And after the ſame manner, what is more numerous with reſpect to what is leſs numerous, and what is double with reference to what is half, and all ſuch like things; and further, what is heavier with reſpect to lighter, and ſwifter to ſlower, and further ſtill, hot to cold; and all ſuch like things, are they not after this manner? Entirely ſo. But what as to the ſciences? Is not the caſe the ſame? For ſcience in general is the ſcience of learning in general, or of whatever elſe you think proper to make it the ſcience: but a certain particular ſcience, and of ſuch a particular kind refers to a certain particular object, and of ſuch a kind. What I mean is this. After the ſcience of building houſes aroſe, did it not ſeparate from other ſciences, ſo as to be called architecture? What elſe? Was it not from its being of ſuch a kind as none of the others were? Yes. Was it not then from its being the art of ſuch a particular thing, that itſelf became ſuch a particular art? And all other arts and ſciences in like manner? They are ſo. Allow then, ſaid I, that this is what I wanted to expreſs, if you have now underſtood it; where things are conſidered as having reference to other things, generals alone refer to generals, and particulars to particulars. I do not however ſay that the ſcience altogether reſembles that of which it is the ſcience; (as if, for example, the ſcience of healthy and ſickly were itſelf healthy and ſickly; or that the ſcience of good and evil were itſelf good and evil.) But as ſcience is not conſtituted the ſcience of

that thing in general of which it is the ſcience, but only of a certain quality of it, (to wit, of its healthy and ſickly ſtate,) ſo itſelf comes to be a certain particular ſcience; and this cauſeth it to be called no longer ſimply a ſcience, but the medicinal ſcience; the particular ſpecies it is of being ſuperadded. I have underſtood you, ſaid he, and it appears to me to be ſo. But will not you, ſaid I, make thirſt now, whatever it be, to be one of thoſe things which reſpect ſomewhat elſe, conſidered as what it is, and it is ſurely thirſt? I will, ſaid he, and it reſpecteth drink. And does not a particular thirſt deſire a particular drink? But thirſt in general is neither of much nor of little, nor of good nor bad, nor, in one word, of any particular kind, but of drink in general alone, is thirſt in general naturally the deſire. Entirely ſo indeed. The ſoul of the man then who thirſteth inclines for nothing further than to drink, this he deſireth, to this he haſteth. It is plain. If then at any time, any thing pull back the thirſting ſoul, it muſt be ſome different part of it from that which thirſteth, and leadeth it as a wild beaſt to the drink: for have we not ſaid, that it is impoſſible for the ſame thing, in the ſame reſpects, and with the ſame parts of it, to do at once contrary things? It is indeed impoſſible. In the ſame manner, I imagine, as it is not proper to ſay of an archer, that his hands at once puſh out, and likewiſe pull in the bow; but that the one hand is that which puſheth out, and the other that which pulleth in. Entirely ſo, ſaid he. But whether may we ſay, that there are ſome who when athirſt are not willing to drink? Yes

indeed, ſaid he, there are many, and many times that is the caſe. What now, ſaid I, may one ſay of theſe perſons? Might it not be ſaid, that there was in their ſoul ſomewhat prompting them to drink, and likewiſe ſomething hindering them, different from the other, and ſuperior to the prompting principle. It ſeems ſo to me, ſaid he. Doth not then the reſtraining principle ariſe from reaſon when it ariſeth; but thoſe which puſh, and drive forwards, proceed from paſſions and diſeaſes? It appears ſo. We ſhall then, ſaid I, not unreaſonably account theſe to be two, and different from one another; calling the one part which reaſoneth, the rational part of the ſoul; but that part with which it loves, and hungers, and thirſts, and thoſe other appetites, the irrational and concupiſcible part, the friend of certain gratifications and pleaſures. We ſhall not, ſaid he, but we may moſt reaſonably conſider them in this light. Let theſe then, ſaid I, be allowed to be diſtinct ſpecies in the ſoul. But as to that of anger, is it a third principle, or has it affinity to one of thoſe two? Perhaps it is, ſaid he, to the concupiſcible part. But I believe, ſaid I, what I have ſomewhere heard, how that Leontius, the ſon of Aglaion, as he returned from the Pyraeum, perceived ſome dead bodies lying in the ſewer, below the outſide of the north wall, and had both a deſire to look at them, and at the ſame time was averſe from it, and turned himſelf away; and for a while he ſtruggled with his deſire, and covered his eyes; but, at laſt, being overcome by his appetite, with eager eyes, running towards the

dead bodies; lo now, ſaid he, you wretched eyes! glut yourſelves with this fine ſpectacle. I too, ſaid he, have heard it. This ſpeech now, ſaid I, ſhows that anger ſometimes oppoſes the appetites, as being different one from another. It ſhows it, indeed, ſaid he. And do not we often perceive, ſaid I, when the appetites compel any one, contrary to reaſon, that he reproacheth himſelf, and is angry at the compelling principle within him, and when the rational and concupiſcible are in a ſtate of ſedition, anger in ſuch a perſon becomes as it were an ally to reaſon: but when the appetite goes along with reaſon, then anger gives no oppoſition. You will ſay, I imagine that you have perceived nothing of this kind in yourſelf, at any time, nor yet in any other. No truly, ſaid he. What now, ſaid I, when one imagines he does an injury, the more generous he is, is he not ſo much the leſs apt to be angry, when he ſuffers hunger and cold, or any other ſuch things from one who inflicts, as he imagines, theſe things with juſtice? And, as I have ſaid, his anger will not incline him to riſe up againſt ſuch an one. True, ſaid he. But what? when one imagines he is injured, doth not anger in ſuch an one burn, and has he not indignation, and fights, as an ally, on the ſide of what appears to be juſt; and under all the ſufferings of hunger, cold, and ſuch like, bears up, and conquers: and ceaſeth not from its generous toils, till either it accompliſh them, or dies, or is reſtrained by the rational principle within him, like a dog by the ſhepherd, and is rendered mild. It perfectly reſembles, ſaid he, what you

ſay; for, in our city, we appointed the auxiliaries to be obedient, as dogs, to the rulers of the city, as to ſhepherds. You rightly underſtand, ſaid I, what I would ſay. But have you beſides conſidered this? As what? That here the reverſe appears concerning the iraſcible from that in the former caſe: for there we were deeming it the ſame with the concupiſcible, but now we ſay it is far from it, or that in the ſedition of the ſoul, it much rather joins its arms with the rational part. Entirely ſo, ſaid he. Is it then as ſomething different from it, or as a ſpecies of the rational? ſo as that there are not three ſpecies, but only two in the ſoul, the rational and concupiſcible. Or as there were three ſpecies which completed the city, the lucrative, the auxiliary, the legiſlative: ſo, in the ſoul, this iraſcible is a third thing, naturally an auxiliary to the rational, if it be not corrupted by bad education? Of neceſſity it is, ſaid he, a third. Yes, ſaid I, if at leaſt it appear to be any way different from the rational, as it appeared to be diſtinct from the concupiſcible. But that is not difficult, ſaid he, to be ſeen. For one may ſee this, even in little children, that immediately from their infancy they are full of anger; but ſome appear to me at leaſt never at all to participate of reaſon; and the moſt arrive at it but late. Yes, truly, ſaid I, you ſay right. And one may yet further obſerve in the brute creatures, that what you ſay is really the caſe: and beſides this, it is likewiſe atteſted by what we formerly mentioned from Homer,

Striking his breaſt, his heart he thus reproved.

For in that paſſage, Homer hath plainly made one part reprehend another; the part which reaſoneth about good and evil, reprehend the part which is unreaſonably angry. You ſay perfectly right, ſaid he. Theſe things, ſaid I, we have with difficulty agreed to; and it is now ſufficiently acknowledged, that the ſame ſpecies of principles as are in a city, are in every individual, and in the ſame number. They are ſo. Muſt it not therefore of neceſſity follow, that after what manner the city was wiſe, and in what reſpect, after the ſame manner, and in the ſame reſpect is the individual wiſe alſo. Why not? And in what reſpects, and after what manner the individual is brave, in the ſame reſpect, and after the ſame manner is a city brave. And ſo in all other reſpects, both of them are the ſame as to virtue. Of neceſſity. And I fancy, Glauco! we ſhall ſay that a man is juſt in the ſame way as we ſaid a city was ſo? This likewiſe is quite neceſſary. But have we not ſome how forgot this, that the city was juſt, when every one of the three ſpecies in it did each its own work? We do not appear to me, ſaid he, to have forgot it. We muſt then remember likewiſe, that each one of us will be juſt, and do his own work, when he doth his own affairs within himſelf. We muſt, ſaid he, carefully remember it. Is it not then proper that the rational part ſhould govern, as it is wiſe, and hath the care of the whole ſoul? And that the iraſcible part ſhould be obedient and an auxiliary of the other? Certainly. Shall not then the mixture, as we obſerved, of muſic and exerciſe make theſe two harmonious, raiſing

and nouriſhing the one with worthy reaſonings and learning, and unbending the other, ſoothing and ſweetening it by harmony and meaſure? Moſt perfectly, ſaid he. And when thoſe two are in this manner nouriſhed, and have been truly taught, and inſtructed in their own affairs, let them be ſet over the concupiſcible part, which in every one is the greater part of the ſoul, and in its nature moſt inſatiably deſirous of being gratified: therefore, to take care of this part, leſt being filled with theſe bodily pleaſures, as they are called, it become great and vigorous, and do not its own work, but attempt to enſlave and rule over thoſe it ought not, and overturn the whole life of all in general. Entirely ſo, ſaid he. And might he not, ſaid I, by this principle, guard likewiſe in the beſt manner againſt enemies from without, by its influence both over the whole ſoul and body likewiſe, the one deliberating, and the other fighting in obedience to its leader, and executing with fortitude the things deliberated. It is ſo. And I imagine that we call one brave, when through all the pains and pleaſures of life, the iraſcible part preſerves the opinion, dictated by reaſon, concerning what is terrible, and what is not. Right, ſaid he. And we call him wiſe, from that ſmall part which governs in him, and dictates theſe things, having in it the knowledge of what is advantageous for each one, and for the whole community of the three themſelves. Perfectly ſo. But what, do we not call him temperate, moreover, from the friendſhip and harmony of theſe very things, when the governing and governed agree in one, that reaſon

ought to govern, and when they do not raiſe ſedition? Temperance, ſaid he, is no other than this, both as to the city, and the individual. But as we have often ſaid, he ſhall be juſt, by theſe things, and in this manner. It is quite neceſſary. What then, ſaid I, hath any thing blunted us, that we ſhould fancy juſtice to be any thing elſe than what it hath appeared to be in a city? Nothing appears to me at leaſt, ſaid he, to have done it. But in this manner, let us, by all means, confirm ourſelves, if there yet remains any doubt in the ſoul, that can be an objection to this principle, by bringing the man into difficult circumſtances. As what? Such as this; if we were obliged to declare concerning ſuch a city, and concerning a man born and educated conformably to it, whether we thought ſuch a one, when entruſted with gold or ſilver, would embezzle it; do you imagine that any one would think ſuch a one would do it ſooner than thoſe who are not of ſuch a kind? No one, ſaid he. Will not ſuch a one then be free of ſacrileges, thefts, treacheries, againſt companions in private, or the city in public? He will be free. Nor will he ever, in any ſhape, be faithleſs, either as to his oaths, or other declarations. How can he. Adulteries, and neglect of parents, impiety againſt the Gods, will belong to every one elſe, ſooner than to ſuch a one. They will belong to every one elſe truly, ſaid he. And is not this the cauſe of all theſe things, that of all within him, each one thing doth its own work, as to governing and being governed. This is it, and nothing elſe. Do you deſire juſtice to be any thing elſe, but

ſuch a power as produces ſuch men and cities? Not I truly, ſaid he, for my part. Our dream then which we conjectured is at laſt accompliſhed; that when we firſt began to build our city, we ſeemed by ſome God's aſſiſtance, to have got to a beginning and pattern of juſtice. Entirely ſo. And that, Glauco, was a certain image of juſtice, according to which, it behoved the man who was fitted by nature for the office of a ſhoe-maker, to perform properly that office, and to do nothing elſe, and he who is a carpenter to perform that office, and all others in the ſame way. It appears ſo. And of ſuch a kind truly was juſtice, as it appeared to us, I do not mean as to external action, but concerning that which is really internal, relating to the man himſelf, and thoſe things which are properly his own; not allowing any principle in himſelf to attempt to do what belongs to others, nor the principles to be pragmatical, engaging in one another's affairs. But having well eſtabliſhed his own proper affairs, and holding the government of himſelf, adorning himſelf, and becoming his own friend, and attuning thoſe three principles in the moſt natural manner, as three muſical ſtrings, baſe, tenor, and treble, or whatever others may chance to intervene. To combine all theſe together, and become of many an entire one, temperate and attuned, and in that manner to perform whatever is done either in the way of acquiring wealth, or concerning the management of the body or any public affair, or private bargain; and in all theſe caſes to account and call that action juſt and handſome, which always ſuſ-

tains and promotes this habit; and to call the knowledge which preſides over this action, wiſdom: but to call that an unjuſt action which diſſolveth this habit, and the opinion which preſides over this, folly. You ſay perfectly true, Socrates! ſaid he. Be it ſo, ſaid I. If then we ſhould ſay that we have found out a juſt man and city, and what juſtice is in them, I don't imagine we ſhould ſeem to be altogether telling a lye. No truly, ſaid he. May we ſay ſo. We may ſay it. Be it ſo, ſaid I. But we were next, I think, to conſider injuſtice. That is plain. Muſt it not then be ſome ſedition among the three principles, ſome pragmaticalneſs and intermedling in things foreign to their proper buſineſs, and an inſurrection of ſome one principle againſt the whole ſoul, to govern in it when it does not belong to it, but which is of ſuch a nature, as what really ought to be in ſubjection to the governing principle; I imagine then we ſhall call their tumult and miſtake by ſuch names as theſe, injuſtice, intemperance, cowardice and folly, and in general all vice. Theſe things, ſaid he, are quite ſo. To do injuſtice then, ſaid I, and to be injurious, and likewiſe to do juſtly, all theſe muſt be very manifeſt, if, to wit, injuſtice and juſtice are ſo. As how? Becauſe they are no way different from what is ſalutary or noxious, as theſe are in the body, ſo are the others in the ſoul. How, ſaid he? Such things as are healthy conſtitute health, and ſuch as are noxious produce diſeaſe. Yes. And muſt not the doing juſtly produce juſtice, and doing unjuſtly produce injuſtice. Of neceſſity. But to produce health, is to eſtabliſh all in

the body, according to nature; to govern, and to be governed of one another; and to produce diſeaſe, is to govern, and be governed, one part by another, contrary to nature. It is indeed. Then again to produce juſtice, is it not to eſtabliſh all in the ſoul according to nature, to govern and be governed by one another? And injuſtice is to govern and be governed by one another, contrary to nature. Plainly ſo, ſaid he. Virtue then, it ſeems, is a ſort of health, and beauty, and good habit of the ſoul; and vice the diſeaſe, and deformity, and infirmity. It is ſo. Do not then honourable purſuits lead to the acquiſition of virtue? but diſhonourable ones to that of vice? Of neceſſity. What remains then for us, as ſeems, to conſider, is, whether it be profitable to do juſtly, and to purſue what is honourable, and to be juſt; whether one under ſuch a character be unknown or not? Or to do unjuſtly, and to be unjuſt, though one be never puniſhed, nor by chaſtiſement become better? But, ſaid he, Socrates! this ſpeculation ſeems now, to me at leaſt, to be ridiculous. For if when the nature of the body is corrupted, it be thought that life is not worth having, not even though one had all kinds of meats and drinks, all kind of wealth, all kind of dominion; when the nature of that by which we live is diſordered, and thoroughly corrupted, ſhall life then be worth having, though one can do every thing elſe which he inclines beſides this, how he ſhall get quit of vice and injuſtice, and acquire juſtice and virtue, ſince, to wit, both theſe things have appeared as we have repreſented? It would be truly ri-

diculous, ſaid I. But however, as we have arrived at ſuch a point as enables us moſt diſtinctly to perceive that theſe things are ſo, we muſt not give over. We muſt not at all truly, ſaid he, give over. Come then, ſaid I, that you may likewiſe ſee how many principles vice hath, principles which, as I imagine, are worthy of attention. I attend, ſaid he, only tell me. And truly now, ſaid I, ſince we have reached this part of our diſcourſe, it appears now to me as from a ſummit, that there is one principle of virtue, but thoſe of vice are infinite. Of which there are four, which deſerve to be mentioned. How do you ſay, reply'd he? There ſeem to be as many ſpecies of ſoul as there are of republics. How many then? There are five, ſaid I, of republics, and five of the ſoul. Tell, ſaid he, what theſe are. I ſay, reply'd I, that this, which we have gone through, is one ſpecies of a republic; and it may have a twofold appellation; for if among the rulers, there be one ſurpaſſing the reſt, it may be called a Monarchy; if there be ſeveral, an Ariſtocracy. True, ſaid he, I call this then, ſaid I, one ſpecies; for whether they be ſeveral, or but one who govern, they will never alter the principal laws of the city; obſerving the nurture and education we have deſcribed. It is not likely, ſaid he.

THE END OF THE FOURTH BOOK.

THE FIFTH BOOK.

I DENOMINATE then indeed both ſuch a city and republic, and ſuch a man as we have deſcribed, good and upright; and if this republic be an upright one, I deem the others bad and erroneous, both as to the regulations in cities, and the eſtabliſhing the temper of ſoul of individuals, and that in four ſpecies of illneſs. Of what kind are theſe, ſaid he? I was then proceeding to mention them in order, as they appeared to me to riſe out of one another: but Polemarchus ſtretching out his hand, (for he ſate a little further off than Adimantus,) caught him by the robe at his ſhoulder, and drew him near; and bending himſelf towards him, ſpoke ſomething in a whiſper, of which we heard nothing but this; Shall we let paſs then? ſaid he, or what ſhall we do? Not at all, ſaid Adimantus, ſpeaking now aloud. And I reply'd, what then will not you let paſs? You, ſaid he, as I had ſaid, what. You ſeem to us to be growing negligent, and to ſteal a whole branch of the diſcourſe, and that not the leaſt conſiderable, that you may not have the trouble of going through it; and you imagine that you eſcaped our notice, when you made this ſpeech ſo ſimply, viz. that both as to wives and children, it is manifeſt to every one, that theſe things will be common among friends. Did not I ſay right, Adimantus! Yes, ſaid he: but

this, which was rightly ſaid, like other parts of your diſcourſe, requires explanation: to ſhow what is the manner of their being common; for there may be many kinds of it. Do not omit then to tell which is the method you ſpoke of; for we have been in expectation for ſome time paſt, imagining you would, on ſome occaſion, make mention of the propagation of children, in what way they ſhould be propagated, and when they are born, how they ſhould be nurtured, and every thing relative to what you ſpoke concerning wives and children being in common; for we imagine, that it is of conſiderable, nay, of the utmoſt importance to the ſtate, when this is rightly performed, or otherwiſe. But now when you are entering on the conſideration of another conſtitution, before you have ſufficiently diſcuſſed theſe things, it ſeemed proper to us what you now heard, not to let you paſs, before you went over all theſe things, as you did the others. And you may count me too, ſaid Glauco, as joining in this vote. You may eaſily judge, Socrates! ſaid Thraſymachus, that this is the opinion of us all. What is this, ſaid I, you have done, laying hold of me? What a mighty diſcourſe do you again raiſe as you did at the beginning, about a republic, in which I was rejoicing as having now completed it, being fond, if any one would have let theſe things paſs, and been content with what was then ſaid. But you know not what a ſwarm of reaſonings you raiſe by what you now challenge, which I forſeeing, paſſed by at that time, leſt it ſhould occaſion great diſturbance. What then, ſaid Thraſymachus, do you

imagine that theſe are now come hither to melt gold, and not to hear reaſonings? Yes, ſaid I, but in meaſure. The whole of life, Socrates! ſaid Glauco, is with the wiſe, the meaſure of hearing ſuch reaſonings as theſe. But paſs what relates to us, and do not at all grudge to explain your opinion concerning what we inquire about. What ſort of community of wives and children is to be obſerved by our guardians, and concerning the nurture the latter are to have while very young, in the period between their generation and their education, which ſeems to be the moſt troubleſome of all. Endeavour then to tell us in what manner it ſhould be done. It is not eaſy, happy Glauco! ſaid I, to go through theſe things; for there are many of them hard to be believed, whether the things we ſay be poſſible, and though they could eaſily be done; whether they would be for the beſt might ſtill be doubted: wherefore, dear companion! I grudge ſomewhat to touch on theſe things, leſt our reaſoning appear to be rather what were to be wiſhed for, than what could take place. Do not at all grudge, ſaid he, for your hearers are neither ſtupid, nor incredulous, nor ill-affected towards you. Then, I ſaid, do you ſay this, moſt excellent Glauco! with a deſire to encourage me? I do, ſaid he. Then your diſcourſe has a quite contrary effect, ſaid I; for if I truſted to myſelf, that I underſtood what I am to ſay, your encouragement would do well. For one who underſtands the truth, about the greateſt and the moſt intereſting affairs, ſpeaks with ſafety and confidence among the wiſe and friendly: but to be diffident of one's

ſelf, and doubtful of the truth, and at the ſame time to be haranguing as I do now, is both dreadful and dangerous; not only leſt he ſhould be expoſed to ridicule, (for that is but a trifling thing,) but leſt that miſtaking the truth, I not only fall myſelf, but draw my friends along with me into an error about things in which we ought leaſt of all to be miſtaken. I adore therefore Adraſtia, for what, Glauco! I am going to ſay. For I truſt it is a ſmaller offence to be a man-ſlayer without intention, than to be an impoſtor with regard to what is good and excellent, juſt and lawful: and it were better to hazard ſuch a thing among enemies than friends; ſo that you muſt give me better encouragement. Then Glauco, laughing; but Socrates! ſaid he, if we ſuffer any thing amiſs from your diſcourſe, we ſhall acquit you as clear of any man-ſlaughter, and as no impoſtor: ſo proceed boldly. But indeed, ſaid I, he who is acquit at a court of juſtice, is deemed clear of the crime, as the law ſays; and if it be ſo in that caſe, 'tis reaſonable it ſhould be ſo in this. For this reaſon then, ſaid he, proceed. We muſt now, ſaid I, return again to what it ſeems ſhould, according to method, have been recited before; and perhaps it is right to proceed in this manner; that after having entirely finiſhed the drama reſpecting the men, we go over that which concerneth the women; eſpecially ſince you challenge me to proceed in this manner. For in my opinion, men who have been born and educated in ſuch a manner as we have deſcribed, can have no right poſſeſſion and enjoyment of children and wives, but in purſuing

the ſame tract in which we have proceeded from the beginning: for we have endeavoured, in our reaſoning, to form ſomehow men as the guardians of a flock. We have. Let us proceed then, having eſtabliſhed likewiſe affairs relating to propagation and education in a manner ſimilar to that of the males; and let us conſider whether it be proper for us to do ſo or not. How do you mean, reply'd he? Thus: whether ſhall we judge it proper for the females of our guardian dogs, to watch likewiſe in the ſame manner as the males do, and to hunt along with them, and do every thing elſe in common? Or ſhall we judge it proper for them to manage domeſtic affairs within doors, as being unable for the other exerciſes, becauſe of the bringing forth, and the nurſing the whelps; and the males to labour and to have the whole care of the flocks? They are to do all, ſaid he, in common. Only we are to employ the females as the weaker, and the males as the ſtronger. Is it poſſible then, ſaid I, to employ any creature for the ſame purpoſes with another, unleſs you give it the ſame nurture and education as you give the other? It is not poſſible. If then we ſhall employ the women for the ſame purpoſes as we do the men, muſt we not likewiſe teach them the ſame things? We muſt. Were not both muſic and exerciſe beſtowed on the males? They were. Theſe two arts therefore, and thoſe likewiſe relating to war, muſt be beſtowed alſo on the women, and they muſt be employed about the ſame things. It is reaſonable, ſaid he, from what you ſay. Yet as theſe things, ſaid I, are

contrary perhaps to cuſtom, many of theſe things we are now ſpeaking of may appear ridiculous, if practiſed in the way we mention. Extremely ſo, reply'd he. What, ſaid I, do you perceive as the moſt ridiculous part? Or is it plainly becauſe that you ſee the women naked in the Palaeſtra wreſtling with the men, and not only the young women, but even the more advanced in years, in the ſame manner as old men in the wreſtling ſchools, when they are wrinkled, and not at all handſome to the eye, yet ſtill fond of the exerciſes? Yes truly, ſaid he. Becauſe it might indeed appear ridiculous, at leaſt, as matters ſtand at preſent. Muſt we not therefore, ſaid I, ſince we have entered upon this diſcourſe, be afraid of the raileries of the men of pleaſantry, whatever things they may ſay with regard to ſuch a revolution being introduced, as well in the exerciſes as in muſic, and particularly in the uſe of arms, and the management of horſes. You ſay right, reply'd he. But ſince we have entered on this diſcourſe, we muſt go to the rigour of the law, and beg theſe men not to follow their own cuſtoms, but to think ſeriouſly, and remember, that it is not long ago ſince theſe things appeared baſe and ridiculous to the Greeks, which are only ſo now to the moſt of the Barbarians: ſuch as to ſee naked men. And when firſt the Cretans, and afterwards the Lacedaemonians, began their exerciſes, it was in the power of the men of humour of that time to turn all theſe things into ridicule. Do not you think ſo? I do. But I imagine, that when upon experience it appeared better to ſtrip themſelves of all

theſe things, than to be wrap'd in them, what was ridiculous indeed to the eye, was removed by the idea of beſt, mentioned in our reaſoning; and this too ſhow'd manifeſtly, that he is a fool who deems any thing ridiculous, but what is bad, and attempts to rally upon any other idea of the ridiculous, but that of the fooliſh and the vicious, or to be ſerious in any other purſuit but that of the good. By all means, ſaid he. Is not this then firſt of all to be agreed on, whether theſe things he poſſible or not? And we muſt allow it to be a matter of diſpute, if any one, either in jeſt or earneſt, inclines to doubt, whether the human genius in the female ſex be able, in every thing, to bear a ſhare with the male? or if it be not in any one thing? or if it be able in ſome things, but not in others? and among which of theſe are the affairs of war? Would not the man who thus ſets out in the moſt handſome manner conclude too, as it ſeems, moſt handſomely? By far, ſaid he. Are you willing then, ſaid I, that we ourſelves, inſtead of others, diſpute about theſe things, that the oppoſite ſide may not be deſtitute of a defence? Nothing hinders, ſaid he. Let us then ſay this for them. That there is no need, Socrates and Glauco! of others to diſpute with you about this matter; for yourſelves, in the beginning of your eſtabliſhment, when you eſtabliſhed your city, agreed, that it was neceſſary for each individual to practiſe one buſineſs, according to their ſeveral genius. I think we acknowledged it; for why ſhould they not? Does not then the genius of the male differ widely from that of the female? Why does it not

differ? And is it not fit to enjoin each a different work, according to their genius? Why not? Are not you then in the wrong now, and contradict yourſelves, when you ſay that men and women ought to do the ſame things, whilſt their genius is extremely different? Can you in anſwer to theſe objections, admirable Glauco! make any defence? It is not quite an eaſy matter, ſaid he, to do it immediately; but I will entreat you, and do now entreat you to go through the arguments on our ſide, whatever they may be. Theſe are the things, Glauco! reply'd I, and many other ſuch like, which I long ago forſeeing, was both afraid and backward to touch on the law concerning the poſſeſſion of wives, and the education of children. It is not eaſy indeed, reply'd he. It is not, ſaid I. But the caſe is thus. If one falls into a ſmall fiſh-pond, or into the middle of the greateſt ſea, he muſt ſtill ſwim in the one no leſs than in the other. Entirely ſo. Muſt not we ſwim then, and endeavour to eſcape from this reaſoning, expecting that either ſome dolphin is to carry us out, or that we ſhall have ſome other remarkable deliverance. It ſeems we muſt do ſo, reply'd he. Come then, ſaid I, if we can any where find an out-gate; for we did acknowledge that different geniuſes ought to ſtudy different things; but the genius of man and woman is different; yet now we ſay that different geniuſes ought to ſtudy the ſame things: theſe are the things which you accuſe us of. Certainly. How ſtrong, Glauco! ſaid I, is the power of the art of cavilling? How? Becauſe, reply'd I, many ſeem to fall into it unwillingly, and imagine that they are not cavil-

ling, but reaſoning truly, becauſe they are not able to underſtand the ſubject, by dividing it into its proper parts; and under this arguing will purſue the oppoſite of their ſubject, uſing cavilling inſtead of reaſoning. This is indeed, ſaid he, the caſe with many; but doth it at preſent extend likewiſe to us? Entirely ſo, ſaid I, we ſeem then unwillingly to have fallen into a contradiction. How? Becauſe we have very ſtrenuouſly and very keenly aſſerted, that when the genius is not the ſame, they ought not to have the ſame employments; but we have not in any reſpect conſidered what is the characteriſtic of the ſameneſs or diverſity of genius, nor to what it points: we ſtop'd then, when we had aſſigned different purſuits to different geniuſes, and to the ſame geniuſes the ſame purſuits. We have never indeed, ſaid he, conſidered it. It is therefore, reply'd I, ſtill in our power, as appears, to queſtion ourſelves, whether the genius of the bald, or of thoſe who wear their hair, be the ſame, and not different? And after we ſhould agree that it was different, whether, if the bald made ſhoes, we ſhould allow thoſe who wear hair to make them? or if thoſe who wear hair made them, whether we ſhould allow the others? That were ridiculous, reply'd he. Is it in any other reſpect, ſaid I, ridiculous then, that we did not wholly determine the ſameneſs and diverſity of genius, but attended only to that ſpecies of diverſity and ſameneſs which reſpects the employments themſelves; juſt as we ſay that the phyſician, and the man who hath a medical ſoul, have one and the ſame genius? Do not you think ſo?

I do. But that the phyſician and architect have a different. Entirely. And ſo, reply'd I, of the genius of men and of women, if it appear different, in reſpect to any art, or other employment, we ſhall ſay, that this different employment is to be aſſigned to each ſeparately. But if their genius appear different only in this, that the female brings forth, and the male begets, we ſhall not ſay, that this hath at all ſhown the man to be different from the woman in the reſpect we ſpeak of. But we ſhall ſtill be of opinion, that both our guardians and their wives ought to purſue the ſame employments. And with reaſon, ſaid he. Shall we not then henceforth deſire any one who ſays the contrary, to inſtruct us in this point, what is that art or ſtudy reſpecting the eſtabliſhment of a city, where the genius of the man and woman is not the ſame, but different? It is reaſonable truly. Poſſibly ſome one may ſay, as you was ſaying a while ago, that it is not eaſy to tell this ſufficiently on the ſudden, but that it is not all difficult to one who has conſidered it. One might indeed ſay ſo. Are you willing then that we deſire ſuch an opponent to liſten to us, if by any means we ſhall ſhow him that there is in the adminiſtration of the city no employment peculiar to the women? By all means. Come on then, (ſhall we ſay to him,) Anſwer us. Is not this your meaning? That one man has a good genius for any thing, and another a bad, in this reſpect, that the one learns any thing eaſily, and the other with difficulty; and the one with a little inſtruction diſcovers a great deal in what he learns; but the other, when he gets a

great deal of inſtruction and care, does not retain even what he hath learned: with the one, the body is duly ſubſervient to the mind; with the other, it oppoſes its improvement: are there any other marks than theſe by which you would determine one to have a good genius for any thing, and another to have a bad one? No one, ſaid he, would mention any other. Know you then of any thing which is managed by mankind, with reference to which the men have not all theſe marks in a more excellent degree than the women? Or ſhould we not be tedious, if we mentioned particularly the weaving art, and the dreſſing pot herbs and victuals, in which the female genius ſeems to be ſomewhat conſiderable, and is moſt ridiculous where it is ſurpaſſed. You ſay true, ſaid he, that in the general, in every thing the one genius is ſuperior to the other, yet there are many women, who, in many things, excel many men: but on the whole, it is as you ſay. There is not then, my friend! any office among the whole inhabitants of the city peculiar to the woman, conſidered as woman, nor to the man, conſidered as man; but the geniuſes are indiſcriminately diffuſed through both: the woman is naturally fitted for ſharing in all offices, and ſo is the man; but in all the woman is weaker than the man: perfectly ſo. Shall we then commit every thing to the care of the men, and nothing to the care of the women? How ſhall we do ſo? It is therefore I imagine, as we ſay, that one woman too is fitted by natural genius for being a phyſician, and another is not; one is naturally a muſician, and another is

not? What elſe? And one is naturally fitted for the exerciſes, and another is not, one is fitted for war, and another is not. I at leaſt am of this opinion. And is not one likewiſe a lover of philoſophy, and another averſe to it; one of high ſpirits, and another of low? This likewiſe is true. And has not one woman a natural genius for being a guardian, and another not? And have not we made choice of ſuch a genius as this for our guardian men? Of ſuch a genius as this. The genius then of the woman and of the man for the guardianſhip of the city is the ſame, only that the one is weaker, and the other ſtronger. It appears ſo. And ſuch women as theſe are to be choſen to dwell with theſe men, and be guardians along with them, as they are naturally fit for them, and of a kindred genius. Entirely ſo. And muſt not the ſame employments be aſſigned to the ſame geniuſes? The ſame. We are now come in a round about way to what we formerly mentioned; and we allow that it is not contrary to nature, to appoint for the wives of our guardians, muſic and exerciſe. By all means. We are not then eſtabliſhing things impoſſible, or ſuch as can only be wiſhed for, ſince we eſtabliſh the law according to nature; and what is at preſent contrary to theſe things, is contrary to nature rather, as appears. It ſeems ſo. Was not our inquiry to hear of what was poſſible and beſt? It was. And we have agreed, that theſe things are poſſible. We have. And we muſt next agree, that they are beſt. It is plain we muſt. In order therefore to make a guardian woman, at leaſt the education

will not be different from that of the men, eſpecially as ſhe has received the ſame natural genius. It will not be different. What do you think then of ſuch an opinion as this? Of what? That of imagining with yourſelf one man to be better, and another worſe, or do you deem them to be all alike? By no means. In the city now which we eſtabliſh, whether do you judge, that our guardians with this education we have deſcribed, or ſhoe-makers with education in their art, will be rendered the better men? The queſtion, reply'd he, is ridiculous. I underſtand you, ſaid I. But what? Of all the other citizens, are not they the beſt? By far. But what will not theſe women too be the beſt of women? They will be ſo, reply'd he, by far. Is there any thing better in a city than that both the women and the men be rendered the very beſt? There is not. This then will be effected by muſic and exerciſe, being afforded them according as we have deſcribed. Why will it not? We have then eſtabliſhed a law which is not only poſſible, but moreover beſt for the ſtate. We have. The wives, then, of our guardians, muſt be uncloathed, ſince they are to put on virtue for clothes; and they muſt bear a part in war, and the other guardianſhip of the city, and do nothing elſe. But the lighteſt part of theſe ſervices are to be alloted to the women rather than to the men, on account of the weakneſs of their ſex. And the man who laughs at naked women, whilſt performing the exerciſes for the ſake of what is beſt, reaps the empty fruit of a ridiculous wiſdom, and in no reſpect knows, as appears, at what he laughs, nor why he does it. For

that ever was and will be deemed a noble ſaying, That what is moſt advantages for the public is handſome, and what is hurtful is ugly. By all means. Let us ſay then, that we have got over one wave, as it were, having thus ſettled the law with reſpect to the women, without being wholly overwhelmed, ordaining that our male and female guardians are to manage all things in common: but our reaſoning hath been conſiſtent with itſelf, as it reſpecteth both what is poſſible, and likewiſe advantageous. It is truly no ſmall wave you get over. You will not, reply'd I, call it a great one, when you ſee what comes after it. Mention it, ſaid he, that I may ſee. That law, reply'd I, and thoſe others formerly mentioned, are followed, as I imagine, by this one. Which? That theſe women muſt all be common to all theſe men, and that no one woman dwell with any man privately, and that their children likewiſe be common; that neither the parent know his own children, nor the children their parent. This is much greater than the other, as to the incredibility, both of its being poſſible, and at the ſame time advantageous. I do not believe, reply'd I, that any one will doubt of its utility, at leaſt, as if it were not the greateſt good to have the women and children in common, if it were but poſſible. But I imagined the greateſt queſtion will be, whether it be poſſible or not? One may very readily, ſaid he, diſpute as to both. You mention, reply'd I, a croud of diſputes. But I thought that I ſhould at leaſt have eſcaped from the one, if its utility had been agreed on, and that it ſhould have only remained to conſider its poſſibility.

But you have not, ſaid he, got off unobſerved; give then an account of both. I muſt then, ſaid I, ſubmit to a trial. But however, indulge me thus far: Allow me to feaſt myſelf, as thoſe are wont to feaſt themſelves who are ſlow in underſtanding, when they walk alone. For men of this ſort, ſometimes before they find out how they ſhall attain what they deſire; waving that inquiry, that they may not fatigue themſelves in deliberating about the poſſibility or impoſſibility of it, ſuppoſe they have obtained what they deſire, and then go through what remains. And they delight in running over what they will do when their deſire is obtained, rendering their ſoul otherwiſe indolent, more indolent ſtill. I am now effeminate after this manner, and wiſh to put off thoſe debates, and to inquire afterwards whether theſe things be poſſible. But at preſent, holding them poſſible, if you allow me, I will conſider in what manner our rulers ſhall regulate theſe things, when they take place, that they may be done in the moſt advantageous manner both to the ſtate and the guardians. Theſe things I ſhall endeavour, in the firſt place, to go over with your aſſiſtance, and the others afterwards, if you allow me. I allow, ſaid he, and inquire accordingly. I imagine then, ſaid I, that if our rulers are worthy of that name, and in like manner theſe who are their auxiliaries, their miniſters in the government, the latter will be diſpoſed to do whatever is injoined them, and the former will be ready to command: Enjoining them ſome things in direct obedience to the law, and imitating the law in whatever things are

entruſted to them. It is likely, ſaid he. Do you now, ſaid I, who are their lawgiver, in the ſame manner as you have choſen out the men, chuſe out likewiſe the women, making their genius as ſimilar as poſſible: and as they dwell and eat together in common; and as no one poſſeſſes any of theſe things privately, they will meet together; and being mingled in their exerciſes and other converſation, they will be led from an innate neceſſity, as I imagine, to mutual embraces. Do not I ſeem to ſay what will neceſſarily happen? Not, reply'd he, by any geometrical, but concupiſcible neceſſity, which ſeems to be more pungent than the other, to perſuade and draw the bulk of mankind. Much more, ſaid I. But after this, Glauco! to mix together in a diſorderly manner, or to do any thing elſe, is neither holy in a city of happy perſons, nor will the rulers permit it. It were not juſt, ſaid he. It is plain then, that after this they ſhall make marriages as much as poſſible ſacred; but the moſt advantageous would be ſacred. By all means. How then ſhall they be moſt advantageous? Tell me that Glauco! for I ſee in your houſes dogs of chace, and a great many excellent birds. Have you then indeed ever attended at all, in any reſpect, to their marriages, and the propagation of their ſpecies? How, ſaid he? Firſt of all, that among theſe, although they be excellent themſelves, are there not ſome who are moſt excellent? There are. Whether then do you breed from all of them alike? Or are you careful to breed chiefly from the beſt? From the beſt. But how? From the youngeſt or from the oldeſt, or from

thoſe who are moſt in their prime? From thoſe in their prime. And if the breed be not of this kind, you reckon that the race of birds and dogs greatly degenerates. I reckon ſo, reply'd he. And what think you as to horſes, ſaid I, and other animals? is the caſe any otherwiſe with reſpect to theſe? That, ſaid he, were abſurd. Strange! ſaid I, my friend! how extremely perfect governours muſt we have, if the caſe be the ſame with reſpect to the human race. But it is ſo, reply'd he; but what then? Becauſe there is a neceſſity, ſaid I, for their uſing many medicines: for where bodies have no occaſion for medicines, but are ready to ſubject themſelves to a regimen of diet, we reckon that a weaker phyſician may ſuffice; but when there is a neceſſity for medicines, we know that a more able phyſician is then requiſite. True; but with what view do you ſay this? With this view, reply'd I. It appears that our rulers are obliged to uſe a deal of fiction and deceit for the advantage of the governed; and we ſaid ſome where that all theſe things were uſeful in the way of medicines. And rightly, ſaid he. This piece of right now ſeems not to be the moſt inconſiderable in marriages, and the propagation of children. How, now? It is proper, ſaid I, from what we have acknowledged, that the beſt men embrace for the moſt part the beſt women; and the moſt naughty men, on the contrary, the moſt naughty women; and the offſpring of the former is to be educated, but not that of the latter, if you deſire to have the flock of the moſt perfect kind; and this muſt be performed in ſuch a man-

ner as to eſcape the notice of all but the governours themſelves, if you would have the whole herd of the guardians to be as free from ſedition as poſſible. Moſt right, ſaid he. Shall there not then be ſome feſtivals by law eſtabliſhed, in which we ſhall draw together the brides and bridegrooms? Sacrifices too muſt be performed, and hymns compoſed by our poets ſuitable to the marriages which are making. But the number of the marriages we ſhall commit to the rulers, that as much as poſſible they may preſerve the ſame number of men, having an eye to the wars, diſeaſes, and every thing elſe of this kind, and that as far as poſſible our city may be neither too great nor little. Right, ſaid he, And certain lots too, I imagine, ſhould be made ſo artificial, that the naughty man may, on every embrace, accuſe his fortune, and not the governours. By all means, ſaid he. And thoſe of the youth, who diſtinguiſh themſelves, whether in war, or any where elſe, ought to have rewards and prizes given them, and the moſt ample liberty of embracing women, that ſo under this pretext likewiſe, the greateſt number of children may be generated of ſuch perſons. Right. And ſhall the children always as they are born be received by magiſtrates appointed for theſe purpoſes, whether men or women, or both; for the magiſtracies are in common to women as to men. They are ſo. And when they receive the children of worthy perſons, they will carry them, I imagine to the nurſery, to certain nurſes dwelling apart in a certain place of the city. But the children of the more naughty, and ſuch others as are

any way lame, they will hide in ſome ſecret and obſcure place as is proper. If they want, ſaid he, the race of guardians to be pure. And ſhall not theſe take care likewiſe of their nurſing, in bringing to the nurſery the mothers when their breaſts are full, practiſing every art, that no one know her own child, and in providing others who have milk, if theſe ſhall prove inſufficient, and they ſhall likewiſe take care of theſe nurſes, that they ſuckle a competent time: and they ſhall appoint the nurſes and keepers to be wakeful, and to take every other neceſſary toil. You ſpeak, ſaid he, of great eaſe to the wives of our guardians, in the breeding of children. It is fit, reply'd I. But let us go over what comes next, which we chiefly intended. We took notice that good children ought to be generated of perſons in their prime. Are you then of opinion with me, that the proper ſeaſon of prime is twenty years to a woman, and thirty to a man? Of what continuance are theſe primes, ſaid he? The woman, reply'd I, beginning at twenty, is to bear children to the ſtate until the age of forty; and the man, after he hath paſſed the moſt raging part of his courſe, from that period, is to beget children to the ſtate until the age of fifty-five. This indeed is the prime, reply'd he, in both ſexes, both of body and of mind. If then any one who is older or younger than theſe, ſhall meddle in generating for the public, we ſhall ſay the treſpaſs is neither holy nor juſt, as he begets to the ſtate a child, which, if it be concealed, is born and grows up without ſacrifices and prayers, (which upon every marriage, the prieſteſſes and

prieſts, and the whole of the city ſhall offer, that the deſcendants of the good may be ſtill more good, and from uſeful deſcendants, ſtill more uſeful may ariſe;) but is born in darkneſs, and from a dreadful intemperance. Right, ſaid he? And the law, ſaid I, muſt be the ſame, if any of thoſe men, who are yet of the age for generating, ſhall touch women of a proper age, without the concurrence of the magiſtrate, we ſhall conſider him as having raiſed to the ſtate a baſtardly, illegitimate and unhallowed child. Moſt right, ſaid he. And I imagine, that when the women and men exceed the age of generating, we will allow the men at liberty to cohabit with any woman they incline, beſides their daughter and mother, and theſe who are the children of their daughters, or thoſe upwards from their mother: and ſo likewiſe the women to embrace any, but a ſon and father, and the children of theſe, either downwards or upwards: all this liberty we will allow them, after we have enjoined them to attend carefully, in the firſt place, if any thing ſhould be conceived not to bring it to the light; but if, by any accident, it ſhould be brought forth, to expoſe it as a creature for which no proviſion is made. All theſe things, ſaid he, are reaſonably ſaid. But how ſhall fathers and daughters, and thoſe other relations you now mentioned, be known of one another? They ſhall not be known at all, ſaid I. But from the day on which any one is a bridegroom, whatever children are born in the tenth or in the ſeventh month after it, all theſe he ſhall call the male his ſons, and the female his daughters, and they

ſhall call him father. And in the ſame way again, he ſhall call the children of theſe grandchildren, and they again ſhall call them grandfathers and grandmothers: and thoſe who were born in that period, in which their fathers and mothers were begetting children, they ſhall call ſiſters and brothers, ſo as not to touch each other, as I juſt now ſaid. But the law ſhall allow brothers and ſiſters to live together, if their lot ſo fall out, and the oracle give conſent. Moſt right, ſaid he. This, Glauco! and ſuch as this, is the community of women and children among your city guardians: and that it is both conſonant to the other parts of our polity, and by far the beſt, we muſt, in the next place, eſtabliſh from reaſon; or how ſhall we do? Juſt ſo indeed, ſaid he. Did not we then agree on this at the beginning? To inquire what we can mention, as the greateſt good with relation to the eſtabliſhment of a ſtate, with an eye to which the lawgiver ought to enact the laws, and what is the greateſt evil; and then to inquire, whether what we have hitherto gone over contributes towards leading us in the ſteps of this good, and away from that evil? By all means, ſaid he. Is there then any greater ill to a city than that which rents it in pieces; and inſtead of one, maketh it many? Or is there any greater good than that which bindeth it together, and maketh it one? There is not. Does not then one common feeling of pleaſure and pain bind them together, when the whole of the citizens as much as poſſible rejoice and mourn in the ſame manner for the ſame things when they are obtained, and when

they are loſt? By all means ſo, reply'd he. But a ſeparate feeling of theſe things deſtroys it, when ſome of the citizens are extremely grieved, and others extremely glad at the ſame ſufferings of the city, or of thoſe who are in it. Why not? Does not then ſuch an evil ariſe from this that follows, when they do not all jointly in the ſtate pronounce theſe words, mine, and not mine? And will not that city be beſt regulated, when every individual, with regard to the concerns of another, in the ſame way with him, pronounces theſe words, mine, and not mine? By far. And it is ſuch as comes neareſt to one man. As when our finger is any how hurt; the whole common feeling ſpread through the body to the ſoul, with one ſymphony of its governing part, perceives it, and the entire whole mourns along with the diſtreſſed part: and ſo we ſay that the man is diſtreſſed in his finger: and the reaſoning is the ſame as to any other part of a man, both with reſpect to grief, when any part is in pain; or with reſpect to pleaſure, when any part is at eaſe. It is the ſame, ſaid he. And to return to your queſtion, the city which comes neareſt to this, is governed in the beſt manner, when any one of the citizens receives any good or ill, ſuch a city, I imagine, will moſt eſpecially ſay, that ſhe herſelf receives it, and the whole city rejoice or mourn together. Of neceſſity, ſaid he, this muſt prevail in a city governed by good laws. It may be time for us to go back to our city, and conſider how thoſe things are in it which we have agreed on in our reaſoning, whether they prevail moſt in our city, or more

in ſome other. We muſt do ſo, reply'd he. What now? Are there not, in other cities, governours and people? And are there not likewiſe in this? There are. And will not all theſe call one another citizens? Why not? But beſides this of citizens, what does the people call their governours in other ſtates? Maſters or Lords in moſt ſtates and in democracies, this very name, Governours. But in our city, beſides that of citizens, what does the people call their Governours? Their Preſervers, ſaid he, and Helpers. And what do they call the people? Rewarders, reply'd he, and Nouriſhers. And in other cities, what do the governours call their people? Slaves, reply'd he. And what do the governours call one another? Fellow rulers, ſaid he. And ours, what? Fellow guardians. Can you tell, whether any one of the governours in other cities can addreſs one of their fellow governours as his kinſman, and another as a ſtranger? Very many ſo. Does he not then reckon and call the kindred one his own, and the ſtranger one as not his own? Juſt ſo. But how is it with your guardians? Is there ſo much as any one of them, who can deem and call any one of their fellow guardians a ſtranger? By no means, reply'd he; for with whomſoever any one meets, he reckons he meets with a brother or ſiſter, a father or mother, a ſon or daughter, or the deſcendants or anceſtors of theſe. You ſay moſt nobly, reply'd I. But further, tell me this likewiſe, whether will you only eſtabliſh among them, by law, theſe kindred names? or will you alſo enjoin them to perform all their actions ſuitable to theſe names? With re-

ſepect to parents, whatever the law enjoins to be performed to parents, ſuch as reverence, and care, and obedience. And that otherwiſe it will not be for his advantage, neither in the ſight of Gods nor of men, as he acteth what is neither holy nor juſt, if he do other things than theſe. Shall theſe, or any other ſpeeches from all our citizens, reſound directly in the ears of our children, both concerning their parents, whom any one ſhall point out to them, and concerning other relations? Theſe things ſhall be ſaid, reply'd he; for it were ridiculous, if friendly names alone reſounded, without any actions accompanying them. Of all cities then, there will be the greateſt harmony in it, when any one individual is either well or ill, as to the expreſſion we lately mentioned, viz. mine is well, or mine is ill. Moſt true, ſaid he? Did not we ſay too, that their common pleaſures and pains will accompany this opinion and expreſſion? And we ſaid rightly. Will not then our citizens moſt eſpecially have this in common which they call my own; and having this in common, they will of all others moſt eſpecially have in common pleaſure and pain? Extremely ſo. And along with the other parts of the conſtitution, is not the community of women and children among the guardians the cauſe of theſe things? This is it moſt eſpecially, reply'd he. But we agreed, that this was the greateſt good of a city, likening a well eſtabliſhed city to a body in its being affected with the pleaſure and pain of any part. And we rightly, ſaid he, agreed on this. This community then of women and children among our au-

xiliaries, hath appeared to us to be the cauſe of the greateſt good to the city. Extremely ſo, reply'd he. And ſurely we agree at leaſt with what went before; for we ſome where ſaid, that they ought neither to have houſes of their own, nor land, nor any poſſeſſion, but receiving their ſubſiſtence from others, as a reward for their guardianſhip, they ſhould all ſpend it in common, if they intended really to be guardians. Right, ſaid he. Do not therefore, as I ſay, both theſe things which were formerly mentioned, and ſtill more what we now ſpeak of, render them real guardians, and prevent the city from being rent in pieces, by their not at all calling one and the ſame thing their own; but one one thing, and another another; one drawing to his own houſe whatever he can poſſeſs, ſeparate from others, and another to his, which is different from the other; and having both wives and children different, which occaſion different pleaſures and pains, which are private, as belonging to private perſons: but being of one opinion concerning their home, and all of them pointing towards the ſame thing, as far as poſſible, to have one common feeling of pleaſure and pain. Extremely ſo, reply'd he. But what? ſhall law-ſuits and accuſations againſt one another be baniſhed from among them, ſo to ſpeak, by their poſſeſſing nothing as private property but their body, and every thing elſe being common, from whence they ſhall be free of all thoſe diſturbances which men raiſe about money, children or relations. They will of neceſſity be free of theſe. Neither indeed can there be reaſonably among them any actions

raiſed for violence or unſeemly treatment. For, making the protection of their perſons a neceſſary thing, we will own it to be handſome and juſt for thoſe of equal age to help one another. Right, ſaid he. And this law, ſaid I, hath this right in it likewiſe: that if any one be in a paſſion, gratifying his paſſion in this manner, he is leſs apt to raiſe greater ſeditions. It is entirely ſo. The elder ſhall be enjoined both to govern and to chaſtiſe the younger. That is plain. And ſurely the younger, as becomes them, ſhall never attempt to beat the elder, or in any other way to offer violence to him, unleſs appointed by the governours; nor will they, I imagine, in any ſort, diſhonour them; for there are ſufficient guardians to hinder it, both fear and reverence. Reverence on the one hand reſtraining them from aſſaulting, as it were, their parents, and fear on the other; leſt others ſhall aſſiſt the ſufferer; ſome as ſons, others as brothers, and others as fathers. It happens ſo, ſaid he. In every reſpect then, as far as relates to the laws, the men ſhall live peaceably with one another. Very much ſo. And while theſe have no ſeditions among themſelves, there is no danger in any other cities raiſing diſturbance againſt theſe, or that they ſhall ſplit into factions. There is not. As for the leſſer evils, from which ſurely they will be freed, I do not chuſe, becauſe of the impropriety of it, ſo much as to mention them. What flattery of the rich, what indigence and ſollicitude in the education of their children, and in making money for the neceſſary ſupport of their family the poor have; ſometimes borrowing, and ſome-

times being deſpiſed, and ſometimes uſing all manner of ſhifts, in procuring proviſions, which they give to the management of their wives and domeſtics: how many ſlaviſh and mean things, my friend! they ſuffer in all theſe reſpects, are not even worthy to be mentioned. And they are manifeſt, ſaid he, to one blind. They ſhall be delivered from all theſe things, and ſhall live happier than that happieſt life which theſe enjoy who gain the prize in the Olympic games. How? Thoſe are eſteemed happy on account of a ſmall part of what theſe enjoy. But the victory of theſe is more noble, and their maintenance from the public is more complete; for the victory they gain is the ſafety of the whole city; and both they and their children are crowned with their maintenance, and all the other neceſſaries of life, as laurels, and receive honour from their city while alive, and at their death an honourable funeral. The moſt noble rewards, ſaid he! Do you remember then, ſaid I, that in our former reaſonings, I do not know who it was objected to us, that we were not making our guardians happy, who, though they had it in their power to have the whole wealth of their citizens, had nevertheleſs nothing at all: and we propoſed to conſider of this afterwards, if it fell in our way; but that at the preſent we were making our guardians only guardians, and the city itſelf as happy as poſſible, but without regarding one particular tribe in it, with a view to make it happy. I remember it, ſaid he. What think you now of the life of our auxiliaries, which appears far more noble and happy than that of

thoſe who gain the prize at the Olympic games? It does not at all appear to reſemble the life of the leather cutter, the handicraft, or farmer. I do not think it, ſaid he. But however, it is proper that I mention here what I likewiſe ſaid on a former occaſion, that if the guardian ſhall attempt to be happy in ſuch a way as to be no longer a guardian, nor be content with this moderate, and ſteady, and, as we ſay, beſt life; but, being ſeized with a fooliſh and youthful opinion about happineſs, ſhall, becauſe he has it in his power, be driven to make himſelf the maſter of every thing in the city, he ſhall know, that Heſiod was truly wiſe, in ſaying, that the half is ſome how more than the whole. If he take me, ſaid he, for his counſellour, he will remain in ſuch a life. You allow then, ſaid I, that the women act in common with the men, as we have explained, with reſpect to education and the breeding of children, and the guardianſhip of the other citizens; both remaining in the city, and in going forth to war; and that along with the men they ought to keep guard, and to hunt like dogs, and in every caſe to take a ſhare in all things as far as they can; and that while they do theſe things, they will do what is beſt, and no way contrary to the nature of the female, with reſpect to the male, by which nature they are made to act jointly with one another. I agree, ſaid he. Does not then this, ſaid I, remain to be diſcuſſed, whether it be poſſible that this community take place among men likewiſe, as among other animals? and how far it is poſſible. You have prevented me, ſaid he, in mentioning what I

was going to aſk. For with relation to warlike affairs, it is plain, I imagine, ſaid I, how they will fight. How, ſaid he? That they will jointly go out on their military expeditions, and beſides will carry along with them, ſuch of their children as are grown up, that like theſe of other artiſts, they may ſee thoſe things which it will be neceſſary for them to practiſe when they are grown up; and beſides, ſeeing that they may ſerve and adminiſter in every thing with relation to the war, and aſſiſt both their fathers and mothers. Or have you not obſerved what happens in the common arts? how that the children of the potters, miniſtring to them for a long time, look on before they apply themſelves to the making earthen ware? Yes indeed. Whether now are theſe or our guardians to inſtruct their children with greater care, by the practice and view of what belongs to their office? To ſuppoſe thoſe, reply'd he, ſhould take greater care than our guardians, were ridiculous. But every creature fights more remarkably in preſence of its offspring. The caſe is ſo; but there is no ſmall danger, Socrates! when they are defeated, as is often the caſe in war, that when their children, as well as themſelves, are cut off, it ſhall be impoſſible to raiſe another city. You ſay true, reply'd I; but you imagine we ought, firſt of all, to take care never to run any riſk. No, by no means. What then, if they are at all to hazard themſelves in any caſe, is it not where, if they ſucceed, they ſhall become better men? That is plain. But do you imagine it a ſmall matter, and not worthy of the riſk, whether children, who yet

are to be military men, ſee affairs relating to war or not? No; it is a matter of conſequence with reſpect to what you mention. We muſt then, firſt, endeavour to make our children ſpectators of the war, but contrive for them a place of ſafety----and then it ſhall do well, ſhall it not? Yes. And ſhall not then, ſaid I, our parents, in the firſt place, as being men, not be ignorant, but underſtand which of the camps are, and which are not dangerous? It is likely, ſaid he. And they ſhall bring them into the one, but with reſpect to the other, they will be on their guard. Right. And they will probably ſet governours over them, ſaid I, not ſuch as are the moſt naughty, but ſuch as by experience and years are able leaders and pedagogues. It is very proper. But we will ſay many things have happened contrary to expectation. Very many. With reference therefore to ſuch events as theſe, it is proper, that whilſt they are children, they get wings, that ſo, in any neceſſity, they may eſcape by flight. How do you mean, ſaid he? They muſt, when extremely young, be mounted on horſes, and taught to ride on horſe-back, and brought to ſee the battle, not on high mettled and warlike horſes, but on the fleeteſt, and thoſe that are the moſt obedient to the rein; for thus they ſhall, in the beſt manner, obſerve their proper work, and, on any neceſſity, ſhall eſcape with the greateſt ſafety, following the aged leaders. You ſeem to me, ſaid he, to ſay right. But what, ſaid I, as to the affairs of war? how are you to manage your ſoldiers, both with reſpect to one another and their enemies, have I imagined rightly or not?

As to what, ſaid he? That whoever of them, ſaid I, leaves his rank, throws away his arms, or does any ſuch thing from cowardice, muſt he not be made a handicraft, or land-labourer? By all means. And ſhall not the man who is taken alive by the enemy, be given gratis to any who incline to employ him in the country as they have a mind? By all means. And are you of opinion, that he who gains a character, and excels, ought, in the firſt place, in the expedition itſelf, to be crowned in ſome meaſure by every one of the youths and boys who are his fellow ſoldiers? or think you otherwiſe? I am of opinion, for my part, they ought to be crowned. But what, and get the right hand likewiſe? This likewiſe. But this further, I imagine, ſaid I, you are not yet ſatisfied about. What? That they embrace, and be embraced by every one. They ſhould moſt of all others; and I will add to this law, that whilſt they are upon this expedition, no one ſhall be allowed to refuſe them, whoever they incline to embrace, that if any happen to be in love with any one, male or female, he may be the more animated to win the prizes. Very well, ſaid I; for we have already ſaid, that there are more marriages provided for the good citizen than for others, and more frequent choice in ſuch matters allowed them than others, that the deſcendants of ſuch an one may be as numerous as poſſible. We have already ſaid ſo, reply'd he. But ſurely, even according to Homer's opinion, it is juſt, that ſuch of the youth as are brave, be honoured in this way. For Homer ſays, that Ajax, who excelled in war, was re-

warded with a large ſhare at the entertainments, this being the moſt natural reward to a brave man in the bloom of youth, by which he at the ſame time acquired honour and ſtrength. Moſt right, ſaid he. We ſhall then obey Homer, ſaid I, at leaſt, in theſe things. And we ſhall honour the good, both at our ſacrifices, and all ſuch occaſions, in as far as they appear to be deſerving, with hymns likewiſe, and with thoſe things we lately mentioned: and beſides theſe things, with ſeats, and diſhes, and full cups. That at the ſame time we may both honour and exerciſe the virtue of worthy men and women. You ſay moſt admirably well, reply'd he. Be it ſo. If any one of thoſe who die in the army ſhall have diſtinguiſhed himſelf, ſhall we not, in the firſt place, ſay, that he is of the golden kind? Moſt eſpecially. And ſhall we not believe Heſiod, telling us, that when any of theſe die,

They, blameleſs deities, become on earth,
Beneficent, all evil warding off;
Guardians of men?------

We ſhall believe him. And we ſhall aſk the oracle in what manner we ought to bury divine and god-like men, and with what marks of diſtinction; and thus ſhall we bury them in that very manner which ſhall be explained. Why ſhall we not? And we ſhall in all after time reverence and worſhip their tombs as thoſe of Deities. And we ſhall enact by law, that the ſame things be performed, and in the ſame manner, to any who ſhall have been deemed to have remarkably diſtinguiſhed themſelves in life, when they die of old age, or any thing elſe? It

is right, ſaid he. But what now? How ſhall our ſoldiers behave towards enemies? As to what? Firſt, as to bringing into ſlavery. Do you think it juſt, that Greeks ſhould enſlave Greek cities? or rather, as far as they are able, not ſuffer any other to do it, and accuſtom themſelves to this, to be ſparing of the Grecian tribe, being greatly on their guard againſt being enſlaved by the Barbarians? It is, ſaid he, in general, and in every particucular caſe, beſt to be ſparing. Are they not to acquire any Grecian ſlave themſelves, and to counſel the other Greeks to act in the ſame manner? By all means, ſaid he. They will the more, at leaſt, by ſuch a conduct, turn themſelves againſt the Barbarians, and abſtain from one another. But what? To ſtrip the dead, ſaid I, of any thing but their arms after they conquer them, is it handſome or not? It gives a pretence to cowards not to go againſt the enemy who is alive, as being neceſſarily occupied when they are thus employed about the one who is dead; and many armies have been loſt by this plundering. Very many. And does it not appear to you to be illiberal and ſordid, and the part of a womaniſh and little mind to ſtrip the dead body, and deem the body of the deceaſt an enemy, when the enemy is fled off, and there is only left behind that with which he fought? Or do you imagine that they who act in this manner, do any way different from dogs, who are in a rage at the ſtones they throw at them, not touching the man who throws them? Not in the leaſt, ſaid he. We muſt let alone then this ſtripping the dead, and theſe hinderances

Vide the Treaty between U. S. and the [illegible] of Pr[illegible]

ariſing from the carrying off booty. Truly, ſaid he, theſe muſt be baniſhed. Nor ſhall we at any time bring the arms into the temples, as if we were to dedicate them, at leaſt not the arms of Grecians, if we have any concern to have the good liking of the other Greeks: but we ſhall rather be afraid, leſt it ſhould be a kind of profanation to bring into the temple ſuch things as theſe from our own kinſman, unleſs the oracle ſhall ſay otherwiſe. Moſt right, reply'd he. But what, with reference to the laying waſte Grecian lands, and burning of houſes, how ſhall your ſoldiers behave towards their enemies, I ſhould be glad, ſaid he, to hear you ſignifying your opinion? Truly then, ſaid I, in my opinion, neither of theſe ought to be done, but only one year's produce to be carried off. And would you have me tell you the reaſon why this ſhould be done? By all means. It appears to me that as theſe two words, war and ſedition, are different, ſo they are two different things which are ſignified by them: I call them two different things, the one is domeſtic and akin, the other foreign and ſtrange. When hatred is among ourſelves, it is called ſedition; when it reſpects foreigners, it is called war. What you ſay, reply'd he, is no way unreaſonable. But conſider now, if I ſay this likewiſe reaſonably: for I averr that the Greek nation is friendly and akin to itſelf, but is foreign and ſtrange to the Barbarian. This too is right. When then the Greeks fight with the Barbarians, and the Barbarians with the Greeks, we ſhall ſay they wage war, and are naturally enemies; and this hatred is to be called war. But when

Greeks do any ſuch thing to Greeks, we ſhall ſay that they are friends by nature, and that Greece in ſuch a caſe is diſtempered, and in ſedition; and ſuch a hatred is to be called a ſedition. I agree, ſaid he, to account of it in the ſame manner. Conſider then, ſaid I, that in the ſedition now mentioned, wherever ſuch a thing happens, and the city is disjointed, if they ſequeſter the lands, and burn the houſes of one another, how deſtructive the ſedition appears, and neither of them ſeems to be lovers of their country: for otherwiſe they would never dare to lay waſte their nurſe and mother; but it would ſuffice the victors to carry off the fruits of the vanquiſhed, and to conſider they are to be reconciled, and not perpetually to be at war. This indeed is by much a more mild ſentiment than the other. But what now, ſaid I! Is not this city you are eſtabliſhing a Greek one? It ſhould be ſo, reply'd he. And ſhall not they be good and mild? By all means. And ſhall they not be lovers of Greeks? And ſhall they not account Greece akin to them? And ſhall they not have the ſame religious rites with the reſt of the Greeks? By all means. A difference then with Greeks, as with kinſmen, will they not denominate a ſedition, and not a war? They will. And they will behave as thoſe who are to be reconciled. By all means. They ſhall then be mild and moderate, not puniſhing ſo far to enſlave or deſtroy, ſince they are moderate and not hoſtile. Juſt ſo, ſaid he. Neither then, as they are Greeks, will they ſequeſter Grecian lands, nor burn their houſes, nor will they allow, that in every city all are their

enemies, men, women, and children; but that always a few only are enemies, the authors of the quarrel: and on all theſe accounts they will neither chuſe to lay waſte lands, as the greateſt number are their friends, nor will they overturn the houſes, but will carry on the war ſo far as till the guilty be obliged by the innocent, whom they diſtreſs, to make reparation. I agree, ſaid he, that we ought to behave ſo towards our own citizens when we are ſet againſt one another; and to behave ſo towards the Barbarians as the Greeks at preſent do to one another. Let us then likewiſe eſtabliſh this law for our guardians, neither to lay waſte the lands, nor burn the houſes. Let us eſtabliſh it, ſaid he, and this further, that theſe things, and thoſe too you mentioned formerly, are right; but it appears to me, Socrates! if one is to allow you to ſpeak in this manner, that you will never remember what you formerly paſſed by, when you entered on all this you have now ſaid. This, to wit, how far ſuch a government is poſſible? and in what way it is at all poſſible? For if it be at all poſſible, I will allow that all theſe good things will belong to that city, and theſe likewiſe which you have omitted; that they will, in the beſt manner, fight againſt their enemies, and of all others leaſt abandon one another, recognizing theſe names, and calling one another by theſe, fathers, ſons, and brothers. And if the female ſhall encamp along with them, whether in the ſame rank, or drawn up behind them, to ſtrike terror into the enemies, and at the ſame time to aſſiſt if ever there be neceſſity for it, I know that in this way

they will entirely be invincible. And I plainly ſee too what advantages they have at home, which we have omitted. But ſpeak no more about this government, as I allow that all theſe, and ten thouſand other things, will belong to it, if it actually exiſt. But let us endeavour to perſuade one another of this itſelf, whether it be poſſible, and in what reſpect it is ſo; and let us omit thoſe other things. You have ſuddenly, ſaid I, made an aſſault on my reaſoning, and make no allowance for one who is fighting; for perhaps you do not advert, that, with difficulty, I am eſcaped from two waves, and now you are bringing upon me the greateſt and moſt dangerous of the three. After you have ſeen and heard this, you will entirely forgive me; allowing, that I with reaſon grudged, and was afraid to mention ſo great a paradox, and undertake to examine it. The more, ſaid he, you mention theſe things, the leſs will you be freed from explaining in what reſpect this government is poſſible. Proceed then, and do not ſpend time. Muſt not this then, ſaid I, in the firſt place, be remembred, that we are come hither in ſearch of juſtice, what it is? and what injuſtice is? It muſt, ſaid he. But what is this to the purpoſe? Nothing. But if we find out what juſtice is, ſhall we then judge, that the juſt man ought in no reſpect to differ from it, but in every reſpect to be ſuch as juſtice is? and ſhall we be ſatisfied if he approach the neareſt to it, and, of all others, partake of it the moſt? We ſhall, ſaid he, be ſatisfied ſo. As a model then, ſaid I, we were inquiring into this, what kind of thing juſtice is; and we like-

wiſe were in queſt of a juſt man; and conſidered what ſort of man he ſhould be, if he did exiſt. We likewiſe inquired what injuſtice is, and what too the moſt unjuſt men. In order that looking into theſe two models, what ſort of men they appeared with reſpect to happineſs and its oppoſite, we might be obliged to acknowledge concerning ourſelves, that whoever ſhould moſt reſemble them in character, ſhall have a fortune the moſt reſembling theirs; and not for this end, to ſhew that theſe things are poſſible or not. In this, ſaid he, you ſay true. Do you imagine then, that the painter is in any degree the leſs excellent, who having painted a model of the moſt beautiful man, and brought every thing fully into his piece, is yet unable to ſhew that ſuch a man does really exiſt? Truly, ſaid he, I do not. What then, have we not made in our reaſonings (ſhall we ſay) a model of a good city? Yes indeed. Have we then ſpoken any thing the worſe, do you imagine, on this account, that we are not able to ſhew, that it is poſſible for a city to be eſtabliſhed ſuch as we have deſcribed? No indeed, ſaid he. This then, ſaid I, is the truth in the caſe. But if truly I muſt now likewiſe, on your account, haſten to this, to ſhew how eſpecially, and in what reſpects, it is moſt poſſible, in order to this diſcovery, you muſt again grant the ſame things as formerly. What things? Is it poſſible for any thing to be executed ſo perfectly as it is deſcribed? or is ſuch the nature of practice, that it approacheth not ſo near the truth as theory, though ſome may think otherwiſe? But whether will you allow this or not? I allow it, ſaid

he. Do not then oblige me to ſhew you all theſe things, and in every reſpect, exiſting in fact, ſo perfectly as we have deſcribed in our reaſoning; but if we be able to find out how a city may be eſtabliſhed the neareſt poſſible to what we have mentioned, you'll ſay we have found out that theſe things which you require are poſſible? Or will you not even be ſatisfied if this be obtained? for my own part, I ſhould be ſatisfied. And I too, ſaid he. We are now it ſeems, in the next place, to endeavour to find out and to ſhew what, at all, is the evil which is now practiſed in cities through which they are not eſtabliſhed in this manner we have deſcribed; and what is that ſmalleſt change, which, if made, would bring the city to this model of government, and let us chiefly ſee, if this can be effected by the change of one thing, if not by the change of two, if not that, by the change of the feweſt things in number, and the ſmalleſt in power. By all means, ſaid he. Upon the change then of one thing, ſaid I, I am able I think to ſhew that the ſtate can fall into this model of government. But the change is not indeed ſmall nor eaſy, yet it is poſſible. What is it, ſaid he? I am now come, ſaid I, to what I compared to the greateſt wave: and it ſhall now be mentioned, though, like a breaking wave, it ſhould overwhelm us with exceſſive laughter and unbelief. But conſider, what I am going to ſay. Proceed, reply'd he. Unleſs either philoſophers, ſaid I, govern in cities, or thoſe who are at preſent called kings and governours philoſophize really and thoroughly, and theſe two, the political power and phi-

loſophy, unite in one, and 'till the bulk of thoſe who at preſent purſue each of theſe ſeparately, are, of neceſſity, excluded, there ſhall be no end, Glauco! to the miſeries of cities, nor yet, as I imagine, to thoſe of the human race; nor till then ſhall ever this republic, which we have gone over in our reaſonings, ſpring up to a poſſibility, and behold the light of the ſun. But this is that which all along made me grudge to mention it, that I ſaw what a paradox I was to utter: for it is difficult to be convinced that no other but this republic can enjoy happineſs, whether public or private. You have thrown out, Socrates! ſaid he, ſuch an expreſſion and argument, as you may imagine will bring on you a great many, and theſe courageous to ſuch a degree, as to put off their clothes, and naked to ſnatch whatever weapon fortune affords each of them; and, as if they were to perform prodigies, ruſh upon you in battle array. And unleſs mowing them down with argument, you make your eſcape, you will pay for it, by ſuffering moſt ſevere ridicule. And are not you the cauſe of all this, ſaid I? But in acting handſomely at leaſt, reply'd he. However, in this affair, I will not betray you, but defend you with ſuch things as I am able. And I am able, both by my good-will, and by encouraging you, and prohably I will anſwer your queſtions more carefully than any other, only do you endeavour, with the help of ſuch an aſſiſtant, to ſhow thoſe who are backward to believe theſe things, that the caſe really is as you repreſent it. I muſt endeavour, ſaid I, ſince even you afford ſo great an alliance. And here,

it ſeems to me to be neceſſary, if we are any how to make our eſcape from thoſe you mention, accurately to define to them what kind of men theſe are we call philoſophers, when we dare to aſſert, that they alone ought to govern, in order that when they are made perfectly manifeſt, any one may be able to defend himſelf when he aſſerts, that to theſe it naturally belongs both to apply themſelves to philoſophy, and likewiſe to take upon them the government of the ſtate: but others are to apply themſelves neither to philoſophy nor government, but to obey their leader. It is proper, ſaid he, to define them. Come then, follow me this way, if together any how we ſhall ſufficiently explain this matter. Lead on then, ſaid he. Will it then be needful, ſaid I, to put you in mind? Or do you remember it? that when we ſay of any one, that he loveth any thing, when we ſpeak with propriety, he muſt not appear to love one part of it, and not another, but to have an affection for the whole? I need it ſeems, reply'd he, to be put in mind; for I do not underſtand it perfectly. It might become another, Glauco! reply'd I, to ſay what you ſay; but it does not become a man who is a lover, to forget that all thoſe who are in their bloom, ſting ſome how, and give emotion to one who is amorous, and a lover, as they are deemed worthy both of reſpect, and of being ſaluted. Or do you not behave in this manner towards the beautiful? One, becauſe flat-noſed, ſhall be called agreeable, and be commended by you; and the hook-noſe of the other, you ſay, is princely; and that which is in the middle of theſe is accord-

ing to the exacteſt ſymmetry: the black are ſaid to be manly to behold; and the fair to be the children of the Gods; but this appellation of pale green, do you imagine it is the invention of any other than of a flattering lover, and one who eaſily bears with the paleneſs, provided it is in the bloom of youth? And, in one word, you make all ſort of pretences, and ſay every thing ſo as never to reject any one who is of a blooming age? If you incline, ſaid he, to judge by me of other lovers, that they do in this ſort, I agree to it for the ſake of the argument. And what, ſaid I, with reſpect to the lovers of wine; do you not obſerve them acting in the ſame manner; chearfully drinking every kind of wine upon every pretext? Yes, indeed. And you perceive, as I imagine, that the ambitious likewiſe, if they cannot obtain the command of a whole army, will take the third command; and if they cannot be honoured by greater and better men, are content if they be honoured by the lower and more contemptible, being deſirous of honour at any rate? It is perfectly ſo. Agree to this or not: if we ſay, one is deſirous of any thing, ſhall we ſay, that he deſires the whole ſpecies, or that he deſires one part of it, but not another? The whole, reply'd he. Shall we not then likewiſe ſay, that the philoſopher is deſirous of wiſdom, and that not of one part only, but of the whole? True. He then who hath a diſlike of learning, eſpecially if he be young, and hath not at all underſtanding to diſcern what is good, and what is otherwiſe, ſhall not be called a lover of learning, nor a philoſopher; in the ſame manner

as we ſay of one who is diſguſted with meats, that he neither hungers after, nor deſires meats, nor is a lover but a hater of them. And we ſhall ſay right. But the man who readily inclines to taſte of every piece of learning, and with pleaſure enters on the ſtudy of it, and is inſatiable of it, this man we ſhall with juſtice call a philoſopher: ſhall we not? On this Glauco ſaid, You ſhall have a great many ſuch philoſophers as thoſe very abſurd: for all your lovers of ſhows appear to me to be of this kind; from their taking a pleaſure in learning; and your ſtory lovers are the moſt ſtupid of all to be reckoned among philoſophers at leaſt. Theſe indeed would not willingly attend on ſuch reaſonings, and ſuch a diſquiſition as this. But yet, as if they had hired out their ears to liſten to every chorus, they run about to the Bacchanalia, omitting neither thoſe of cities nor villages. Shall all theſe then, and others ſtudious of ſuch things, and thoſe who apply to the inferior arts, be called by us philoſophers? By no means, ſaid I, but reſembling philoſophers? But whom, ſaid he, do you call the true ones? Thoſe, ſaid I, who are deſirous of diſcerning the truth. This likewiſe, ſaid he, is right. But how do you mean? It is not eaſy, ſaid I, to tell it to another; but you, I imagine, will agree with me in this. In what? That ſince the beautiful is oppoſite to the deformed, theſe are two things. Why are they not? And if they are two, then each of them is one. This alſo is granted. And the reaſoning is the ſame concerning juſtice and injuſtice, good and evil. And concerning every other ſpecies of things, the argument is the

the ſame. That each of them is one in itſelf, but appears to be many, being every where diverſified by their communication with action and body, and with one another. You ſay right, ſaid he. In this manner then, ſaid I, I ſeparate theſe, and ſet apart thoſe you now mentioned, the lovers of public ſhows, of handicrafts, and mechanics, and then apart from theſe, I ſet thoſe of whom we diſcourſe at preſent, whom alone we may properly call philoſophers. How do you ſay, reply'd he? The lovers of common ſtories and of ſpectacles delight in fine ſounds, colours, and figures, and every thing which is compounded of theſe; but the real nature of beauty itſelf their underſtandings are incapable to diſcern and admire. Indeed the caſe is ſo, ſaid he. But as to thoſe then who are able to approach this beauty itſelf, and to behold it as it is in itſelf, muſt they not be few in number? Extremely ſo. He then who accounts ſome things beautiful, but neither knows beauty itſelf, nor is able to follow, if one were to lead him to the knowledge of it, does he ſeem to you to live in a dream, or to be awake? Conſider now, what is it to dream? Is it not this, when one, whether aſleep or awake, imagines the ſimilitude of a thing is not the ſimilitude, but really the thing itſelf, which it reſembleth? I for my part would averr, reply'd he, that ſuch a perſon is really in a dream. But what now as to him who judgeth oppoſite to this, who underſtandeth both what beauty is itſelf, and is able to diſcern both it and ſuch things as participate of it, and neither deemeth the participants to be beauty, nor beauty

to be the participants? whether doth ſuch an one ſeem to you to live awake, or in a dream? Perfectly awake, ſaid he. May we not then properly call this man's perception, as he really knows, knowledge, but that of the other, opinion, as he only imagines? By all means. But what if the perſon who we ſay only imagines things, but does not really know them, be enraged at us, and diſpute with us, alledging that what we ſay is not true; ſhall we have any method of ſoothing and perſuading him, in a gentle manner, by concealing that he is not in a ſound ſtate? At leaſt there is need of it, reply'd he. Come now, conſider what we ſhall ſay to him. Or do you incline we ſhall thus interrogate him? Telling him, that if he knows any thing, no one envies him for it, but we ſhall gladly ſee him poſſeſſed of ſome knowledge; but only tell us this, does the man who has knowledge, know ſomething or nothing? Do you now anſwer me for him? I will anſwer, ſaid he, that he knows ſomething. Whether ſomething which really exiſts, or which does not? What does really exiſt: for how can that be known which has no real exiſtence? We have then examined this ſufficiently, though we might have conſidered it more fully; that what really is, may be really known; but what does not at all exiſt, cannot at all be known. We have examined it moſt ſufficiently. Be it ſo. But if there be any thing of ſuch a kind, as both to be and not to be, muſt it not lye between that which perfectly is, and that which is not at all? Between them. As to what really is, then is there not knowledge, and as to that which is not at

all, is there not of neceſſity ignorance; and for that which is between theſe, we muſt ſeek for ſomething between ignorance and knowledge, if there be any ſuch thing. By all means. Do we ſay then that opinion is any thing? Why not? Whether is it a different power from knowledge, or the ſame? Different. Is opinion then converſant about one thing, and knowledge about another, by virtue of the ſame power, or each of them by virtue of a power of its own? This laſt. Is not the power of knowledge converſant about what really exiſts, to know that it is? Or rather it ſeems to me to be neceſſary to diſtinguiſh in this manner. How? We ſhall ſay, that powers are a certain ſpecies of real exiſtences, by which both we can do whatever we can do, and every being elſe whatever it can do. Thus, I ſay, that ſeeing and hearing are among theſe powers, if you underſtand what I mean to call a ſpecies. I underſtand, ſaid he. Hear then what appears to me concerning them. For I do not ſee any colour of a power, nor figure, nor any of ſuch qualities, as of many other things, in regard to which I diſtinguiſh ſome things with myſelf, that they are different from one another. But as to power, I regard that alone about which it is converſant, and what it effects; and, on this account, I have called each of theſe a power. And the power which is converſant about, and effects, one and the ſame thing, I call the ſame power, but that converſant about, and effecting a different thing, I call a different power: but what ſay you? In what manner do you? Juſt ſo, reply'd he. But come again,

excellent Glauco! whether do you ſay that knowledge is itſelf a certain power, or to what claſs do you refer it? I refer it to this claſs of power, ſaid he, as it is of all powers the moſt ſtrong? But what now? Shall we refer opinion to power, or to ſome other ſpecies? By no means to power, ſaid he; for that by which we form opinions, is nothing elſe but opinion. But you owned a little ago, that knowledge and opinion were not the ſame. How, ſaid he, can ever any one who hath underſtanding reduce under one, that which is infallible, and that which is not infallible? You ſay right, ſaid I. And it is plain that we have allowed opinion to be a different thing from knowledge. A different. Each of them then hath naturally a different power over a different thing. Of neceſſity. Knowledge hath a power over being itſelf, in knowing real exiſtence, how it exiſts. Yes. But we ſay that opinion imagines. Yes. Whether does it imagine the ſame thing which knowledge underſtands? and ſhall that which is known, and that which is imagined, be the ſame? or is this impoſſible? Impoſſible, ſaid he, from what we have allowed; ſince they are naturally powers of different things, and both of them are powers; opinion and knowledge, and each of them different from the other, as we have ſaid; from theſe things it cannot be, that that which is imagined is the ſame with that which is known. If then real exiſtence itſelf be known, muſt it not be different from the exiſtence which is imagined? Different. Does he then imagine that which has no exiſtence? Or is it impoſſible even to imagine that which doth not exiſt

at all? Conſider now, does not the man who imagines, refer his opinion to ſomewhat? Or is it poſſible to imagine, and yet imagine nothing at all. Impoſſible. But whoever imagines, imagines ſome one thing. Yes. But ſurely that which does not exiſt, cannot be called any one thing, but moſt properly nothing at all. Certainly ſo. But we neceſſarily referred ignorance to that which does not exiſt, but knowledge to real exiſtence. Right, ſaid ſaid he. Therefore neither exiſtence, nor what does not exiſt imagines. No indeed. Opinion then is neither knowledge, nor is it ignorance. It appears it is not. Does it then exceed theſe, either knowledge in perſpicuity, or ignorance in obſcurity? It does neither. But does opinion, ſaid I, ſeem to you to be more obſcure than knowledge, but more perſpicuous than ignorance? A great deal, ſaid he. But does it lye between them both then? It does. Opinion then is in the middle of theſe two. Entirely ſo. And have we not already ſaid, that if any thing appeared of ſuch a kind, as at the ſame time to be, and yet not to be, ſuch a thing would lye between that which has really an exiſtence, and that which does not at all exiſt, and that neither knowledge nor ignorance would be converſant about it, but that which appeared to be between ignorance and knowledge. Right. And now that which we call opinion, hath appeared to be between them. It hath appeared. It yet remains for us, as appears, to find out that which participates of both theſe, of exiſtence, and of non-exiſtence, and which with propriety can be called neither of them perfectly, that

if it appear to be what is imagined, we may juſtly call it ſo, aſſigning to the extremes what is extreme, and to the middle what is in the middle. Shall we not do thus? Thus. Theſe things being ſettled, let this worthy man, I will ſay, tell and anſwer me, he who reckons that beauty, and a certain idea of beauty there is none, always the ſame, and in the ſame reſpects; but this lover of beautiful objects reckons there are many beautiful things, but can never bear it, if any one tells him that there is one beautiful, and one juſt, and ſo of others. Of all theſe many things, excellent man! ſhall we ſay to him, where is there any which will not appear ugly, and of thoſe juſt which will not appear unjuſt, of thoſe holy which will not appear profane? No, but of neceſſity, ſaid he, the beautiful things themſelves muſt in ſome reſpects appear even ugly, and others in like manner. But what? many things which are double, or twofold, do they leſs really appear to be halves than doubles? No leſs. And things great and ſmall, light and heavy, ſhall they be denominated what we call them, any more than the oppoſite: No, but each of them, ſaid he, always participates of both. Whether then is each of theſe many things that which it is ſaid to be, or is it not? It is like their riddles at feaſts, ſaid he, and the riddle of children, about the eunuch's ſtriking the bat, puzzling one another in what manner, and how far he ſtrikes it. For all theſe things have a double meaning, and it is impoſſible to know accurately that they are, or are not, that they are both, or neither of the two. How can you do with them then,

ſaid I, or have you a better claſs for them, than a medium between exiſtence and non-exiſtence? For nothing ſeems more obſcure than non-exiſtence in reſpect of having no being at all, nor more perſpicuous than exiſtence in reſpect of real being. Moſt true, ſaid he. We have then diſcovered, it ſeems, that the moſt of the maxims of the generality of mankind concerning the beautiful, and thoſe other things, roll ſome how between exiſtence and non-exiſtence. We have accurately diſcovered it. But we formerly agreed, that if any ſuch thing ſhould appear, it ought to be called that which is imagined, and not what is known; and that which fluctuates between the two to be perceived by the power between the two. We agreed. Thoſe then who contemplate many beautiful things, but who never perceive beauty itſelf, nor are able to follow another leading them to it; and many juſt things, but never juſtice itſelf, and all other things in like manner, we will ſay that they imagine all things, but of all that they imagine they know none. Of neceſſity, ſaid he. But what now? Thoſe who perceive each of the things themſelves, always exiſting in the ſame manner, and in the ſame reſpect, will we not ſay that they know, and do not imagine? Of neceſſity this likewiſe. And will we not ſay, that theſe embrace, and love theſe things of which they have knowledge, and the others the things of which they have opinion? Or do we not remember, that we ſaid they beheld and loved fine ſounds and colours, and ſuch things; but that beauty itſelf they do not admit of as any real exiſtence? We remember. Shall

we then commit any wrong, in calling them lovers of opinion, rather as philoſophers; yet they will be greatly inraged at us, if we call them ſo? No, if they be perſuaded by me, ſaid he; for it is not lawful to be inraged at the truth. Theſe then who admire every thing which hath a real exiſtence, are to be called philoſophers, and not lovers of opinion. By all means.

THE END OF THE FIFTH BOOK.

THE SIXTH BOOK.

THESE now who are philoſophers, ſaid I, Glauco! and theſe who are not, have, through a long compaſs of diſcourſe, with difficulty, diſcovered themſelves what they ſeverally are. Becauſe, perhaps, it was not eaſy, ſaid he, in a ſhort one. So it appears, ſaid I. But I ſtill think they would have better diſcovered themſelves, if we had been to ſpeak to no other point than this, and not have gone through all thoſe other things, when we were to conſider what difference there is between a juſt life and an unjuſt. What then, ſaid he, are we to treat of next. What elſe, ſaid I, but of what is next in courſe. Since thoſe are philoſophers who are able to attain to the knowledge of that which exiſts always, and in all reſpects the ſame; but thoſe who are not able to attain to this, but who wander amidſt many things, and ſuch as are every way ſhifting, are not philoſophers; which of theſe ought to be the governours of the city? Which way, ſaid he, ſhall we determine in this, and determine reaſonably? Which ever of them, ſaid I, appears capable of preſerving the laws and inſtitutions of cities, theſe are to be made guardians. Right, ſaid he. This now, ſaid I, is certainly plain; whether a blind or quick-ſighted guardian be proper for guarding any thing. Why is it not plain, ſaid he? Whether then do thoſe appear to you

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to differ from the blind, who are wholly deprived of the knowledge of each particular being, and have neither a clear model in their ſoul, nor are able, as painters looking up to the trueſt model, and always referring themſelves thither, and contemplating it in the moſt accurate manner poſſible, to eſtabliſh here too in like manner juſt maxims of the beautiful, and juſt and good, if there be occaſion to eſtabliſh them, and to guard and preſerve ſuch as are already eſtabliſhed? No ſurely, ſaid he. They do not differ much. Shall we then appoint thoſe to be guardians, or thoſe who know each being, and who in experience are nothing behind thoſe others, nor inferior to them in any other part of virtue? It were abſurd, ſaid he, to chuſe others, at leaſt if theſe are not behind in other things; for in this, which is almoſt the greateſt, they excel. Shall we not then ſpeak to this point? In what manner the ſame perſons ſhall be able to have both the one and the other of thoſe things? By all means. It is then firſt of all neceſſary, as we obſerved in the beginning of this diſcourſe, thoroughly to underſtand their genius, and I imagine, if we ſufficiently agree as to it, we ſhall likewiſe agree that the ſame perſons are able to have both of theſe things, and that no others but theſe ought to be the governours of cities. How ſo? Let this now be agreed among us concerning the philoſophic geniuſes, that they are always deſirous of ſuch learning as may diſcover to them that being which always exiſts, and is not changed by generation or corruption. Let it be agreed. And likewiſe, ſaid I, that they are deſirous of the whole

of ſuch learning, and that they will not willingly omit any part of it, neither ſmall nor great, more honourable, or more diſhonourable, as we formerly obſerved concerning the ambitious, and concerning lovers. You ſay right, ſaid he. Conſider then, in the next place, if beſides what we have mentioned, it be neceſſary that this alſo ſhould ſubſiſt in the genius of thoſe who are to be ſuch as we have deſcribed. As what? That they be void of falſhood, nor willingly at any time receive a lye, but hate it, and love the truth. It is likely, ſaid he. It is not only likely, friend! but muſt be ſo of neceſſity, that one who is naturally in love with any thing ſhould love every thing akin, and belonging to the objects of his affection. Right, ſaid he. Can you then find any thing more akin to wiſdom than truth? How can we, ſaid he? Is it poſſible then that the ſame genius can be philoſophic, and at the ſame time a lover of falſhood? By no means. He then, who is in reality a lover of learning, ought immediately from his infancy to be in the greateſt meaſure deſirous of all truth. By all means. But we know ſome how, that whoever hath his deſires running vehemently after any one thing, hath them upon this very account weaker as to other things, as a current diverted from its channel. Why are they not? But whoſoever hath his deſires running out after learning, and every thing of this kind, would be converſant, I imagine, about the pleaſure of the ſoul itſelf, and would forſake thoſe pleaſures which ariſe from the body, provided he be not a counterfeit, but ſome real philoſopher. This

of neceſſity muſt be the caſe. And ſuch an one is moderate, and by no means a lover of money. For the reaſons why money is with ſo much trouble ſollicitouſly ſought after, have weight with any other than ſuch an one to make him ſollicitous. Aſſuredly. And ſurely ſome how you muſt likewiſe conſider this, when you are to judge what is a philoſophic genius, and what is not. As what? That it do not without your knowledge partake of an illiberal turn: for littleneſs of ſoul is moſt oppoſite to a mind which is always to purſue earneſtly the whole, and every thing divine and humane. Moſt true, ſaid he. Do you then imagine that any underſtanding which hath a greatneſs of mind, and is fitted for the contemplation of the whole of time, and the whole of being, can poſſibly think human life a great matter? It is impoſſible, ſaid he. Such an one then will not account death any thing terrible. Leaſt of all. A cowardly and illiberal genius then will not it ſeems readily participate of true philoſophy. No, as I imagine. What now, can the moderate man, and one who is not a lover of money, nor illiberal, nor boaſting, nor cowardly, ever poſſibly be an ill co-partner, or unjuſt? It is impoſſible. And you will likewiſe conſider this, when you are viewing from its infancy what is the philoſophic ſoul, and what is not, whether it be juſt and mild, or unſocial and ſavage. By all means. Neither indeed, as I imagine, will you omit this. What? Whether it be docile or undocile? Or do you expect that ever any one will at all love any thing to purpoſe, in performing which he performs with uneaſineſs

and with difficulty, making ſmall progreſs? It cannot be. But what if he can retain nothing of what he learns, being quite forgetful, is it poſſible for him not to be void of knowledge? How is it poſſible? And when he labours unprofitably, do you not imagine he will be obliged at laſt to hate both himſelf and ſuch practice? Why muſt he not? We ſhall never then reckon a forgetful ſoul among thoſe who are thoroughly philoſophic, but we ſhall require it to be of a good memory. By all means. But never ſhall we ſay this at leaſt, that an unmuſical and indecent genius leads any where elſe but towards intemperance. Where elſe? But whether do you reckon truth akin to intemperance, or to temperance? To temperance. Let us require then among other things an underſtanding naturally temperate, and graceful, as a proper guide towards attaining the real idea of each particular being, according to its own nature. Why not? What now? Do we not in ſome meaſure ſeem to you to have gone through the neceſſary qualifications, and ſuch as are conſequent on one another, in a ſoul which is to apprehend being ſufficiently, and to perfection. The moſt neceſſary, ſaid he. Is it poſſible then for you in any meaſure to find fault with ſuch a ſtudy as this, which one can never be able ſufficiently to aply to, unleſs he be naturally poſſeſſed of a good memory, be docile, generous, graceful; and the friend and ally of truth, juſtice, fortitude and temperance? Not even Momus himſelf, ſaid he, could find fault with ſuch a ſtudy. But, ſaid I, will it not be to theſe alone, when they are perfected by edu-

cation and age, that you will entruſt the city. Here Adimantus ſaid, Indeed, Socrates! no one is able to contradict you as to theſe things; but all who hear you at any time advancing what you do at preſent, are ſome how affected in this manner. Being led off a little by your reaſoning on each queſtion, through their inexperience in this method of queſtion and anſwer, when all theſe littles are collected together, at the cloſe of your reaſonings, they reckon that the miſtake appears conſiderable, and the contrary of their firſt conceſſions: and like thoſe who play at talus with ſuch as are dextrous, but are themſelves unſkilful, they are in the end ſhut up, and can do no more; ſo your hearers have nothing to ſay, ſhut up by this other kind of game, not with pieces, but with your reaſonings. Though the truth at leaſt is not by this any way advanced: I ſay this with reference to the preſent inquiry: for one may tell you, that he hath nothing to oppoſe to each of your queſtions, by way of argument, but that in fact he ſees, that all thoſe who plunge into philoſophy, applying to it, not with this view, that being early inſtructed, they may give it over when in their prime, but that they may continue in it much longer, become the moſt of them quite aukward, not to ſay altogether naughty, and thoſe of them who appear the moſt worthy, do yet ſuffer this much from this ſtudy you ſo much commend, that they become uſeleſs to the public. When I had heard this, do you imagine then, ſaid I, that ſuch as ſay theſe things are telling a falſhood? I do not know, ſaid he, but would gladly hear your opinion.

You would then hear that they appear to me to ſay true. How then, reply'd he, is it right to ſay that the miſeries of cities ſhall never have an end till they be governed by philoſophers, whom we are now acknowledging to be uſeleſs to them? You aſk a queſtion, ſaid I, which needs an anſwer by a compariſon. And you, ſaid I, are not wont, I imagine, to talk by compariſons, Be it ſo, ſaid I. You joke now, when you have brought me on a ſubject which is ſo hard to be explained. But hear now my compariſon, that you may ſee further with what difficulty I make one; for the ſufferings of the moſt worthy philoſophers, in the management of public affairs, are ſo grievous, that there is not any one other ſuffering ſo ſevere; but in making our compariſon, and in apologizing for them, we muſt collect from many particulars: in the ſame manner as painters mix the figures of two different animals together, and paint a creature which is both goat and ſtag in one, and others of this kind. Imagine now that ſuch an one as this is the pilot of a fleet, or of a ſingle ſhip, one who exceeds all in the ſhip, both in bulk and in ſtrength, but is ſomewhat deaf, and ſees in like manner but a ſhort way, and whoſe ſkill in ſea affairs is much of the kind. And imagine that the ſailors are all in ſedition among themſelves, contending for the pilotſhip, each imagining he ought to be pilot, though he never at all learned the art, nor is able to ſhew who was his maſter, nor what time he learned it. That beſides this, all of them ſay that the art itſelf cannot be taught, and are ready to cut in pieces any one who ſays

that it can. Imagine further, that they continually ſurround the pilot himſelf, begging, and doing every thing that he may put the helm into their hands; and even ſometimes, when they are not ſo ſucceſsful in perſuading him as others are, they either kill theſe others, or throw them overboard: and after they have by mandragora, or wine, or ſome other thing, rendered the real pilot incapable, they manage the ſhip with the aſſiſtance of the crew, and whilſt they drink and feaſt in this manner, they ſail as it may be expected of ſuch people. And beſides theſe things, if any one be dextrous in aſſiſting them to get the government into their own hands, and in ſetting aſide the pilot, either by perſuaſion or force, they commend ſuch an one, calling him ſailor and pilot, and intelligent in navigation; but they contemn, as uſeleſs, every one who is not of this kind: whilſt it never enters into their thought, that the true pilot muſt have regard to the year, the ſeaſons, the heavens, and ſtars, and winds, and every thing belonging to the art, if he mean to be a governour of a ſhip in reality; but the art and practice of governing men, whether ſome be willing or not, they think impoſſible for one to attain along with the art of navigation. Whilſt affairs are in this ſituation with regard to the ſhips, do you not imagine that the true pilot will be called by the ſailors aboard of ſhips fitted out in this manner, a ſtar-gazer, inſignificant, and unprofitable to them? Undoubtedly, ſaid Adimantus? I imagine then, ſaid I, that you will not want any explanation of the compariſon, to ſee that it repreſents how they are

affected in cities towards true philoſophers, but that you underſtand what I ſay? Perfectly, ſaid he. Firſt of all then with reſpect to this, if any one wonders, that philoſophers are not honoured in cities, teach him our compariſon, and endeavour to perſuade him, that it would be much more wonderful, were they held in greater honour. I will teach them ſo, reply'd he. And further, that it is indeed true, what you now was obſerving, that the beſt of thoſe who apply to philoſophy are uſeleſs to the bulk of mankind; but however, for this, bid them blame ſuch as make no uſe of theſe philoſophers, and not theſe philoſophers themſelves. For it is not natural for the pilot to entreat the ſailors to allow him to govern them, nor for the wiſe to be reſorting to the gates of the rich; but whoever made this witty objection, was in a miſtake; for this is the moſt natural method, that whoever is ſick, whether rich or poor, muſt of neceſſity go to the gates of the phyſician, and whoever wants to be governed, muſt wait on him who is capable to govern: for it is not natural that the governour, who is really of any value, ſhould entreat the governed to ſubject themſelves to his government. But you will not greatly err, when you compare our preſent political governours to thoſe ſailors we now mentioned, and thoſe who are called by them inſignificant and ſtar-gazers to thoſe who are truly pilots. Moſt right, ſaid he. From hence then it would ſeem, that the beſt purſuit is not likely to be held in eſteem among thoſe who purſue ſtudies of an oppoſite nature: but by far the greateſt and moſt violent ac-

cuſation of philoſophy is occaſioned by means of thoſe who profeſs to be ſtudying it; the moſt of whom, you ſay, your accuſer of philoſophy calls altogether naughty, and the very beſt of them of no advantage to the ſtate: and I agreed that you ſay the truth, did I not? You did. And have we not fully explained the cauſe, why the beſt of them are of no advantage? We have. Would you chuſe then, that we ſhould, in the next place, explain the reaſon, why the moſt of them muſt of neceſſity be naughty, and that we endeavour to demonſtrate, that of this, as little as of the other is philoſophy the cauſe. By all means. Let us attend then, and begin our reaſoning, calling to mind what we formerly obſerved concerning the natural genius which neceſſarily belongs to the good and worthy.----And what was a leading part in it, if you remember, was truth, which he muſt by all means wholly purſue, or elſe be a vain boaſter, and never partake of true philoſophy. It was ſo ſaid. Is not this one part of his character, quite contrary to the preſent opinions of him. It is very much ſo, reply'd he. Will it not then be no ſmall defence, if we be able to ſhow, that the true lover of learning is naturally made to aſpire to the knowledge of real being, and not to reſt in the many particular things which are the objects of opinion, but goes on, and is not blunted, nor ceaſes from his love of truth before he attain to the knowledge of the nature of each particular being, by that part of the ſoul whoſe office it is to attain to ſuch knowledge, and it belongs to that principle in the mind which is akin to it: and when he hath ap-

proached to this knowledge, and mingled with real being, having generated intelligence and truth, he would then really have true knowledge, and enjoy life and nouriſhment in the moſt real manner, and then alone, and no ſooner, does he ceaſe from trouble. This, ſaid he, will be a moſt reaſonable defence. What now, will it be the part of ſuch an one to love falſhood, or quite the contrary, to hate it? To hate it, ſaid he. But whilſt truth indeed leads the way, we can never at all, as I imagine, ſay, that any band of evils follows in her train. How can we? But on the contrary we may averr, that ſhe is followed by a ſound and moderate diſpoſition, and ſuch as is accompanied with temperance. Right, ſaid he. Why now? need we go over again, and range in order the whole qualities of the philoſophic genius; for you no doubt remember, that there belong to men of this character fortitude, magnanimity, docility, memory: and when you reply'd, that every one would be obliged to agree to what we ſaid, we quitted that ſubject, and turned to that which is the ſubject of diſcourſe at preſent, on your ſaying, that you obſerved ſome of the philoſophers were inſignificant, and many of them altogether naughty. And while we were examining into the cauſe of that calumny, we are now come to this, whence it is that many of them are naughty. And on this account we have gone over again the genius of true philoſophers, and have neceſſarily defined what it is. It is ſo, ſaid he. It is neceſſary now, ſaid I, that we conſider the corruptions of this genius, and in what manner it is deſtroyed in the moſt; but

one ſmall matter eſcapes us: who they are they call not naughty, but inſignificant. And next, what thoſe geniuſes are which counterfeit the philoſophic one, and pretend to its purſuit: what is the genius of their minds, who aſpire to a purſuit which does not belong to them, and is above their reach. Thus by their manifold blunders, they have every where ſpread over all this opinion of philoſophy you mention. What ſort of corruptions, ſaid he, do you mean! I ſhall endeavour to rehearſe them, ſaid I, if I be able. And this now, I imagine, every one will allow us, that ſuch a genius, with all thoſe qualifications we have enjoined one who is to be a perfect philoſopher, rarely ariſes among men, and that there are but few of them: Do not you think ſo? Entirely ſo. And of thoſe few, conſider how many and how great are the cauſes of corruption. As what? What is moſt of all wonderful to hear, that each of thoſe things we commended in the genius of a philoſopher, corrupts the mind which poſſeſſeth them, and withdraws it from philoſophy, fortitude, I mean, and temperance, and all thoſe other qualifications we have gone through. That is ſtrange to hear, ſaid he. And further ſtill, ſaid I, beſides theſe things, all thoſe which are commonly called good, ſuch as beauty, riches, ſtrength of body, a powerful alliance in the city, and every thing akin to theſe, corrupt and withdraw it from philoſophy; for you have now a ſample of what I mean. I have, reply'd he, and would gladly underſtand more perfectly what you ſay. Underſtand then, ſaid I, the whole of it aright, and it will appear mani-

feſt, and what we formerly ſaid will not appear abſurd. How then, ſaid he, do you bid me do? With reſpect to every kind of ſeed, or plant, ſaid I, whether of vegetables or animals, we know, that whatever doth not meet with the proper nouriſhment, nor ſeaſon, nor place belonging to it, the more vigorous it is by nature, the more it is defective in the excellencies of its kind; for evil is more oppoſite to good, than to that which is not good. Why is it not? It is then agreeable to reaſon, I imagine, that the beſt genius, when meeting with nouriſhment foreign to it, ſhall be more changed to what is evil, than a bad genius. It is. And ſhall we not, Adimantus! ſaid I, in the ſame manner ſay, that ſouls of the nobleſt genius, when they meet with ill education, become remarkably bad? Or do you imagine that great iniquity, and the extremeſt wickedneſs ariſe from a weak genius, and not from a vigorous one quite ruined in its education; but that a weakly genius will never at all be the cauſe of any thing remarkable, whether good or evil? I do not think it will, ſaid he, but the caſe is as you ſay. If then this philoſophic genius, which we have eſtabliſhed, meet with ſuitable inſtruction, it will, as I imagine, neceſſarily grow up, and attain to every virtue; but if when ſown in an improper ſoil, it grow up and be nouriſhed accordingly, it will on the other hand turn out quite the reverſe, unleſs one of the Gods come to its aſſiſtance. Or do you imagine, as the generality do, that certain of the youth are corrupted by the ſophiſts, and that the corruptors are certain private ſophiſts, which is worthy of our

notice? Or think you rather, that the perſons who ſay theſe things are themſelves the greateſt ſophiſts, conveying their inſtruction in the moſt powerful manner, and rendering young and old, men and women, ſuch as they incline? When do they ſo, reply'd he? When many of them, ſaid I, are ſet down, crouded together in an aſſembly, in their courts of juſtice, the theatre, or the camp, or any other public meeting of the people, with a deal of tumult, they blame ſome ſpeeches and actions, and commend others, roaring and bawling out the one and the other beyond meaſure. And beſides theſe things, the rocks and the place where they are, reſounding, redoubles the noiſe they make, whilſt they blame and applaud in this manner. In ſuch a ſituation now, what kind of heart, as we ſay, do you imagine the youth are to have? Or what private inſtruction can make him withſtand, ſo as not to be quite overwhelmed by ſuch blame or applauſe, and giving way, be carried down the ſtream wherever it carries him, and ſay that things are beautiful and baſe, according as theſe people ſay, and purſue the things they purſue, and become of the very ſame kind himſelf? This, ſaid he, muſt of neceſſity happen, Socrates! But, ſaid I, we have not yet mentioned, what muſt of the greateſt neceſſity be the caſe. What is that, ſaid he? That which theſe inſtructors and ſophiſts ſuperadd by action, not being able to perſuade by ſpeech: Or do you not know, that they puniſh with diſgraces, and fines, and deaths, the man whom they cannot perſuade? I know that, ſaid he, extremely well. What other ſophiſt then,

or what private reaſonings do you imagine capable, drawing oppoſite to theſe, to overpower them? I know none, ſaid he. But is it not beſides, ſaid I, great folly even to attempt it? For there neither is, nor was, nor ever can be a different method of attaining virtue, beſides this education by theſe ſophiſts. I mean a humane method, friend! for a divine one, according to the proverb, I keep out of the queſtion: for you muſt know well, that whatever temper is preſerved, and becomes ſuch as it ought to be in ſuch a conſtitution of politics, you will not ſay amiſs when you ſay that a divine interpoſition hath preſerved it. Nor am I, ſaid he, of a different opinion. But further now, beſides theſe things, ſaid I, you muſt likewiſe be of this opinion. Of what? That each of theſe private hirelings, which theſe men call ſophiſts, and deem the rivals of their art, teach no other things but thoſe maxims of the vulgar, which they approve when they are aſſembled together, and call it wiſdom. As if one had learned what were the paſſions and deſires of a great and ſtrong animal he were nouriſhing, how one muſt approach it, how touch it, and at what ſeaſons it is moſt fierce or moſt mild, and from what cauſes, and the ſounds which on theſe ſeveral occaſions it was wont to utter, and at what ſounds uttered by another, the animal is rendered both mild and ſavage; and having learned all theſe things by aſſociating with the animal, and by ſpending conſiderable time with it, ſhould call this wiſdom, and as if he had eſtabliſhed an art, ſhould ſet about the teaching it; whilſt yet with reference to theſe opinions

and deſires, he knows not in reality what is handſome, or baſe, or good, or ill, or juſt, or unjuſt, but ſhould pronounce all theſe according to the opinions of the great animal, calling theſe things good in which it delighted, and that evil with which it was vexed, and ſhould have no other meaſure as to theſe things; and ſhould call theſe things which proceed from neceſſity of nature, handſome and juſt, but the nature of neceſſity, and good, how much they differ in reality, he hath never diſcovered himſelf, nor is able to ſhow to another. Whilſt he is ſuch an one, does he not truly appear to you an abſurd teacher. To me he appears ſo, ſaid he. And from this man, think you, does he any way differ, who deems it wiſdom to have underſtood the anger, and the pleaſures of the multitude, and of aſſemblies of all kinds of men, whether with relation to painting, muſic, or politics? For if any one converſes with theſe, and ſhows them either a poem, or any other piece of workmanſhip, or piece of adminiſtration reſpecting the city, and makes the multitude the judges of it, he is under what is called a Diomedaean neceſſity, which is above all other neceſſities, of doing whatever they commend. But to ſhew that theſe things are in reality good and handſome, have you at any time heard any of them advance a reaſon that was not quite ridiculous? Nor do I imagine, ſaid he, I ever ſhall. Whilſt you attend then to all theſe things, bear this in mind, that the multitude never will admit or reckon that there is the one beautiful, and not many beautifuls, one proper nature to each thing, and not many natures. They

will be the laſt to do ſo, reply'd he. It is impoſſible then for the multitude to be philoſopher. Impoſſible. And thoſe who philoſophize, muſt of neceſſity be reproached by them. Of neceſſity. And likewiſe by thoſe private perſons, who, in converſing with the multitude, deſire to pleaſe them. It is plain. From this ſtate of things now, what ſafety do you ſee for the philoſophic genius to continue in its purſuit, and arrive at perfection? and conſider from what was formerly hinted, for we have allowed, that docility, memory, fortitude, and magnanimity belong to this genius. We have. And ſhall not ſuch an one, of all men, immediately be the firſt at every thing, eſpecially if he have a body naturally aſſiſting to the ſoul? Why ſhall he not, ſaid he? And when he comes to riper years, his kindred and citizens, I imagine, will incline to employ him in their affairs. Why will they not? And making ſupplications to him, and paying him homage, they will ſubmit to him, and anticipate and flatter before-hand his growing power. Thus, ſaid he, it uſually happens. What now, ſaid I, do you imagine ſuch an one will do, in ſuch a caſe, eſpecially if he happen to belong to a great city, and be rich, and of a noble deſcent, and withal beautiful and of a handſome ſtature? Shall he not be filled with extravagant hopes, deeming himſelf capable of managing both the affairs of Greeks and Barbarians, and on theſe accounts carry himſelf loftily, without any ſolid judgment, full of oſtentation and vain conceit. Extremely ſo, reply'd he. If one ſhould gently approach a man of this diſpoſition, and tell him the truth, that he

hath no judgment, yet needeth it; but that it is not to be acquired, but by one who ſubjecteth himſelf to this acquiſition, do you think, that with all theſe evils about him, he would be ready to hearken? Far from it, ſaid he. If now, ſaid I, through a good natural temper, and an innate diſpoſition to reaſon, any one ſhould ſome how be made ſenſible, and be bended and drawn towards philoſophy, what do we imagine thoſe others will do, when they reckon they ſhall loſe his company and acquaintance? Will they not by every action, every ſpeech, ſay and do every thing both towards the man himſelf, not to ſuffer himſelf to be perſuaded, and towards his adviſer, to render him incapable by inſnaring him in private, and bringing him to public trial? This, ſaid he, muſt of neceſſity happen. Is it likely now ſuch an one ſhall philoſophize? Not altogether. You ſee then, ſaid I, that we were not wrong, when we ſaid that even the very ingredients of the philoſophic genius, when they meet with bad education, are in ſome meaſure the cauſe of a falling off from this purſuit, as well as thoſe vulgarly reputed goods, riches, and all furniture of this kind. We were not, reply'd he, but it was rightly ſaid. Such then, ſaid I, admirable friend! is the ruin, ſuch, and ſo great the corruption of the beſt genius for the nobleſt purſuit, and which beſides but rarely happens, as we obſerved; and from among ſuch as theſe are the men who do the greateſt miſchiefs to cities, and to private perſons, and likewiſe they who do the greateſt good, ſuch as happen to be drawn to this ſide. But a little genius never

did any thing remarkable to any one, neither to a private perſon, nor to a city. Moſt true, ſaid he. Theſe indeed then, whoſe buſineſs it chiefly was to apply to philoſophy, having thus fallen off, leaving her deſolate and imperfect, lead themſelves a life neither becoming nor genuine, whilſt other unworthy perſons, intruding themſelves on philoſophy, abandoned in a manner by her kindred, have diſgraced her, and loaded her with reproaches, ſuch as theſe you ſay her reproachers reproach her with: how that of thoſe who converſe with her, ſome are of no value, and the generality of them worthy of the greateſt puniſhments. Theſe things, reply'd he, are commonly ſaid. And with reaſon, reply'd I, they are ſaid. For other contemptible men ſeeing the field unoccupied, and that the poſſeſſion of it is attended with dignities and honourable names, like perſons who make their eſcape from priſons to temples, theſe likewiſe gladly leap from their handicrafts to philoſophy; ſuch of them as are of the greateſt addreſs in their own little art; for even in this ſituation of philoſophy, her remaining dignity, in compariſon with all the other arts, is ſtill far ſuperior: of which dignity many are deſirous, who by natural diſpoſition are unfit for it, whoſe bodies are not only deformed by their arts and handicrafts, but whoſe ſouls alſo are in like manner confuſed, and cruſhed by their ſervile works. Muſt it not of neceſſity be ſo? Undoubtedly, ſaid he. Do you imagine then, ſaid I, that they are any way different in appearance from a black-ſmith, who has made a little money, bald and puny, newly

looſed from chains, and waſhed in the bath, with a new robe on him, juſt decked out as a bridegroom, preſuming to marry the daughter of his maſter, encouraged by the poverty and forelorn circumſtances he ſees him in. There is, ſaid he, no great difference. What ſort of a race muſt ſuch as theſe produce? Muſt it not be baſtardly and abject? Moſt neceſſarily. But what now? When men who are unworthy of inſtruction apply to it, and are converſant in it, in an unworthy manner, what ſort of ſentiments and opinions ſhall we ſay are produced? Muſt they not be ſuch as ought properly to be termed ſophiſms, and having nothing at all genuine or worthy of one of true judgment? By all means ſo, reply'd he. A very ſmall number now, ſaid I, Adimantus! remains of thoſe who worthily are converſant in philoſophy, who happen either to be detained ſome how in baniſhment, and whoſe generous and well cultivated genius perſiſts in the ſtudy of philoſophy, being removed from every thing which tends to corrupt it; or elſe, when in a ſmall city, a mighty genius ariſes, who, deſpiſing the honours of the ſtate, entirely neglects them, and likewiſe with juſtice deſpiſing any ſmall thing ariſing from the other arts, his generous ſoul returns to philoſophy: ſo that the bridle which keeps in our friend Theagis, is ſufficient to keep them; for all other things conſpire to withdraw Theagis from philoſophy, but the care of his health excluding him from politics, keeps him to it. For as to my genius, it is not worth mentioning; for certainly it hath happened heretofore to but one other, or to none at all.

And even of theſe few now, ſuch as are taſting, and have taſted how ſweet and happy the acquiſition of philoſophy is, and have withal ſufficiently ſeen the madneſs of the multitude, and how none of them, to ſpeak in the general, doth any thing ſalutary in the affairs of cities, and that there is no ally with whom one might go to the aſſiſtance of the juſt and be ſafe, but that he is as a man falling among wild beaſts, being neither willing to join them in injuſtice, nor able, being but one, to oppoſe the whole ſavage crew, but, ere he can ſerve the city or his friends, is deſtroyed and is unprofitable both to himſelf and others, reaſoning on all theſe things, lying quiet, and minding his own affairs, as in a tempeſt, when earth and ſea are driven by winds, entering under roof, be holding others overwhelmed in injuſtice, he is ſatisfied if he ſhall himſelf any how paſs his life here pure from injuſtice and unholy deeds, and make his exit hence in good hopes chearful and compoſed. And he ſhall make his exit, ſaid he, after having done none of the ſmalleſt matters. Nor the greateſt neither, ſaid I, whilſt he has not met with a republic that is ſuitable to him; for in a ſuitable one, he ſhall both be more improven himſelf, and ſhall preſerve the affairs of private perſons as well as of the public. We have now then, I imagine, ſufficiently told whence it happens that philoſophy is accuſed, and that it is ſo unjuſtly, unleſs you have ſomething elſe to offer. But, ſaid he, I ſay nothing further about this point. But which of the preſent republics do you ſay is ſuitable to philoſophy! Not one indeed, ſaid I; but

this is what I complain of, that there is no conſtitution of a city at preſent worthy of the philoſophic genius, which is therefore turned and altered, as a foreign ſeed, ſown in an improper ſoil, which degenerates to what is uſually produced in that ſoil. After the ſame manner this race, as it hath not at preſent its proper activity, degenerates to another ſpecies: but ſhould it meet with the beſt republic, as it is the beſt in itſelf, then ſhall it indeed diſcover that it is really divine, and that all beſides are human, both as to their genius and their purſuits. But now you ſeem plainly to be going to aſk which is this republic. You are miſtaken, ſaid he; for this I was not going to aſk: but whether it was this which we have deſcribed, in eſtabliſhing our city, or another one: as to other things, ſaid I, it is this one, and this very thing was then mentioned, that there muſt always be in the city ſomething which ſhall have the ſame regard for the republic, which you the legiſlator have, when you eſtabliſh the laws. It was mentioned, ſaid he. But it was not, ſaid I, made ſufficiently plain, through fears which pre-occupied you, when you ſignified that the illuſtration of the thing would be both tedious and difficult; and it is not indeed altogether eaſy to go over what remains. As what? In what manner a city ſhall attempt philoſophy, and not be deſtroyed, for all grand things are dangerous, and, as the ſaying is, fine things are truly difficult. But however, ſaid he, let our diſquiſition be compleated in making this evident. Want of inclination, ſaid I, ſhall not hinder, though want of ability may. And being pre-

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ſent, you ſhall know my eagerneſs, and conſider now how eagerly and adventurouſly I am going to ſay, that a city ought to attempt this ſtudy, in a way oppoſite to that at preſent. How? At preſent, ſaid I, thoſe who meddle with it are ſtriplings, who immediately from their childhood, amidſt their domeſtic affairs, and lucrative employments, apply themſelves to the moſt abſtruſe parts of philoſophy, and then they go off moſt conſummate philoſophers. I call the moſt difficult part, that reſpecting the art of reaſoning. And in all after time, if, when they are invited by others who practiſe this art, they are pleaſed to become hearers, they think it a mighty matter, reckoning they ought to do it as a by-work:---but towards old-age, beſides ſome few, they are extinguiſhed much more than the Heraclitean ſun, in that they are never kindled up again. But how ſhould they do, ſaid he? Quite the reverſe. Whilſt they are ſtriplings and boys they ſhould apply to juvenile inſtruction and philoſophy, and in taking proper care of their body, whilſt it ſhoots and grows to firmneſs, provide for philoſophy a proper aſſiſtant: and then, as that age advances, in which the ſoul begins to be perfected, they ought vigorouſly to apply to her exerciſes, and when ſtrength decays, and is no longer able for civil and military employments, they ſhould then be diſmiſſed, and live at pleaſure, and excepting a by-work, do nothing elſe but philoſophize, if they propoſe to live happy, and at death to have in the other world a lot ſuitable to the life they have led in this. How truly, ſaid he, Socrates! do you ſeem to me to ſpeak with zeal; yet,

I imagine, the greater part of your hearers will ſtill more zealouſly oppoſe you, and by no means be perſuaded, and that Thraſymachus will be the firſt of them. Do not divide, ſaid I, Thraſymachus and me, who are now become friends, nor were we enemies heretofore. For we ſhall no way deſiſt from our attempts, till we either perſuade both him and the reſt, or make ſome advances towards that life at which when they arrive they ſhall again meet with ſuch diſcourſes as theſe. You have ſpoken, ſaid he, but ſhort time. None at all, ſaid I, with reſpect at leaſt to the whole of time: but that the multitude are not perſuaded by what is ſaid, is no wonder, for they have never at any time ſeen exiſting what hath now been mentioned, but rather ſuch diſcourſes as have been induſtriouſly compoſed, and have not fallen in naturally as theſe do at preſent. But as for a man who is come up to the model of virtue, and is rendered conformable to it in the moſt perfect manner poſſible, both in word and in deed, never at all have they ſeen ſuch a man, neither one nor more of the kind. Or do you imagine they have? By no means. Neither yet, happy friend! have they ſufficiently attended to noble and generous reaſonings, ſo as keenly to inquire after the truth, by every method, merely for the ſake of knowing it, baniſhing at a diſtance ſuch intricate and contentious debates, as tend to nothing elſe but to opinion and contention, both in their courts of juſtice and in their private meetings. The caſe is juſt ſo, reply'd he. On theſe accounts then, ſaid I, and with foreſight of theſe things, we were formerly

afraid; however, being compelled by the truth, we did aſſert, that neither city nor republic, nor even ſingle man in the ſame way, would ever become perfect, till ſome neceſſity of fortune oblige theſe few philoſophers, who are at preſent accounted not naughty, yet inſignificant, to take the government of the city whether they will or not, and oblige the city to be obedient to them; or till the ſons of thoſe who are in the offices of power and magiſtracies, or they themſelves, by ſome divine inſpiration, be ſmitten with a genuine love of genuine philoſophy: and I aver that no one hath reaſon to think, that either of theſe, or both, are impoſſible; for thus might we juſtly be laughed at, as ſaying things which are only to be wiſhed for. Is it not ſo? It is. If then, in the infinite ſeries of paſt ages, the greateſt neceſſity hath obliged philoſophy to take the government of a ſtate, or is now prevailing in any barbarous region, remote ſomewhere from our obſervation, or ſhall afterwards happen, we are ready in that caſe to contend in our reaſoning, that this republic we have deſcribed hath exiſted and ſubſiſts, and ſhall ariſe at leaſt when this our muſe ſhall get the government of the ſtate: for this is neither impoſſibe to happen, nor do we talk impoſſibilities, though we ourſelves confeſs that they are difficult. I am likewiſe, ſaid he, of the ſame opinion. But you will ſay, reply'd I, that the multitude do not think ſo too. It is likely, ſaid he. Happy friend! ſaid I, do not thus altogether accuſe the multitude; but whatever opinion they may have, without upbraiding them, but rather encouraging them, and

removing the reproach thrown on philoſophy, point out to them the perſons you call philoſophers, and define diſtinctly, as at preſent, both their genius and their purſuits, that they may not think you call theſe philoſophers whom they think ſo; or if they mean the ſame men, you will tell them they have conceived a different opinion of the men from what you have, and give very different anſwers about them from yours. Or do you imagine, that one can be inraged at one who is not in a paſſion? or that one ſhall envy the envious, who is himſelf both void of envy, and is of a mild diſpoſition?-----I will prevent you, and ſay that I imagine there is in ſome few ſo bad a natural temper, but not in the generality. I likewiſe, ſaid he, imagine ſo. Are you not then of the ſame opinion with me in this? That theſe men are the cauſe of the multitude's being ill affected towards philoſophy, who openly ſatyrize what is no way becoming them, behaving in a ſcoffing and diſtaſteful manner towards the multitude, always making diſcourſes about particular men, doing what is leaſt of all becoming philoſophy. Certainly, ſaid he. For certainly ſome how, Adimantus! the man at leaſt who really applies his underſtanding to real being, has not leiſure to look down to the little affairs of mankind, and in fighting with them, to be filled with envy and ill nature, but beholding and contemplating ſuch objects as are orderly, and always uniform, ſuch as neither injure nor are injured of one another, but are in all reſpects beautiful, and according to reaſon, theſe he imitates and reſembles as far as poſ-

ſible; or do you imagine it poſſible to find out any contrivance to draw men off from the imitation of that, in converſing with which they are filled with admiration? It is impoſſible, reply'd he. The philoſopher then who converſeth with that which is beautiful and divine, as far as is poſſible for man, becomes himſelf beautiful and divine. But calumny is powerful in every thing. It is entirely ſo. If then, ſaid I, he be under any neceſſity, not merely forming himſelf alone, but likewiſe of endeavouring to introduce any thing he beholds there among mankind, in order to form their manners, both in private and in public life, would he prove, think you, a bad artiſt of temperance and of juſtice, and of every ſocial virtue? Not at all, ſaid he. But if now the multitude perceive that we ſay the truth of ſuch an one, will they be angry at philoſophers, and diſbelieve us when we ſay, that the city can never otherwiſe be happy unleſs it be drawn by thoſe painters who follow a divine original? They will not be angry, ſaid he, if they perceive ſo: but what method of painting do you mean? When they have got, ſaid I, the city and the manners of men as their canvaſs, they would firſt make it clean, which is not altogether an eaſy matter. But in this, you know, they differ from others, that they are unwilling to meddle either with private man or city, or to preſcribe laws, 'till once they either receive theſe clean, or cleanſe them themſelves. And rightly, ſaid he. And after this, do not you imagine they will draw a ſketch of the republic? Why not? Afterwards I imagine, as they proceed in their work, they

will frequently look both ways, both to what is naturally juſt and beautiful, and temperate and the like; and likewiſe again to that which they can eſtabliſh among mankind, blending and compounding their human form from different human characters and purſuits, drawing from this which Homer calls the divine likeneſs, and the divine reſemblance ſubſiſting among men. Right, ſaid he. They will then, I imagine, ſtrike out one thing, and inſert another, 'till they have rendered human manners, as far as is poſſible, amiable to the Gods. It ſhould thus, ſaid he, be the moſt beautiful picture. Do we now then, ſaid I, any way perſuade theſe men, who, you ſaid, were coming upon us in battle array, that ſuch a painter of republics is the man we then recommended to them, and on whoſe account they were enraged at us, that we committed cities to him, and will they now be more mild when they hear us mentioning it? Certainly, ſaid he, if they be wiſe. For what is there now they can further queſtion? Shall they ſay that philoſophers are not lovers of real being and of truth? That, ſaid he, were abſurd. Or that their genius, as we deſcribed it, is not akin to that which is beſt? Nor this neither. What then? Whilſt their genius is ſuch as this, and meets with ſuitable exerciſes, ſhall it not become perfectly good and philoſophic, if any other be ſo? or will you ſay thoſe will be more ſo whom we ſet aſide? Not at all. Will they ſtill then be enraged at us, when we ſay that till the philoſophic race have the government of the city, neither the miſeries of the city nor of the citizens ſhall

have an end, nor ſhall this republic, which we ſpeak of in way of fable, come in fact to perfection? It is likely, ſaid he, they will be leſs enraged. Are you content then, ſaid I, that we ſay not of them they are leſs enraged at us, but that they are altogether appeaſed and perſuaded, that if we make no more of them, they may at leaſt conſent by their bluſhing? By all means, ſaid he. Let them then, ſaid I, be perſuaded of this. But is there any one will call this into queſtion, that thoſe of the philoſophic genius do not uſually ſpring from kings and ſovereigns? Not one, ſaid he, would alledge that. And though they were born with a philoſophic genius, one may ſay they are under a great neceſſity of being corrupted; for indeed that it is a difficult matter for theſe geniuſes to be preſerved untainted, even we ourſelves agree. But that in the infinite ſeries of time, of the whole of the human race, there ſhould never at all be ſo much as a ſingle one preſerved pure and untainted, is there any one who will call into queſtion? How could any do it? But ſurely, ſaid I, a ſingle one is ſufficient, if he exiſts, and has a city ſubject to him, to accompliſh every thing now ſo much diſbelieved. He is ſufficient, ſaid he.----And when the governour, ſaid I, hath eſtabliſhed the laws and cuſtoms we have recited, it is not at all impoſſible that the citizens ſhould be willing to obey him. Not at all. But is it wonderful or impoſſible, that what appears to us ſhould alſo appear to others? I do not think it, ſaid he. And that theſe things are beſt, if they be poſſible, we have ſufficiently, as I imagine, explained in the preceding part

of our diſcourſe. Sufficiently indeed. Now then it ſeems we are agreed about our legiſlation; that the laws we mention are the beſt, if they could exiſt; but that it is difficult to get them to prevail, not however impoſſible. We are agreed, ſaid he. After that this hath with difficulty been brought to a concluſion, ſhall we not, in the next place, conſider what follows? In what manner, and from what education and ſtudies, they ſhall become the preſervers of our republic? and in what periods of life they ſhall each of them apply to the ſeveral branches of education. We muſt indeed conſider that, ſaid he. I acted not wiſely, ſaid I, when in the former part of our diſcourſe, I left untouched the difficulty attending the poſſeſſion of women, and the propagation of the ſpecies, and the eſtabliſhing governours, knowing with what envy and difficulty they muſt be introduced, or be carried no further than theory. For now we are under no leſs a neceſſity of diſcuſſing theſe things at preſent. What relates to women and children is already finiſhed; and we muſt now go over again, as from the beginning, what refers to governours. We ſaid, if you remember that they ſhould appear to be lovers of the city, and be tried both by pleaſures and by pains, and appear to quit this opinion neither through toils nor fears, nor any other change; and that he who was not able to do this was to be rejected; but he who came forth altogether pure as gold tried in the fire, was to be appointed ruler, and to have honours and rewards paid him both alive and dead. Such were the things we ſaid whilſt our reaſoning paſ-

Laws

Preservers

Governors

Rulers

ſed over, and concealed itſelf, as afraid to rouſe the preſent argument. You ſay moſt truly, ſaid he, for I remember it. For I grudged, friend! to ſay, what I am now to adventure on; but now we muſt even venture to aſſert this: that the moſt complete guardians muſt be made philoſophers. Let this be agreed upon, reply'd he. But conſider that you ſhall likely have but few of them: for ſuch a genius as we ſaid they muſt of neceſſity have, is wont but ſeldom in all its parts to meet in one; but its different parts generally ſpring up in different perſons. How do you ſay, reply'd he? That ſuch as are wont to be docile, of good memory, quick, and acute, and endued with whatever qualifications are akin to theſe, are not at the ſame time vigorous, and magnanimous in their mind, ſo as to live decently, with quietneſs and ſtability, but that ſuch are carried by their acuteneſs wherever it happens, and every thing that is ſtable departs from them. You ſay true, reply'd he. With regard then to theſe firm habits of the mind, which are not at all verſatile, and which one might rather employ as truſty, and which are difficult to be moved at dangers in war, are they not of the ſame temper with reference to learning; they move heavily, and with difficulty learn, as if they were benumbed, and are oppreſſed with ſleep and yawning, when they are obliged to labour at any thing of this kind? It is ſo, reply'd he. But we ſaid that he muſt partake both theſe well and handſomely, or elſe he ought not to ſhare in the moſt perfect education, nor magiſtracy, nor honours of the ſtate. Right, ſaid he. Do not

you imagine this will but rarely happen? Why will it not? They muſt be tried then both in the things we formerly mentioned, in labours, in fears, and in pleaſures; and likewiſe in what we then paſſed over, and are now mentioning; we muſt exerciſe them in various kinds of learning, whilſt we conſider whether their genius be able for the higheſt learning, or whether it fails, as thoſe who fail in the other things. It is proper now, ſaid he, to conſider this queſtion at leaſt in this manner. But which learning do you call the higheſt? You remember in ſome meaſure, ſaid I, that when we had diſtinguiſhed the ſoul into three parts, we determined concerning juſtice, temperance, fortitude, and wiſdom, what each of them is. If I did not remember, ſaid he, it were juſt I ſhould not hear what remains. Do you likewiſe remember what was ſaid before that? What was it? We ſomewhere ſaid, that it was poſſible to behold theſe in their moſt beautiful forms, but that the journey would be tedious which one muſt go over, who would ſee them conſpicuouſly. That it was poſſible, however, to approach towards them in the way of our demonſtrations abovementioned; and you ſaid that theſe were ſufficient; ſo what was then advanced, came to be ſpoken far ſhort, in my own opinion, of accuracy, but if agreeably to you, you may ſay ſo. To me at leaſt, ſaid he, they ſeemed to be diſcuſſed in meaſure; and the reſt ſeemed to think ſo too. But friend! ſaid I, in ſpeaking of matters of this kind, ſuch a meaſure as leaves out any part whatever of the truth, is not altogether in meaſure. For nothing that

is imperfect is the measure of any thing. Though some at times are of opinion, that matters are sufficiently well when brought this length, and that there is no necessity for further inquiry. Very many, said he, are thus affected through indolence. But the guardian of the city and of the laws, said I, hath least of all need of that passion. It appears so, reply'd he. Such an one then, friend! said I, must go over the longer compass, and labour no less in learning than in the exercises, otherwise, as we were now saying, he shall never at all arrive at the perfection of the highest and most suitable learning. But are not these, said he, the highest? Or is there yet any thing higher than justice, and those virtues which we mentioned? There is even higher, said I. And even of these, we must not contemplate only the coarse draught, but not omit the highest finishing. Or is it not ridiculous in other things of small account to employ our whole labour, and to strain hard to have them the most accurate and perfect, and not deem the highest and most important matters worthy of our highest attention, in order to render them the most perfect? The sentiment, said he, is very just. But however, do you imagine, said he, that any one will let you pass without asking you, what indeed is this highest learning, and about what is it conversant, when you call it so? Not at all, said I, but do you yourself ask me; for assuredly you have not seldom heard it, and at present you either do not attend, or you intend to occasion me trouble in raising opposition. This I rather imagine, since you have often heard at least,

that the idea of the good is the higheſt learning: which idea, when juſtice and the other virtues uſe as a model, they become really uſeful and advantageous; you now almoſt know that this is what I mean to ſay, and beſides this, that we do not ſufficiently know that idea, and that without this knowledge, though we underſtood all elſe in the higheſt meaſure, you know that it profiteth us nothing: in the ſame manner, as it would avail us nothing though we poſſeſſed any thing whatever without the poſſeſſion of the good: or do you imagine there is any more profit in poſſeſſing all things without the poſſeſſion of the good, than in knowing all things without the knowledge of the good, knowing nothing at all that is beautiful and good? Not I, for my part, indeed, ſaid he. But ſurely this too at leaſt you know, that to the multitude pleaſure ſeems to be the good; and to the more elegant it ſeems to be wiſdom. And very ridiculouſly, ſaid he. How indeed can it be otherwiſe, reply'd I? if when they upbraid us, that we know not what is the good, they tell us that they know, and call it the wiſdom of what is good, as if we underſtood what they ſay, when they pronounce the word the good. Moſt true, ſaid he. But what? thoſe who define pleaſure to be good, are they any way in a leſſer error than the others, or are not theſe too obliged to confeſs that pleaſures are evil? Extremely ſo. They come then to acknowledge, I imagine, that the ſame things are both good and evil, do they not? Why do not they? Is it not evident then, that there are great and manifold doubts about it? Why are there not?

But what? is it not alſo evident, that with reference to things juſt and beautiful, the multitude chuſe the apparent, even though they be not really ſo, yet they act, and poſſeſs, and are reputed of accordingly; but the acquiſition of goods, that were only the apparent, never yet ſatisfied any one, but in this they ſeek what is real, and here every one deſpiſes what is only the apparent. Extremely ſo, ſaid he. This then is that which every ſoul purſues, and for the ſake of this it acts all with a prophetic impreſſion, that it is ſomewhat yet in doubt, and unable to comprehend what it is, nor to hold by a ſteady opinion of it, as in other things, and thus are they unſucceſsful alſo in other things, if there be in them any profit.----About a matter now of ſuch a kind, and of ſuch mighty conſequence, ſhall we ſay that even theſe our beſt men in the city, and by whom we take in hand to do every thing, ſhall be thus in the dark? As little at leaſt as poſſible, ſaid he. I imagine then, ſaid I, that whilſt it is unknown in what manner the juſt and beautiful are good, they are not of any great value to a guardian to poſſeſs, if it be likely he ſhall know theſe, whilſt he is ignorant of this, but I propheſy no one will come to the real knowledge of theſe before he knows what is good. You propheſy rightly, ſaid he. Shall not then our republic be completely adorned if ſuch a guardian be ſet over it as is intelligent in theſe things? It muſt of neceſſity, ſaid he. But with reſpect to yourſelf, whether, Socrates! do you ſay that the good is ſcience, or pleaſure, or ſomething elſe beſides theſe? You was ever, ſaid I, a

worthy man, and manifeſtly ſhewed of old that you was not to be ſatisfied with the opinions of others about theſe things. Nor does it appear to me juſt, Socrates! ſaid he, that one ſhould be able to tell the opinions of others, but not his own, after having ſpent ſo much time inquiring about theſe things. But what, ſaid I, does it then appear to you juſt for one to ſpeak of theſe things of which he is ignorant, as if he knew them? By no means, ſaid he, as if he knew them; yet however, according as he imagines, that he ſhould be willing to tell us what he imagines. But what, ſaid I, have you not obſerved of opinions void of knowledge how deformed they all are? Or do thoſe, who without underſtanding form right opinion, ſeem to you in any reſpect to differ from thoſe who are blind, and at the ſame time go ſtraight on the road? No way, ſaid he. Do you incline then that we ſhould examine things deformed, blind, and crooked, having it in our power to hear from others what is clear and beautiful? Do not, I entreat you, Socrates! ſaid Glauco, give over at the end; for it will ſuffice us, if in the ſame way as you have talked of juſtice, and temperance, and thoſe other virtues, you likewiſe talk concerning the good. And I too ſhall be very well ſatisfied, friend! ſaid I; but I'm afraid I ſhall not be able; and by appearing keen, I ſhall incur the ridicule of the unmannerly. But, my happy friends! let us quit at preſent this inquiry, what the good is; (for it appears to me a greater matter than that in our preſent purſuit we can overtake, even what I imagine of it at the time,) but I am willing to tell you what

the offspring of the good appears, and what moſt reſembles it, if this be agreeable to you, and if not, ſhall let it alone. But tell us, ſaid he; for you ſhall afterwards explain to us what the father is. I could wiſh, ſaid I, both that I were able to give that explanation, and you to receive it, and not as now the offspring only. Receive now then this child and offspring of the good itſelf. Yet take care however that unwillingly I deceive you not, in any reſpect, giving an adulterate account of this offspring. We ſhall take care, ſaid he, as we are able, only tell us. I ſhall tell then, ſaid I, after we ſhall have ſettled matters together, and I have put you in mind of what was mentioned in our preceding diſcourſe, and has been frequently ſaid on other occaſions. What is it, ſaid he? That there are many things, ſaid I, beautiful, and many good, and each of theſe we ſay is ſo, and we diſtinguiſh them in our reaſoning. We ſay ſo. But as to the beautiful itſelf, and the good itſelf, and in like manner concerning all thoſe things which we then placed as many, now again eſtabliſhing them according to one ſimple idea of each particular, as being one, we give each that appellation which belongs to it; and the things themſelves we ſay are ſeen by the eye, but not underſtood by the intellect; but that the ideas are underſtood by the intellect, but not ſeen by the eye. Perfectly ſo. By what part then of ourſelves do we ſee things viſible? By the ſight, ſaid he. And is it not, ſaid I, by hearing, that we perceive what is heard; and by the other ſenſes, all the matters of ſenſe? Why not? But have you not obſerved,

ſaid I, with regard to the maker of the ſenſes, how he hath formed the power of ſight, and of being viſible in the moſt perfect manner? I have not entirely perceived it, reply'd he. But conſider it in this manner. Is there any other ſpecies, which hearing and ſound require, in order that the one may hear, and the other be heard, which third thing if it be not preſent, the one ſhall not hear, and the other not be heard? There is nothing, ſaid he. Imagine then, ſaid I, that neither do many others, (that I may not ſay none) require any ſuch thing: or can you mention any one that does require it? Not I, reply'd he. But with reference to the ſenſe of ſeeing, and the object of ſight, do not you perceive that they require ſomething? How? When there is ſight in the eyes, and when he who has it attempts to uſe it, and when there is colour in the objects before him, unleſs there concur ſome third ſpecies, naturally formed for the purpoſe, you know that the ſight ſhall ſee nothing, and the colours ſhall be inviſible. What is that you ſpeak of, ſaid he? What you call light, ſaid I. You ſay true, reply'd he. This ſpecies then is not deſpicable. By no ſmall idea then are the ſenſe of ſeeing, and the power of being ſeen, connected together; but by a bond, the moſt honourable of all bonds, if light be not diſhonourable. But it is far, ſaid he, from being diſhonourable. Whom then of the Gods in heaven can you aſſign as the cauſe of this, that light makes our ſight to ſee, and viſible objects to be ſeen in the beſt manner? The ſame as you, ſaid he, and others do; for it is evident you mean the ſun. Is not the

ſight then naturally formed in this manner with reference to this God? How? The ſight is not the ſun, nor is that the ſun in which ſight is, which we call the eye. It is not. But yet, I imagine, that of all the organs of ſenſe, it partaketh moſt of the image of the ſun. Greatly ſo. And the power which it hath, doth it not poſſeſs, as diſpenſed, and flowing from hence? Perfectly ſo. Is not then the ſun, which indeed is not ſight itſelf, yet as it is the cauſe of it, ſeen by ſight itſelf? It is ſo, ſaid he. Imagine then, ſaid I, that this is what I was calling the offspring of the good, which the good generates, analogous to itſelf, and that what this is in the intellectual world, with reſpect to intelligence, and the objects of intelligence, the ſame is the ſun in the viſible world with reſpect to ſight and viſible things. How is it, ſaid he, explain to me yet further? You know that the eyes, ſaid I, when they are no longer directed towards objects whoſe colours are ſhone upon by the light of day, but by that faint one of the night, grow dim, and appear almoſt blind, as if they had in them no perfect ſight. Juſt ſo, ſaid he. But I imagine, when they turn to objects which the ſun illuminates, they ſee clearly, and in thoſe very eyes there appears now to be ſight. There does. Underſtand then, in the ſame manner, the caſe to be ſo with reference to the ſoul; when it ſhall firmly adhere to that which truth and real being enlighten, then it underſtands and knows it, and appears to have intelligence: but when it adheres to that which is blended with darkneſs, which is generated, and which periſheth, it fancieth and gueſ-

ſeth, taketh up and layeth down its opinions, and reſembleth now one without intelligence. It has ſuch a reſemblance. That therefore which giveth truth to what is known, and diſpenſeth the power to him who knows, you may call the idea of good, being the cauſe of knowledge and of truth, as being known by intelligence. And as both theſe two, knowledge and truth, are ſo beautiful, when you deem that the good is ſomething different, and ſtill more beautiful than theſe, you ſhall deem aright. Knowledge and truth here are as light and ſight there, which we rightly judged to partake moſt of the image of the ſun, but that we were not to imagine they were the ſun. So here it is right to judge, that both theſe partake of the image of the good, but to imagine either of them the good, is not right, but the good itſelf is worthy of greater honour. You mean, ſaid he, an ineſtimable beauty, ſince it affords knowledge and truth, but is itſelf ſuperior to theſe in beauty. And you never any where at all ſaid that it was pleaſure. Softly, ſaid I, and in this manner rather conſider its image yet further. How? You will ſay, I imagine, that the ſun gives to things which are ſeen, not only their viſibility, but likewiſe their generation, growth and nouriſhment, though in itſelf it be not generation. Why not? We may ſay, therefore, that things which are known, have not only this from the good, that they are known, but likewiſe their being and eſſence are given them by it, whilſt the good itſelf is not eſſence, but above eſſence, ſuperior to it, both in dignity and in power. Here Glauco, with a

great laugh, ſays, what a prodigious excellence is this! I ſwear. You yourſelf, reply'd I, are the cauſe, having obliged me to tell my opinion about it. And by no means, ſaid he, ſtop, if ſomething does not hinder you, but go over again the reſemblance relating to the ſun, if you are omitting any thing. But I omit, ſaid I, many things. Do not omit, reply'd he, the ſmalleſt matter. I imagine, ſaid I, there will be a great deal omitted; however, as far as I am able at preſent, I ſhall not willingly omit any thing. Do it not, ſaid he. Attend then, ſaid I, how that we ſay there are two ſpecies; and that the one reigns over the intellectual world, and the other over the viſible, not to ſay the heavens, leſt I ſeem to you to be uſing ſophiſtry in the expreſſion: You underſtand then theſe two ſpecies? The viſible, the intellectual? I do. As if then you took a line, cut into two unequal parts, and cut over again each ſection according to the ſame proportion, both that of the viſible ſpecies, and that of the intellectual; and thus you ſhall have perſpicuity and obſcurity placed by one another; in the viſible ſpecies you ſhall have in one ſection images: I call images, in the firſt place, ſhadows, next, the appearances in water, and ſuch as appear in bodies which are cloſe, poliſhed, and bright, and every thing of this kind, if you underſtand me. I do. Suppoſe now the other ſection of the viſible which this reſembleth, ſuch as the animals around us, and every kind of plant, and all ſort of workmanſhip. I ſuppoſe it, ſaid he. Are you willing then that this ſection appear to be divided into true and untrue? And that the ſame pro-

portion, which the object of opinion has to the object of knowledge, the very ſame proportion hath the reſemblance to that of which it is the reſemblance? I am indeed, ſaid he, extremely ſo. But conſider now again the ſection of the intellectual, how it was divided. How? How as to one part of it, the ſoul uſeth the former ſections as images; and is obliged to inquire upon hypotheſes, not going to the beginning, but to the concluſion: and the other part again, where the ſoul goes by an hypotheſis to a beginning, not ſuppoſed, and without thoſe images about it, by the ſpecies themſelves, making its way through them. I have not, ſaid he, ſufficiently underſtood you in theſe things. But again, ſaid I, for you ſhall more eaſily underſtand me, after theſe things have been premiſed. For I imagine, that thoſe who are converſant in geometry, and computations, and ſuch like, after they have laid down hypotheſes of exceſs, and of equality, and made their figures, and three kinds of angles, and other things akin, according to each method, they go upon theſe things as known, having laid down all theſe as hypotheſes, and do not give any further reaſon about them, neither to themſelves, nor others, as being things obvious to all. But, beginning at theſe, they directly go over, explaining the reſt, and with full conſent end at that which their inquiry purſued. I know this, ſaid he, perfectly well. And do you not likewiſe know, that when they make uſe of the viſible ſpecies, and reaſon about them, their underſtandings are not employed about theſe ſpecies, but about thoſe which they are the reſemblances

of, holding their reaſonings about a real ſquare, and about a real diameter, not about that which they draw? And, in the ſame manner, with reference to other things, thoſe very things which they form and draw, in which number, ſhadows and images in water are to be reckoned, theſe they make uſe of as images, ſeeking to behold thoſe real things, which one can no way ſee, but by his intellect. You ſay true, reply'd he. This then I called a ſpecies of the intellectual. But that the ſoul was obliged to uſe hypotheſes in the ſearch of it, not going back to the principle, as not being able to go beyond hypotheſes, in aſcending upwards, but made uſe of images formed from things below, to lead to thoſe above, as perſpicuous, as objects of opinion, and diſtinct from the things themſelves. I underſtand, ſaid he, that you mention what happens in the geometrical, and other ſiſter arts. Underſtand now, that by the other ſection of the intellectual, I mean this, that which reaſon by itſelf attains, making hypotheſes by its own reaſoning power, not as principles, but really hypotheſes, as ſteps and handles to go on to that which was not an hypotheſis, but the principle of the whole, and attain to it: and then, again, holding by all thoſe things which hold by it, to deſcend down to the concluſion; uſing no where any thing which is matter of ſenſe, but the ideas themſelves, from ſome, onwards to others, and concluding in ideas. I underſtand, ſaid he, but not ſufficiently. For you ſeem to me to talk of a perplexed ſubject: but you want, however, to determine that the diſcoveries concerning real be-

ing, and the objects of intellect, made by the ſcience of reaſoning, are more conſpicuous than the diſcoveries made by the arts, as they are called, which have hypotheſes for their firſt principles, and thoſe who inquire into them are obliged, in their diſquiſitions, to uſe their underſtandings, and not their external ſenſes. But as they are not able to perceive, by riſing up to the principle, but by hypotheſes, they ſeem to you not to have intelligence, though the things are objects of the intellect, by the help of the principle; and you ſeem to me, to call the practice in geometrical and ſuch other arts, demonſtration, and that it is ſomewhat between opinion and ſcience. You have comprehended, ſaid I, moſt ſufficiently: and conceive now, that correſponding to my four ſections, there are theſe four faculties in the ſoul; intelligence anſwering to the higheſt, demonſtration to the ſecond, and aſſign opinion to the third; and to the laſt imagination; and range the objects accordingly. That as their objects participate of truth, ſo reckon that they participate of perſpicuity. I underſtand, ſaid he, and I agree, and I range them as you deſire.

THE END OF THE SIXTH BOOK.

THE SEVENTH BOOK.

AFTER theſe things now, ſaid I, compare, with reference to inſtruction, and the want of inſtruction, our nature to ſuch a condition as follows. Conſider men as in a ſubterraneous habitation, reſembling a cave, with its entrance opening to the light, and anſwering to the whole extent of the cave. Suppoſe them to have been in it from their childhood, with chains both on their legs and necks, ſo as to remain there, and only be able to look before them, but by the chain incapable to turn their heads round, ſuppoſe them to have light of a fire, burning far above and behind them. And that between the fire and the chain'd men there is a road above them. Along which, obſerve a low wall built, like that which hedges in the ſtage of mountebanks on which they ſhow to men their wonderful tricks. I obſerve it, ſaid he. Obſerve now, along this wall, men bearing all ſorts of utenſils, raiſed above the wall, and human ſtatues, and other animals, in wood and ſtone, and all ſort of furniture. And, as is likely, ſome of thoſe who are carrying theſe, are ſpeaking, and others ſilent. You mention, ſaid he, a wonderful compariſon, and wonderful chained men. But ſuch, however, as reſemble us, ſaid I; for, in the firſt place, do you imagine that ſuch as theſe ſee any thing of themſelves, or of one another, but the ſhadows formed

by the fire, falling on the oppoſite part of the cave? How can they, ſaid he, if through the whole of life, they be under a neceſſity, at leaſt, of having their heads unmoved. But what do they ſee of what is carrying along? Is it not the very ſame? Why not? If then they were able to converſe with one another; do not you imagine they would think it proper to give names to thoſe very things they ſaw before them? Of neceſſity they muſt. And what if the oppoſite part of this priſon had an echo, when any of thoſe who paſſed along ſpake, do you imagine they would reckon that what ſpake, was any thing elſe, than the ſhadow paſſing by? Not I, truly, ſaid he. Such as theſe then, ſaid I, will entirely judge, that there is nothing genuine, but the ſhadows of utenſils. Entirely ſo, reply'd he. With reference then, both to their freedom from theſe chains, and their cure of this ignorance, conſider the nature of it; if ſuch a thing ſhould happen to them. When any one ſhould be looſed, and obliged on a ſudden to riſe up, turn round his neck, and walk and look up towards the light: and in doing all theſe things he ſhould be pained, and be unable, from the ſplendors, to behold the things he formerly ſaw the ſhadows of. What do you imagine he would ſay, if one ſhould tell him, that formerly he had ſeen trifles, but now being ſomewhat nearer to reality, and having his face turn'd toward what was more real, he ſaw better; and ſo, pointing out to him each of the things paſſing along, ſhould queſtion him, and oblige him to tell what it were; do not you imagine he would be both in doubt,

and would deem what he had formerly ſeen to be more genuine than what was now pointed out to him? By far, ſaid he. And if he ſhould oblige him to look to the light itſelf, would not he find pain in his eyes, and ſhun it; and turning to ſuch things as he is able to behold, reckon that theſe are really more certain than thoſe pointed out. Juſt ſo, reply'd he. But if one, ſaid I, ſhould drag him from thence violently, through a rough and ſteep aſcent, and never ſtop till he drew him up to the light of the ſun, would not he whilſt he was thus drawn, both be in torment, and be filled with indignation, and after he had even come to the light, having his eyes filled with ſplendor, he would be able to ſee none of thoſe things now called genuine. He would not, ſaid he, all of a ſudden, at leaſt. But he would need, I imagine, to be accuſtomed to it ſome time, if he were to perceive things above. And, firſt of all, he would moſt eaſily perceive ſhadows, afterwards the images of men and of other things in water, and after that, the things themſelves. And, with reference to theſe things, he would more eaſily ſee the things in the heavens, and the heavens themſelves, looking in the night-time to the light of the ſtars, and the moon, than by day, looking on the ſun, and the light of the ſun. How can it be otherwiſe? And, laſt of all, he may be able, I imagine, thoroughly to perceive and contemplate the ſun himſelf, not in water, nor images of him, appearing in any thing elſe, but as he is in himſelf, in his own proper region; ſuch as he is. Of neceſſity, ſaid he. And

after this, he would now reaſon with himſelf concerning him, that it is he who gives the ſeaſons, and years, and regulates all things in this viſible region, and that, of all theſe things which they formerly ſaw, he is in a certain manner the cauſe. It is certain, ſaid he, that after theſe things, he may come to ſuch reaſonings as theſe. But what? when he remembers his firſt habitation, and the wiſdom which was there, and thoſe who were there his companions in bonds, do you not imagine he will eſteem himſelf happy by the exchange, and compaſſionate them? And that greatly. And if there were there any honours and encomiums and rewards among themſelves, for him who moſt accurately perceived what paſſed along, and beſt remembered which of them were wont to paſs foremoſt, which lateſt, and which of them went together; and from theſe obſervations were moſt able to preſage what was to happen, do you imagine he will be deſirous of theſe honours, or envy thoſe who among theſe are honoured, and in power? Or, rather wiſh to ſuffer that of Homer, and greatly deſire

--------as labourer to work
To ſome ignoble man for hire--------

and rather to ſuffer any thing, than to hold ſuch opinions, and live after ſuch a manner. I imagine ſo, reply'd he, that he would ſuffer, and embrace any thing rather than live in that manner. But conſider this further, ſaid I, if ſuch an one ſhould deſcend, and ſit down again in the ſame ſeat, ſhould not he now have his eyes filled with darkneſs, coming on the ſudden from the ſun?

Very much ſo, reply'd he. And ſhould he now again be obliged to give his opinion of thoſe ſhadows, and to diſpute about them with thoſe who are there eternally chained, whilſt yet his eyes were dazzled, and before they recovered their former ſtate, (which would require no ſmall time of habit) would he not afford them laughter, and would it not be ſaid of him, that having gone above, he was returned with vitiated eyes, and that it was not proper even to attempt to go above, and that whoever ſhould attempt to looſe them, and lead them up, if ever they were able to get him into their hands, ſhould even be put to death? They would by all means, ſaid he, put him to death. The whole of this compariſon now, ſaid I, friend Glauco! is to be apply'd to our preceding diſcourſe; for if you compare this region, which is ſeen by the ſight, to the habitation of the priſon, and the light of the fire in it, to the power of the ſun, and the aſcent above, and the ſight of things above, to the ſoul's aſcent into the region of intelligence, you will apprehend my meaning, ſince you want to hear it. But God knows whether it be true. Appearances then to me appear in this manner. In the intellectual world, the idea of the good is moſt remote, and ſcarcely to be ſeen; but if it be ſeen, it is to be deemed, as indeed the cauſe to all of all things right and beautiful, generating in the viſible world, light, and its principle the ſun, and in the intellectual world, it is itſelf the principle, producing truth and intelligence, and that this muſt be beheld by him, who is to act wiſely, either privately, or in public. I agree with you, ſaid he,

in ſuch manner as I can. Come now, ſaid I, and agree with me likewiſe in this. And do not wonder that ſuch as come hither, are unwilling to act in human affairs, but their ſouls are carried alway to converſe with things above, for it is ſome how reaſonable it ſhould be ſo, if theſe matters hold according to our compariſon abovementioned. It is indeed reaſonable, reply'd he. But what? do you imagine this any thing wonderful, that when one comes from divine contemplations to human evils, he ſhould behave aukwardly and appear extremely ridiculous, whilſt yet the light is in his eyes, and is obliged, before he is ſufficiently accuſtomed to the preſent darkneſs, to contend in courts of juſtice, or elſewhere, about the ſhadows of juſtice, or thoſe ſtatues, which occaſion the ſhadows; and to diſpute about this point, how theſe things are conceived of by thoſe who have never at any time beheld juſtice itſelf? This is not at all, ſaid he, to be wondered at. But if one hath, at leaſt, underſtanding, ſaid I, he muſt remember, that there is a twofold diſturbance of the ſight, and ariſing from two cauſes, when one comes from light to darkneſs, and from darkneſs to light: and when one imagines that theſe very things happen with reference alſo to the ſoul, when at any time he ſees one in confuſion, and unable to perceive any thing, he will not laugh in an unreaſonable manner, but will conſider, whether the ſoul, coming from a more enlightened life, be darkened by ignorance, or going from prevailing ignorance, to a life more enlightened, be filled with the dazzling ſplendor, and ſo will congratulate

the one on its fate and life, and compaſſionate the life and fate of the other. And if he wants to laugh at the ſoul that goes from darkneſs to light, his laughter would be leſs improper, than if he were to laugh at the ſoul which comes from the light to darkneſs. You ſay very reaſonably, reply'd he. It is proper then, ſaid I, that we judge of them after ſuch a manner as this, if thoſe things be true. That education is not ſuch a thing as ſome undertakers talk of; for they ſome how ſay, that whilſt there is no knowledge in the ſoul, they will inſert it, as if they were inſerting ſight in blind eyes. They ſay ſo, reply'd he. But our preſent reaſoning, ſaid I, now ſhows, that this power being in the ſoul of every one, and the organ by which every one learns, and being in the ſame condition as the eye, if it were unable otherwiſe, than with the whole body, to turn from darkneſs to light, muſt, in like manner, with the whole ſoul, be turned from generated being, till it be able to endure the contemplation of being itſelf, and the moſt ſplendid of being; and this we call the good. Do we not? We do. This then, ſaid I, would appear to be the art of his converſion, in what manner he ſhall, with greateſt eaſe and advantage be turned. Not to implant in him the power of ſeeing, but conſidering him as poſſeſſed of it, only improperly ſituated, and not looking at what he ought, to contrive a method of accompliſhing this point. It ſeems ſo, reply'd he. The other virtues now then of the ſoul, as they are called, ſeem to be ſomewhat reſembling thoſe of the body; (for when, in reality, they were not in it formerly, they are after-

wards produced in it by habits and exercises,) but that of wisdom, as it seems, happens to be of a nature somewhat more divine than any other; as it never loseth its power, but according as it is turned, is useful and advantageous, or useless and hurtful. Or have you not observed of those who are said to be wicked, yet wise, how sharply the little soul sees, and how acutely it comprehends every thing to which it is turned, as having no contemptible sight, but compelled to minister to wickedness: so that the more accurately it sees, so much the more productive is it of wickedness? Entirely so, reply'd he. But however, said I, with reference to this part of such a genius; if, being dressed immediately from childhood, it should be stripped of every thing akin to procreation, as leaden weights, and of all those pleasures and lusts which relate to feastings and such like, which turn the sight of the soul towards things downwards, from all which, if the soul, being freed, should turn itself towards truth, the very same principle in the same men would most accurately see those things as it now does these to which it is turned. It is likely, reply'd he. But what? is not this likely, said I, and necessarily flowing from what hath been mentioned? that neither these who are uninstructed and unacquainted with truth can ever sufficiently take care of the city; nor yet those who allow themselves to spend the whole of their time in learning. Those, because they have no one scope in life, aiming at which they ought to do whatever they do, both in private and in public; and the latter, because they

are not willing to manage civil affairs, imagining that whilſt they are yet alive, they inhabit the iſlands of the bleſt. True, ſaid he. It is our buſineſs then, ſaid I, to oblige thoſe of the inhabitants who have the beſt geniuſes, to apply to that learning which we formerly ſaid was the greateſt, both to view the good, and to aſcend that aſcent; and when they have aſcended, and ſufficiently viewed it, we are not to allow them what is now allowed them. What is that? To continue there, ſaid I, and be unwilling to deſcend again to thoſe bondmen, or ſhare with them in their toils and honours, whether more trifling or more important. Shall we then, ſaid he, do them injuſtice, and make them live a worſe life when they have it in their power to live a better? You have again forgot, friend! ſaid I, that this is not the legiſlator's concern, in what manner any one tribe in the city ſhall live remarkably happy; but this he endeavours to effectuate in the whole city, connecting the citizens together; and by neceſſity, and by perſuaſion, making them ſhare the advantage with one another, with which they are ſeverally able to benefit the community: and the legiſlator, when he maketh ſuch men in the city, does it not that he may permit them to go where each may incline, but that himſelf may employ them for connecting the city together. True, ſaid he, I forgot, indeed. Conſider then, ſaid I, Glauco! that we ſhall no way injure the philoſophers who ariſe among us, but tell them what is juſt, when we oblige them to take care of others, and to be guardians. We will allow, indeed, that thoſe

who in other cities become philoſophers, with reaſon do not participate of the toils of public offices in the ſtate; (for they ſpring up of themſelves, the policy of each city oppoſing them, and it is juſt, that what ſprings of itſelf, owing its growth to none, ſhould not be forward to pay for its nurture to any one;) but you have we generated both for yourſelves, and for the reſt of the ſtate, as the leaders and kings in a hive, and have educated you better, and in a more perfect manner than they, and made you more capable of ſharing both in the rewards and labours attending public offices. Every one then muſt, in part, deſcend to the dwelling of the others, and accuſtom himſelf to behold obſcure objects: for when you are accuſtomed to them, you will infinitely better perceive things there, and will fully know the ſeveral images what they are, and of what, from your having perceived the truth concerning things beautiful, and juſt, and good. And thus, as a real viſion, both to us and you, ſhall the city be inhabited, and not as a dream, as are the generality of cities at preſent inhabited by ſuch as both fight with one another about ſhadows, and raiſe ſedition about governing, as if it were ſome mighty good. But the truth is in this manner.----In whatever city thoſe who are to govern, are the moſt averſe to undertake government, that city, of neceſſity, will be the beſt eſtabliſhed, and the moſt free from ſedition; and that city, whoſe governours are of an oppoſite character, will be in a condition quite oppoſite. Entirely ſo, reply'd he. Do you imagine then that our pupils will diſobey us,

when they hear theſe injunctions, and be unwilling to labour jointly in the city, each bearing a part, but ſpend the moſt of their time with one another, free from public affairs? Impoſſible, ſaid he. For we preſcribe juſt things to juſt men. And each of them enters on magiſtracy from this conſideration beyond all others, that they are under a neceſſity to govern contrarywiſe to all the preſent governours of all other cities. For thus the matter ſtands, companion! ſaid I, if you ſhall find out a life for thoſe who are to be our governours, better than that of governing, then it will be poſſible for you to have the city well eſtabliſhed, for in it alone ſhall thoſe govern who are truly rich, not in gold, but in that in which a happy man ought to be rich, in a good and prudent life. But if, whilſt they are poor, and deſtitute of goods of their own, they come to the public, imagining they ought thence to pillage good, it is not poſſible to have the city rightly eſtabliſhed? For the conteſt being who ſhall govern, ſuch a war being domeſtic, and within them, it deſtroys both themſelves, and the reſt of the city. Moſt true, ſaid he. Have you then, ſaid I, any other kind of life which deſpiſes public magiſtracies, but that of true philoſophy? No truly, ſaid he. But however, they ought, at leaſt, not to be fond of governing who enter on it, otherwiſe the rivals will fight about it. How can it be otherwiſe? Whom elſe then will you oblige to enter on the guardianſhip of the city, but thoſe who are moſt intelligent in thoſe things, by which the city is beſt eſtabliſhed, and who have other honours, and a life

better than the political one? No others, ſaid he. Are you willing then, that we now conſider this, by what means ſuch men ſhall be produced, and how one ſhall bring them into the light, as ſome are ſaid, from the lower regions, to have aſcended to the Gods? Why am I not willing, reply'd he? This now, as it ſeems, is not the turning of a ſhell; but the converſion of the ſoul coming from ſome benighted day, to the true re-aſcent to real being, which we ſhall ſay is true philoſophy. By all means. Ought we not then to conſider which of the parts of learning hath ſuch a power? Why not? What now? Glauco! may be that diſcipline of the ſoul, which draws her from that which is generated, towards being itſelf? But this I conſider whilſt I am ſpeaking. Did not we indeed ſay, that it was neceſſary for them, whilſt young, to be wreſtlers in war! We ſaid ſo. It is proper then, that this piece of learning likewiſe be added to that which we are inquiring after.-----Which? Not to be uſeleſs to military men. It muſt indeed, ſaid he, be added if poſſible. They were ſomewhere in our former diſcourſe inſtructed by us in exerciſe and muſic. They were, reply'd he. Exerciſe indeed ſome how reſpecteth what is generated and deſtroyed, for it preſideth over the increaſe and corruption of body. It ſeems ſo. This then cannot be the learning we require. It cannot. Is it muſic then, ſuch as we formerly deſcribed? But it was, ſaid he, as a counter-part of exerciſe, if you remember, by habits inſtructing our guardians, imparting no ſcience, but only with reſpect to harmony, a certain propriety, and with

regard to meaſure, a certain propriety of meaſure, and in diſcourſes, certain other things akin to theſe, both in ſuch diſcourſes as are fabulous, and in ſuch as are nearer to truth. But as to learning reſpecting ſuch a good as you now inquire after, there was nothing at all of this in that muſic. You have, moſt accurately, ſaid I, put me in mind, for it treated, in reality, of no ſuch thing. But, divine Glauco! what may this learning be? For all the mechanical arts have ſome how appeared to be ſervile. Why have they not? And what other learning is there left yet remaining diſtinct from muſic, exerciſe, and the mechanical arts? Come, ſaid I, if we have nothing yet further beſides theſe to lay hold of, let us lay hold of ſomething in theſe which extends over them all. What is that? Such as this general thing, which all arts, and reaſonings, and ſciences make uſe of, and which every one ought, in the firſt place, neceſſarily to learn. What is that, ſaid he? This trifling thing, ſaid I, to underſtand one, and two, and three: I call this in the general, number, or computation. Or is it not thus with reference to theſe, that every art, and likewiſe every ſcience, muſt of neceſſity participate of theſe? They muſt of neceſſity, reply'd he. And muſt not the art of war likewiſe participate of them? Of neceſſity, ſaid he. Palamedes then, in the tragedies, ſhows every where Agamemnon to have been at leaſt a moſt ridiculous general; or have you not obſerved how he ſays, that having invented numeration, he adjuſted the ranks in the camp at Troy, and numbered up both the ſhips, and all the other forces which were

not numbered before; and Agamemnon, as it ſeems, did not even know how many foot he had, as he underſtood not how to number them, but what kind of general do you imagine him to be? Some abſurd one, for my part, reply'd he, if this were true. Is there any other learning then, ſaid I, which we ſhall eſtabliſh as more neceſſary to a military man, than to be able to compute and to number? This moſt of all, ſaid he, if he would any way underſtand how to range his troops, and more ſtill if he want to be a man. Do you perceive then, ſaid I, with regard to this piece of learning the ſame thing as I do? What is that? It ſeemeth to be of thoſe things which we are inquiring after, which naturally lead to intelligence, but that no one uſeth it aright, being entirely a conductor towards real being. How do you ſay, reply'd he? I ſhall endeavour, ſaid I, to explain at leaſt my own opinion. With reference to thoſe things which I diſtinguiſh with myſelf into ſuch as lead towards intelligence, and ſuch as do not, do you conſider them along with me, and either agree or diſſent, in order that we may more diſtinctly ſee, whether this be ſuch as I conjecture of it.-----Show me, ſaid he. I ſhow you then, ſaid I, if you perceive ſome things with relation to the ſenſes, which call not upon the intelligence to the inquiry, as they are ſufficiently determined by the ſenſe, but other things which by all means call upon it to inquire, as the ſenſe doth nothing genuine. You plainly mean, ſaid he, ſuch things as appear at a diſtance, and ſuch as are painted. You have not altogether, ſaid I, hit my meaning. Which

then, ſaid he, do you mean? Theſe things, ſaid I, call not upon intelligence, which do not iſſue in a contrary ſenſation at one and the ſame time; but ſuch as iſſue in this manner, I deem to be of thoſe which call upon intelligence: ſince here ſenſe maketh the one ſenſation no more manifeſt than its contrary, whether it meet with it nigh at hand, or at a diſtance. But you will underſtand my meaning more plainly in this manner. Theſe, we ſay, are three fingers, the little finger, the next to it, and the middle finger? Plainly ſo, reply'd he. Conſider me then, as ſpeaking of them when ſeen nigh at hand, and take notice of this concerning them. What? Each of them alike appears to be a finger, and in this, there is no difference, whether it be ſeen in the middle or in the end; whether it be white or black, groſs or ſlender, or any thing elſe of this kind; for in all theſe, the ſoul of the multitude is under no neceſſity to queſtion their intellect what is a finger; for never at all does ſight itſelf at the ſame time intimate finger to be finger, and its oppoſite. It does not, reply'd he. Is it not likely then, ſaid I, that ſuch a caſe as this at leaſt ſhall neither call upon, nor excite intelligence? It is likely. But what? with reference to their greatneſs and littleneſs, does the ſight ſufficiently perceive this matter, and makes it no difference to it, that one of them is ſituated in the middle, or at the end; and in like manner with reference to their groſsneſs and ſlenderneſs, their ſoftneſs and hardneſs, does the touch ſufficiently perceive theſe things; and in like manner the other ſenſes, do they no way defectively manifeſt ſuch

things? Or does each of them act in this manner? First of all, must not that sense which relates to hard, of necessity relate likewise to soft; and feeling these, it reports to the soul, as if both hard and soft were one and the same? It does. And must not then the soul again, said I, in such cases, of necessity be in doubt, what at all the sense points out to it as hard, since it calls the same thing soft likewise; and so likewise with reference to the sense relating to light and heavy; the soul must be in doubt what is light and what is heavy; if the sense intimates that heavy is light, and that light is heavy. These at least, said he, are truly absurd reports to the soul, and stand in need of examination. It is likely then, said I, that first of all, in such cases as these, the soul, calling in reason and intelligence, endeavours to find out, whether the things reported be one, or whether they be two. Why not? And if they appear to be two, each of them appears to be one, and distinct from the other. It does. And if each of them be one, and both of them two, his understanding will at least perceive two distinct; for if they were not distinct, he could not perceive two, but only one. Right. The sight in like manner, we say, perceives great and small, but not as distinct from each other, but as somewhat blended together. Does it not? It does. In order to clear this matter, the intellect is obliged again to consider great and small, not as blended together, but distinct, contrarywise of what the sense does. True. And is it not from hence, some how, that it comes first of all to question us, what at all then is great, and what is little?

By all means. And ſo we have called the one, that which is known by intellect, and the other that which is ſeen by the eye. Very right, ſaid he. This then is what at preſent I was endeavouring to expreſs, when I ſaid, that ſome things call on the intelligence, and others do not: ſuch as fall on the ſenſe at the ſame time with their contraries, I define to be ſuch as require intelligence, but ſuch as do not, do not excite intelligence. I underſtand now, ſaid he, and it appears ſo to me. What now? with reference to number and unity, to which of the two claſſes do you imagine they belong? I do not underſtand, reply'd he. But reaſon by analogy, ſaid I, from what we have already ſaid: for if unity be of itſelf ſufficiently ſeen, or be apprehended by any other ſenſe, it will not lead towards real being, as we ſaid concerning finger. But if there be always ſeen at the ſame time ſomething contrary to it, ſo as that it ſhall no more appear unity than the contrary, it would truly want then one to judge of it: and the ſoul would be under a neceſſity to doubt within itſelf, and to inquire, rouſing the intellect within itſelf, and to interrogate it what this unity is. And thus the learning which relates to unity, would be of the claſs of thoſe which lead up, and turn the ſoul towards the contemplation of real being. But indeed this at leaſt, ſaid he, is what the very ſight of it doth in no ſmall meaſure effect: for we behold the ſame thing, at one and the ſame time as one, and as an infinite multitude. And if this be the caſe with reference to unity, ſaid I, will not every number be affected in the ſame manner? Why not? But

ſurely both computation and arithmetic wholly relate to number. They do entirely. Theſe then at leaſt ſeem to lead towards truth. Remarkably ſo. They are then, as it appears, of thoſe pieces of learning which we are in ſearch of. For the ſoldier muſt neceſſarily learn theſe things, for the diſpoſing of his ranks; and the philoſopher for the attaining to real being, coming up above what is generated, otherwiſe he can never become a reaſoner. It is ſo, reply'd he. But our guardian at leaſt happens to be both a ſoldier and a philoſopher. Why is he not? It were proper then, Glauco! to eſtabliſh by law this piece of learning, and to perſuade thoſe who are to manage the greateſt affairs of the city, to apply to computation, and ſtudy it, not in a common way, but 'till by the intellect itſelf, they arrive at the contemplation of the nature of numbers, not for the ſake of buying, nor of ſelling, as merchants and retailers, but both for war, and for the agility of the ſoul itſelf, and its converſion from what is generated towards both truth and being. Moſt finely ſaid, reply'd he. And ſurely now, I perceive likewiſe, ſaid I, at preſent whilſt this learning reſpecting computations is mentioned, how elegant it is, and every way advantageous towards our purpoſe, if one applies to it for the ſake of knowledge, and not to make a traffic by it. Which way, reply'd he! This very thing at leaſt, which we now mentioned, how powerfully does it ſome how lead up the ſoul, and put it under a neceſſity of reaſoning about the numbers themſelves, no way admitting, if one in reaſoning with it ſhall produce numbers which

have viſible and tangible bodies. For you know of ſome who are dextrous in theſe things, how that if one, in reaſoning, ſhall attempt to divide unity itſelf, they both ridicule him, and will not admit of it, but if you divide it into parts, they multiply them, afraid leſt any how unity ſhould appear not to be unity, but many. You ſay, reply'd he, moſt true. What think you, now Glauco! if one ſhould aſk them: wonderful men! about what kind of numbers are you reaſoning? In which there is unity, ſuch as you allow of, each whole equal to each whole, and not differing in the ſmalleſt degree, having no fraction in itſelf, what do you imagine they would anſwer? This, as I imagine; that they mean ſuch numbers as can be conceived by the mind alone, but cannot at all be comprehended any other way. You ſee then, friend! ſaid I, that, in reality, this learning appears neceſſary for us, ſince it appears to lay the ſoul under a neceſſity at leaſt of employing the intellect itſelf towards the diſcovery of truth itſelf. And ſurely now, ſaid he, it does this at leaſt in a very ſtrong degree. But what? have you hitherto conſidered this? that thoſe who are naturally computers appear to be acute in all pieces of learning; and ſuch as are naturally ſlow, if they be inſtructed and practiſed in this, though they gain nothing elſe, all of them however proceed ſo far as to become more acute than they were before. It is ſo, reply'd he. And ſurely, as I imagine, you will not eaſily find any thing, and not at all many, which occaſion greater labour to the learner and ſtudent than this. No indeed. On all theſe accounts then, this

learning is not to be omitted, but the beſt geniuſes are to be inſtructed in it. I agree, ſaid he. Let this one thing then, ſaid I, be eſtabliſhed among us; and, in the next place, what is akin to it, let us conſider if it any way belongs to us. What is it, ſaid he? or do you mean geometry? That very thing, ſaid I. As far, ſaid he, as it relates to warlike affairs, it is plain that it belongs to us; for, as to encampments, and the occupying of ground, contracting and extending an army, and all thoſe figures into which they form armies, both in battles and in marches, the ſame man would differ from himſelf when he were a geometer, and when he were not. But ſurely now, ſaid I, for ſuch purpoſes as theſe, ſome little geometry, and ſome particle of computation might ſuffice: but we muſt inquire, whether much of it, and great advances in it, would contribute any thing to this great end, to make us more eaſily comprehend the idea of the good. And we ſay that every thing contributes to this, that obliges the ſoul to turn itſelf towards that region in which is the moſt divine of being, which it muſt by all means contemplate. You ſay right, reply'd he. If therefore it oblige the ſoul to contemplate being, it belongs to us, but if it oblige to contemplate what is generated only, it does not belong to us. We ſay ſo at leaſt. They then who are but a little converſant in geometry, ſaid I, will not diſpute with us this point at leaſt, that this ſcience is quite oppoſite to the common modes of ſpeech, employed in it by thoſe who practiſe it. How, ſaid he? They ſpeak ſome how very ridiculouſly, and through neceſſity: for

all the diſcourſe they employ in it appears to be with a view to operation, and to practice. Thus they ſpeak of making a ſquare, of prolonging, of adjoining, and the like. But yet the whole of this learning is ſome how ſtudied with a view to knowledge. By all means indeed, ſaid he. Muſt not this further be agreed on? What? That it is the knowledge of what is perpetual, and not at all of what is ever generated and deſtroyed. This, ſaid he, is agreed on; for geometrical knowledge is of that which is perpetual. It would ſeem then, brave Glauco! to draw the ſoul towards truth, and to be productive of a philoſophic underſtanding, ſo as to make us raiſe the powers of the mind to things above, inſtead of unworthily fixing them on things below. As much as poſſible, reply'd he. As much as poſſible then, ſaid I, muſt we give orders, that thoſe in this fineſt city of yours by no means omit geometry; for even its by-works are not inconſiderable. What by-works, ſaid he? Thoſe, ſaid I, which you mentioned relating to war; and indeed with reference to all pieces of learning, as to the underſtanding of them more handſomely, we know ſome how, that one's having learned geometry or not, makes every way an entire difference. Every way truly, ſaid he. Let us then eſtabliſh this ſecond piece of learning for the youth. Let us eſtabliſh it, reply'd he. But what? ſhall we, in the third place, eſtabliſh aſtronomy? or are you of a different opinion? I am, ſaid he, of the ſame: for to be well ſkilled in the ſeaſons of months and years, belongs not only to agriculture and navigation, but equally to

the military art. You are pleaſant, ſaid I, as you ſeem to be afraid of the multitude, leſt you appear to enjoin uſeleſs pieces of learning: but this is not altogether deſpicable, though it is hard to perſuade them, that by each of theſe pieces of learning, ſome power of the ſoul is both purified and invigorated, which was deſtroyed and blunted by other ſtudies, though more worthy of preſervation than ten thouſand eyes, for by it alone is truth beheld. To ſuch therefore as are of the ſame opinion, you will very readily appear to reaſon admirably well: but ſuch as have never obſerved this, will probably imagine you ſay nothing at all: for they perceive no other advantage in theſe things worthy of account. Conſider now from this point, with which of theſe two you will reaſon; or carry on the reaſonings with neither of them, but principally for your own ſake, yet not grudge another, if any one ſhall be able to reap any benefit by them. In this manner, reply'd he, I chuſe, on my own account principally both to reaſon, and to queſtion and anſwer. Come then, ſaid I, let us go back again: for we have not taken aright in order, what comes next after geometry. How have we taken, reply'd he? After plain ſurface, ſaid I, we have taken a ſolid, moving in a circle, before we conſidered it by itſelf: but the right method was, to have taken the third augment immediately after the ſecond, and that is ſome how the augment of cubes, and what participates of depth. It is ſo, reply'd he. But theſe things, Socrates! ſeem not yet to be found out. The reaſon of it, ſaid I, is twofold. Becauſe there is no city

which holds them in ſufficient honour, they are ſlightly ſearched into, being difficult; and beſides, thoſe who do ſearch into them want a leader, without which they cannot find them out. And this leader is in the firſt place hard to be found, and after that he does exiſt, as matters are at preſent, the inquirers into theſe things, as they are high-ſpirited, will not obey him. But if the whole city preſided over theſe things, and held them in eſteem, ſuch as inquired into them would be obedient, and their inquiries, being carried on with aſſiduity and vigour, would diſcover themſelves what they were: ſince even now, whilſt they are on the one hand deſpiſed, and kept down by the multitude, and on the other by thoſe who ſtudy them without being able to give any account of their utility, they yet forcibly, under all theſe diſadvantages, grow up through their native charm, and it is no wonder that they do appear. Becauſe truly, ſaid he, this charm is very remarkable. But tell me more plainly what you were juſt now ſaying; for ſome how that ſtudy which reſpects plain ſurface, you called geometry. I did, ſaid I. And then, ſaid he, you mentioned aſtronomy in the firſt place after it. But afterwards you drew back. Becauſe whilſt I am haſtening, ſaid I, to go through all things ſpeedily, I advance more ſlowly. For that augment by depth which was next in method we paſſed over, becauſe the inveſtigation of it is ridiculous, and after geometry we mentioned aſtronomy, which is the circular motion of a ſolid. You ſay right, reply'd he. We eſtabliſh then, ſaid I, aſtronomy as the fourth piece of learning, ſuppo-

ſing that one to ſubſiſt which we have now omitted, if the city ſhall enter upon it. It is reaſonable, ſaid he. And now that you agree with me, Socrates! I proceed in my commendation of aſtronomy, which you formerly reproved as unſeaſonable. For it is evident, I imagine, to every one, that this piece of learning at leaſt obliges the ſoul to look to that which is above, and from the things here conducts it thither. It is probable, ſaid I, that it is evident to every one, but to me. For to me it does not appear ſo. How then do you think of it, reply'd he? In the way theſe purſue it who introduce it into philoſophy, it plainly makes the ſoul entirely to look downwards. How do you ſay, reply'd he? You ſeem to me, ſaid I, to have formed with yourſelf no ignoble opinion of the learning reſpecting things above, what it is: for you ſeem to think, that if any one contemplates the various bodies in the firmament, and by earneſtly looking up, apprehends every thing, you reckon he has intelligence of theſe things; and not merely ſees them with his eyes; and perhaps you judge right, and I fooliſhly. For I, on the other hand, for my part, am not able to imagine, that any other learning can make a ſoul look upwards, but that which reſpects the being, and that which is inviſible; and if any one undertakes to learn any thing of ſenſible objects, whether he gape upwards, or bellow downwards, never at all ſhall I ſay that he learns; for I aver he hath no real knowledge of theſe things, nor ſhall I ſay that his ſoul looks upwards, but downwards, even though he learns lying on his back, either at land or at

ſea. I am puniſhed, ſaid he, for you have juſtly reproved me. But which was the proper way, ſaid you, of learning aſtronomy different from the methods they learn at preſent, if they mean to learn it with advantage for the purpoſes we ſpeak of? In this manner, ſaid I, that theſe variegated bodies in the heavens, as they are varied in a viſible ſubject, be deemed the moſt beautiful and the moſt regular of the kind, but far inferior to real beings, according to thoſe orbits in which the real velocity, and the real ſlowneſs, in true number, and in all true figures are carried with reſpect to one another, and carry all things that are within them. Which things truly are to be comprehended by reaſon and intellect, but not by ſight; or do you think they can? By no means, reply'd he. Is not then, ſaid I, that variety in the heavens to be made uſe of as a pattern for learning thoſe real things, in the ſame manner as if one ſhould meet with geometrical figures, drawn remarkably well and elaborately by Daedalus, or ſome other artiſt or painter? For one who were any way ſkill'd in geometry, or ſeeing theſe would truly think the workmanſhip moſt excellent, yet would eſteem it ridiculous to conſider theſe things ſeriouſly, as if from thence he were to learn the truth, as to what were in equal, in duplicate, or in any other proportion? Why would it not be ridiculous, reply'd he? And do not you then imagine, that he who is truly an aſtronomer, is affected in the ſame manner, when he looks up to the orbits of the planets? And that he reckons that the heavens and all in them are indeed eſtabliſhed by

the Former of the heavens, in the fineſt manner poſſible for ſuch works to be eſtabliſhed; but would not he deem him abſurd, who ſhould imagine that this proportion of night with day, and of both theſe to a month, and of a month to a year, and of other planets to ſuch like things, and towards one another, exiſted always in the ſame manner, and in no way ſuffered any change, though they have a body, and are viſible, but would ſearch by every method to apprehend the truth of theſe things? So it appears to me, reply'd he, whilſt I am hearing you. Let us then make uſe of problems, ſaid I, in the ſtudy of aſtronomy, as in geometry. And let us drop the heavenly bodies, if we want truly to apprehend aſtronomy, and render profitable inſtead of unprofitable that part of the ſoul which is naturally wiſe. You truly enjoin a much harder taſk on aſtronomers, ſaid he, than is taken at preſent. And I imagine, at leaſt, reply'd I, that we muſt likewiſe enjoin other things, in the ſame manner, if we are to be of any ſervice as law-givers. But can you ſuggeſt any of the proper pieces of learning? I can ſuggeſt none, reply'd he, at preſent at leaſt. Motion, ſaid I, as I imagine, affords us not one indeed, but many ſpecies of learning. All of which any wiſe man can probably tell; what occur to us are two. Which now? Along with this, ſaid I, there is its counter-part. Which? As the eyes, ſaid I, ſeem to be fitted to aſtronomy, ſo the ears ſeem to be fitted to harmonious motion. And theſe ſeem to be ſiſter arts to one another, both as the Pythagoreans ſay, and we, Glauco! agree with them, or how do

we do? Juſt ſo, reply'd he. Shall we not, ſaid I, as they deal greatly in theſe matters, inquire how they talk about them, and if there be any other thing beſides theſe, inquire into it likewiſe? But above all theſe things, we will ſtill watch over our own affairs. What is that? That thoſe we educate never at all attempt at any time to learn any of thoſe things in an imperfect manner, and not pointing always at that mark to which all ought to be directed: as we now mentioned with reference to aſtronomy. Or do not you know that they do the ſame thing with regard to harmony, as in aſtronomy? For whilſt they meaſure one with another the ſymphonies and ſounds which are heard, they labour like the aſtronomers unprofitably. Nay truly, ſaid he, and ridiculouſly too, whilſt they frequently repeat certain notes, and liſten with their ears, to catch the ſound as from a neighbourhood, and ſome of them ſay they hear ſome middle note, but that the difference is exceeding ſmall which meaſures them, and others again are in doubt about it, and ſay that the notes are the ſame as were ſounded before, and both parties ſubject the mind to the ears. But you ſpeak, ſaid I, of the lucrative muſicians, who perpetually haraſs and torment their ſtrings, and turn them on the pegs. But that the compariſon may not be too tedious, I ſhall ſay nothing of their complaints of the ſtrings, their refuſals and ſtubbornneſs, but put an end to it. But I ſay we ought not to chuſe theſe to talk of harmony, but theſe true muſicians whom we ſpoke of. For theſe do the ſame things here as the others did

in aſtronomy: for in theſe ſymphonies which are heard, they ſearch for numbers, but they paſs not thence to the problems, to inquire which numbers are ſymphonious, and which are not, and the reaſon why they are either the one or the other. This is truly, ſaid he, a divine work you mention. It is then indeed profitable in the ſearch of the beautiful and good, but if purſued in another manner, it is unprofitable. It is likely at leaſt, ſaid he. But I imagine, ſaid I, that the proper method of inquiry into all theſe things, if it reach the union and affinity which they have, and compute in what reſpects they are akin to one another, this exerciſe will contribute ſomewhat towards what we want, and our labour will not be unprofitable, otherwiſe it will. I likewiſe, ſaid he, am of the ſame opinion. But you ſpeak, Socrates! of a very mighty work. Mean you the introduction, or what elſe, ſaid I? Or do not we know that all theſe things are introductory to the law itſelf, which we ought to learn; for even the dialectic philoſophers do not appear any way expert as to theſe things. No truly, ſaid he, unleſs a very few of all I have met with. But whilſt they are not able, ſaid I, to offer and to hear reaſon, ſhall they ever be able to know any thing of what we ſay is neceſſary to be known? Never ſhall they be able to do this at leaſt, reply'd he. Is not this itſelf then, Glauco! ſaid I, the law? To carry the power of reaſoning to its high- *Law*
eſt perfection; which being intellectual, the power of ſight may be ſaid to reſemble it; which power endeavours, as we ſaid, firſt to look at the animals, then at the

ſtars, and laſt of all at the ſun himſelf. So when any one attempts to reaſon without any of the ſenſes, by reaſoning he puſheth on to know each particular, what it is; and if he never give over till he apprehend by his intelligence what is the good itſelf, he then arrives at the perfection of intelligence, as the other does at that of viſible. By all means, ſaid he. What now? Do not you call this progreſs reaſoning? What elſe? And now, ſaid I, as the looſing the men from their chains, and their turning from the ſhadows towards the ſtatues, and the light, and their aſcent from the ſubterraneous dwelling to the ſun; and when there, the looking at the images in water, from their inability at firſt to look at animals and vegetables, and the light of the ſun. And here the contemplating the divine images themſelves, and the ſhadows of real beings, and not the ſhadows of images ſhadowed out by another ſort of light, as by the ſun: this whole exerciſe in the arts we have mentioned, hath this power, to lead back again that which is beſt in the ſoul, to the contemplation of that which is beſt in beings? as in the former caſe, that which is brighteſt in the body is led to that which is brighteſt in the material and viſible world. I admit, ſaid he, of theſe things. Though truly it appears to me quite difficult to admit of them, and in another reſpect it is difficult not to admit of them. But however (for we ſhall hear theſe things not only now at preſent, but often go over them afterwards,) eſtabliſhing theſe things as now expreſſed, let us go to the law itſelf, and go through with it as we have done with the

introduction. Say then what is the manner of the reasoning power, and into what species is it divided, and what are the paths leading to it? For these, it is likely, conduct us to that place, at which when we are arrived, we shall have repose from travel, and the end of the journey. You will not as yet, friend Glauco! said I, be able to follow; for otherwise no zeal should be wanting on my part; nor should you any longer only see the image of what we speak of, but the truth itself. But this is what to me at least it appears, whether it be so in reality or not, this it is not proper confidently to affirm, but that indeed it is somewhat of this kind may be affirmed. May it not? Why not? And further that it is the reasoning power alone, which can discover this to one who is conversant in these things we have mentioned, and that by no other power it is possible. This also, said he, we may confidently affirm. This at least no one, said I, will dispute with us. That no other method can attempt to comprehend at all, in any orderly way, what each particular being is; for all the other arts respect either the opinions and passions of men, or generations, and compositions, or are all employed in the culture of things generated and compounded. Those others, which we said participated somewhat of being, geometry, and such as are connected with her, these we see having a dream as it were of the being, but it is impossible for them to see the reality, so long as employing hypotheses they hold by these immoveably, without being able to give the reason of them. For

where one holds as a principle what he does not know, and a concluſion and intermediate ſteps are connected with that unknown principle, what contrivance can there be found by which an aſſent of ſuch a kind ſhall ever become ſcience? None at all, reply'd he. Does not then, ſaid I, the reaſoning method proceed in this way alone, toward the firſt principle itſelf, removing all hypotheſes, in order to eſtabliſh it, and diſengaging the eye of the ſoul from a certain barbarian clay with which it was buried, gently draws and leads it upwards, uſing as helps and aſſiſtants thoſe arts we have mentioned, which through cuſtom we frequently call ſciences, but they require another appellation more expreſſive than opinion, and more indiſtinct than ſcience: we have ſomewhere, in our preceding diſcourſe, termed it demonſtration. But it is not, as I imagine, about a name they diſpute, who inquire into matters of ſo great importance as we have now before us. No indeed, ſaid he. Do you agree then, ſaid I, as formerly, to call the firſt claſs ſcience, the ſecond demonſtration, the third faith, and the fourth imagination? And both theſe laſt opinion: and the two former intel ligence. And that opinion reſpects what is generated, and intelligence real being. And in the ſame proportion as being is to what is generated, ſo is intelligence to opinion, ſcience to faith, and demonſtration to imagination. But as for the analogy of the things which theſe powers reſpect, and the diviſion of each of them into two, to wit what is matter of opinion, and what is matter of intellect, we omit, Glauco! that we may not be more te-

dious here than in our former reaſonings. As for me, ſaid he, with reference to thoſe other things, as far as I am able to follow, I am of the ſame opinion. But do not you call him a reaſoner, who apprehends the reaſon of the being of each particular; and as for the man who is not able to give a reaſon to himſelf, and to another, in as far as he is not able, ſo far will you ſay he wants intelligence of the thing? Why ſhould I not ſay ſo, reply'd he? And is not the caſe the ſame with reference to the good? Whoſoever cannot define it by reaſon, ſeparating the idea of good from all others, and piercing through all arguments as in a battle, eagerly contending to prove it, not according to opinion, but according to reality, and in all theſe caſes to march forward with unerring reaſon, ſuch an one knows nothing of the good itſelf, nor of any good whatever, but if he hath attained to any image of the good, we will ſay he hath attained to it by opinion, not by ſcience, and is dreaming and ſleeping out his preſent life, and ere he be awakened, he will deſcend to the lower regions, there to ſleep on to the end. Now truly, ſaid he, I will ſtrongly aver all theſe things. But ſurely you will not, as I imagine, allow your own children at leaſt whom you bred up and educated in reaſoning, if ever at all indeed you educate them, to have the ſupreme government of the moſt important affairs in the ſtate, whilſt they are void of reaſon, as letters of the alphabet. By no means, reply'd he. You will then lay down this to them as a law. That in a moſt eſpecial manner they attain to that piece of education, by

which they may become capable to queſtion and anſwer in the moſt ſcientific manner. I will ſettle it by law, ſaid he, with your aſſiſtance at leaſt. Do you agree then, ſaid I, that above all the other pieces of learning, we place the art of reaſoning, as the top ſtone? and that no other piece of learning can be properly ſet above it; but that every thing reſpecting learning is now finiſhed? I agree, ſaid he. There now remains for you, ſaid I, the diſtribution: to whom ſhall we aſſign theſe pieces of learning, and after what manner? That is plain, ſaid he. Do you remember then our former election of rulers, what kind we choſe? Why do I not, ſaid he? As to other things then, imagine, ſaid I, that ſuch geniuſes as theſe ought to be pick'd out. For the moſt firm and brave are to be preferred, and, as far as poſſible, the moſt graceful; and beſides, we muſt not only ſeek for ſuch as are of noble and ſtern manner, but they muſt be poſſeſſed of every other natural diſpoſition conducive to this education. Which diſpoſitions do you recommend? They muſt have, ſaid I, happy friend! acuteneſs for the ſciences, that they may not learn with difficulty. For ſouls are much more diſcouraged by hard pieces of learning, than by ſevere bodily exerciſes; as the toil which is proper to them, and not in common with the body, more intimately affects them. True, ſaid he. And we muſt ſeek for one of good memory, untainted, and every way laborious: or how elſe do you imagine any one ſhall be willing to endure the fatigue of the body, and to accompliſh at the ſame time ſuch learning and ſtudy? No one, ſaid he, unleſs

he be every way of a fine genius. The miſtake then about philoſophy, and the contempt of it have been occaſioned through theſe things, becauſe, as I formerly ſaid, they apply to it not in a worthy manner: for it ought not to be apply'd to by the baſtardly, but the legitimate. How, ſaid he? In the firſt place, he who is to apply with philoſophy ought not, ſaid I, to be lame as to his love of any kind of labour, loving it in ſome things, and hating it in others: and this is the caſe when one loves wreſtling and hunting, and all exerciſes of the body, but is not a lover of learning, and loves neither to hear nor to inquire, but in all theſe reſpects has averſion to labour. He likewiſe is lame, in a different manner from this one, who diſlikes all bodily exerciſe. You ſay moſt true, reply'd he. And ſhall we not, ſaid I, in like manner account that ſoul lame as to truth, who hates indeed a voluntary falſhood, and bears it ill in itſelf, and is beyond meaſure enraged when others tell a lye; but the involuntary lye, it eaſily admits, and though at any time it be found ignorant, it is not diſpleaſed, but like a ſavage ſow willingly wallows in ignorance. By all means, ſaid he. And in like manner, ſaid I, as to temperance and fortitude, and magnanimity, and all the parts of virtue, we muſt no leſs carefully attend to what is baſtardly, and what is legitimate; for when either any private perſon or city underſtands not how to attend all theſe things, they unawares employ the lame and the baſtardly for whatever they have occaſion; private perſons employ them as friends, and cities as governours. The caſe is

entirely ſo, ſaid he. But we, ſaid I, muſt beware of all ſuch things; for if we take ſuch as are entire in body and in mind for ſo extenſive learning, and ſo extenſive an exerciſe, and inſtruct them, juſtice herſelf will not blame us, and we ſhall preſerve both the city and its conſtitution: but if we introduce other ſort of perſons into theſe affairs, we ſhall do every thing the reverſe, and bring philoſophy under ſtill greater ridicule. That indeed were ſhameful, ſaid he. Certainly, ſaid I. But I myſelf ſeem at preſent to be ſomewhat ridiculous. How ſo, ſaid he? I forgot, ſaid I, that we were amuſing ourſelves, and ſpoke with too great keenneſs; for whilſt I was ſpeaking, I caſt my eye towards philoſophy, and ſeeing her moſt unworthily abuſed, I ſeem to have been filled with indignation, and as being enraged at thoſe who are the cauſe of it, to have ſpoken more earneſtly what I ſaid. No truly, ſaid he, not to me your hearer at leaſt. But for me, ſaid I, the ſpeaker. But let us not forget this, that in our former election, we made choice of old men; but in this election, it will not be allowed us. For we muſt not believe Solon, that one who is old is able to learn many things; but he is leſs ſo than to run. They are the young who perform all great and frequent toils. Of neceſſity, ſaid he. Every thing then relating to arithmetic and geometry, and all that previous inſtruction which they ſhould be taught before they learn the art of reaſoning, ought to be ſet before them whilſt they are children, and that method of teaching obſerved, which ſhall make them learn with-

out compulſion. Why ſo? Becauſe, ſaid I, a free ſpirit ought to learn no piece of learning with ſlavery: for the toils of the body when undergone through compulſion, render the body nothing worſe; but no piece of compelled learning is laſting in the ſoul. True, ſaid he. Do not then, ſaid I, excellent friend! compel boys in their learning; but train them up, amuſing themſelves, that you may be better able to diſcern to what every one's genius naturally tends. What you ſay, reply'd he, is reaſonable, Do not you remember then, ſaid I, that we ſaid the boys are even to be carried to war, as ſpectators, on horſe-back, and that they are to be brought nearer, if they can with ſafety, and like young hounds taſte the blood? I remember, ſaid he. Whoever then, ſaid I, ſhall appear the moſt forward in all theſe toils, and in all pieces of learning, and in terrors, are to be ſelected into a certain number. At what age, ſaid he? When they have, ſaid I, finiſhed their neceſſary exerciſes, for during this time, whilſt it continues, for two or three years, it is impoſſible to do any thing elſe; for fatigue and ſleep are enemies to learning; and this too is none of the leaſt of their trials, what each of them appears to be in his exerciſes. Why is it not, ſaid he. And after this period, ſaid I, let ſuch as formerly have been ſelected of the age of twenty receive greater honours than others, and let thoſe pieces of learning which in their youth they learned ſeparately, be brought before them in one view, that they may ſee the relation between the ſciences and the nature of real being. This learning indeed will alone, ſaid he,

remain immoveable in thoſe in whom it obtains. And this, ſaid I, is the greateſt trial for diſtinguiſhing between thoſe geniuſes which are naturally fitted for learning, and thoſe which are not. He who perceiveth this relation is a reaſoning genius; he who doth not, is none. I am of the ſame opinion, ſaid he. It will then be neceſſary for you, ſaid I, after you have obſerved theſe things, and ſeen who are moſt approven in theſe, perſevering in learning, perſevering in war, and in the other things eſtabliſhed by law, to make choice of ſuch after they exceed thirty years, chuſing a-new from thoſe choſen formerly, and advance them to greater honours; and obſerve them, trying them by the reaſoning power, who of them without the help of his eyes, or any other ſenſe, is able to proceed with truth to being itſelf. And here, friend! is a work of great care. For what principally, ſaid he? Do not you perceive, ſaid I, the evil which at preſent attends reaſoning, how great it is? What is it, ſaid he, you mean? How it is ſome how, ſaid I, full of what is contrary to law. Greatly ſo, reply'd he. Do you imagine then, ſaid I, they ſuffer ſome dreadful thing, and will you not forgive them? How do you mean, ſaid he? Juſt as if, ſaid I, a certain ſuppoſititious child were educated in great opulence in a rich and noble family, and amidſt many flatterers, and ſhould perceive when grown up to manhood, that he is not deſcended of thoſe who are ſaid to be his parents, but yet ſhould not diſcover his real parents; can you gueſs how ſuch an one would be affected both towards his flatterers, and towards

his ſuppoſed parents, both at the time when he knew nothing of the cheat, and at that time again, when he came to perceive it? Or are you willing to hear me, while I gueſs at it? I am willing, ſaid he. I conjecture then, ſaid I, that he will pay more honour to his father and mother, and his other ſuppoſed relations, than to the flatterers, and that he will leſs neglect them when they are in any want, and be leſs apt to do or ſay any thing amiſs to them, and in matters of conſequence be leſs diſobedient to them than to thoſe flatterers, during that period in which he knows not the truth. It is likely, ſaid he. But when he perceives the real ſtate of the matter, I conjecture, he will then ſlacken in his honour and reſpect for them, and go after the flatterers, and be remarkably more perſuaded by them now than formerly, and truly live according to their manner, converſing with them openly. But for that father, and thoſe ſuppoſed relations, if he be not of an entirely good natural diſpoſition, he will have no regard. You ſay every thing, ſaid he, as it would happen. But in what manner does this compariſon reſpect our preſent argument to reaſoning? In this. We have certain opinions from our childhood concerning juſt and beautiful, in which we have been educated, as by parents, obeying and honouring them. We have, ſaid he. Are there not likewiſe other purſuits oppoſite to theſe, with pleaſures flattering our ſouls, and drawing towards theſe. They do not however perſuade thoſe who are in any degree moderate, but they honour thoſe their relations, and obey them. Theſe things are

ſo. What now, ſaid I, when to one who is thus affected, the queſtion is propoſed, what is the beautiful, and when he, anſwering what he hath heard from the law-giver, is refuted by reaſon; and reaſon frequently and every way convincing him, reduces him to the opinion, that this is no more beautiful than it is ugly. And in the ſame manner, as to what is juſt and good, and whatever elſe he held in higheſt eſteem, what do you imagine ſuch an one will after this do, with regard to theſe things, as to honouring and obſerving them? Of neceſſity, ſaid he, he will neither honour nor obſerve them any more in the ſame manner as formerly. When then he no longer deems, ſaid I, theſe things honourable, and a-kin to him as formerly, and cannot diſcover thoſe which really are ſo, is it poſſible he can readily join himſelf to any other life than the flattering one? It is not poſſible, ſaid he. And from being an obſerver of the law, he ſhall, I imagine, appear to be a tranſgreſſor. Of neceſſity. Is it not likely then, ſaid I, that thoſe ſhall be thus affected who in this ſituation apply to reaſoning, and that they ſhould have, as I was juſt now ſaying, great forgiveneſs. And pity too, ſaid he. Whilſt you take care then, leſt this compaſſionable caſe befal theſe of the age of thirty, ought you not by every method to accompliſh them in reaſoning? Certainly, ſaid he. And is not this one prudent care? that they meddle not with reaſonings, whilſt they are young: for you have not forgot, I imagine, that the youth, when they firſt meddle with reaſonings, abuſe them in the way of amuſement, whilſt they uſe them

alway in the way of contradiction. And imitating thoſe who are refuters, they themſelves refute others, delighting like whelps in dragging and tearing to pieces, in their reaſonings, thoſe always who are near them. Extremely ſo, ſaid he. And after they have confuted many, and been themſelves confuted by many, do they not powerfully and ſpeedily come to hold none of the opinions they held formerly? And by theſe means they themſelves, and the whole of philoſophy are ſcandalized to others. Moſt true, ſaid he. But he who is of a riper age, ſaid I, will not incline to ſhare in ſuch a madneſs, but will rather imitate him who inclines to reaſon and inquire after truth, than one, who, for the ſake of diverſion, amuſeth himſelf, and contradicteth. And will both be more modeſt himſelf, and render the practice of diſputing more honourable inſtead of being more diſhonourable. Right, ſaid he. Were not then all our former remarks rightly made, in the way of precaution, in this point, that the geniuſes ought to be decent and grave, to which one ſhall impart the art of reaſoning, and not, as at preſent, when every common genius, and ſuch as is not at all proper, is admitted to it? Certainly, ſaid he. Will not then the double of the former period ſuffice one to remain in imbibing the art of reaſoning with perſeverance and application, and doing nothing elſe, but in way of counterpart exerciſing himſelf in all bodily exerciſes? Do you mean ſix years, ſaid he, or four? 'Tis of no conſequence, ſaid I, make it five. After this you muſt make them deſcend to that cave again, and oblige them

to govern both in things relating to war, and ſuch other magiſtracies as require youth, that they may not fall ſhort of others in experience. And they muſt be ſtill further tried among theſe, whether being drawn to every different quarter, they will continue firm, or whether they will in any meaſure be drawn aſide. And for how long a time, ſaid he, do you appoint this? For fifteen years, ſaid I? And when they are of the age of fifty, ſuch of them as are preſerved, and as have excelled in all theſe things, in actions, and in the ſciences, are to be brought to the higheſt degree, and are to be obliged to direct the beam of their ſoul towards that which giveth light to all, and when they have viewed the good itſelf, to uſe it as a model, each of them, in their turn, in adorning both the city and private perſons, and themſelves, all the remainder of their life. Occupied for the moſt part in philoſophy, and when their turn comes on them, they toil in political affairs, and take the government, each for the good of the city, performing this office, not as any thing honourable, but as a matter of neceſſity. And after they have educated others in the ſame manner ſtill, and left ſuch as reſemble themſelves to be the guardians of the city, they depart to inhabit the iſlands of the bleſt. But the city will publicly erect for them monuments, and offer ſacrifices, if the oracle aſſent, as to ſuperior beings; and if it do not, as to happy and divine men, you have, Socrates! ſaid he, like a ſtatuary, made our governours every way perfect. And our governeſſes likewiſe, Glauco! ſaid I. For do not imagine that I have ſpoken what I

have ſaid any more concerning the men, than concerning the women, ſuch of them as are of a ſufficient genius. Right, ſaid he, if at leaſt they are to ſhare in all things equally with the men, as we explained. What then, ſaid I, do you agree, that with reference to the city and republic, we have not altogether ſpoken what can only be conſidered as wiſhes; but ſuch things as are indeed difficult, yet poſſible ſome way, and in no other way than what has been mentioned, viz. when thoſe who are truly philoſophers, whether more of them or a ſingle one, becoming governours in a city, ſhall deſpiſe thoſe preſent honours, eſteeming them illiberal and of no value: but eſteeming the right and the honours which come from it above all things; and accounting juſtice of greateſt moment, and moſt abſolutely neceſſary; and miniſtering to it, and encreaſing it, thoroughly regulate the conſtitution of their own city? How, ſaid he? As many, ſaid I, of the more advanced in life, as have lived ten years in the city, they will ſend out to the country, and taking their children away from thoſe habits which the domeſtics have at preſent, they will educate them in their own manners and laws, which are what we formerly mentioned: and the city and republic we have deſcribed being thus eſtabliſhed in the ſpeedieſt and eaſieſt manner, it will both be happy itſelf, and be of the greateſt advantage to that people among whom it is eſtabliſhed. Very much ſo indeed, ſaid he. And you ſeem to me, Socrates! to have told very well how this city ſhall ariſe, if it ariſe at all. Are not now then, ſaid I, our diſcourſes ſufficient

both concerning ſuch a city as this, and concerning a man ſimilar to it? For it is alſo now evident what ſort of a man we ſhall ſay he ought to be. It is evident, reply'd he; and your inquiry ſeems to me to be at an end.

THE END OF THE SEVENTH BOOK.

THE EIGHTH BOOK.

BE it ſo. Theſe things, Glauco! have now been agreed on; that in this city which is to be eſtabliſhed in a perfect manner, the women are to be common, the children common, and likewiſe the whole of education; and, in like manner, their employments both in peace and war are to be common; and that their kings are to be ſuch as moſt excel both in philoſophy and in the arts of war. Theſe things, ſaid he, have been agreed on. And ſurely we likewiſe agreed on theſe things, that when the governours are marching with the ſoldiers, and come to ſettle themſelves, they ſhall dwell in ſuch habitations as we formerly mentioned, which have nothing peculiar to any one, but are common to all: and beſides theſe houſes, we likewiſe, if you remember, agreed on what ſort of poſſeſſions they ſhall have. I remember, ſaid he, that we were of opinion, none of them ought to poſſeſs any thing as others do at preſent; but, as wreſtlers in war and guardians, they were to receive a reward for their guardianſhip from others, or an yearly maintenance on theſe accounts, and were to take care of themſelves and the reſt of the city. You ſay right, ſaid I. But after we have finiſhed this now, let us recollect whence we made this digreſſion; that we may now proceed again in the ſame way. That is no hard matter, ſaid he: for you were men-

tioning much the ſame things of the city with thoſe you have done at preſent, ſaying that you held ſuch a city to be good, as it was at that time deſcribed, and the man to be good who reſembleth it; whilſt yet it ſeems you are able to deſcribe a better city, and a better man. And you ſaid moreover, that all the others were wrong, if this one was right. Of the other republics, you ſaid, as I remember, there were four ſpecies, which deſerved to be conſidered, and to have the errors in them, and the lawleſs people in them obſerved. In order that when we have beheld the whole of them, and when we have agreed which is the beſt, and which is the worſt man, we may inquire whether the beſt man be the happieſt, and the worſt the moſt miſerable, or otherwiſe. And when I aſked you, which you call the four republics, Polemarchus and Adimantus hereupon interrupted; and you in this manner having taken up the ſubject, are come to this part of the reaſoning. You have recollected, ſaid I, moſt accurately. As a wreſtler now afford me again the ſame opportunity, and whilſt I aſk you the ſame queſtion, endeavour to anſwer what you was going to do then. If indeed I be able, ſaid I. And I am truly deſirous, ſaid he, for my part, to hear which you call the four republics. You ſhall hear that, ſaid I, without difficulty. For they are theſe I mention, and they have names too. There is that which is commended by many, the Cretan and the Spartan. There is, ſecondly, that which has a ſecondary praiſe, called Oligarchy, a republic full of many evils: and that which is different from this one,

and followeth next in order, a Democracy; then genuine Tyranny different from all theſe, the fourth and laſt diſeaſe of a city. Or have you any other form of a republic belonging to any diſtinct ſpecies? For your little principalities and venal kingdoms, and ſuch like republics, are ſome how of a middle kind between theſe, and one may find of them as many among the barbarians as among the Greeks. They are indeed, ſaid he, ſaid to be very many, and very ſtrange ones. Do you know now, ſaid I, that there is ſome how a neceſſity that there be as many ſpecies of men as of republics? Or do you imagine that republics are generated ſome how of an oak, or a rock, and not of the manners of thoſe who are in the city, to which, as into a current, all other things likewiſe are drawn? By no means do I imagine, ſaid he, they are generated from any thing but from hence. If then there be five ſpecies of cities; the ſpecies of ſouls in individuals ſhall be likewiſe five. Why not? We have already gone over that one which reſembleth an Ariſtocracy, which we have rightly pronounced to be both good and juſt. We have ſo. Are we now, in the next place, to go over the worſe ſpecies, the contentious and the ambitious man, who is formed according to the Spartan republic; and then him reſembling an Oligarchy; then the Democratic and the Tyrannic, that we may contemplate the moſt unjuſt, and ſet him in oppoſition to the moſt juſt, that our inquiry may be completed? How after all, the moſt finiſhed juſtice is in compariſon of the moſt finiſhed injuſtice, as to the happineſs or miſery of the poſſeſſor?

That ſo we may either follow injuſtice being perſuaded by Thraſymachus, or juſtice, yielding to the preſent reaſoning? By all means, ſaid he, we muſt do ſo. Shall we then, in the ſame manner, as we began, conſider the manners in republics, before we conſider them in private perſons, as being there more conſpicuous? And according to this method the ambitious republic is firſt to be conſidered (for I have no other name to call it by, but it may be called either ambitious, or aſpiring after power;) and along with it we ſhall conſider a man reſembling it; afterwards we ſhall conſider an Oligarchy, and a man reſembling Oligarchy; and then again when we have viewed a Democracy, we ſhall contemplate a Democratic man; and then in the fourth place, when we come to Tyranny, and contemplate it, and likewiſe a tyrannic ſoul, we ſhall endeavour to become competent judges of what we propoſed. Both our contemplation and judgment, ſaid he, would in this manner at leaſt be agreeable to reaſon. Come then, ſaid I, let us endeavour to tell in what manner the ambitious republic ariſes out of Ariſtocracy. Or is not this plain, that every republic changes, by means of that part which holds the magiſtracies; when in this itſelf, there ariſes ſedition; but whilſt this agrees with itſelf, though the ſtate be extremely ſmall, it is impoſſible to be changed? It is ſo indeed. How then, Glauco! ſhall our city be changed? Or in what ſhape ſhall our allies and rulers fall into ſedition with one another, and among themſelves? Or are you willing, that, like Homer, we invoke the Muſes to tell us;

"How firſt ſedition roſe." And ſhall we ſay, that whilſt they talk tragically, playing with us, and rallying us as children, they yet talk ſeriouſly and ſublimely? In what manner? Some how thus. It is indeed difficult for a city in this manner conſtituted to be changed. But as every thing which is generated is liable to corruption, neither will ſuch a conſtitution as this remain for ever, but be diſſolved. And its diſſolution is this. Not only the vegetable ſpecies, but likewiſe the animal, has ſeaſons of fertility and ſterility of ſoul as well as of body, when their revolutions complete the periphery of their reſpective orbits: which are ſhorter to the ſhorter lived, and contrarywiſe to ſuch as are the contrary; and with reference to the fertility and ſterility of our race, although they are wiſe theſe you have educated to be governours of cities, yet will they not, for all that, by their reaſon joined with ſenſation, obſerve the proper ſeaſons, but overlook them, and ſometimes generate children when they ought not. Now the period for a divine generation is that which the perfect number comprehends: and that for a human generation*, is that whole geometrical number, which is of ſuch an influence as to regulate the better and the worſe births. Of which when our governours, being ignorant, join our couples together unſeaſonably, the children ſhall neither be of a good genius, nor fortunate. And though the former governours ſhall inſtall the beſt of them in the office, they nevertheleſs being unworthy of it, and coming to have the power their fathers

Mont. b. II. c. 6.

* Six or eight lines here omitted, as the text is unintelligible or corrupted.

had, will begin to be negligent of us, in their guardianſhip in the firſt place, eſteeming muſic leſs than they ought, and in the next place the exerciſes. Hence our youth ſhall become leſs acquainted with muſic. And the guardians which ſhall be appointed from among theſe, ſhall not be altogether expert guardians, to diſtinguiſh, according to Heſiod and us, the ſeveral ſpecies of geniuſes. The golden, the ſilver, the brazen, and the iron: but whilſt iron is mixed with ſilver and braſs with gold, diſſimilitude ariſes, and unharmonious irregularity. And when theſe ariſe, wherever they prevail, they perpetually generate war and enmity. To ſuch a race now of men as this, we muſt ſuppoſe them to ſay, that ſedition belongs whenever it happens to riſe. And we ſhall ſay that they have anſwered juſtly at leaſt, reply'd he. And of neceſſity, ſaid I, for they are muſes. What then, ſaid he, do the muſes ſay next? When ſedition is riſen, ſaid I, two of the ſpecies of geniuſes, the iron and the brazen will be carried after making gain, and the acquiſition of lands and houſes, of gold and ſilver. But the golden and the ſilver geniuſes, as they are not in want, but naturally rich, will lead the ſoul towards virtue and the original conſtitution; yet as they live in a violent manner, and draw contrary to one another, they make an agreement to divide their lands and houſes between them, and to dwell apart one from another: and then enſlaving thoſe who were formerly kept by them as freemen, as friends, and tutors, they keep them as domeſtics and ſlaves, for ſervice in war and for their own protection. This re-

Inequality of Genius.

volution, ſaid he, ſeems to me to ariſe in ſuch a manner. Shall not then this republic, ſaid I, be ſomewhat in the middle between Ariſtocracy and Oligarchy? Certainly. And the change ſhall happen in this manner, and on this change what ſort of life ſhall it lead? Or is it not plain, that in ſome things it ſhall imitate the former republic, and in others Oligarchy, as being in the middle of the two, and ſhall likewiſe have ſomewhat peculiar to itſelf? Juſt ſo, reply'd he. Shall they not then, in honouring their rulers, and in this that their military abſtain from agriculture, from mechanical and other gainful employments, in their eſtabliſhing common meals, and in ſtudying both gymnaſtic exerciſes and conteſts of war, in all theſe things ſhall they not imitate the former republic? Yes. But in this, that they are afraid to bring wiſe men into the magiſtracy, as having no longer any ſuch as are truly ſimple and inflexible, but ſuch as are of a mixed kind; and in that they incline for thoſe who are more forward and rough, whoſe natural genius is rather fitted for war than peace, and in that they eſteem tricks and ſtratagems, and ſpend the whole of their time in continual war, in all theſe reſpects ſhall it not have many things peculiar to itſelf? Yes. And ſuch as theſe, ſaid I, ſhall be deſirous of wealth, as thoſe who live in Oligarchies, and in an illiberal manner, value gold and ſilver hoarded up, as having repoſitories of their own, and domeſtic treaſuries, where they hoard them up, and hide them, and have their houſes encloſed about, where, as in neſts altogether peculiar, they ſquander every thing

profuſely, together with their wives and ſuch others as they fancy. Moſt true, ſaid he. And will they not likewiſe be ſparing of their ſubſtance, as valuing it highly, and acquiring it not in an open manner, but love to ſquander the ſubſtance of others, through their diſſoluteneſs, and ſecretly indulging their pleaſures. They will likewiſe fly from the law, as children from their father, who have been educated not by perſuaſion but by force, having neglected the true muſe, which is accompanied with reaſon and philoſophy, and honoured exerciſe more than muſic. You deſcribe entirely, ſaid he, a mixed republic, compounded of good and ill. It is indeed mixed, ſaid I. One thing is moſt remarkable in it, from the prevalence of the forward temper, contention, and ambition. Exceedingly, ſaid he. Doth not then, ſaid I, this republic ariſe in this manner? And is it not of ſuch a kind as this, as far as the form of a republic can be deſcribed in words where there is not perfect accuracy; as it ſufficeth us to contemplate in deſcription likewiſe the moſt juſt and the moſt unjuſt man; and it were a work of prodigious length to go over all republics, and all the various manners of men, without omitting any thing? Very right, ſaid he. What now ſhall the man be correſpondent to this republic; how ſhall he be form'd, and of what kind? I imagine, ſaid Adimantus, he ſhall be ſomewhat like Glauco here, at leaſt in a love of contention. Perhaps, ſaid I, as to this particular. But in other reſpects he does not ſeem to me to have a natural reſemblance of him. In what? He muſt neceſſarily, ſaid I,

be more arrogant, and unapt to muſic, but fond of it: and fond to hear oratory, but not at all an orator: and ſuch an one will be rough towards ſome ſlaves, without deſpiſing them, as he does who is ſufficiently educated; he will be mild towards ſuch as are free, and extremely ſubmiſſive to governours; fond of being in the magiſtracy and of dignity, reckoning that neither eloquence, nor any ſuch thing, ſhould intitle to magiſtracy, but political management and military performances, being a lover of exerciſes and of hunting. This indeed, ſaid he, is the temper of that republic. And ſhall not ſuch an one, ſaid I, deſpiſe money, whilſt he is young, but the older he grows, the more he will always value it, becauſe he partakes of the covetous natural temper, and is not ſincerely affected towards virtue, becauſe deſtitute of the beſt guardian. Which, ſaid Adimantus? Reaſon, ſaid I, accompanied with muſic, which being the alone inbred preſervative of virtue, dwells with the poſſeſſor through the whole of life. You ſay well, reply'd he. And ſurely at leaſt ſuch an ambitious youth, ſaid I, reſembles ſuch a city. Certainly. And ſuch an one, ſaid I, is formed ſome how, in this manner. He happens ſometimes to be the young ſon of a worthy father, who dwells in an ill regulated city, and who ſhuns honours and magiſtracies, and law-ſuits, and all ſuch public buſineſs, and wants to be neglected in obſcurity, in order that he may have no trouble. In what manner then, ſaid he, is he formed? When firſt of all, ſaid I, he hears his mother venting her indignation, becauſe her huſband is not in

the magiſtracy, and complaining that ſhe is on this account neglected among other women, and that ſhe obſerves him not extremely attentive to the making of money, not fighting nor ſcolding privately nor publicly in courts of juſtice; but behaving on all theſe occaſions indolently, and perceiving him always taken up about himſelf, and treating her neither with extreme reſpect nor contempt. Upon all theſe accounts, being filled with indignation, ſhe tells her ſon that his father is unmanly, and extremely remiſs, and all other ſuch things as wives are wont to cant over concerning ſuch huſbands. They are very many truly, ſaid Adimantus, and very much in their ſpirit. And you know, ſaid I, that the domeſtics likewiſe of ſuch families, ſuch of them as appear good-natured ſometimes privately ſay the ſame things to the ſons; and if they ſee any one either owing money whom the father does not ſue at law, or in any other way doing injuſtice, they exhort him to puniſh all ſuch perſons when he comes to be a man, and to be more of a man than his father. And when he goes abroad, he hears other ſuch like things. And he ſees that ſuch in the city as mind their own affairs are called ſimple, and held in little eſteem, and that ſuch as mind not their affairs, are both honoured and commended. The young man now hearing and ſeeing all theſe things, and then again hearing the ſpeeches of his father, and obſerving his purſuits in a near view, in compariſon with thoſe of others, being drawn by both theſe, his father watering and encreaſing the rational part in his ſoul, and theſe others the

concupiſcible and iraſcible, and being naturally no bad man, but ſpoiled by the bad converſations of others, he is brought to a mean between the two, and delivers up the government within himſelf to a middle power, that which is fond of contention and iraſcible, and ſo he becomes a haughty and ambitious man. You ſeem, ſaid he, to have accurately explained the formation of ſuch an one. We have now then, ſaid I, the ſecond republic and the ſecond man. We have, ſaid he. Shall we not after this ſay with Aeſchylus?

" O'er diff'rent cities diff'rent men are ſet."

Or, rather according to our plan, ſhall we firſt eſtabliſh the cities? By all means ſo, reply'd he. It would be Oligarchy then, I imagine, which ſucceeds this republic. But what conſtitution, ſaid he, is it you call Oligarchy? That republic, ſaid I, which is founded on men's valuations, in which the rich bear rule, and the poor have no ſhare in the government. I underſtand, ſaid he. Muſt we not tell, firſt, how the change is made from the ambitious republic to the Oligarchy? We muſt. And ſurely at leaſt how this change is made, ſaid I, is manifeſt even to the blind. How? That treaſury, ſaid I, which every one hath filled with gold deſtroys ſuch a republic; for firſt of all, they find out for themſelves methods of expence, and to this purpoſe ſtrain the laws, both they and their wives diſobeying them. That is likely, ſaid he. And afterwards, as I imagine, one obſerving another, and coming to rival one another, the generality are rendered of this kind. It is likely. And from hence

then, ſaid I, proceeding ſtill to a greater deſire of making money, the more honourable they account this to be, the more will virtue be thought diſhonourable: or is not virtue ſo different from wealth, that if each of them be placed in the oppoſite arm of a balance, they always weigh oppoſite to each other? Entirely ſo, reply'd he. But whilſt wealth and the wealthy are held in honour in the city, both virtue and the good muſt be more diſhonoured. It is plain. And what is honoured is always purſued, and what is diſhonoured is neglected. Juſt ſo. Inſtead then of contentious and ambitious men, they will at laſt become lovers of gain and of wealth. The rich, on the one hand, they both praiſe and admire, and bring into the magiſtracy, but the poor man they deſpiſe? Certainly. And do not they then make laws, marking out the boundary of the Oligarchic conſtitution, and regulating the quantity of Oligarchic power according to the quantity of wealth, more to the more wealthy, and leſs to the leſs, intimating that he who hath not the valuation ſettled by law, is to have no ſhare in the government? And theſe things they tranſact violently, by force of arms, or eſtabliſh ſuch a republic after they have previouſly ſtrucken them with terror. Is it not thus? Thus indeed. This then to ſay in a word is the conſtitution. It is, reply'd he. But what now is the nature of the republic, and what are the faults we aſcribed to it? Firſt of all, ſaid I, this very thing, the conſtitution itſelf, what think you of this? For conſider, if one ſhould in this manner appoint pilots of ſhips, according to their valuations, but never

entruſt one with a poor man, though better ſkill'd in piloting? They would, ſaid he, make very bad navigation. And is it not in the ſame manner with reference to any other thing, or any government whatever? I imagine ſo. Is it ſo in all caſes but in a city, ſaid I? or is it ſo with reference to a city likewiſe? There moſt eſpecially, ſaid he, in as much as it is the moſt difficult, and the greateſt government. Oligarchy then would ſeem to have this one, which is ſo great a fault. It appears ſo. But what? Is this any thing leſs than it? What? That ſuch a city is not one, but of neceſſity two; one conſiſting of the poor, and the other of the rich, dwelling in one place, and always plotting againſt one another. Truly, ſaid he, it is no way leſs. But ſurely neither is this a handſome thing, to be incapable to wage any war, becauſe of the neceſſity they are under, either of employing the armed multitude, and of dreading them more than the enemy themſelves; or not employing them, to appear in battle itſelf truly Oligarchic, and at the ſame time to be unwilling to advance money for the public ſervice, through a natural diſpoſition of covetouſneſs. This is not handſome. But what? with reference to what we long ago condemned, the engaging in a multiplicity of different things, the ſame perſons, at the ſame time, minding in ſuch a republic, agriculture, lucrative employments, and military affairs, does this appear to be right? Not in any degree. But ſee now whether this form of republic be the firſt which introduceth this greateſt of all evils. What is that? That one ſhall be allow-

ed to diſpoſe of the whole of his effects, and another to purchaſe them from him, and the ſeller be allowed to dwell in the city, whilſt he belongs to no one claſs in the city, and is neither called a maker of money, nor mechanic, nor horſe-man, nor foot-ſoldier, but poor and deſtitute. It is the firſt, ſaid he. But yet ſuch an one ſhall not be prohibited in Oligarchic governments, for otherwiſe ſome of them ſhould not be over-rich, and others altogether poor. Right. But conſider this likewiſe. When ſuch a rich man as this is ſpends of his ſubſtance, was it of any more advantage to the city with reference to the purpoſes we now mentioned? or did he appear to be indeed one of the magiſtrates, but was in truth neither magiſtrate of the city, nor ſervant to it, but a waſter of ſubſtance? So he appeared, reply'd he. He was nothing but a waſter. Are you willing then, ſaid I, that we ſay of him, that as when a drone is in a bee-cell, it is the diſeaſe of the ſwarm; in like manner ſuch an one, when a drone in his houſe, it is the diſeaſe of the city? Entirely ſo, Socrates! reply'd he. And hath not God, Adimantus! made all the winged drones without any ſting; but theſe with feet, ſome of them without ſtings, and ſome of them with dreadful ſtings? And of thoſe who are without ſtings, are they who continue poor to old age; and of thoſe who have ſtings, are all theſe who are called miſchievous. Moſt true, ſaid he. It is plain then, ſaid I, that in a city where you obſerve there are poor, there are ſomewhere in that place concealed thieves and purſe-cutters, and ſacrilegious perſons, and workers of all other ſuch evils. It is

plain, ſaid he. What then? Do not you perceive poor people in cities under Oligarchic government? They are almoſt all ſo, ſaid he, except the governours. And do we not imagine, ſaid I, that there are many miſchievous perſons in them with ſtings, whom the magiſtracy, by diligence, and by force, reſtrains? We imagine ſo indeed, ſaid he. And ſhall we not ſay, that through want of education, through bad nurture, and a corrupt conſtitution of ſtate, ſuch ſort of perſons are there produced? We ſhall ſay ſo. Is not then the city which is under Oligarchy of ſuch a kind as this, and hath it not ſuch evils as theſe, and probably more too? It is nearly ſo, ſaid he. We have now finiſhed, ſaid I, this republic likewiſe, which they call Oligarchy, having its governours according to valuation. And let us now conſider the man who reſembles it, in what manner he ariſes, and what ſort of man he is. By all means, ſaid he. And is not the change from that ambitious one, to the Oligarchic, chiefly in this manner? How? When ſuch a one hath a ſon, firſt of all, he both emulates his father, and follows his ſteps, afterwards he ſees him, on a ſudden, daſhed on the city, as on a rock, and waſting both his ſubſtance and himſelf, either in the office of a general, or ſome other principal magiſtracy; then falling into courts of juſtice, deſtroyed by ſycophants, either put to death, or ſtrip'd of his dignities, diſgraced, and loſing all his ſubſtance. It is likely, ſaid he. When he hath ſeen, and ſuffered thoſe things, friend! and hath loſt his ſubſtance, he inſtantly in a terror, puſheth headlong from the throne of

his ſoul, that ambitious and forward diſpoſition, and being humbled by his poverty, turns to the making of money, lives meanly and ſparingly, and applying to work, ſcrapes together ſubſtance. Or do you not imagine, that ſuch a man will then ſeat in that throne the covetous and avaricious diſpoſition, and make it a mighty king within himſelf, deck'd out with Perſian crowns, and bracelets, and ſceptres? I imagine ſo, ſaid he. But he, I imagine, having placed both the rational and the ambitious diſpoſition low on the ground, on either ſide, and having enſlaved them under it, the one he allows to reaſon on nothing, nor ever to inquire but in what way leſſer ſubſtance ſhall be made greater; and the other again he allows to admire and honour nothing but riches and rich people, and to receive honour on no other account, but the acquiſition of money, or whatever conduceth towards it. There is no other change, ſaid he, of an ambitious youth to a covetous one ſo ſudden and ſo powerful as this. Is not this then, ſaid I, the Oligarchic man? And the change into ſuch an one, is from a man reſembling that republic, from which the Oligarchic republic ariſeth. Let us conſider now if he any way reſembleth it. Let us conſider. Does he not, in the firſt place, reſemble it in valuing money above all things? Why does he not? And ſurely at leaſt in being ſparing and laborious, ſatisfying only his neceſſary deſires, and not allowing of any other expences, but ſubduing the other deſires as fooliſh. Certainly. And being, ſaid I, an emaciated man, and making gain of every thing,

a hoarding-up perſon, ſuch as the multitude extols------ would not this be the man who reſembleth ſuch a republic? It appears ſo to me, reply'd he. Riches then muſt be moſt valued both by the city and by ſuch a man. For I do not imagine, ſaid I, that ſuch a man hath applied his mind to education. I do not imagine he has, ſaid he; for he would not have taken a blind one to be the leader of his life. But farther ſtill, conſider this attentively, ſaid I, ſhall we not ſay that there are in him from the want of education, the deſires of the drone, ſome of them beggarly, and ſome of them miſchievous, forcibly kept in by ſome other deſire? Entirely ſo, ſaid he. Do you know then, ſaid I, where you will beſt obſerve their wickedneſs? Where, ſaid he? In their tutelages of orphans, or in whatever elſe of this kind comes in their way, where they have it much in their power to do injuſtice. True. And is not this now manifeſt that in every other commerce of life, wherever ſuch an one acts ſo as to be approven, appearing to be juſt, and by a certain moderate behaviour, reſtrains the other wrong deſires within him, he does ſo, not from any perſuaſion, that it is not better to indulge them, nor from ſober reaſon, but from neceſſity and fear, trembling for the reſt of his ſubſtance. Entirely ſo, ſaid he. And truly, ſaid I, friend! you ſhall find in the moſt of them deſires partaking of the nature of the drone, where there is occaſion to ſpend the things of others. Very much ſo, ſaid he. Such a one as this then will not be without ſedition within himſelf; nor be one, but a kind of double man; he

will however have for the moſt part deſires governing other deſires, the better governing the worſe. It is ſo. And on theſe accounts ſuch a one, as I imagine, will be more decent than many others, but the true virtue of a harmonized and conſiſtent ſoul would far eſcape him. It appears ſo to me. And the parſimonious man will, in private life, be but a poor rival for any victory, or in any conteſt of the honourable kind. And being unwilling, for the ſake of good reputation, or for any ſuch conteſts, to ſpend his ſubſtance, being afraid to waken up expenſive deſires, or any alliance or conteſt of this kind, fighting with a ſmall part of his forces in an Oligarchic manner, he is generally defeated, and makes rich. Very true, ſaid he. Do we then yet heſitate, ſaid I, to rank the covetous and parſimonious man as moſt of all reſembling the city under Oligarchic government? By no means, ſaid he. Democracy now, as ſeems, is next to be conſidered, in what manner it ariſes, and what kind of man it produceth when ariſen; that underſtanding the nature of ſuch a man, we may bring him to a trial. We ſhall in this method, ſaid he, proceed in a conſiſtency with ourſelves. Is not, ſaid I, the change from Oligarchy to Democracy, produced in ſome ſuch way as this, through the inſatiable deſire of the propoſed good, viz. the deſire of becoming as rich as poſſible. How now? As thoſe who are governours in it, govern on account of their poſſeſſing great riches, they will be unwilling, I imagine, to reſtrain by law ſuch of the youth as are diſſolute from having the liberty of ſquandering and waſt-

ing their ſubſtance; that ſo, by purchaſing the ſubſtance of ſuch perſons, and lending them on uſury, they may ſtill become both richer, and be held in greater honour. They will be more unwilling than any other. And is not this already manifeſt in the city, that it is impoſſible for the citizens to hold riches in eſteem, and at the ſame time ſufficiently to poſſeſs temperance, but either the one or the other muſt of neceſſity be neglected? It is abundantly plain, ſaid he. But whilſt in Oligarchies they neglect education, and ſuffer the youth to grow licentious, they lay ſometimes under a neceſſity of becoming poor, ſuch as are of no ungenerous diſpoſition. Very much ſo. And theſe, I imagine, ſit in the city, ſitted both with ſtings and with armour, ſome of them in debt, others in contempt, others in both, hating and conſpiring againſt thoſe who poſſeſs their ſubſtance, and others likewiſe being deſirous of a change. Theſe things are ſo. But the money-catchers ſtill brooding over it, and not ſeeming to obſerve theſe; but wherever they ſee any of the reſt giving way, they wound them by throwing money into their hands, and drawing to themſelves exorbitant uſury, fill the city with plenty of drones, and of poor. How can there be, ſaid he, but great plenty. Nor yet, ſaid I, when ſo great an evil is burning in the city, are they willing to extinguiſh it, not even by that method, reſtraining any one from ſpending his ſubſtance at pleaſure; nor yet to take that method, by which, according to the ſecond law, ſuch diſorder might be removed. According to which? According to that, which after that other, is ſecondary,

obliging the citizens to apply to virtue: for if one ſhould enjoin them to trade a great deal in the way of voluntary commerce, and upon their own hazard, they ſhould in a leſs ſhameful way make money in the city, and likewiſe leſs of thoſe evils we have now mentioned ſhould ariſe in it. Much leſs, ſaid he. But at preſent, ſaid I, by means of all theſe things, the governours render the governed of this kind. And do they not render both themſelves and all belonging to them, and the youth likewiſe, luxurious and idle with reſpect to all the exerciſes of body and of mind, and effeminate in bearing both pleaſures and pains, and likewiſe indolent? What elſe? As to themſelves, they neglect every thing but the making of money, and make no more account of virtue than the poor do. They do not indeed. After they are trained up in this manner. When theſe governours and their ſubjects meet together either on the road in their journeying, or in any other meetings, either at public ſhows, or military marches, either when fellow-ſailors or fellow-ſoldiers, or when they ſee one another in common dangers, by no means are the poor in theſe caſes contemned by the rich; but very often a robuſt fellow poor and ſun-burnt, when he has his rank in battle beſide a rich man bred up in the ſhade, and ſwoln with a great deal of adventitious fleſh, and ſees him panting for breath and in agony, do not you imagine that he thinks it is through their own fault that ſuch fellows grow rich, and that they ſay to one another, when they meet in private, that our rich men are good for nothing at all? I

know very well, ſaid he, that they do ſo. For as a diſeaſed body needs but the ſmalleſt ſhock from without to render it ſickly, and ſometimes without any impreſſion from without is in ſedition with itſelf, ſhall not in like manner a city reſembling it in theſe things, on the ſmalleſt occaſion from without, when either the one party maketh an alliance with the Oligarchic, or the other with the Democratic, be ſickly and fight with itſelf, and ſometimes without theſe things from abroad, be in ſedition? And extremely ſo. A Democracy then, as I imagine, ariſes when the poor prevailing over the rich, kill ſome, and baniſh others, and ſhare the places in the republic, and the magiſtracies equally among the remainder, and for the moſt part the magiſtracies are diſpoſed in it by lot. This truly, ſaid he, is the eſtabliſhment of a Democracy, whether it ariſe by force of arms, or through others withdrawing themſelves through fear. In what manner now, ſaid I, do theſe live, and what ſort of a republic is this; for it is plain that a man of this kind ſhall appear ſome Democratic one? It is plain, ſaid he. Is not then the city, in the firſt place, full of all freedom of action, and of ſpeech, and of liberty, to do in it what any one inclines? So truly it is ſaid at leaſt, reply'd he. And wherever there is liberty, it is plain, that every one will regulate his own method of life in whatever way he pleaſes. It is plain. And, I imagine, that in ſuch a republic moſt eſpecially, there would ariſe men of all kinds. How can it be otherwiſe? This, ſaid I, ſeems to be the fineſt of all republics, as a variegated robe diverſified with all kinds

of flowers, ſo this republic, variegated with all ſorts of manners, appears the fineſt. What elſe, ſaid he? And it is likely, ſaid I, that the multitude judge this republic to be the beſt, like children and women gazing at variegated things. Very likely, ſaid he. And it is very proper at leaſt, happy friend! ſaid I, to ſearch for a republic in ſuch a ſtate as this. How now? Becauſe it contains all kinds of republics on account of liberty; and it appears neceſſary for any one who wants to conſtitute a city, as we do at preſent, to come to a Democratic city, as to a general fair of republics, and chuſe that form which he fancies. It is likely indeed, ſaid he, he ſhould not be in want of models. But what now, ſaid I, is not this a divine and ſweet manner of life for the preſent. To be under no neceſſity in ſuch a city to govern, not though you were able to govern, nor yet to be ſubject unleſs you incline, nor to be engaged in war when others are, nor to live in peace when others do ſo unleſs you be deſirous of peace: and though there be a law reſtraining you from governing or adminiſtering juſtice, to govern nevertheleſs, and adminiſter juſtice if you incline. It is likely, ſaid he, it is pleaſant for the preſent at leaſt. But what now, is not the meekneſs of ſome of thoſe who are condemned very curious? Or have you not as yet obſerved, in ſuch a republic, men condemned to death or baniſhment, yet nevertheleſs continuing ſtill, and walking up and down openly, and as if no one minded or obſerved him, the condemned man returns like a hero? I have obſerved very many, ſaid he. But is not this indulgence

of the city very generous, and not at all to ſay the ſmall regard, but the contempt it ſhows for all thoſe things we celebrated ſo much when we ſettled our city, how that unleſs one had an extraordinary genius, he never would become a good man, unleſs when a child he were inſtantly educated in things handſome, and ſhould diligently apply to all theſe things: how magnanimouſly it deſpiſes all theſe things, and does not regard from what ſort of purſuits one comes to act in political affairs, but honours him if he only ſay he is well affected towards the multitude? This contempt, ſaid he, is very generous indeed. Theſe now, ſaid I, and ſuch things as are a-kin to theſe, are to be found in a Democracy, and it would be, as appears, a pleaſant ſort of republic, anarchical, and variegated, diſtributing a certain equality to all alike without diſtinction. What you ſay, reply'd he, is quite manifeſt. Conſider now, ſaid I, what ſort of man ſuch an one is in private, or, firſt, muſt we not conſider as we did with reſpect to the republic in what manner he ariſes? Yes, ſaid he. And does he not in this manner ariſe from that parſimonious one, who was under the Oligarchy as a ſon, I imagine, train'd up by his father in his manners? Why not? Such a one by force governs his own pleaſures, theſe of them which are expenſive, and tend not towards making money, and which are called unneceſſary ones. It is plain, ſaid he. Are you willing then, ſaid I, that we may not reaſon in the dark, firſt to determine what deſires are neceſſary, and what are not? I am content, ſaid he. May not ſuch be juſtly called neceſſary,

which we are not able to remove, and such as when gratified are of advantage to us; for both these kinds our nature is under a necessity to pursue; is it not? Very strongly. This then we shall justly say makes the necessary part in our desires. Justly. But what now? Such desires as one may banish, if he study it from his youth, and such as whilst they remain do no good, if we say of these that they are not necessary, shall we not say right? Right indeed. Let us chuse out a sample of each of them, that we may understand by an example what they are. It is proper. Is not the desire of eating, so far as is conducive towards health and good habit of body; and the desire of food and victuals, may it not be considered as of the necessary kind? I imagine so. The desire of food at least is indeed necessary on both accounts, as meat is advantageous, and as the want of it must put an end to life altogether. It is. And the desire of victuals is likewise necessary if it any how contribute any thing towards the good habit of the body. Certainly. But what? Such desire even of these things as goes beyond these purposes, or such desire as respects other meats than these, and yet is capable of being curb'd in youth, and by being disciplined, to be removed from many things, and which is hurtful both to the body, and hurtful to the soul with reference to her attaining wisdom and temperance, may not such desire be rightly called unnecessary. Most rightly indeed. And may we not call these expensive likewise, and the others frugal, as they are conducive towards the actions of life? Why not? In the same manner, surely

ſhall we ſay of venereal deſires, and the others. In the ſame manner. And did we not by him whom we juſt now denominated the drone, mean one who was full of ſuch deſires and pleaſures, and was governed by the unneceſſary deſires? but that he who was under the neceſſary ones was the parſimonious and Oligarchic. Without doubt. Let us again mention, ſaid I, how the Democratic ariſes from the Oligarchic; and to me he appears to ariſe in great meaſure thus. How? When a young man bred up, as we now mentioned, without proper inſtruction, and in a parſimonious manner, comes to taſte the honey of the drones, and aſſociates with thoſe vehement and terrible creatures who are able to procure all ſorts of pleaſures, and every way diverſified, and from every quarter. Thence imagine there is ſome how the beginning of a change in him from the Oligarchic to the Democratic. There is great neceſſity for it, ſaid he. And as the city was changed by the aſſiſtance of an alliance from without with one party of it with which it was a-kin, ſhall not the youth be changed in the ſame manner, by the aſſiſtance of one ſpecies of deſires from without, to another within him which reſembleth it, and is a-kin to it? By all means. And I imagine at leaſt, if by any alliance there be given counter-aſſiſtance to the Oligarchic party within him, either any how by his father, or by the others of the family, both admoniſhing and upbraiding him, then truly ariſes ſedition, and oppoſition, and a fight within him with himſelf. Why does there not? And ſometimes indeed, I imagine, the Democratic party yields

to the Oligarchic, and ſome of the deſires are deſtroyed, ſome of them retire, on the riſe of a certain modeſty in the ſoul of the youth, and he is again rendered ſomewhat decent. It happeneth ſometimes, ſaid he. And again, I imagine, that when ſome deſires retire, there are others a-kin to them which grow up, and through inattention to the father's inſtruction, become both many and powerful. It is wont, ſaid he, to happen ſo. And do they not draw towards intimacies among themſelves, and meeting privately together, generate a multitude? What elſe? And at length, I imagine, they ſeize the citadel of the ſoul of the youth, finding it evacuated both of noble learning and purſuits and of true reaſoning, which truly are the beſt watchmen and guardians in the underſtandings of men beloved of the Gods. Very much ſo, ſaid he. And then indeed, falſe and boaſting reaſonings and opinions, ruſhing up in their ſtead, poſſeſs the ſame place in ſuch a one. Strongly ſo, ſaid he. And does he not now again, on coming among thoſe Lotophagi, dwell with them openly? And if any aſſiſtance come from his friends to the parſimonious part of his ſoul, thoſe boaſting reaſonings ſhutting the gates of the royal wall againſt it, neither give enterance to this alliance, nor to the ambaſſadorial admonitions of private old men; but fighting againſt theſe, hold the government themſelves. And denominating modeſty to be ſtupidity, they thruſt it out diſgracefully as a fugitive, and temperance they call unmanlineſs, and abuſing it moſt ſhamefully, thruſt it out; and perſuading themſelves that moderation, and decent expence, are no other than ruſticity;

and illiberality, they expel them their territories, with many other and unprofitable desires. This they do mightily. And after that they have emptied and cleared of all these desires the soul that is held down by them, and is initiated in all the great mysteries, they next lead in, with encomiums and applauses, insolence and anarchy, and luxury, and impudence, shining with a great retinue, and crowned with crowns; insolence, they denominate Education; anarchy they call Liberty; luxury they call Magnificence; and impudence they call Manhood. Is it not, said I, some how in this manner, that a youth changes from one bred up with the necessary desires into the licentiousness and remissness of the unnecessary and unprofitable pleasures? And very plainly so, reply'd he. And such a one, I imagine, after this leads his life, expending his substance, his labour, and his time no more on the necessary than the unnecessary pleasures: and if he be fortunate, and be not excessively debauched, when he is somewhat more advanced in years, and when the great croud of desires is over, he admits a part of those which were thrust out, and does not deliver himself wholly up to such as had intruded, but regulates his pleasures by a sort of equality, and so lives delivering up the government of himself to every incidental desire as it chanceth, till it be satisfied, and then to another, undervaluing none of them, but indulging them all alike. Entirely so. And such a one, said I, does not listen to true reasoning, nor admit it into the citadel, if any should tell him that there are some pleasures of the worthy and the good desires,

and others of the ill ones: and that he ought to purſue and honour thoſe, but to chaſtiſe and ſubject theſe. But, in all theſe caſes, he diſſents, and ſays that they are all alike, and ought to be held in equal honour. Whoever is thus affected, ſaid he, acts in this manner very powerfully. And does he not live, ſaid I, from day to day, indulging after this manner every incidental deſire, ſometimes indulging himſelf in drinking ſtrong drink, and in muſic, ſometimes drinking water, and extenuating himſelf by abſtinence; then again minding the exerciſes; ſometimes too he is quite indolent and careleſs about every thing; then again he applies as it were to philoſophy,-----many times he acts the part of a politician, and in a deſultory manner ſays and does whatever happens: if at any time he affects to imitate any of the military, thither he is carried; or of the mercantile, then again hither; nor is his life regulated by any order, or any neceſſity, but deeming this ſort of life pleaſant, and free, and happy, he followeth it throughout? You have entirely, ſaid he, gone through the life of one who puts all laws whatever on a level. I imagine at leaſt, ſaid I, that he is multiform, and full of very different manners; and that like the city, he is fine, and variegated, and that very many men and women would deſire to imitate his life, as he hath in him a great many patterns of republics and of manners. He hath ſo, ſaid he. What now? Shall ſuch a man as this be ranked as reſembling a Democracy, as he may truly be called Democratic? Let him be ranked, ſaid he. But it yet remains that we go over, ſaid I, the moſt ex-

cellent republic, and the moſt excellent man, viz. Tyranny, and the Tyrant. It does, ſaid he. Come then, friend companion! in what manner does Tyranny ariſe; for it is almoſt plain that the change is from Democracy? It is plain. Does not Tyranny ariſe in the ſame manner from Democracy, as Democracy does from Oligarchy? How? What did Oligarchy, ſaid I, propoſe as its good, and according to what was it conſtituted? It was with a view to become extremely rich, was it not? Yes. An inſatiable deſire then of riches, and a neglect of other things, through attention to making money, deſtroyeth it. True, ſaid he. And with reference to that which Democracy denominateth good, an inſatiable thirſt of it deſtroys it likewiſe? But what is it you ſay it denominates good? Liberty, ſaid I. For this you are told is moſt beautiful in a city which is under a Democracy, and that for the ſake of liberty any one who is naturally of a free ſpirit chuſes to live in it alone. This word, Liberty, ſaid he, is indeed often mentioned. Does not then, ſaid I, as I was going to ſay, the inſatiable deſire of this, and the neglect of other things, change even this republic, and prepare it to ſtand in need of a tyrant? How, ſaid he. When a city, ſaid I, is under a Democracy, and is thirſting after liberty, and happens to have bad cup-bearers appointed it, and grows drunk with an unmixed draught of it beyond what is neceſſary, it puniſhes even the governours if they will not be entirely tame, and afford a deal of liberty, accuſing them as corrupted, and leaning towards Oligarchy. That they do, ſaid he. But ſuch as are

obedient to magiſtrates, they abuſe, ſaid I, as willing ſlaves, and good for nothing, and both in private and in public, commend and honour magiſtrates who reſemble ſubjects, and ſubjects who reſemble magiſtrates; muſt they not in ſuch a city, of neceſſity, go to the higheſt pitch of liberty? Why muſt they not? And muſt not this inbred anarchy, friend! deſcend into private families, and in the end reach even the brutes? How, ſaid he, do we ſay ſuch a thing as this? Juſt as if, ſaid I, a father ſhould accuſtom himſelf to reſemble a child, and to be afraid of his ſons, and the ſon accuſtom himſelf to reſemble his father, and neither to revere nor to ſtand in awe of his parents, that ſo indeed he may be free, as if a ſtranger were to be equalled with a citizen, and a citizen with a ſtranger, and in like manner, a foreigner. It is juſt ſo, ſaid he. Theſe things, ſaid I, and other little things of a like nature happen. The teacher in ſuch a city fears and flatters the ſcholars, and the ſcholars deſpiſe their teachers and their tutors in like manner: and in general the youth reſemble the more advanced in years, and rival it with them both in words and deeds: and the old men ſitting down with the young, are full of merriment and pleaſantry, mimicking the youth, that they may not appear to be moroſe and deſpotic. It is entirely ſo, reply'd he. But that higheſt pitch, ſaid I, of the liberty of the multitude, how great it is in ſuch a city as this, when the men and women-ſlaves are no leſs free than thoſe who purchaſe them, and how great an equality and liberty the wives have with their huſbands, and huſbands with their wives, we have almoſt

forgotten to mention. Shall we not then, according to Aeſchylus, ſaid he, ſay whatever now comes into our mouth. By all means, ſaid I; and accordingly I do ſay in this manner; with reference even to the brute creatures, ſuch of them as are under men's diſcipline, how much more free they are in ſuch a city, one who has not experience of it will not eaſily believe: for readily even the puppies, according to the proverb, reſemble their miſtreſſes; and the horſes and aſſes are accuſtomed to go freely and gracefully, marching up againſt any one they meet on the road unleſs he give way; and many other ſuch things happen full, in like manner, of liberty. You tell me, ſaid he, my dream; for I have often met with this when going into the country. But do you obſerve, ſaid I, what is the ſum of all thoſe things collected together? How delicate it maketh the ſoul of the citizens, in ſo much, that if any one bring near to them any thing of ſlavery, they are filled with indignation, and cannot endure it. And do you know, that at length they regard not even the laws, written or unwritten, that no one whatever by any manner of means may become their maſter. I know it well, ſaid he. This now, friend! ſaid I, is that government ſo beautiful and youthful, whence Tyranny ſprings, as it appears to me. Youthful truly, reply'd he! but what comes after this? The ſame thing, ſaid I, which ſpringing up as a diſeaſe in Oligarchy, deſtroyed it; the ſame ariſing here in a greater and more powerful manner, through its licentiouſneſs, enſlaves the Democracy: and in reality, the doing any thing to exceſs, is wont to occa-

ſion a mighty change to the reverſe: thus in ſeaſons, in vegetable and in animal bodies, and in republics as much as any. It is probable, ſaid he. And exceſſive liberty ſeems to change into nothing elſe but exceſſive ſlavery, both with a private perſon and a city. It is probable indeed. It is probable then, ſaid I, that out of no other republic is Tyranny conſtituted but out of Democracy, out of the moſt exceſſive liberty I imagine the greateſt and moſt ſavage ſlavery. There is indeed, ſaid he, reaſon for it. But this I imagine, ſaid I, was not what you was aſking. But what is that diſeaſe which enſlaves Democracy, reſembling that which deſtroys Oligarchy? You ſay true, reply'd he. That then, ſaid I, I called the race of idle and profuſe men, one part of which was more brave, and were leaders, the other more cowardly, and followed. And we compared them to drones; ſome to ſuch as have ſtings, others to ſuch as have none. And rightly, ſaid he. Theſe two now, ſaid I, ſpringing up in any republic, raiſe diſturbance, as phlegm and bile in a natural body. And it behoves a wiſe phyſician and law-giver of a city no leſs than a wiſe bee-maſter, to be afraid of theſe, at a great diſtance principally that they never get in, but if they have gotten in, that they be in the ſpeedieſt manner poſſible cut off, together with their very cells. Yes, truly, ſaid he, by all means. Let us take it then, ſaid I, in this manner, that we may ſee more diſtinctly what we want. In what manner? Let us divide in our reaſoning a Democratic city into three, as it really is; for one ſuch ſpecies as the above grows through licentiouſneſs in it no leſs

than in the Oligarchic. It does ſo. But it is much more fierce at leaſt in this than in that one. How? Under Oligarchy, becauſe it is not in places of honour, but is debarred from the magiſtracies, it is unexerciſed, and does not become ſtrong. But in a Democracy this, excepting a few, is ſome how the preſiding party, and now it ſays and does itſelf the moſt outrageous things, and then again approaching courts of juſtice, it maketh a noiſe, and cannot bear any other to ſay different from it; ſo that all things, if it be not ſome few, in ſuch a republic, are adminiſtered by ſuch a party. Extremely ſo, ſaid he. Some other party now, ſuch as this, is always ſeparated from the multitude. Which? Whilſt the whole are ſome how in the purſuit of gain, ſuch as are naturally the moſt temperate become for the moſt part the wealthieſt. It is likely. And hence, I imagine, the greateſt quantity of honey, and what comes with the greateſt eaſe, is preſſed out of theſe by the drones. For how, ſaid he, ſhall any one preſs out of thoſe who have but a little? Such wealthy people, I imagine, are called the paſture of the drones. Almoſt ſo, reply'd he. And the people would be a ſort of third ſpecies, ſuch of them as mind their own affairs, and meddle not with any others, who have not very much ſubſtance, but yet are the moſt numerous, and the moſt prevalent in a Democracy, whenever it is fully aſſembled. It is ſo; but this it will not do often, if it does not get ſome ſhare of the honey. Does it not always get a ſhare, ſaid I, as far as their leaders are able, robbing thoſe who have ſubſtance, and giving to the people that they may have

the moſt themſelves? They are indeed, ſaid he, ſharers in this manner. Theſe then, who are thus deſpoiled are obliged to defend themſelves, ſaying and doing all they can among the people. Why not? Others then give them occaſion to form deſigns againſt the people, though they ſhould have no inclination to introduce a change of government, and ſo they are Oligarchic. Why not? But at length, after they ſee that the people, not of their own accord, but being ignorant and impoſed on by thoſe ſlanderers, attempt to do them wrong; do they not then indeed, whether they will or not, become truly Oligarchic; yet not ſpontaneouſly, but this miſchief likewiſe is generated by that drone ſtinging them. Extremely ſo indeed. And ſo they have accuſations, law-ſuits, and conteſts one with another. Frequently too. And are not the people wont always to ſet ſome one, in a conſpicuous manner, over themſelves, and to cheriſh him and greatly to encreaſe his power? They are wont indeed. And this ſaid I, is plain, that whenever a tyrant ariſes it is from this preſident root, and from nothing elſe that he bloſſoms. This is extremely manifeſt. What is the beginning then of the change from a preſident into a tyrant? Or is it plain, that it is after that the preſident begins to do the ſame thing with that in the fable, which is told in relation to the temple of Lycaean Jupiter, to whom was dedicated the wolf in Arcadia. Which, ſaid he? How that whoever taſted human entrails which were mixed with thoſe of other ſacrifices, neceſſarily became a wolf. Have you not heard the ſtory? I have. And muſt not he in the

ſame manner, who being preſident of the people, and receiving an extremely ſubmiſſive multitude, abſtaineth not from kindred blood, but unjuſtly accuſing them, (of ſuch things as they are wont) and bringing them into courts of juſtice, ſtains himſelf with bloodſhed, taking away the life of a man, and with unhallowed tongue, and mouth, taſting kindred blood, and baniſheth, and ſlayeth, and propoſeth the abolition of debts, and diviſion of lands,------muſt not ſuch an one of neceſſity, and as it is deſtined, be either deſtroyed by his enemies or exerciſe tyranny, and from being a man become a wolf? Of great neceſſity, ſaid he. This is he now, ſaid I, who becomes ſeditious towards thoſe who have ſubſtance, and when he fails he goes againſt his enemies with open force, and becomes an accompliſhed tyrant. It is plain. And if they be unable to expel him, or to put him to death on an accuſation before the city, they truly conſpire to cut him off privately by a violent death. It is wont indeed, ſaid he, to happen ſo. And on this account all thoſe who mount up to tyranny invent this celebrated tyrannical demand, to demand of the people certain guards for their perſon, that the aſſiſtance of the people may be ſecured to them. This, ſaid he, they take ſpecial care of. And they grant them, I imagine, being afraid of his ſafety, but ſecure as to their own. Extremely ſo. And when one who hath ſubſtance, and who along with his ſubſtance, hath the crime of hating the people, obſerves this; he then, friend! according to the anſwer of the oracle to Croeſus,

-----To craggy Hermus flies,
Nor ſtays, nor fears, to be a coward deem'd.

becauſe he would not, ſaid he, be in fear again a ſecond time. But he at leaſt, I imagine, ſaid I, who is caught, is put to death. Of neceſſity. It is plain then that this preſident of the city does not himſelf behave like a truly great man in a manner truly great, but tumbling down many others, ſits in his chair a conſummate tyrant of the city, inſtead of a preſident. Why is he not, ſaid he? Shall we conſider now, ſaid I, the happineſs of the man, and of the city in which ſuch a mortal ariſes? By all means, ſaid he, let us conſider it. Doth he not then, ſaid I, in the firſt days, and for the firſt ſeaſon, ſmile and ſalute every one he meets, ſays he is no tyrant, and promiſeth many things, both in private and in public, and frees from debts, and diſtributes land both to the people in general, and to thoſe about him, and affecteth to be mild, and of the patriot ſpirit towards all? Of neceſſity, ſaid he. But when, as I imagine, he hath reconciled to himſelf ſome of his foreign enemies, and deſtroyed others, and there is tranquillity with reference to theſe, he in the firſt place always raiſes ſome wars, in order that the people may be in need of a leader. It is likely. And is it not likewiſe with this view, that being rendered poor by payment of taxes, they may be under a neceſſity of becoming intent on a daily ſuſtenance, and may be leſs ready to conſpire againſt him? It is plain. And, I imagine, if he ſuſpect that any of them who are of free ſpirits will not allow him to govern, in order to have ſome

pretext for deſtroying them, he expoſes them to the enemy; on all theſe accounts a tyrant is always under a neceſſity of raiſing war. Of neceſſity. And whilſt he is doing theſe things, he muſt readily become more hateful to his citizens. Why not? And muſt not ſome of thoſe who have been promoted along with him, and who are in power, ſpeak out freely both towards him, and among themſelves, finding fault with the tranſactions, ſuch of them as are of a more manly ſpirit? It is likely. It behoves the tyrant then to cut off all theſe, if he means to govern, till he leave no one, either of friends or foes worth any thing. It is plain. He muſt then carefully obſerve who is courageous, who is magnanimous, who wiſe, who rich, and in this manner is he happy, that willing, or not willing, he is under a neceſſity of being an enemy to all ſuch as theſe; and to lay ſnares till he cleanſe the city of them. A noble cleanſing! ſaid he. Yes, ſaid I, the reverſe of what phyſicians do with reſpect to animal bodies; for they, taking away what is worſt, leave the beſt; but he does the contrary. Becauſe it ſeems, ſaid he, he muſt of neceſſity do ſo, if he is to govern. In a bleſſed neceſſity then truly is he bound, ſaid I, which obliges him either to live with many naughty people, and to be hated too by them, or not to live at all. In ſuch neceſſity he is, reply'd he. And the more he is hated by his citizens whilſt he does theſe things, ſhall he not ſo much the more want a greater number of guards, and more faithful ones? Why ſhall he not? Who then are the faithful, and from whence ſhall he ſend for them? Many, ſaid he, of

their own accord will come flying, if he give them hire. You ſeem, by the dog, ſaid I, again to mention certain drones foreign and multiform. You imagine right, reply'd he. But thoſe at home would he not incline to have them alſo as guards? How? After he has taken away the citizens, to give the ſlaves their liberty, and make of them guards about his perſon. By all means, ſaid he; for theſe are the moſt faithful to him. What a bleſſed poſſeſſion! ſaid I, is this which you mention belonging to the tyrant, if he employ ſuch friends and faithful men, after having deſtroyed thoſe former ones! But ſurely ſuch at leaſt, ſaid he, he does employ. And ſuch companions, ſaid I, admire him, and the new citizens accompany him: but the worthy men both hate and fly from him. Why will they not? It is not without reaſon, ſaid I, that tragedy in the general is thought a wiſe thing, and that Euripides is thought to excel in it. For what? Becauſe he uttered this which is the mark of a good underſtanding. That tyrants are wiſe, by the converſation of the wiſe, and he plainly ſaid thoſe were wiſe with whom they hold converſe. And he commends too, ſaid he, Tyranny as a divine thing, and ſays a great many other things of it, as do likewiſe the other poets. Therefore then, ſaid I, thoſe compoſers of tragedy, as they are wiſe, will forgive us, and ſuch as eſtabliſh the government of cities in a manner nearly reſembling ours, in not admitting them into our republic as being panegyriſts of Tyranny. I imagine, ſaid he, ſuch of them at leaſt as are more polite will forgive us. But going about among other cities,

I imagine, and drawing together the crouds, and putting to ſale their fine, magnificent and perſuaſive words, they will draw over the republics to Tyrannies and Democracies. Extremely ſo. And do they not further receive rewards, and are held in honour chiefly by Tyrants, as is natural, and in the next place by Democracy. But the further on they advance towards the republics, the reverſe of theſe, their honour forſakes them the more, as if it were diſabled by an aſthma to advance. Entirely ſo. Thus far, ſaid I, we have digreſſed: but now again let us mention in what manner that army of the Tyrant, which is ſo beautiful, ſo numerous and multiform, and no way the ſame ſhall be maintained. It is plain, ſaid he, that if at any time there be any ſacred things in the city, theſe they will ſpend, that ſo what they ſell for, may ſtill anſwer their demands, and the people be obliged to pay in the lighter taxes. But what ſhall they do, when theſe fail them? It is plain, ſaid he, that he and his drunken companions, and his aſſociates, male and female, ſhall be maintained out of the paternal inheritance. I underſtand, ſaid I, that the people who have made the Tyrant ſhall nouriſh him and his companions. They are under great neceſſity, ſaid he. How do you ſay, reply'd I? What if the people be enraged, and ſay that it is not juſt, that the ſon who is come to maturity be maintained by the father, but contrarywiſe that the father be maintained by the ſon; and that they did not make and eſtabliſh him for this purpoſe, to be a ſlave to his ſlaves when he ſhould be grown up, and to maintain him and his ſlaves with

their other tumultary attendants; but in order that they might be ſet at liberty from the rich in the city, who are alſo called the good and worthy, by having ſet him over them. And now they order him and his companions to be gone out of the city, as a father drives out of the houſe his ſon with his tumultuary drunken companions. Then indeed at leaſt ſhall the people, ſaid he, know truly what a beaſt they are themſelves, and what a beaſt they have generated, and hugged, and bred up, and that whilſt they are the weaker, they attempt to drive out the ſtronger. How do you ſay, reply'd I? Will the Tyrant dare to offer violence to his father, and if he cannot perſuade him, will he ſtrike him? Yes, ſaid he, even ſtripping him of his armour. You call, ſaid I, the Tyrant a parricide and a miſerable nouriſher of old-age: and yet as it is probable, Tyranny would really ſeem to be of this kind, and according to the ſaying, the people defending themſelves againſt the ſmoke of ſlavery amid free men, have fallen into the ſlaviſh fire of deſpotiſm; inſtead of that exceſſive and unſeaſonable liberty, embracing the moſt rigorous, and the moſt wretched ſlavery of bond-men. Theſe things, ſaid he, happen very much ſo. What then, ſaid I, ſhall we not ſpeak modeſtly, if we ſay that we have ſufficiently ſhown how Tyranny ariſes out of Democracy, and what it is when it doth ariſe? Quite ſufficiently, reply'd he.

THE END OF THE EIGHTH BOOK.

THE NINTH BOOK.

THE tyrannical man himſelf, ſaid I, remains yet to be conſidered in what manner he ariſes out of the Democratic, and when he doth ariſe, what kind of man he is, and what kind of life he leads, whether wretched or happy. He indeed yet remains, ſaid he. Do you know, ſaid I, what I ſtill want? What is it? We do not appear to me to have ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed that matter of the deſires; of what kind they are, and how many, and whilſt this is defective, the inquiry we make ſhall be leſs evident. May it not be done, ſaid he, in good ſeaſon ſtill. Certainly. And conſider what it is I want to know about them; for it is this. Of thoſe pleaſures and deſires which are not neceſſary, ſome appear to me to be repugnant to law: theſe indeed appear to ſpring up in every one, but being chaſtiſed by the laws, and the better deſires, along with reaſon, they either forſake ſome men altogether, or are leſs few in number, and feeble; in others they are more powerful, and in greater number. Which are theſe you mean, ſaid he? Such, ſaid I, as are excited in ſleep: when the other part of the ſoul, ſuch as is rational and mild, and which governs in it, is aſleep, and the part which is brutal and ſavage, being filled with meats and drunkenneſs, friſks about, and puſhing away ſleep, wants to go and accompliſh its practices. In ſuch a one you

know it dares to do every thing, as being looſed, and diſengaged from all modeſty and diſcretion: for it ſcruples not the embraces, as it imagines of a mother, or of any one elſe, whether of Gods, of men, or of beaſts; nor to kill any one, nor to abſtain from any ſort of meat, and, in one word, is wanting in no folly nor impudence. You ſay moſt true, reply'd he. But I imagine, when one is in health, and keeps himſelf temperately, and goes to ſleep, having ſtirred up the rational part, and having feaſted it with worthy reaſonings and inquiries, coming to an unanimity with himſelf; and allowing the part of the ſoul which is concupiſcible neither to be ſtarved nor glutted, that it may lye quiet, and give no diſturbance to the part which is beſt, either by its joy or grief, but ſuffer it by itſelf alone and untainted to inquire, and to deſire to apprehend what it knoweth not, either ſomething of what hath exiſted, or of what now exiſts, or what will exiſt hereafter; and having likewiſe ſoothed the iraſcible part, not ſuffering it to be hurried by any thing, to tranſports of anger, and to fall aſleep with agitated paſſion: but having quieted theſe two parts of the ſoul, and excited the third part, in which wiſdom reſides, ſhall in this manner take reſt; by ſuch an one you know the truth is chiefly apprehended, and the viſions of his dreams are then leaſt of all repugnant to law. I am altogether, ſaid he, of this opinion. We have, indeed, been carried a little too far in mentioning theſe things. But what we want to be known is this, that there is in every one a certain ſpecies of deſires which is terrible, ſavage, and irregular,

even in ſome who entirely ſeem to us to be moderate. And this ſpecies becomes indeed manifeſt in ſleep. But conſider if there appear to be any thing in what I ſay, and if you agree with me. But I agree. Recollect now what kind of man we ſaid the Democratic one was: for he was ſome how educated from his infancy under a parſimonious father, who valued the avaricious deſires alone; but ſuch as were not neceſſary, but roſe only through a love of amuſement and finery, he deſpiſed. Was he not? Yes. But, being converſant with thoſe who are more refined, and ſuch as are full of thoſe deſires we now mentioned, running into their manner, and all ſort of inſolence, from a deteſtation of his father's parſimony; however, having a better natural temper than thoſe who corrupt him, and being drawn oppoſite ways, he ſettles into a manner in the middle of both, and participating moderately, as he imagines, of each of them, he leads a life neither illiberal nor licentious, becoming a Democratic man from an Oligarchic. This was, ſaid he, and is our opinion of ſuch an one. Suppoſe now again, that when ſuch a one is become old, his young ſon is educated in his manners. I ſuppoſe it. And ſuppoſe too, the ſame things happening to him as to his father; that he is drawn into all kind of licentiouſneſs, which is termed however by ſuch as draw him off the moſt compleat liberty; and that his father and all the domeſtics are aiding to thoſe deſires which are in the middle, and others alſo give aid likewiſe. But when thoſe curious magicians and tyrant-makers have no hopes of retaining the

youth in their power any other way, they contrive to excite in him a certain love which preſides over the indolent deſires, and ſuch as miniſter readily to their pleaſures a certain winged and large drone; or do you imagine that the love of theſe things is any thing elſe? I imagine, ſaid he, it is nothing other than this. And when other deſires make a noiſe about him, full of their odours and perfumes, and crowns, and wines, and thoſe pleaſures of the moſt diſſolute kind which belong to ſuch copartnerſhips; and being encreaſed and cheriſhed, add a ſting of deſire to the drone, then truly he is ſurrounded with madneſs as a life-guard, and that preſident of the ſoul rages with phrenſy; and if he find in himſelf any opinions or deſires which ſeem to be good, and which yet retain modeſty, he kills them, and puſheth them from him, 'till he be cleanſed of temperance, and is filled with additional madneſs. You deſcribe perfectly, ſaid he, the formation of a tyrannical man. Is it not, ſaid I, on ſuch an account as this, that of old love is ſaid to be a tyrant? It appears ſo, reply'd he. And friend! ſaid I, hath not a drunken man likewiſe ſomewhat of a tyrannical ſpirit? He hath indeed. And ſurely at leaſt he who is mad and is diſturbed in his mind, undertakes and hopes to be able to govern not only men, but likewiſe the Gods. Entirely ſo, ſaid he. The tyrannical man then, divine friend! becomes ſo in perfection, when either by temper, or by his purſuits, or by both, he becomes drunk, and in love, and melancholy. Perfectly ſo indeed. Such a one, it ſeems then, ariſes in this manner. But in what manner does he

live? As they ſay in their plays, reply'd he, that you will tell me likewiſe. I tell then, ſaid I. For I imagine that after this there are feaſtings among them, and revellings and banquetings, and miſtreſſes, and all ſuch things as may be expected among thoſe where Love the tyrant dwelling within governs all in the ſoul. Of neceſſity, ſaid he. And every day and night do there bloſſom forth many and dreadful deſires, indigent of many things. They are many indeed. And if they have any ſupplies, they are ſoon ſpent. What elſe? And after this there is borrowing and pillaging of ſubſtance. What elſe? And when every thing fails them, is there not a neceſſity that the deſires, on the one hand, neſtling in the mind, ſhall give frequent and powerful cries; and the men, on the other hand, being driven, as by ſtings, both by the other deſires, and more eſpecially by Love itſelf, commanding all the others as its life-guards, ſhall rage with phrenſy, and ſearch if any one have any thing which they are able, by deceit or violence, to carry off? Extremely ſo, ſaid he. They muſt of neceſſity therefore be plundering from every quarter, or be tormented with great agonies and pains. Of neceſſity. And as with ſuch a man his new pleaſures have more to ſay than his antient ones, and take away what belonged to them, ſhall not he deem it proper in the ſame manner, that himſelf being young, ſhould have more than his father and mother, and take away from them, and if he hath ſpent his own portion, encroach on that of his parents? Why will he not, ſaid he? And if they do not allow him, will he not firſt endeavour to

pilfer from, and beguile his parents? By all means. And where he is not able to do this, will he not, in the next place, uſe rapine and violence? I imagine ſo, reply'd he. But, wonderful friend! when the old man and the old woman oppoſe and fight, will he not revere them, and beware of doing any thing tyrannical? I, for my part, am not quite ſecure, ſaid he, with reference to the ſafety of the parents of ſuch an one. But do you truly, Adimantus! imagine that for the ſake of a newly beloved and unneceſſary miſtreſs, ſuch a one would give up his antiently beloved and neceſſary mother; or for the ſake of a blooming youth newly beloved, and not neceſſary, give up his decayed, his neceſſary and aged father, the moſt antient of all his friends, to ſtripes, and ſuffer theſe to be enſlaved by thoſe others, if he ſhould bring them into the ſame houſe? Yes truly I do, ſaid he. It ſeems, ſaid I, to be an extremely happy thing to beget a tyrannical ſon. Not altogether ſo, ſaid he. But what! when the ſubſtance of his father and mother fails ſuch an one, and when now there is the greateſt ſwarm of pleaſures aſſembled in him, ſhall he not firſt break into ſome houſe, or late at night ſtrip ſome one of his coat, and after this ſhall he not riſle ſome temple; and in all theſe actings thoſe deſires newly looſed from ſlavery, and become as the guards of love, ſhall along with him rule over thoſe antient opinions he had from his infancy, the eſtabliſhed deciſions concerning good and evil; theſe deſires which heretofore were only looſe from their ſlavery in ſleep, when he was as yet under the laws, and his father when

under Democratic government, now when he is tyrannized over by love, ſuch as he rarely was when aſleep, ſuch ſhall he be always when awake; and from no horrid ſlaughter, or food, or deed of any kind, ſhall he abſtain. But that tyrannical love within him, living without any reſtraint of law or government, as being ſole monarch itſelf, ſhall lead on the man it poſſeſſeth, as a city, to every mad attempt, whence he may ſupport himſelf, and the crew about him; which partly entereth from without from ill company, and partly through their manners and his own, is become unreſtrained and licentious. Or is not this the life of ſuch a one? It is this truly, ſaid he. And if there be, ſaid I, but a few ſuch in the city, and the reſt of the multitude be ſober, they go out and ſerve as guards to ſome other tyrant, or aſſiſt him for hire, if there be any war; but if they remain in peace and quiet, they commit at home in the city a great many ſmall miſchiefs. Which do you mean? Such as theſe; they ſteal, break houſes, cut purſes, ſtrip people of their clothes, rifle temples, make people ſlaves: and where they can ſpeak they ſometimes turn falſe informers, and give falſe teſtimony, and take gifts. You call theſe, ſaid he, ſmall miſchiefs, if there be but a few ſuch perſons. What is ſmall, ſaid I, is ſmall in compariſon of great. And all thoſe things, with regard to the tyrant, when compared with the wickedneſs and miſery of the city, do not, as the ſaying is, come near the mark; for when there are many ſuch in the city, and others accompanying them, and when they perceive their own number, then theſe are they who

through the fooliſhneſs of the people, eſtabliſh as tyrant the man who among them hath himſelf moſt of the tyrant, and in the greateſt ſtrength within his ſoul. It is probable indeed, ſaid he; for he ſhall be moſt tyrannical. Shall he not be ſo, if they willingly ſubmit to him, but if the city ſhall not allow him, in the ſame manner as he formerly uſed violence to his father and mother, ſo now again ſhall he chaſtiſe his country if he be able, and bringing in other young people, he ſhall keep and nouriſh under ſubjection to theſe, his formerly beloved mother and father-country, as the Cretans ſay? And this ſhall be the iſſue of ſuch a man's deſire. It ſhall be entirely this, ſaid he. But do not theſe, ſaid I, become ſuch as this, firſt in private, and before they govern? In the firſt place by the company they keep, either converſing with their own flatterers, and ſuch as are ready to miniſter to them in every thing; or if they need any thing themſelves, falling down to thoſe they converſe with, they dare to aſſume every appearance as friends; but after they have gained their purpoſe, they act as enemies. Extremely ſo. Thus they paſs the whole of their life, never friends to any one, but always either domineering, or enſlaved to another. But liberty and true friendſhip, the tyrannic diſpoſition never taſtes. Entirely ſo. May we not then rightly call theſe men faithleſs? Why not? And ſurely we may call them moſt of all unjuſt, if we have rightly agreed about juſtice, in our former reaſonings, what it is. But we did rightly agree, ſaid he. Let us finiſh then, ſaid I, our worſt man. He would then ſeem ſuch a one awake,

as we deſcribed as aſleep. Entirely ſo. And does not that man become ſuch a one, who being moſt tyrannical by natural temper, is in poſſeſſion of ſupreme power, and the longer time he lives in tyranny, the more he becomes ſuch a one? Of neceſſity, reply'd Glauco, taking up the diſcourſe. And ſhall not the man, ſaid I, who appears the moſt wicked, appear likewiſe the moſt wretched, and he who ſhall tyrannize for the longeſt time, and in the greateſt meaſure, ſhall in reality, in the greateſt meaſure, and for the longeſt time, be ſuch a one? But as many men as many minds. Of neceſſity, ſaid he, theſe things at leaſt muſt be ſo. And would this tyrannic man at leaſt differ any thing, ſaid I, as to likeneſs when compared with the city under Tyranny, and the Democratic man when compared with the city under Democracy, and the ſame way of others? How ſhould they? As city then is in reſpect of city as to virtue and happineſs, will not man be to man in the ſame way? Why not? What then? How is the city which is tyrannized over, in reſpect of that under kingly government, ſuch as we at the firſt deſcribed? Quite the reverſe, ſaid he, for the one is the beſt, and the other is the worſt. I will not aſk, ſaid I, which you mean, for it is plain; but do you judge in the ſame way, or otherwiſe, as to their happineſs and miſery? And let us not be ſtruck with admiration, whilſt we regard the tyrant alone, or ſome few about him; but let us, as we ought to do, enter into the whole of the city, and conſider it, and going through every part, and viewing it, let us declare our opinion. You propoſe righly, ſaid he. And

it is evident to every one that there is no city more wretched than that which is under Tyranny, nor any more happy than that under regal power. If now, ſaid I, I ſhould propoſe the ſame things with reſpect to the men, ſhould I rightly propoſe, whilſt I account him worthy to judge about them, who is able, by his underſtanding, to enter within, and ſee through the temper of the man, and who may not as a child beholding the out-ſide, be ſtruck with admiration of tyrannical pomp, which he makes a ſhew of to thoſe without, but may ſufficiently ſee through him. If then I ſhould be of opinion, that all of us ought to hear ſuch a one, who, having dwelt with the man in the ſame houſe, and having been along with him in his actions in his family, is able to judge in what manner he behaves to each of his domeſtics, (in which moſt eſpecially one appears ſtrip'd of theatrical ſhews,) and likewiſe in public dangers; and after he hath obſerved all theſe things, we ſhall bid him declare, how the Tyrant is as to happineſs and miſery, in compariſon of others. You would adviſe to theſe things, ſaid he, moſt properly. Are you willing then, ſaid I, that we pretend to be ourſelves of the number of thoſe who are thus able to judge, and that we have already met with ſuch men, that we may have one who ſhall anſwer our queſtions? By all means. Come then, ſaid I, conſider in this manner. Recollect the reſemblance of the city, and the man, to one another, and thus conſidering each of them apart, tell the affections of each. Which affections, ſaid he? To begin firſt, ſaid I, with the city. Do you

call the one under Tyranny, either free or enſlaved? Slaviſh, ſaid he, in the greateſt degree poſſible. And yet, ſurely, at leaſt, you ſee in it maſters and free men. I ſee, ſaid he, ſome ſmall part ſo. But the whole in it, in the general, and the moſt excellent part, is diſgracefully and miſerably ſlaviſh. If then, the man, ſaid I, reſembleth the city, is it not neceſſary, that there be the ſame regulation in him likewiſe, and that his ſoul be full of the greateſt ſlavery and illiberality, and that theſe parts of his ſoul, which are the nobleſt, be enſlaved, and that ſome ſmall part, which is moſt wicked and frantic, is maſter. Of neceſſity, ſaid he. What now? ſhall you ſay that ſuch a ſoul is ſlaviſh or free? Slaviſh ſome how, I ſay. But does not then the city which is ſlaviſh, and tyrannized over, leaſt of all do what it inclines? In great meaſure. And ſhall not the ſoul too, which is tyrannized over, leaſt of all do what it ſhall incline, to ſpeak in the general of the whole ſoul; but hurried violently by ſome ſtinging paſſion, ſhall be full of tumult, and inconſtancy? Why ſhall it not? But whether ſhall the city which is tyrannized over be neceſſarily rich or poor? Poor. And the ſoul under Tyranny be of neceſſity likewiſe indigent and inſatiable. Juſt ſo, ſaid he. But what? Muſt not ſuch a city, and ſuch a man, of neceſſity, be full of fear? In great meaſure. Do you imagine you will find more lamentations, and groans, and weepings, and torments, in any other city? By no means. But with reference to a man, do you imagine that theſe things are greater, in any other than in this tyrannical one, who madly rages by

his deſires and luſts? How can they, ſaid he? It is then, on conſideration of all theſe things, and other ſuch as theſe, I imagine, that you have deemed this city the moſt wretched of cities? And have I not deemed right, ſaid he? Extremely ſo, ſaid I. But what ſay you again with reference to the tyrannical man, when you conſider theſe things? That he is by far, ſaid he, the moſt wretched of all others: You do not as yet ſay this rightly, reply'd I. How, ſaid he? I do not as yet imagine, ſaid I, that he is ſuch in the greateſt degree. But who then is ſo? This one ſhall probably appear to you to be yet more miſerable than the other. Which one? He, ſaid I, who being naturally tyrannical, leads not a private life, but is unfortunate, and through ſome misfortune it is brought upon him to become a Tyrant. I conjecture, ſaid he, from what was formerly mentioned, that you ſay true. It is ſo, ſaid I. But we ought not merely to conjecture about matters of ſuch importance as theſe, but moſt thoroughly to inquire into them by reaſoning of this kind: for the inquiry is concerning the moſt important matter, a good life and a bad. Moſt right, ſaid he. Conſider then whether there be any thing in what I ſay; for, in conſidering this queſtion, I am of opinion we ought to perceive it from theſe things. From what? From each particular one of private men, ſuch of them as are rich, and poſſeſs many ſlaves, for thoſe have this reſemblance at leaſt of Tyrants, that they rule over many, with this difference, that the Tyrant has great numbers. There is this difference. You know then, that theſe live ſecurely, and are not

afraid of their domeſtics. What ſhould they be afraid of? Nothing, ſaid I; but do you conſider the reaſon? Yes. It is becauſe the whole city gives aſſiſtance to each particular private man. You ſay right, reply'd I. But what now? If ſome God ſhould lift ſome man who had fifty ſlaves or upwards out of the city, both him, and his wife and children, and ſet him down in a deſert, with his other ſubſtance, and his domeſtics, where no freeman was to give him aſſiſtance, in what kind of fear, and in how great, do you imagine he would be about himſelf, his children and wife, leſt they ſhould be deſtroyed by the domeſtics? In the greateſt poſſible, ſaid he, I imagine, for my part. Would he not be obliged even to flatter ſome of the very ſlaves, and promiſe them many things, to ſet them at liberty when there was no occaſion for it: and appear to be himſelf a flatterer of ſervants? He is under great neceſſity, ſaid he, to do ſo, or be deſtroyed. But what, ſaid I, if the God ſhould ſettle round him many other neighbours, who could not endure if any one ſhould pretend to lord it over another; but if they any where found ſuch a one, ſhould puniſh him with the extremeſt rigour? I imagine, ſaid he, that he would be ſtill more in all ſort of diſtreſs, thus beſet with all ſort of enemies. And in ſuch a priſon-houſe is not the tyrant bound, being ſuch by diſpoſition, as we have mentioned, full of many and moſt various fears and loves of all kinds? And whilſt he has in his ſoul the greateſt deſire, he alone of all in the city is neither allowed to go any where abroad, nor to ſee ſuch things as other men are deſirous of; but creep-

ing into his houſe, lives moſtly as a woman, envying the other citizens if any of them goes abroad, and ſees any good. It is entirely ſo, ſaid he. And beſides ſuch evils as theſe, does not the man reap ſtill more of them who being under ill policy within himſelf, (which you juſt now deemed to be the moſt wretched Tyranny,) lives not as a private perſon, but through ſome fortune is obliged to act the tyrant, and without holding the government of himſelf, attempts to govern others, as if one, with a body diſeaſed, and unable to ſupport itſelf, were obliged to lead their life not in a private way, but in wreſtling and fighting againſt other bodies? You ſay, Socrates! reply'd he, what is altogether moſt likely and true. Is not then, friend Glauco! ſaid I, this condition altogether miſerable; and does not the tyrant live more miſerably ſtill, than the man deemed by you to live moſt miſerably? Very much ſo, ſaid he. True it is then, though one may fancy otherwiſe, that the truly tyrannical man is truly ſlaviſh with reſpect to the greateſt flatteries and ſlaveries, and is a flatterer of the moſt abandoned men; nor does he ever in the ſmalleſt degree obtain the gratification of his deſires, but is of all the moſt indigent of the moſt things, and appeareth poor indeed, if one knoweth how to contemplate his whole ſoul; and full of fear through the whole of life, being filled with anxieties and griefs, if indeed he reſembles the conſtitution of that city which he governs. But he doth reſemble it. Doth he not? Extremely, ſaid he. And ſhall we not beſides theſe things, likewiſe aſcribe to this man what we formerly mention-

ed, that he muſt neceſſarily be, and by governing ſtill, become more than formerly envious, faithleſs, unjuſt, unfriendly, unholy, and a ſink and breeder of all wickedneſs; and from all theſe things be moſt eſpecially unhappy himſelf, and then render all about him unhappy likewiſe. No one, ſaid he, who hath underſtanding will contradict you. Come now, ſaid I, as a judge who pronounces, after conſidering all, ſo do you tell me, who, according to your opinion, is the firſt as to happineſs, and who ſecond, and the reſt in order, they being five in all? The Regal, the Ambitious, the Oligarchic, the Democratic, and the Tyrannic. But the judgment, ſaid he, is eaſy; for as if I had entered among them, I judge of them as of public performers, by their virtue and vice, and by their happineſs, and its contrary. Shall we then hire a Herald, ſaid I? Or ſhall I myſelf declare that the ſon of Ariſton hath judged the beſt and juſteſt man to be the happieſt; (and that this is the man who hath moſt of the regal ſpirit, and ruleth himſelf with a kingly power;) and that the worſt and the moſt unjuſt is the moſt wretched; and that he again happens to be the man who is moſt tyrannical, who in the greateſt degree tyrannizes over himſelf, and the city. Let it be publiſhed by you, ſaid he. Shall I add, ſaid I, whether they be unknown to be ſuch or not both to all men and Gods? Add it, ſaid he. Be it ſo, ſaid I, this would ſeem to be one proof of ours. And this, if you are of the ſame opinion, muſt be the ſecond. Which is it? Since the ſoul, ſaid I, of every individual is divided into three, in the ſame manner as the city was

was divided into three parts, it will, in my opinion, afford a ſecond proof. Which is it? It is this. Of the three parts of the ſoul, there appear to me to be three pleaſures, one peculiar to each one. And the deſires and governments are in the ſame manner. How do you ſay, reply'd he? There is one part, we ſaid, by which a man learns, and another by which he is iraſcible; the third is ſo multiform, we are unable to expreſs it by one word peculiar to itſelf, but we denominated it from that which is greateſt, and moſt impetuous in it; for we called it the concupiſcible, on account of the impetuoſity of the deſires relative to meat, drink, and venereal pleaſures, and whatever others belong to theſe, and we called it avaricious likewiſe, becauſe it is by means of wealth moſt eſpecially, that ſuch deſires are accompliſhed. And we ſaid rightly, reply'd he. If then we ſay that its pleaſure and delight are in gain, ſhall we not beſt of all reduce it under one head in our diſcourſe, ſo as to expreſs ſomething to ourſelves, when we make mention of this part of the ſoul, and calling it the covetous, and the deſirous of gain, ſhall we not term it properly? So I imagine at leaſt, ſaid he. But what? Do not we ſay that the iraſcible ought wholly to run after ſuperiority, victory, and applauſe? Extremely ſo. If then we term it the contentious and ambitious, ſhall it not be accurately expreſſed? Moſt accurately. But it is evident to every one, that the part of the ſoul, by which we learn, is wholly intent always to know the truth, and as to wealth and glory, it careth for theſe leaſt of all. Extremely ſo. When we call it then the de-

ſirous of learning, and the philoſophic, we ſhall call it according to propriety. Why ſhall we not. And do not theſe, ſaid I, govern in ſouls, one of them in ſome, and in others another, as it happeneth? Juſt ſo, ſaid he. On this account then, we ſaid there were three original ſpecies of men; the philoſophic, the ambitious, and the avaricious. Entirely ſo. And that there were likewiſe three ſpecies of pleaſures, one ſubject to each of theſe. Certainly. You know then, ſaid I, that if you were to aſk theſe three men, each of them apart, which of theſe lives is the moſt pleaſant, each would moſt of all commend his own. And the avaricious will ſay, that in compariſon with the pleaſure of making gain, that ariſing from honour, or from learning, is of no value, unleſs one make money by them. True, ſaid he. And what ſays the ambitious, ſaid I; does not he deem the pleaſure ariſing from making money a ſort of burden, and likewiſe that ariſing from learning, unleſs learning brings him honour; does he not deem it ſmoke and trifling? It is ſo, ſaid he. And we ſhall ſuppoſe the philoſopher, ſaid I, to deem the other pleaſures as nothing in compariſon of that of knowing the truth, how it is, and that whilſt he is always employed in learning ſomething of this kind, he is not very remote from pleaſure; but that he calls the other pleaſures truly neceſſary, as wanting nothing of the others, but where there is a neceſſity for it. This, ſaid he, we muſt well underſtand. When therefore, ſaid I, theſe ſeveral lives, and the reſpective pleaſure of each diſpute among themſelves, not with reference to liv-

ing more worthily or more baſely, or worſe or better; but merely with reference to this of living more pleaſantly, or on the contrary more painfully, how can we know which of them ſpeaks moſt conformably to truth? I am not quite able, ſaid he, to tell. But conſider it thus. By what ought we to judge of whatever is to be rightly judged of? Is it not by experience, by prudence, and by reaſon? Or hath any one a better criterion than theſe? How can he, ſaid he? Conſider now; of the three men, who is the moſt experienced in all the pleaſures? Whether do you imagine that the avaricious man, in learning truth itſelf, what it is, is more experienced in the pleaſure ariſing from knowledge, than the philoſopher is in that ariſing from making money? There is, ſaid he, a great difference: for the philoſopher, beginning from his childhood, muſt, of neceſſity, taſte the other pleaſures; but what it is to know real beings, and how ſweet this pleaſure is, the lucrative man hath no neceſſity of taſting, or of becoming experienced in, but rather when he uſes earneſt endeavours, it is no eaſy matter. The philoſopher then, ſaid I, far ſurpaſſeth the lucrative man, at leaſt in experience of both the pleaſures. Far indeed. But what with reference to the ambitious man? Is he more experienced in the pleaſure ariſing from honour, than the philoſopher is in that ariſing from knowledge? Honour, ſaid he, attends all of them, if they obtain each of them what they aim at: for the rich man is honoured of many, and ſo is the brave, and the wiſe, ſo as to that of honour, what ſort of pleaſure it is, all of them

have the experience. But in the contemplation of being itſelf, what pleaſure there is, it is impoſſible for any other but the philoſopher to have taſted; on account of experience then, ſaid I, he of all men judgeth the beſt. By far. And ſurely, along with prudence at leaſt, he alone becomes experienced. Why does he not? But even the organ by which theſe pleaſures muſt be judged is not the organ of the lucrative, nor of the ambitious, but of the philoſoper. Which is it? We ſaid ſomewhere, that they muſt be judged of by reaſon, did we not? Yes. But reaſoning is chiefly the organ of the philoſopher. Why is it not? If then the things to be determined were beſt determined by riches and gain, what the lucrative man commended or deſpiſed, were of neceſſity moſt agreeable to truth. Entirely. And if by honour, and victory and bravery, muſt it not be as the ambitious and contentious man determined? It is evident. But ſince it is by experience, and prudence, and reaſon, of neceſſity, ſaid he, what the philoſopher and the philologiſt commends, muſt be the moſt true. Of the three pleaſures then, that is the moſt pleaſant which belongs to that part of the ſoul by which we learn moſt, and in whomſoever of us this part governs, his life is the moſt pleaſant. How can it, ſaid he, be otherwiſe? For the wiſe man being the ſovereign commender, commends his own life. But which life, ſaid I, doth our judge pronounce the ſecond, and which the ſecond pleaſure? It is plain that of the warlike and ambitious man; for this is nearer to his own, than that of the lucrative. And that of the covetous, as

it appears, is laſt of all. Why not, ſaid he. Theſe things now have thus ſucceeded one another in order. And the juſt man hath twice now overcome the unjuſt. The third victory now, as at the Olympic games, is ſacred to Olympic Jupiter, the deliverer; for conſider, that the pleaſure of the others is not every way genuine, but that of the wiſe man is: nor are they pure, but ſome how coloured over, as I imagine I have heard from one of the wiſe men. And this truly now would be the greateſt and moſt complete downfall of the unjuſt. Extremely ſo. But how do you mean? I ſhall thus trace it out, ſaid I, whilſt in ſearching you anſwer my queſtions. Aſk then, ſaid he. Tell me then, reply'd I, do we not ſay that pain is oppoſite to pleaſure? Entirely ſo. And do we not ſay likewiſe, that to feel neither pleaſure nor pain is ſomewhat? We ſay it is. That being in the middle of both theſe, it is a certain tranquillity of the ſoul with reference to them. Do you not thus underſtand it? Thus, reply'd he. Do you not remember, ſaid I, the ſpeeches of the ſick diſeaſed, which they utter in their ſickneſs? Which? How that nothing is more pleaſant than health, but that it eſcaped their notice before they became ſick, that it was the moſt pleaſant. I remember it, ſaid he. And are you not wont to hear thoſe who are under any acute pain ſay, that there is nothing more pleaſant than a ceſſation from pain? I am wont to hear them. And you may perceive in men, I imagine, the ſame thing, when they are in many other ſuch like circumſtances, where, when they are in pain, they extol a freedom from pain, and the tran-

quillity of ſuch a ſtate, as being the moſt pleaſant, and do not extol that of feeling joy. Becauſe this, it is likely, ſaid he, becomes at that time pleaſant and deſireable tranquillity. And when any one ceaſeth, ſaid I, to feel joy, this tranquillity from pleaſure will be painful. It is likely, ſaid he. This tranquillity then, which we juſt now ſaid was between the two, ſhall at times become each of theſe, pain and pleaſure. It appears ſo. But is it truly poſſible, that what is neither of the two ſhould become both? I do not imagine it is. And ſurely at leaſt, when any thing pleaſant or any thing painful is in the ſoul, both ſenſations are a ſort of emotion; are they not? Yes. But did not that which is neither painful, nor pleaſant, appear juſt now to be tranquillity, and in the middle of theſe two? It appears ſo indeed. How is it right then, to deem it pleaſant not to be in pain, or painful, not to enjoy pleaſure? It is by no means. In theſe caſes then, tranquillity is not really ſo, ſaid I, but it appeareth pleaſant in reſpect of the painful, and painful in reſpect of the pleaſant. And there is nothing genuine in theſe appearances as to the truth of pleaſure, but a ſort of impoſture. As our reaſoning ſhows, ſaid he. Conſider then, ſaid I, the pleaſures which do not ariſe from the ceſſation of pains, that you may not frequently in the preſent diſcourſe imagine, that by nature theſe two are univerſally in this manner, pleaſure, the ceſſation of pain, and pain the ceſſation of pleaſure. How, ſaid he, and which pleaſures do you mean? There are many others, ſaid I, but chiefly if you incline to conſider the pleaſures

from ſmells; for theſe, without any preceding pain, are on a ſudden immenſely great, and when they ceaſe, they leave no pain behind them. Moſt true, ſaid he. Let us not then be perſwaded, that pure pleaſure is the removal of pain, or pain the removal of pleaſure. Let us not. But yet, ſaid I, theſe which reach the ſoul, by means of the body, and which are called pleaſures, the greateſt part of them almoſt, and the moſt conſiderable, are of this ſpecies, certain ceſſations of pain. They are ſo. And are not the pre-conceptions of pleaſure and pain, which ariſe in the mind from the foreſight of theſe things, of the ſame kind? Of the ſame. Do you know then, ſaid I, what kind they are of, and what they chiefly reſemble? What, ſaid he? Do you reckon, ſaid I, there is any ſuch thing in nature as this, the above, the below, and the middle? I do. Do you imagine then, that any one when he is brought from the below to the middle, imagines any thing elſe than that he is brought to the above, and when he ſtands in the middle, and looks down whence he was brought, will he imagine he is any where elſe but in the above, whilſt yet he hath not ſeen the true above? Truly, ſaid he, I do not think that ſuch an one will imagine otherwiſe. But if he ſhould again, ſaid I, be carried to the below, he would imagine he was carried to the below, and would imagine according to truth. Why would he not? Would he not be affected in all theſe reſpects, from his not having experience in what is really above, and in the middle, and below? It is plain. Should you wonder then, that whilſt men are inexperi-

enced in the truth, they have unſound opinions about many other things, and that as to pleaſure and pain, and what is between theſe, they are likewiſe affected in this ſame manner? So that even when they are brought to what is painful, they imagine truly, and are truly pained; but when from pain, they are brought to the middle, they ſtrongly imagine that they are arrived at fulneſs of pleaſure. In the ſame manner as theſe who along with the black colour look at the grey, through inexperience of the white, are deceived; ſo thoſe who conſider pain along with a freedom from pain, are deceived through inexperience of pleaſure. Truly, ſaid he, I ſhould not wonder, but much rather if it were not ſo. But conſider it at leaſt, ſaid I, in this manner. Are not hunger and thirſt, and ſuch like, certain emptineſſes in the bodily habit? What elſe? And is not ignorance and folly an emptineſs in the habit of the ſoul? Extremely ſo. And is not the one filled when it receiveth food, and the other when it hath intelligence? Why not? But which is the more real repletion, that of the leſs, or that of the more real exiſtence? It is plain that of the more real. Which ſpecies, then, do you imagine participates moſt of a more pure ſubſtance; whether theſe which participate of bread and drink, and meat, and all ſuch ſort of nouriſhment; or that ſpecies which participates of true opinion, and knowledge, and intelligence, and in general, of all virtue? And judge of it in this manner. That which reſides in that which is always alike, and immortal, and true, and is ſo itſelf, and ariſeth in what is ſuch, does it appear to

you to exiſt more really than that which reſides in what is never alike, and mortal, is ſo itſelf, and ariſeth in what is ſuch? This, ſaid he, differs much from that which is always alike. Does then the eſſence of that which is always alike participate any more of eſſence than of ſcience? By no means. But what with relation to truth? Nor of this neither. If it participate leſs of truth, doth it not likewiſe do ſo of eſſence? Of neceſſity. In general then, do not the ſpecies relating to the care of the body participate leſs of truth and eſſence, than the ſpecies relating to the care of the ſoul? By far. And the body leſs than the ſoul; do you not think ſo? I do. Is not that which is filled with more real beings, and is itſelf a more real being, in reality more truly filled than that which is filled with leſs real beings, and is itſelf a leſs real being? Why not? If then it be pleaſant to be filled with what is ſuitable to nature, that which is in reality filled, and with more real being, muſt be made both more really and more truly to enjoy true pleaſure; but that which participates of leſs real being, muſt be leſs truly and ſolidly filled, and participateth of a more uncertain and leſs genuine pleaſure. Moſt neceſſarily, ſaid he. Such then as are unacquainted with wiſdom and virtue, and are always converſant in feaſtings and ſuch like, are carried as it appears to the below, and back again to the middle, and there they wander for life. But never at all, getting beyond this, do they look towards the true above, nor are carried to it, nor are they ever really filled with real being, nor have they ever taſted ſolid and

pure pleaſure, but after the manner of brutes looking always downwards, and bowed towards earth and their tables, they live feeding and coupling, and from a luſt of theſe things, kicking and puſhing at one another with iron horns and hoofs, they periſh through their unſatiableneſs, as thoſe who are filling with unreal being that which is no real being, nor friendly to themſelves. You pronounce moſt perfectly, Socrates! as from an oracle, ſaid Glauco, the life of the multitude. Muſt they not then, of neceſſity, be converſant in pleaſures mixed with pains, images of the true pleaſure, painted over, and coloured by their poſition beſide one another, hence both their pleaſures and pains appear vehement, and engender their mad paſſions in the fooliſh. Hence alſo they muſt fight about theſe things, as Steſichorus ſays thoſe at Troy fought about the image of Helen, through ignorance of the true one. Of neceſſity, ſaid he, the matter muſt be ſomething of this kind. And what as to the iraſcible part of the ſoul? Muſt not other ſuch like things happen, wherever any one gratifies it, either in the way of envy, through ambition, or in the way of violence, through contentioufneſs, or in the way of anger, through moroſeneſs, purſuing after a glut of honour, of conqueſt, and of anger, both without reaſon, and without intelligence? Such things as theſe, ſaid he, muſt neceſſarily happen with reference to this part of the mind. What then, ſaid I, ſhall we boldly ſay concerning all the pleaſures, both reſpecting the avaricious and the ambitious part, that ſuch of them as are obedient to intelligence and reaſon,

and along with theſe follow after, and obtain the pleaſures to which wiſdom points, ſhall obtain the trueſt pleaſures, as far as it is poſſible for them to attain true pleaſure, and in as much as they follow truth, pleaſures which are properly their own; if indeed what is beſt for every one be moſt properly his own? But ſurely it is moſt properly, ſaid he, his own at leaſt. When then the whole ſoul is obedient to the philoſophic part, and there is no ſedition in it, then every part in other reſpects does its proper buſineſs, and is juſt, and alſo reaps its own pleaſures, and ſuch as are the beſt, and as far as is poſſible the moſt true. Certainly, indeed. But when any of the others governs, it happens that it neither attains its own pleaſures, and it obliges the other parts to purſue a pleaſure foreign to them, and not at all true. It does ſo, ſaid he. Do not then the parts which are the moſt remote from philoſophy and reaſon, moſt eſpecially effectuate ſuch things? Extremely. And is not that which is moſt remote from law and order, likewiſe moſt remote from reaſon? It plainly is. And have not the amorous and the tyrannical deſires appeared to be moſt remote from law and order? Extremely. And the royal and the moderate ones, the leaſt remote. Yes. The tyrant then, I imagine, ſhall be the moſt remote from true pleaſure, and ſuch as is moſt properly his own, and the other ſhall be the leaſt. Of neceſſity. And the tyrant, ſaid I, ſhall lead a life the moſt unpleaſant, and the king the moſt pleaſant one. Of great neceſſity. Do you know then, ſaid I, how much more unpleaſant a life the tyrant leads

than the king? If you tell me, ſaid he. As there are three pleaſures, as it appears, one genuine, and two illegitimate; the Tyrant in carrying the illegitimate to extremity, and flying from law and reaſon, dwells with ſlaviſh pleaſure as his life-guards, and how far he is inferior, is not eaſily to be told, unleſs it may be done in this manner. How, ſaid he? The Tyrant is ſome how the third remote from the Oligarchic; for the Democratic was in the middle between them. Yes. Does he not then dwell with the third image of pleaſure, diſtant from him with reference to truth, if our former reaſonings be true? Juſt ſo. But the Oligarchic is the third again from the Royal, if we ſuppoſe the Ariſtocratic and the Royal the ſame. He is the third. The Tyrant then, ſaid I, is remote from true pleaſure, the third from the third. It appears ſo. A plain ſurface then, ſaid I, may be the image of tyrannical pleaſure, as to the computation of length. Certainly. But as to power, and the third augment, it is manifeſt, by how great a diſtance it is remote. It is manifeſt, ſaid he, to the computer at leaſt. If now, converſely, one ſhall ſay the King is diſtant from the Tyrant as to truth of pleaſure, as much as 729 and 70 are diſtant from 9, ſhall he not, on compleating the multiplication, find him leading the more pleaſant life, and the Tyrant the more wretched one by this ſame diſtance. You have heaped up, ſaid he, a prodigious account of the difference between theſe two men, the juſt and the unjuſt, with reference to pleaſure and pain. Yet the numbers are true, ſaid I, and correſponding to their lives, if

indeed days, and nights, and months, and years, correſpond to them. But theſe, ſaid he, do correſpond to them. If then the good and juſt man ſurpaſſeth ſo far the evil and unjuſt man in pleaſure, in what a prodigious degree further ſhall he ſurpaſs him in decorum of life, in beauty and in virtue? In a prodigious degree, truly, ſaid he. Be it ſo, ſaid I. Since now we are come to this part of our argument, let us recapitulate what we firſt ſaid, on account of which we have come hither: and it was ſomewhere ſaid, that it was advantageous to do injuſtice, if one were compleatly unjuſt, but were reputed juſt. Was it not ſo ſaid? It was indeed. Now then, ſaid I, let us ſettle this point, ſince we have now ſettled the other, with reference to acting juſtly and unjuſtly, what power each of theſe hath in itſelf. How, ſaid he? Let us in our reaſoning make a reſemblance of the ſoul, that the man who ſaid thoſe things may know what he ſaid. What kind of reſemblance, ſaid he? One of thoſe creatures, ſaid I, which are fabled to have been of old, as that of Chimaera, of Scylla, of Cerberus, and many others are ſpoken of, where many particular natures exiſted together in one. They are ſpoken of indeed, ſaid he. Form now one figure of a creature, various, and many-headed, having all around heads of tame creatures, and of wild, and having power in itſelf of changing all theſe heads, and of breeding them out of itſelf. This is the work, ſaid he, of a curious former however, as the formation is eaſier in reaſoning, than in wax and ſuch like, let it be formed. Let there be now one other

figure of a lyon and one of a man, but let the firſt be by far the greateſt, and the ſecond be the ſecond in bulk. Theſe are eaſy, ſaid he, and they are formed. Conjoin now theſe three in one, ſo as to exiſt ſome how with one another. They are conjoined, ſaid he. Form now around them the external appearance of one of them, that of the man; ſo that to one who is not able to ſee what is within, but who perceives only the external covering, the man may appear one creature. This is formed around, ſaid he. Let us now tell him, who ſaith that it is profitable to this man to do injuſtice, but to do juſtice is unprofitable, that he ſaith nothing elſe, than that it is profitable for him to feaſt the multiform creature, and to make it ſtrong; and likewiſe the lyon, and what reſpecteth the lyon, whilſt the man he kills with famine, and renders weak, ſo as to be dragged which ever way either of thoſe drag him, and never accuſtom the one to live in harmony with the other, nor to make them friends, but to ſuffer them to be biting one another, and to fight and devour one another. He, ſaid he, who commendeth the doing injuſtice, ſaith undoubtedly theſe things. And doth not he again, who ſaith it is profitable to do juſtice, ſay that he ought to do, and to ſay ſuch things by which the inner man ſhall come to have the moſt entire command of the man, and, as a tiller of the ground, ſhall take care of the many-headed creature, cheriſhing the mild ones, and nouriſhing them, and hindering the wild ones to grow up, taking the nature of the Lyon as his ally, and having a common care for all, make them

friendly to one another, and to himſelf, and ſo nouriſh them? He who commendeth juſtice undoubtedly ſays ſuch things as theſe. In all reſpects then, he who commendeth juſtice, would ſeem to ſpeak the truth, but he who commendeth injuſtice, to ſpeak what is falſe; for with regard both to pleaſure, and applauſe, and profit, he who commends juſtice ſpeaks the truth, and he who diſcommends it, ſpeaks nothing genuine. Nor does he diſcommend with underſtanding what he diſcommends. Not at all, ſaid he, as appears to me at leaſt. Let us then in a mild manner perſuade him, (for it is not willingly he errs,) aſking him, happy man! do not we ſay that the maxims of good and evil become ſo, upon ſuch accounts as theſe? Theſe are good which ſubject the brutal part of our nature moſt to the human, or rather to the divine: but theſe evil which enſlave the mild part of our nature to the brutal: ſhall he agree with us? Or how? He ſhall, if he be adviſed by me, ſaid he. Is there then any one, ſaid I, whom it avails, by this reaſoning, to take gold unjuſtly, if ſomething of this kind happens, if whilſt he takes the money, he at the ſame time ſubjects the beſt part of himſelf to the worſt; or if, taking gold, he ſhould enſlave a ſon or daughter, and that even to ſavage and wicked men, this would not avail him, no, though he ſhould receive for it a prodigious ſum? But if he enſlaveth the moſt divine part of himſelf to the moſt unhallowed and moſt polluted part, without any pity, is he not wretched, and taketh a gift of gold to his far more dreadful ruin, than Euriphyle did when ſhe received the

necklace for her husband's life? By far, said Glauco; for I will answer you for the man. And do you not imagine that to be intemperate, hath of old been discommended on such accounts as these, because that in such a one that terrible, that great and multiform beast was indulged more than was meet? It is plain, said he. And are not arrogance and morosenes blamed, when the lyon and the serpentine disposition encrease and stretches beyond measure? Entirely so. And are not luxury and effeminacy blamed because of the remissnes and loosenes of this disposition, when it engenders in the man cowardice? What else? Are not flattery and illiberality blamed, when any one maketh this irascible part itself subject to the brutal crew, and for the sake of wealth and its insatiable lust, accustoms the irascible to be affronted from its youth, and instead of a lyon to become an ape? Entirely so, said he. But why is it, do you imagine, that bodily toil and handicrafts are despicable, shall we say it is on any other account than this, that when one hath the best part of his constitution naturally weak, so as not to be able to govern the creatures within himself, but to minister to them, he is able only to learn what flatters them? It is likely, said he. In order then that such a one may be governed in the same manner as the best man is, do we not say that he must be the servant of one who is the best, and who hath within him the divine governour? not at all imagining that he should be governed to the hurt of the subject (as Thrasymachus imagined) but as it is best for every one to be

governed by one divine and wiſe, moſt eſpecially having it of his own within him, if not ſubjecting himſelf to it without; that as far as poſſible we may all reſemble one another and be friends, governed by one and the ſame? Rightly indeed, ſaid he. And law at leaſt, ſaid I, plainly ſhows it intends ſuch a thing, being an ally to all in the city; as does likewiſe the government of children, in not allowing them to be free 'till we eſtabliſh in them a proper government, as in a city; and having cultivated that in them which is beſt, by that which is beſt in ourſelves, we eſtabliſh a ſimilar guardian and governour for youth, and then truly we ſet it free. It ſhows indeed, ſaid he. In what way then ſhall we ſay Glauco! and according to what reaſoning, that it is profitable to do injuſtice, to be intemperate, or do any thing baſe, by which a man ſhall indeed become more wicked, but yet ſhall acquire more wealth, or any kind of power? In no way, ſaid he. But how ſhall we ſay it is profitable for the unjuſt to be concealed, and not to ſuffer puniſhment? or does he not indeed, who is concealed, ſtill become more wicked? but he who is not concealed, and is puniſhed, hath the brutal part quieted, and made mild, and the mild part ſet at liberty. And the whole ſoul being ſettled in the beſt temper, in poſſeſſing temperance, and juſtice, with wiſdom, acquires a more valuable habit than the body does, in acquiring vigour and beauty, with a ſound conſtitution; in as far as the ſoul is more valuable than the body. Entirely ſo, ſaid he. Shall not every one then, who hath underſtanding at leaſt, regulate his life

in bending the whole of his powers hither, in the firſt place, in honouring thoſe pieces of learning which will render his ſoul of this kind, and deſpiſing all other things? It is plain, ſaid he. And next, ſaid I, with reference to a good habit of body and its nouriſhment, he will ſpend his life in attention to theſe, not that he may indulge the brutal and irrational pleaſure; nor yet with a view to health, nor principally regarding this, to become ſtrong, and healthy, and beautiful, unleſs by means of theſe, he is to become temperate likewiſe: but he always appears to adjuſt the harmony of the body for the ſake of the ſymphony which is in the ſoul. By all means, ſaid he, if indeed he is to be truly muſical. That arrangement then, ſaid I, and ſymphony ariſing from the poſſeſſion of wealth, and that vulgar magnificence, he will not, ſtruck with admiration of the felicity of the multitude, encreaſe to infinity, and bring on himſelf infinite evils. I do not think it, ſaid he. But having an eye, ſaid I, to that polity within himſelf, and taking care that nothing there be moved out of its place, through the greatneſs or ſmallneſs of his ſubſtance, governing in this manner as far as he is able, he will add to his ſubſtance, and ſpend out of it. Entirely ſo, ſaid he. He will regard honours likewiſe in the ſame manner; ſome he will willingly partake of, and taſte, which he judges will render him a better man, but thoſe which he imagines would diſſolve that habit of ſoul which ſubſiſts within him, he will fly from both in private and in public. He ſhall not then, ſaid he, be willing to act in polities, if he take care of this.

Yes truly, ſaid I, in his own city, and greatly too. But not probably in his country, unleſs ſome divine fortune befal him. I underſtand, ſaid he. You mean in the city we have now eſtabliſhed, which exiſts in our reaſoning, ſince it is no where on earth, at leaſt, as I imagine. But in heaven, probably, there is a model of it, ſaid I, for any one who inclines to contemplate it, and on contemplating to regulate himſelf accordingly; and it is no matter to him, whether it does exiſt any where, or ſhall ever exiſt here. He does the duties of this one alone, and of no other. It is reaſonable, ſaid he.

THE END OF THE NINTH BOOK.

THE TENTH BOOK.

I OBSERVE, ſaid I, with reference to many other things, that we have eſtabliſhed a city in a right manner, beyond what all others have done, and among theſe eſtabliſhments, I mean that reſpecting poeſy, as none of the leaſt. Which, ſaid he? That no part of it which is imitative, be by any means admitted. For it appears, now moſt of all, and with greateſt perſpicuity, that it is not to be admitted, after that the ſeveral principles of the ſoul have been diſtinguiſhed apart from one another. How do you mean? To tell it as to you, (for you will not accuſe me to the compoſers of tragedy, and the reſt of the imitative kind) all ſuch things as theſe ſeem to be the ruin of the underſtanding of the hearers; ſuch of them as have not a medicine to enable them to diſcern what kind they are of. From what conſideration, ſaid he, do you ſay ſo? It muſt be ſpoken, ſaid I, although a certain friendſhip, at leaſt, and reverence for Homer, which I have had from my childhood, reſtrains me from telling it; for he ſeems truly both to have been the firſt teacher and leader of all theſe good compoſers of tragedy: but the man muſt not be honoured, preferably to the truth. But what I mean muſt be ſpoken. By all means, ſaid he. Hear me then, or rather anſwer me. Aſk. Can you tell me perfectly, what at all imitation is; for I do not myſelf altogether

underſtand what it means? And ſhall I then any how underſtand it, ſaid he? That would be no way ſtrange, ſaid I; ſince thoſe who are dim-ſighted perceive many things ſooner than thoſe who ſee more clearly. The caſe is ſo, ſaid he; but whilſt you are preſent, I ſhould not be able to adventure to tell, even though ſomething did appear to me. But conſider it yourſelf. Do you incline then, that we hence begin our inquiry in our uſual method: for we were wont to ſuppoſe a certain ſpecies with reſpect to many individuals, to which we give the ſame name; or do you not underſtand me? I underſtand. Let us ſuppoſe now of the many, which you chuſe; as for example, there are many beds and tables, if you incline. Why are there not? But the ideas, at leaſt, reſpecting theſe pieces of furniture are two; one of bed, and one of table. Yes. And are we not wont to ſay, that the workmen of each of theſe pieces of furniture, looking towards the idea, make in this manner, the one, the beds; and the other, the tables which we uſe? and all other things after the ſame manner. For no one of the artiſts maketh, at leaſt, the idea itſelf; for how can he? In no way. But ſee now whether you call ſuch a one as this an artiſt? Which one. One who doth all things, whatever each particular mechanic does. You mention ſome dextrous and wonderful man. Not yet, at leaſt; but you will much more ſay ſo preſently; for this ſame mechanic is not only able to make all ſorts of utenſils, but he maketh alſo every thing which ſpringeth from the earth, and he makes all ſorts of animals, himſelf, as well as others:

and beſides theſe things, he maketh the earth, and heaven, and the Gods, and all things in heaven, and in the world below. You mention, ſaid he, quite a wonderful ſophiſt. You do not believe me; but tell me, do you imagine there is no ſuch artiſt at all? or that, in one reſpect, he is the maker of all theſe things, and in another, he is not? or do you not perceive that even you yourſelf might be able to make all theſe things in a certain manner at leaſt? And what, ſaid he, is this manner? 'Tis no difficult manner, ſaid I, but is many ways, and quickly performed; but in the quickeſt manner of all, if you chuſe to take a mirror, and carry it round every where, you ſhall quickly make the ſun, and the things in the heavens, quickly the earth, quickly yourſelf, and the other animals, and utenſils, and vegetables, and all that was now mentioned. Yes, ſaid he, the appearances, but not however the real things at leaſt. You come well, ſaid I, and ſeaſonably, with your remark; for I imagine that the painter too is one of theſe artiſts. Is he not? Why is not he? But you will ſay, I imagine, that he doth not make genuine what he makes, although the painter too, in a certain manner, at leaſt, maketh a bed, does he not? Yes, ſaid he, he too maketh only the appearance. But what with reference to the bed-maker? Did you not indeed ſay juſt now, that he doth not make the ſpecies which we ſay exiſts, which is bed, but a particular bed? I ſaid ſo indeed. If then he doth not make that which is, he doth not make real being, but ſome ſuch thing as being, but not being itſelf: but if any one would ſay,

that the work of a bed-maker, or of any other handicraft were real being, he would ſeem not to ſay true. He would, ſaid he, as it would appear at leaſt to thoſe who are converſant in ſuch kind of reaſonings. Let us not then at all wonder if this likewiſe happen to be ſomewhat obſcure with reference to the truth. Let us not. Do you incline then, ſaid I, that with reference to theſe very things, we inquire concerning the imitator who he really is. If you incline, ſaid he. Are there not then theſe three ſorts of beds? One which exiſts in nature, and which we may ſay, as I imagine, God made, or who elſe? None, I imagine. And one at leaſt which the joiner makes. Yes, ſaid he. And one which the painter makes. Is it not ſo? Be it ſo. Now the painter, the bed-maker, God, theſe three preſide over three ſpecies of beds. They are three indeed. But God, whether it were that he did not incline it, or whether there was ſome neceſſity for it, that he ſhould not make but one bed in nature, made this one only, which is really bed; but two ſuch, or more, have never been produced by God, nor ever will be produced. How ſo, ſaid he? Becauſe, ſaid I, if he had made but two, one again there would have appeared, the ſpecies of which both theſe two would have partaken of, and that ſpecies would be, that which is bed, and not thoſe two. Right, ſaid he. God then knowing theſe things, as I imagine, and willing to be the maker of bed, really, and really exiſting, but not of any particular bed, nor to be any particular bed-maker, produced but one in nature. It appears ſo. Do you incline then, that we call

him the creator of this one, or ſomething of this kind? It is juſt, in reaſon, ſaid he, ſince he hath, in their nature, made both this, and all other things. But what as to the joiner? Is not he the workman of a bed? Yes. And is the painter too, the workman and maker of ſuch a work? By no means. But what will you ſay he is, with relation to bed? This, ſaid he, as I imagine, we may moſt reaſonably call him; the imitator of what theſe are the workmen. Be it ſo, ſaid I; you call him then the imitator who maketh what is generated the third from nature? Entirely ſo, ſaid he. And this the compoſer of tragedy ſhall be likewiſe, ſince he is an imitator, riſing as a ſort of third from the King and the truth, and in like manner all other imitators. It ſeems ſo. We have agreed then as to the imitator; but tell me this concerning the painter, whether do you imagine he undertakes to imitate each particular thing in nature, or the works of artiſts? The works of artiſts, ſaid he. Whether, ſuch as they really are, or ſuch as they appear, determine this further? How do you ſay, reply'd he. Thus. Does a bed differ any thing from itſelf, whether he view it obliquely, or directly oppoſite, or in any particular poſition? or, does it differ nothing, but only appears different, and in the ſame way as to other things? Thus, ſaid he, it appears, but differs nothing. Conſider this too with reference to which of the two does painting work, in each particular work; whether with reference to real being, to imitate it as it really is, or with reference to what is apparent, as it appears; and whether is it the imitation of

appearance, or of truth? Of appearance, ſaid he. The imitative art, then, is far from the truth: and on this account, it ſeems, he is able to make theſe things, becauſe he is able to attain but to ſome ſmall part of each particular, and that but an image. Thus we ſay that a painter ſhall paint us a ſhoemaker, a joiner, and other artiſts, though he be ſkilled in none of thoſe arts; yet he ſhall be able to deceive children and ignorant people, if he be a good painter, when he paints a joiner, and ſhows him at a diſtance, ſo far as to make them imagine he is a real joiner. Why not. But this, I imagine, friend! we muſt conſider with reference to all theſe things; that when any one tells us of ſuch a painter, that he hath met with a man who is ſkilled in all manner of workmanſhip, and every thing elſe which every ſeveral artiſt underſtands, and that there is nothing which he does not underſtand more accurately, than any one elſe, we ought to reply to ſuch a one, that he is a ſimple man, and that it ſeems, having met with ſome impoſtor, and mimic, he hath been deceived; ſo that he hath appeared to him to know every thing, from his own incapacity to diſtinguiſh between ſcience, and ignorance, and imitation. Moſt true, ſaid he. Ought we not then, ſaid I, in the next place, to conſider tragedy, and its leader, Homer: ſince we hear from ſome, that theſe poets underſtand all arts, and all human affairs, reſpecting virtue and vice, and likewiſe all divine things, for a good poet muſt of neceſſity compoſe with knowledge, if he means to compoſe well what he compoſes, elſe he is not able to compoſe. It behoves us then

to conſider whether theſe who have met with thoſe imitators have been deceived, and on viewing their works have not perceived that they are the third diſtant from real being, and that their works are ſuch as can eaſily be made by one who knows not the truth (for they are phantoms they make, and not real beings) or whether they do ſay ſomewhat, and that the good poets in reality have knowledge in theſe things which they ſeem to the multitude elegantly to expreſs. By all means, ſaid he, this is to be inquired into. Do you imagine then, that if any one were able to make both of theſe, that which is imitated, and likewiſe the image, he would allow himſelf ſeriouſly to apply to the workmanſhip of the images, and propoſe this to himſelf as the beſt thing in life? I do not. But if he were in reality intelligent in theſe things which he imitates, he would far rather, I imagine, ſeriouſly apply himſelf to the things than to the imitations, and would endeavour to leave behind him many and beautiful actions, as monuments of himſelf, and would ſtudy rather to be himſelf the perſon commended than the commender. I imagine ſo, ſaid he; for neither is the honour nor the profit equal. As to other things then, let us not call them to account, aſking Homer or any other of the poets, whether any of them were any way ſkilled in medicine, and not an imitator only of medical diſcourſes, for which of the antient or latter poets is ſaid to have recovered any to health, as Aeſculapius did? or what ſtudents in medicine, hath any left behind him, as he did his deſcendants. Nor let us aſk

them concerning the other arts, but let them alone: but with reference to thoſe greateſt, and moſt noble things which Homer attempts to ſpeak of, with reference to wars, and armies, and conſtitutions of cities, and the education belonging to men, it is juſt, ſome how, to queſtion him, whilſt we demand of him: Friend Homer! if you be not the third from the truth with regard to virtue, being the workman of an image, (which we have defined an imitator to be) but art the ſecond, and art able to diſcern what purſuits render men better or worſe, both in private and public tell us which of the cities hath been by you better conſtituted, as Lacedaemon was by Lycurgus, and many other both great and ſmall cities by many others, but what city acknowledges you to have been a good lawgiver, and to have been of advantage to them. Italy and Sicily acknowledge Charondas, and we Solon; but ſhall any one acknowledge you as any thing? I fancy not, ſaid Glauco. It is not then pretended even by the Homerics themſelves. But what war in Homer's days is recorded to have been well conducted by him as leader, or counſellour? Not one. But what are his diſcoveries, as among the works of a wiſe man, there are many diſcoveries and inventions ſpoken of, reſpecting the arts, and other affairs; as of Thales the Mileſian, and of Anacharſis the Scythian? By no means is there any ſuch thing. But if not in a public manner, is Homer ſaid to have lived as a private tutor to any, who delighted in his converſation, and have delivered down to poſterity a certain Homeric manner of life. In like manner as Py-

thagoras was remarkably beloved on this account, and even to this day, ſuch as denominate themſelves from the Pythagorean manner of life, appear to be ſome how eminent beyond others. Neither is there, ſaid he, any thing of this kind related of Homer. For fleſh-lover Creaphilus, Socrates! the companion of Homer, may probably appear more ridiculous ſtill in his education, than in his name, if what is ſaid of Homer be true. For it is ſaid, that he was greatly neglected when he lived under Homer's tuition. It is ſaid indeed, reply'd I. But do you imagine, Glauco! that if Homer had been able to educate men, and to render them better, as being capable not only to imitate with reſpect to theſe matters, but to underſtand them; would he not then have procured himſelf many companions, and have been honoured and beloved by them? But Protagoras the Abderite, and Prodicus the Chian, and many others are able to perſuade the men of their times, converſing with them privately, that they ſhall neither be able to govern their family, nor yet their city, unleſs they themſelves ſhall preſide over their education, and for this wiſdom of theirs, they are ſo exceedingly beloved, that their companions almoſt carry them about on their heads. Would then the men of Homer's time have left him or Heſiod to go about ſinging their ſongs, if he had been able to profit men in the way of virtue; and not rather have retained him with gold, and obliged him to ſtay with them? or, if they could not perſuade him, they would as ſcholars have followed him every where, 'till they had got ſufficient education?

You ſeem to me, ſaid he, Socrates! to ſay perfectly right. Shall we not then eſtabliſh this point? That all the poetical men, beginning with Homer, are imitators of the images of virtue, and of other things about which they compoſe, but that they do not attain to the truth: but as we juſt now ſaid, a painter who himſelf knows nothing about the making of ſhoes, ſhall draw a ſhoemaker, who ſhall appear to be real to ſuch as are not intelligent, but who view according to the colour and figures? Entirely ſo. In the ſame manner, I imagine, we ſhall ſay that the poet colours over with his names and words certain colours of the ſeveral arts, whilſt he underſtands nothing himſelf, but merely imitates, ſo as to others ſuch as himſelf who view things in his compoſitions, he appears to have knowledge: and if he ſay any thing about ſhoemaking in meaſure, number, and harmony, he ſeems to ſay quite well, and in like manner if of an expedition, or of any thing elſe: ſo great an enchantment have theſe things naturally, ſince you know, I imagine, in what manner poetical things appear when ſtript of muſical colouring, and expreſſed apart by themſelves, for you have ſomewhere beheld it. I have, ſaid he. Do they not, ſaid I, reſemble the faces of people who are in their prime, but who are not beautiful, ſuch as they appear, when their bloom forſakes them? Entirely, ſaid he. Come now, and conſider this. The maker of the image, whom we call imitator, knoweth nothing of real being, but only of the apparent. Is it not ſo. Yes. Let us not then leave it expreſſed by halves, but let us ſufficiently

perceive it. Say on, reply'd he. A painter, we ſay, ſhall paint reins, and a bit. Yes. And the leather-cutter, and the ſmith, ſhall make them. Certainly. Does then the painter underſtand what kind of reins and bit there ought to be, or not even he who makes them, the ſmith, nor the leather-cutter, but he who underſtands to uſe them, the horſeman alone? Moſt true. Shall we not ſay it is ſo in every thing elſe? How? That with reference to each particular thing, there are theſe three arts. That which is to uſe it, that which is to make it, and that which is to imitate it. Yes. Is then the virtue, and the beauty, and the rectitude of every utenſil, and animal, and action, for nothing elſe but for the uſe for which each particular was made, or generated? Juſt ſo. Of all neceſſity then, he who uſeth each particular, muſt be the moſt ſkilful, and be able to tell the maker what he makes good or bad, with reference to the uſe, in which he uſeth it: thus, for example, a player on the pipe, tells the pipe-maker concering pipes, what things are of ſervice, towards the playing on the pipe, and he ſhall give orders how he ought to make them, but the work-man does not ſo. What elſe. Does not the one then being intelligent, pronounce concerning good and bad pipes, and the other believing him, make accordingly? Yes. With reference then to one and the ſame inſtrument, the maker ſhall have right opinion concerning its excellence or naughtineſs, whilſt he is converſant with one who is intelligent, and is obliged to hear from the intelligent; but he who uſeth it ſhall have ſcience. Entirely ſo. But whether

ſhall the imitator have intelligence from uſing the things he paints, whether they be handſome and right, or otherwiſe? or ſhall he have right opinion from his being neceſſarily converſant with the intelligent, and from being enjoined in what manner he ought to paint? Neither of the two. The imitator then ſhall have neither knowledge, nor right opinion about what he imitates with reference to excellence, or naughtineſs. It appears not. The imitator then ſhould be very agreeable in his imitation, with regard to wiſdom, concerning what he paints. Not entirely. But however he will imitate at leaſt, without knowing concerning each particular, in what reſpect it is ill or good; but it is likely, ſuch as appears to be beautiful to the multitude, and thoſe who know nothing, that he ſhall imitate. What elſe? We have now, indeed, ſufficiently, as it appears, at leaſt, ſettled theſe things. That the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning, in thoſe things which he imitates, but that imitation is a ſort of amuſement, and not a ſerious affair. And likewiſe that thoſe who apply to tragic poetry in iambics and heroics, are all imitators in the higheſt degree. Entirely ſo. But certainly, ſaid I, this of imitation is it not ſome how in the third degree from the truth? Is it not? Yes. To what part then of man bears it a reference, having the power it hath? What part do you ſpeak of? Of ſuch as this. The ſame magnitude perceived by ſight, does not appear in the ſame manner, near at hand, and at a diſtance. It doth not. And the ſame things appear crooked and ſtreight, when we look at them in

water, and out of water, and concave and convex, through the miſtake of the ſight, as to colours; all this diſturbance is manifeſt in the ſoul, and this infirmity of our nature, painting lays hold of and leaves nothing of impoſture undone, in the ſame way as magic doth, and many other arts of this kind. True. And have not the arts of meaſuring, numbering and weighing, appeared to be moſt ingenious helps in theſe things, that ſo the apparent greater or leſs, the apparent more or heavier, may not govern us, but the numbered, the meaſured, and the weighed? What elſe? But this again is, at leaſt the work of the rational part in the ſoul. It is ſo indeed. But whilſt reaſon often meaſures and declares ſome things to be greater or leſs than other things, or equal, the contrary appears at the ſame time with reference to theſe things. Yes. But did not we ſay, that it was impoſſible for the ſame perſon to have contrary opinions about the ſame things at the ſame time? And thus far at leaſt we ſaid rightly. That part of the ſoul then, which judgeth contrary to the meaſure, would ſeem not to be the ſame with that which judgeth according to the meaſure. It would not. But ſurely at leaſt that which truſteth to meaſure and computation, would ſeem to be the beſt part of the ſoul. Why not? That then, which oppoſeth itſelf to it, would ſeem to be ſome of the naughty parts of us. Of neceſſity. It was then this I inclined ſhould be agreed upon, when I ſaid that painting, and imitation in general being far from the truth, delight in their own work, converſing with that part in us which is far from wiſ-

dom, and are its companion and friend, to no ſound nor genuine purpoſe. Entirely ſo, ſaid he. Imitation then, being naughty in itſelf, and joining with that which is naughty, generates naughty things. It ſeems ſo. Whether, ſaid I, is the caſe thus, with reference to the imitation which is by the ſight only, or is it likewiſe ſo with reference to that by hearing, which we call poetry? Likely as to this alſo, ſaid he. We ſhall not therefore, ſaid I, truſt to the appearance in painting, but we ſhall proceed to the conſideration of that part of the intellect with which the imitation by poetry is converſant, and ſee whether it is naughty or valuable. It muſt be done. Let us proceed then thus. Poetic imitation, we ſay, imitates men acting either voluntarily or involuntarily; and imagining that in their acting, they have done either well or ill, and in all theſe caſes, receiving either pain or pleaſure: does it any more than this? No more. In all theſe, now, does the man agree with himſelf, or, as he diſagreed with reference to ſight, and had contrary opinions in himſelf of the ſame things at one and the ſame time, does he, in the ſame manner, diſagree likewiſe in his actions, and fight with himſelf? But I recollect that there is no occaſion for us to ſettle this at leaſt; for in our reaſonings above, we ſufficiently ſettled all theſe things, that our ſoul is full of a thouſand ſuch contrarieties exiſting in it. Right, ſaid he. Right truly, ſaid I, but it appears to me neceſſary to go over now, what was then omitted. As what, ſaid he? We ſaid ſomewhere formerly, ſaid I, that a good man when he meets with ſuch a fortune as the loſs of

a ſon, or of any thing elſe, which he values the moſt, will bear it of all men the eaſieſt. Certainly. But let us now conſider this further, whether will he grieve none at all, or is this indeed impoſſible, but he will, however, moderate his grief? The truth, ſaid he, is rather this laſt. But tell me this now concerning him, whether do you imagine that he will ſtruggle more with grief and oppoſe it, when he is obſerved by his equals, or when he is in ſolitude, alone by himſelf? Much more, ſaid he, when he is obſerved. But when alone, he will venture, I imagine, to utter many things, which if any one heard him, he would be aſhamed of, and he will do many things which he would not wiſh any one ſaw him doing. It is ſo, ſaid he. Is it not then reaſon and law which command him to reſtrain his grief, but what drags him to grief, is the paſſion itſelf? True. As then there is in the man an oppoſite conduct, with regard to the ſame thing, at one and the ſame time, we muſt neceſſarily ſay that he has two conductors. What elſe? And ſhall we not ſay, that one of them is ready to obey the law wherever law leads him? Law. How? Law in a manner ſays, that it is beſt in misfortunes to have the greateſt tranquillity poſſible, and not to bear them ill; ſince the good and evil of ſuch things as theſe is not manifeſt, and ſince no advantage followeth the bearing theſe things ill, and as nothing of human affairs is worthy of great concern, and beſides their grief proves a hinderance to that in them which we ought to have moſt at hand. What is it, ſaid he, you ſpeak of? To deliberate, ſaid I, on the event, and as on a throw of

the dice, to regulate his affairs according to what caſts up, in whatever way reaſon ſhall declare to be beſt. And not as children when they fall, to lye ſtill, and waſte the time in crying; but always to accuſtom the ſoul to apply in the ſpeedieſt manner to heal and rectify what was fallen and ſick, diſmiſſing lamentation. One would thus, ſaid he, behave in the beſt manner in every condition. And did not we ſay that the beſt part is willing to follow this which is rational? It is plain. And ſhall not we ſay that the part which leadeth to the remembrance of the affliction, and to wailings, and is inſatiably given to theſe, is irrational, and idle, and a friend to cowardice? We ſhall ſay ſo truly. Is not then the grieving part that which admits of much and of various imitation? But the prudent and tranquil part, which is always uniform with itſelf, is neither eaſily imitated, nor when imitated, eaſily underſtood, eſpecially by a popular aſſembly, where all ſorts of men are aſſembled together in a theatre? For it is the imitation of a diſpoſition, which is foreign to them. Entirely ſo. It is plain then, that the imitative poet is not made at leaſt for ſuch a part of the ſoul as this. Nor is his ſkill fitted to pleaſe it, if he mean to gain the applauſe of the multitude. But he applies to the paſſionate and the multiform part, as it is eaſily imitated. It is plain. May we not then, with juſtice, lay hold of the imitative poet, and place him as correſpondent to the painter; for he reſembles him, both in that, as to truth, he does but naughty things, and in this too he reſembles him, in being converſant with a different part of the

foul from that which is beſt. And thus we may, with juſtice, not admit him into our city which is to be well regulated, becauſe he excites and nouriſhes this part of the ſoul, and ſtrengthening it, deſtroys the rational; as when one in a city makes the wicked powerful, he betrays the city, and deſtroys the beſt men, in the ſame manner we ſhall ſay that the imitative poet eſtabliſheth a bad republic in the ſoul of each individual, gratifying the fooliſh part of it, which neither diſcerns what is great, nor what is little, but deems the ſame things ſometimes great, and ſometimes ſmall, forming little images in its own imagination, altogether remote from the truth. Entirely ſo. But we have not however as yet, at leaſt, brought the greateſt accuſation againſt it: for that is, ſome how, a very dreadful one that it is able to corrupt even the good, if it be not a very few excepted. Why will it not, ſince it acts in this manner? But hear now, and conſider; for ſome how, the beſt of us, when we hear Homer, or any of the tragic writers imitating ſome of the heroes when in grief, pouring forth long ſpeeches in their ſorrow, bewailing and beating their breaſts, you know we are delighted, and yielding ourſelves, we follow along, and ſympathizing with them, we ſeriouſly commend him, as an able poet, whoever moſt affecteth us in this manner. I know it. Why do you not? But when any domeſtic grief befals any of us, you perceive, on the other hand, that we value ourſelves on the oppoſite behaviour, if we can be quiet, and endure, this being the part of a man, but that of a woman, which in the

other caſe we commended. I perceive it, ſaid he. Is this commendation then, ſaid I, a handſome one, when we ſee ſuch a man as one would not deign to be one's ſelf, but would be aſhamed of, not to abominate but to delight in him, and commend him? No, truly, ſaid he; it appears unreaſonable. Certainly, ſaid I, if you conſider it, at leaſt, in this manner. How? If you conſider that the part of us, which in our private misfortunes is forcibly reſtrained, and is kept from weeping and bewailing to the full, being by nature of ſuch a kind as is deſirous of theſe, is the very part which is by the poets filled and gratified: but that part in us, which is naturally the beſt, being not ſufficiently inſtructed, neither by reaſon nor habit, grows remiſs in its guardianſhip over the bewailing part, by attending to the ſufferings of others, and deems it no way diſgraceful to itſelf, to commend and pity one who grieves immoderately, whilſt he profeſſes to be a good man. But this it thinks it gains, even pleaſure, which it would not chuſe to be deprived of, by deſpiſing the whole of the poem. For, I imagine, it falls to the ſhare of few to be able to conſider, that what we feel with reſpect to the fortunes of others, muſt neceſſarily be felt with reſpect to our own. Since it is not eaſy for one to bear up under his own misfortunes, who ſtrongly cheriſheth the bewailing diſpoſition over thoſe of others. Moſt true, ſaid he. And is not the reaſoning the ſame with reference to the ridiculous? For when you hear, in imitation by comedy, or in private converſation, what you would be aſhamed to do yourſelf to excite laughter, and are delight-

ed with it, and imitate it, you do the ſame thing here as in the tragic: for that part, which, when it wanted to excite laughter, was formerly reſtrained by reaſon from a fear of incurring the character of ſcurrility, you now letting looſe, and allowing there to grow vigorous, you are often imperceptibly brought to be in your own behaviour a buffoon. Extremely ſo, ſaid he. And the caſe is the ſame as to venereal pleaſures, and anger, and the whole of the paſſions, as well the ſorrowful as the joyful; which, truly, we have ſaid, attend us in every action that the poetical imitation of theſe has the ſame effect upon us; for it nouriſhes and waters thoſe things which ought to be parched, and conſtitutes as our governour, thoſe which ought to be governed, in order to our becoming better and happier, inſtead of being worſe and more miſerable. I can ſay no otherwiſe, ſaid he. When therefore, Glauco! ſaid I, you meet with the commenders of Homer, who tell how this poet inſtructed Greece, and that he deſerves to be taken as a maſter to teach one both the management, and the knowledge of human affairs, and that one ſhould regulate the whole of his life, according to this poet, we ſhould indeed love and embrace ſuch people, as being the beſt they are able; and agree with them that Homer is moſt poetical, and the firſt of tragedy writers, but they muſt know, that the hymns of the Gods, and the praiſes of worthy action are alone to be admitted into the city. But if it ſhould admit the pleaſureable muſe likewiſe, in ſongs, or verſes, you ſhould have pleaſure, and pain, reigning in the city, inſtead of law, and of that reaſon which al-

way appeareth beſt to the community. Moſt true, ſaid he. Let theſe things now, ſaid I, be our apology, when we recollect what we have ſaid with reference to poetry, that it was with reaſon we then diſmiſſed it from our republic, ſince it is ſuch as is now deſcribed: for reaſon obliged us. And let us tell it further, leſt it accuſe us of a certain roughneſs, and ruſticity. That there is an old variance between philoſophy, and poetry. For ſuch as theſe,

That bawling bitch, which at her miſtreſs barks,

and

He's great in empty eloquence of fools,

and

On trifles ſtill they plod, becauſe they're poor.

And a thouſand ſuch like, are marks of an antient oppoſition between them. But nevertheleſs let it be ſaid, that if any one ſhow reaſon for it, that the poetry and the imitation which are calculated for pleaſure, ought to be in a well regulated city, we, for our part, ſhall gladly admit them, as we are at leaſt conſcious to ourſelves that we are charmed by them. But to betray what appears to be truth, were an unholy thing. For are not you yourſelf, friend! charmed by this imitation, and moſt eſpecially when you ſee it performed by Homer? Very much ſo. Is it not juſt then, that we introduce it apologizing for itſelf, either in ſong, or in any other meaſure? By all means. And we may at leaſt grant, ſome how, even to its defenders, ſuch as are not poets, but lovers of poetry, to ſpeak in its behalf, without verſe,

and ſhow that it is not only pleaſant, but profitable for republics, and for human life; and we ſhall hear with pleaſure, for we ſhall gain ſome what if it ſhall appear not only pleaſant, but alſo profitable. Why ſhall we not gain, ſaid he? And if it happen otherwiſe, friend! we ſhall do as thoſe who have been in love when they deem their love unprofitable, though it is a violence on them, they however deſiſt: ſo we, in like manner, through this inborn love of ſuch poetry that prevails in our beſt republics, ſhall be well pleaſed to ſee it appear to be the beſt and trueſt: and we ſhall hear it till it is able to make no further apology. But we ſhall take along with us this diſcourſe we have held, as a counter-charm, and incantation, being afraid to fall back again into a childiſh and vulgar love: we may perceive then that we are not to be much in earneſt about ſuch poetry as this, as if it were a ſerious affair, and approached to the truth, but the hearer is to beware of it, and to be afraid for the republic within himſelf, and to hold thoſe opinions of poetry which we mentioned: I entirely agree, ſaid he, for great, friend Glauco! ſaid I, great is the conteſt, and not ſuch as is imagined, to become a good or a bad man: ſo as not to be moved neither through honour, nor riches, nor any magiſtracy, nor poetic imitation, ever to neglect juſtice, and the other virtues. I agree with you, from what we have diſcuſſed, and ſo I imagine will any other. But we have not yet, ſaid I, gone through the greateſt prize of virtue, and the rewards laid up for her. You ſpeak of ſome prodigious greatneſs, ſaid he, if there be

other greater, than thoſe mentioned. But what is there, ſaid I, can be great in a little time? for this whole period from infancy to old age, is but little in reſpect of the whole. Nothing at all, indeed, ſaid he. What then? Do you imagine an immortal being, ought to be much concerned about ſuch a period, and not about the whole of duration? I imagine, ſaid he, about the whole. But why do you mention this? Have you not perceived, ſaid I, that our ſoul is immortal, and never at all periſheth? On which, he looking at me, and wondering, ſaid, Not I, indeed. But are you able to ſhow this? I ſhould otherwiſe do a wrong, ſaid I. And I imagine you yourſelf can ſhow it, for it is, in no reſpect, difficult. To me, at leaſt, ſaid he, it is difficult; but I would willingly hear from you this which is not difficult. You ſhall hear then, ſaid I. Only ſpeak, reply'd he. Is there not ſomething, ſaid I, you call good, and ſomething you call evil? I own it. Do you then conceive of them in the ſame manner as I do? How? That which deſtroys and corrupts every thing, is the evil, and what preſerves and profits it, is the good. I do, ſaid he. But what? Do you not ſay, there is ſomething is good, and ſomething is bad, to each particular? As blindneſs to the eyes, and diſeaſe to every animal body, blaſting to corns, rottenneſs to wood, ruſt to braſs and iron, and as I am ſaying, almoſt every thing hath its peculiar evil, and diſeaſe? I imagine ſo, reply'd he. And when any thing of this kind befalleth any thing, does it not render that which it befalleth, naughty, and in the end, diſſolveth, and deſtroyeth it. Why doth it not? Its

own peculiar evil then, and naughtineſs, deſtroys each particular, or if this does not deſtroy it, nothing elſe at leaſt, can ever deſtroy it. For that which is good at leaſt, can never at all deſtroy any thing, nor yet that which is neither good, nor evil. How can they, ſaid he? If then, we ſhall be able to find among beings, any one, which hath, indeed, ſome evil, which rendereth it naughty, but is not however able to diſſolve and deſtroy it, ſhall we not then know that a being thus conſtituted, cannot be deſtroyed at all? So, reply'd he, it appears. What then? ſaid I. Is there not ſomething which renders the ſoul, evil? Certainly, reply'd he, all theſe things which we have now mentioned, injuſtice, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance. But does then any of theſe diſſolve and deſtroy it? And attend now, that we may not be impoſed on, in imagining that an unjuſt and fooliſh man, when he is catched doing injuſtice, is then deſtroyed through his injuſtice, which is the naughtineſs of his ſoul: but conſider it thus. As diſeaſe, which is the naughtineſs of animal body diſſolveth and deſtroyeth body, and reduceth it to be no longer that body; and all thoſe things we mentioned, being deſtroyed by their own proper evil adhering to them and poſſeſſing them, are reduced to a non-exiſtence. Is it not ſo? Yes. Conſider now the ſoul in the ſame manner. Doth injuſtice, or other vice poſſeſſing it, by poſſeſſing it, and adhering to it, corrupt and deface it, 'till bringing it to death, it ſeparate it from the body? By no means, doth it this, ſaid he. But it were abſurd, ſaid I, that any thing ſhould be deſtroyed, by the naughtineſs of

another, but not by its own. Abſurd. For conſider, Glauco! ſaid I, that neither by the naughtineſs of victuals, whether it be their mouldineſs, or rottenneſs, or whatever elſe, do we imagine our body can be deſtroyed, but if this naughtineſs in them, create in the body a naughtineſs of the body, we will ſay, that through their means, the body is deſtroyed by its own evil which is diſeaſe. But we will never allow that by the naughtineſs of food which is one thing, the body which is another thing, can ever by this foreign evil, without creating in it its own peculiar evil, be at any time deſtroyed. You ſay moſt right, reply'd he. According to the ſame reaſoning then, ſaid I, unleſs the naughtineſs of the body, create a naughtineſs of the ſoul, let us never allow, that the ſoul can be deſtroyed, by an evil which is foreign, without its own peculiar evil, one thing by the evil of another. There is reaſon for it, ſaid he. Let us then, either refute theſe things as not good reaſoning, or ſo long as they are unrefuted, let us at no time ſay, that the ſoul ſhall be ever in any degree the more deſtroyed, either by burning fever, or by any other diſeaſe, or by ſlaughter, not even though one ſhould cut the whole body into the ſmalleſt parts poſſible, 'till one ſhow that through theſe ſufferings of the body, the ſoul herſelf becomes more unjuſt and impure. But we will never allow it to be ſaid, that when a foreign evil befalleth any thing, whilſt its own proper evil is not within it, that either the ſoul, or any thing elſe, is deſtroyed. But this at leaſt, ſaid he, no one ſhall ever ſhow, that the ſouls of thoſe who die are by death

rendered more unjuſt. But if any one, reply'd I, ſhall dare to contend with us in reaſoning; and, in order that he may not be obliged to own the ſouls are immortal, will ſay, that when one dies he becomes more wicked, and unjuſt, we ſhall ſome how juſtly demand of him to ſhow, if he ſays true in telling us this, that injuſtice is deadly to the poſſeſſor, as a diſeaſe; and that thoſe who embrace it are deſtroyed by it as by a diſeaſe deſtructive in its own nature.---Of thoſe moſt ſpeedily who embrace it moſt, and thoſe more ſlowly who embrace it leſs. And not as at preſent where the unjuſt die having this puniſhment inflicted on them by others. Truly, ſaid he, injuſtice does not appear altogether dreadful, if it ſhall be deadly to him who practiſeth it, (for that were a deliverance from evil) but I rather imagine it will appear to be altogether the reverſe, it deſtroying others as far as it can, but rendering the unjuſt extremely alive, and along with his being alive rendering him wakeful likewiſe; ſo far it ſeems, does it dwell from being deadly. You ſay well, reply'd I, for when one's own wickedneſs and peculiar evil is inſufficient to kill and deſtroy the ſoul, hardly can that evil at leaſt, which aims at the deſtruction of another, deſtroy a ſoul or any thing elſe, but what it is aimed againſt. Hardly indeed, ſaid he, as appears to me at leaſt. When therefore it is deſtroyed by no one evil, neither peculiar, nor foreign, is it not plain that, of neceſſity, it always exiſts, and if it always exiſts, it is immortal? Of neceſſity, reply'd he. Let this then, ſaid I, be fixed in this manner. And if it be, you'll perceive that

the ſame ſouls ſhall always remain, for their number ſhall never become leſs, none being deſtroyed, nor ſhall it become greater; for if, any how, the number of immortals was made greater, you know it would take from the mortal, and in the end all would be immortal. You ſay true. But let us not, ſaid I, imagine this (for reaſon will not allow of it) nor yet that the ſoul in its trueſt nature, is of ſuch a kind as to be full of much variety, diverſity, and difference, conſidered in itſelf. How do you ſay, reply'd he? That can hardly, ſaid I, be eternal which is compounded of many things, and which hath not the fineſt compoſition, as hath now appeared to us to be the caſe with reference to the ſoul? It is not likely, at leaſt. That the ſoul then is ſomething immortal, both our preſent reaſonings, and others too, may oblige us to own: but in order to know what kind of being the ſoul is, in truth, one ought not to contemplate it, as it is damaged both by its conjunction with the body, and by other evils, as we now behold it, but ſuch as it is when become pure, ſuch it muſt by reaſoning be fully contemplated, and he (who doth this) ſhall find it far more beautiful at leaſt, and ſhall more plainly ſee through juſtice, and injuſtice, and every thing we have now gone over. We are now telling the truth concerning it, ſuch as it appears at preſent. We have ſeen it indeed, in the ſame condition in which they ſee the marine Glaucus, where they cannot eaſily perceive his antient nature, becauſe the antient members of his body are partly broken off, and others are worn away; and he altogether da-

maged by the waves: and beſides other things are grown to him, ſuch as ſhell fiſh, ſea weed, and ſtones: ſo that he every way reſembleth a beaſt, rather as what he naturally was. In ſuch a condition do we behold the ſoul under a thouſand evils. But we ought, Glauco, to behold it there. Where, ſaid he. In its philoſophy; and to obſerve to what it applies, and what intimacies it affects, as being ally'd to that which is divine, immortal, and eternal; and what it would become, if it purſued wholly what is of this kind, and were by this purſuit, brought out of that ocean, in which it now is, and had the ſtones and ſhell fiſh, ſhaken off from it, which, at preſent, as it is fed on earth, render its nature in great meaſure, earthy, ſtony, and ſavage, through thoſe enjoyments, which are ſaid to render happy. And then ſhould one behold its true nature, whether multiform, or uniform, and every thing concerning it. But we have, now, as I imagine, ſufficiently gone over its paſſions, and appearances in human life. Entirely ſo, reply'd he. Have we not now, ſaid I, diſcuſſed every thing elſe in our reaſonings, but have not produced thoſe rewards, and honours of juſtice (as you ſay Heſiod and Homer do,) but we find juſtice itſelf to be the beſt reward to the ſoul; and that it ought to do what is juſt, whether it have, or have not Gyges' ring, and along with ſuch a ring, the helmet likewiſe of Pluto. You ſay moſt true, ſaid he. Will it not now then, Glauco! ſaid I, be attended with no envy, if beſides theſe, we add thoſe rewards to juſtice and the other virtues, what and how great there are afforded to

the ſoul both by men and Gods, both whilſt the man is alive, and after he is dead? By all means, ſaid he. Will you then reſtore me what you borrowed in the reaſoning? What, chiefly? I granted you, that the juſt man ſhould be deemed unjuſt, and the unjuſt be deemed to be juſt. For you were of opinion, that though it were not poſſible that theſe things ſhould be concealed from Gods and men, it ſhould however be granted, for the ſake of the argument, that juſtice in itſelf, might be compared with injuſtice in itſelf, or do you not remember it? I ſhould, indeed, be unjuſt, ſaid he, if I did not. Now after the judgment is over, I demand again, in behalf of juſtice, that as you allow it to be indeed eſteemed both by Gods and men, you likewiſe allow it to have the ſame good reputation, that it may alſo receive theſe prizes of victory, which it acquires from the reputation of juſtice, and beſtows them on thoſe who poſſeſs it. Since it hath already appeared to beſtow thoſe good things which ariſe from really being juſt, and that it doth not deceive thoſe who truly embrace it. You demand what is juſt, ſaid he. Will you not then, ſaid I, in the firſt place, reſtore me this? That it is not concealed from the Gods, what ſort of man each of the two is. We will grant it, ſaid he. And if they be not concealed, one of them ſhall be beloved of the Gods, and one of them hated, as we agreed in the beginning. We did ſo. And ſhall we not agree, that as to the man who is beloved of the Gods, whatever comes to him from the Gods, ſhall all be the beſt poſſible, unleſs he have ſome neceſſary ill from former

miſcarriage. Entirely ſo. We are then, to think in this manner of the juſt man, that if he happen to be in poverty, or in diſeaſes, or in any other of thoſe imaginary evils, theſe things to him iſſue in ſomething good, either whilſt alive, or dead. For never at all is he neglected by the Gods at leaſt, whoever he is who inclines earneſtly to endeavour to become juſt, and practiſes virtue as far as it is poſſible for man to reſemble God. It is reaſonable, reply'd he, that ſuch an one ſhould not be neglected by him he reſembles. And are we not to think the reverſe of theſe things, concerning the unjuſt man? Entirely. Such then, would ſeem to be the prizes, which the juſt man receiveth from the Gods. Such they are indeed in my opinion, ſaid he. But what, ſaid I, do they receive from men? Is not the caſe thus? (if we are to ſuppoſe the truth) Do not cunning, and unjuſt men, do the ſame thing as racers, who run well at the beginning, but not ſo at the end? for at the firſt they briſkly leap forward, but in the end they become ridiculous, and, with their ears on their neck, they run off without any reward. But ſuch as are true racers, arriving at the end, both receive the prizes, and are crowned. Does it not happen thus for the moſt part as to juſt men? that at the end of every action, and intercourſe of life they are both held in eſteem, and receive rewards from men. Entirely ſo. You will then ſuffer me to ſay of theſe what you yourſelf ſaid of the unjuſt. For I will aver now, that the juſt when they are grown up, ſhall arrive at power if they deſire magiſtracies, they ſhall marry where they incline, and

ſhall ſettle their children in marriage where they incline, and every thing elſe you mentioned concerning the others, I now ſay concerning theſe. And on the other hand I will ſay of the unjuſt, that the moſt of them, though they may be concealed whilſt they are young, yet being catched at the end of the race, are ridiculous, and when they become old, are wretched and ridiculed, and ſhall be ſcourged both by foreigners, and citizens, and they ſhall afterwards be tortured, and burnt, which you ſaid were terrible things, and you ſpoke the truth. Imagine you hear from me that they ſuffer all theſe things. But ſee if you will admit of what I ſay. Entirely, ſaid he, for you ſay what is juſt. Such as theſe now, ſaid I, are the prizes, the rewards and gifts, which a juſt man receives in his life time, both from Gods and men; beſides thoſe good things which juſtice contains in itſelf. And they are extremely beautiful, ſaid he, and likewiſe permanent. But theſe now, ſaid I, are nothing in number or magnitude, when compared with thoſe which await each of the two at death. And theſe things muſt likewiſe be heard, that each of them may compleatly have what is their due in the reaſoning. You may ſay on, reply'd he, not as to a hearer who hath heard much, but who hears with greater pleaſure. But, however, I will not, ſaid I, tell you the apologue of Alcinus; but that, indeed, of a brave man, Erus the ſon of Armenius, by deſcent a Pamphilian; who happening on a time to die in battle, when the dead were on the tenth day carried off, already all corrupted, he was taken up ſound, and being carried

home, as he was about to be buried on the twelfth day, when laid on the funeral pile, he revived, and being revived, he told what he ſaw in the other ſtate, and ſaid; That after his ſoul went out, it went with many others, and that they came to a certain region of ſpirits, where there were two gulphs in the earth, near to one another, and other two openings in the heavens, oppoſite to them, and that the judges ſate between theſe. And when they give judgment, they commanded the juſt to go to the right hand, and upwards through the heaven, fixing before them the accounts of the judgment pronounced; but the unjuſt, they commanded to the left, and downwards, and theſe likewiſe had behind them the accounts of all they had done. But on his coming before the judges, they ſaid, it behoved him to be a meſſenger to men concerning things there, and they commanded him to hear, and to contemplate every thing in the place. And that he ſaw here, through two openings, one of the heaven, and one of the earth, the ſouls going away, after they were there judged; and through the other two openings he ſaw, riſing through the one out of the earth, ſouls full of ſqualidneſs, and duſt; and through the other, he ſaw other ſouls deſcending pure from heaven; and that always on their arrival, they ſeemed to come off a long journey, and that they gladly went to reſt themſelves in the meadow, as in a public aſſembly, and ſaluted one another, ſuch as were of acquaintance, and that theſe who roſe out of the earth, aſked the others concerning the things above, and thoſe from heaven aſked them concerning the things below, and

that they told one another: thoſe wailing and weeping whilſt they called to mind, what and how many things they ſuffered and ſaw in their journey under earth; (for it was a journey of a thouſand years) and that theſe again from heaven, explained their enjoyments, and ſpectacles of inexpreſſible beauty. To narrate many of them, Glauco! would take much time; but this, he ſaid, was the ſum, whatever pieces of injuſtice any had committed, and how many ſoever any one had injured, they were puniſhed for all theſe ſeparately tenfold, and that it was in each, according to the rate of an hundred years, the life of man being conſidered as ſo long, that they might ſuffer tenfold puniſhment of the injuſtice they had done. So that if any one had put any to death, either by betraying cities, or armies, or bringing men into ſlavery, or being confederates in any other wickedneſs, for each of all theſe they reaped tenfold ſufferings; and if, again, they had benefited any by good deeds, and had been juſt, and holy, they reaped what was worthy, according to theſe actions. Of thoſe who died very young, and lived but a little time, he told what is not worth relating in reſpect of other things. But of impiety and piety towards the Gods, and parents, and of ſuicide, he told the more remarkable retributions. For he ſaid he was preſent when one was aſked by another, where the great Aridaeus was? This Aridaeus had been tyrant in a certain city of Pamphylia a thouſand years before that time, and had killed his aged father, and his elder brother, and had done many other unhallowed deeds as it was

reported: and he ſaid, the one who was aſked, reply'd; he neither comes, ſaid he, nor ever will come hither: for we then ſurely ſaw this likewiſe among other dreadful ſpectacles, when we were near the mouth of the opening, and were about to come up after having ſuffered all our ſufferings, we beheld both him on a ſudden, and others likewiſe, the moſt of whom were tyrants, and ſome private perſons who had committed great iniquity, whom, when they imagined they were to get up, the mouth of the opening did not admit, but bellowed when any of thoſe who were ſo polluted with wickedneſs, or who had not been ſufficiently puniſhed, made an attempt to aſcend. And then, ſaid he, fierce men, and all of fire to look at, ſtanding by, and underſtanding the bellowing, took them and led them apart, Aridaeus and the reſt, binding their hands, and their feet, and thruſting down their head, and pulling off their ſkin, dragged them to an outer road, tearing them on thorns. Declaring always to thoſe who paſſed by, on what accounts they ſuffered theſe things, and that they were carrying them to be thrown into Tartarus. And hence, he ſaid, that amidſt all their various terrors, this terror ſurpaſſed, leſt the mouth ſhould bellow, and that when it was ſilent, every one moſt gladly aſcended. And that the puniſhments and torments were ſuch as theſe, and their rewards were the reverſe of theſe. And that every one, after they had been ſeven days in the meadow, ariſing thence, it behoved them to depart on the eight day, and arrive at another place on the fourth day after, from whence they per-

ceived from above through the whole heaven and earth, a light ſtretched as a pillar, moſtly reſembling the rainbow, but more bright, and pure. At which they arrived, in one day's journey, and thence they perceived through the middle of the light from heaven, the extremities of its ligatures extended: for that this light was the belt of heaven, like the tranverſe beams of ſhips in like manner keeping the whole circumference united. And that from the extremities hang the diſtaff of neceſſity, by which all the revolutions were turned round, whoſe ſpindle, and point, were both of adamant, but its whirl mixed of this and of other things, and that the nature of the whirl was of ſuch a kind, as to its figure, as is any one we ſee here. And you muſt conceive it, from what he ſaid, to be of ſuch a kind as this. As if in ſome great hollow whirl, carved throughout, there was ſuch another, but leſſer within it, fitted to it, like caſks fitted one within another, and in the ſame manner a third, and a fourth, and other four, for that the whirls were eight in all, as circles one within another, having their lips appearing upwards, and forming round the ſpindle one united convexity of one whirl; and that the ſpindle was driven through the middle of the eight; and that the firſt and outmoſt whirl had the wideſt circumference in the lip, that the ſixth had the ſecond wide, and that of the fourth is the third wide, and the fourth wide that of the eight, and the fifth wide that of the ſeventh, the ſixth wide that of the fifth, and the ſeventh wide that of thethird, and the eight wide that of the ſe-

cond. And that that of the largeſt is variegated, that of the ſeventh is the brighteſt, and that of the eight hath its colour from the ſhining of the ſeventh, that of the ſecond and fifth like to one another, more yellow than thoſe others. But the third hath the whiteſt colour, the fourth reddiſh; the ſecond in whiteneſs ſurpaſſing the ſixth, and that the diſtaff muſt turn round in a circle with the whole it carries, and whilſt the whole is turning round, the ſeven inner circles are gently turned round in a contrary motion to the whole. And that of theſe, the eight moves the ſwifteſt, and next to it, and equal to one another, the ſeventh, the ſixth and the fifth; and that the third went in a motion which as appeared to them compleated its circle in the ſame way as the fourth. The fourth in ſwiftneſs was the third, and the fifth was the ſecond, and it was turned round on the knees of neceſſity. And that on each of its circles there was ſeated a Syren on the upper ſide carried round, and uttering her voice in one monotone. But that the whole of them being eight, compoſed one harmony. That there were other three ſitting round at equal diſtance one from another, each on a throne, the daughters of neceſſity, the Fates, in white veſtments, and having crowns on their heads; Lacheſis, and Clotho, and Atropos, ſinging to the harmony of the Syrens. Lacheſis ſinging the paſt, Clotho the preſent, and Atropos the future. And that Clotho, at certain intervals, with her right hand laid hold of the ſpindle, and along with her mother turned about the outer circle. And Atropos, in like manner, turned

the inner ones, with her left hand. And that Lacheſis touched both of theſe, ſeverally, with either hand. After they arrive here, it behoves them to go directly to Lacheſis. That then a certain prophet firſt of all ranges them in order, and then taking the lots, and the models of lives, from the knees of Lacheſis, and aſcending a lofty tribunal, he ſays; The ſpeech of virgin Lacheſis, the daughter of neceſſity; ſouls of a day! The beginning of another period of men of mortal race. The daemon ſhall not receive you as his lot, but you ſhall chuſe the daemon: he who draws the firſt, let him firſt make choice of a life, to which he muſt of neceſſity adhere: virtue is independent which every one ſhall partake of, more or leſs, according as he honours, or diſhonours her: the cauſe is in himſelf, who makes the choice, and God is blameleſs. And that when he had ſaid theſe things, he threw on all of them the lots, and that each took up the one which fell beſide him, and that he was allowed to take no other than it. And that when he had taken it, he knew what number he had drawn. That after this he placed on the ground before them, the models of lives many more than thoſe we ſee at preſent. And that they were of every kind. For there were lives of all ſorts of animals, and human lives of every kind. And that among theſe, there were tyrannies alſo, ſome of them perpetual, and others deſtroyed in the midſt of their greatneſs, and ending in poverty, baniſhment, and want. That there were alſo lives of renowned men, ſome for their appearance as to beau-

ty, ſtrength, and agility; and others renowned for their deſcent, and the virtues of their anceſtors. There were the lives of renowned women in the ſame manner. But that there was no diſpoſition of ſoul among theſe models, becauſe, of neceſſity, on chuſing a different life, it becometh different itſelf. As to other things, riches and poverty, ſickneſs and health, they were mixed with one another, and ſome were in a middle ſtation between theſe.-----There, then, as appears, friend Glauco! is the whole danger of man. And, on theſe accounts, this, of all things, is moſt to be ſtudied, in what manner every one of us, omitting other ſtudies, ſhall become an enquirer, and learner, in this ſtudy, if, by any means, he be able to learn and find out, who ſhall make him expert and intelligent to diſcern a good life, and a bad; and to chuſe every where, and at all times, the beſt of what is poſſible, conſidering all the things now mentioned, both compounded and ſeparated from one another what they are with reſpect to the virtue of life. And to underſtand what good or evil beauty operates when mixed with poverty, or riches, and with this or the other habit of ſoul; and what is operated by noble and ignoble deſcent, by privacy, and by public ſtation, by ſtrength and weakneſs, docility and indocility, and every thing elſe of the kind which naturally pertains to the ſoul, and likewiſe of what is acquired, when blended one with another; ſo as to be able from all theſe things to compute, and having an eye to the nature of the ſoul, to comprehend both the

worſe and the better life, pronouncing that to be the worſe which ſhall lead the ſoul to become more unjuſt, and that to be the better life which ſhall lead it to become more juſt, and to diſmiſs every other conſideration. For we have ſeen, that in life, and in death, this is the beſt choice. But it is neceſſary that one have this opinion firm as an adamant in him, when he goes into the other world, in order that there alſo he may be unmoved with riches, or any ſuch evils, and may not, ſtumbling into tyrannies, and other ſuch practices, do many and incurable miſchiefs, and himſelf ſuffer ſtill greater: but may underſtand to chuſe always the middle life, as to theſe things, and to ſhun the extremes on either hand, both in this life as far as is poſſible, and in the whole of hereafter. For thus man becomes moſt happy.----For that then the meſſenger from the other world further told, how that the prophet ſpoke thus.------Even, to him who comes laſt, chuſing with judgment, living conſiſtently, there is prepared a deſirable life, no way bad. Let neither him who is firſt, be heedleſs in his choice, nor let him who is laſt, deſpair. He ſaid, that when the prophet had ſpoken theſe things, the firſt who drew a lot run inſtantly, and choſe the greateſt tyranny, but through folly and inſatiableneſs had not ſufficiently examined all things on making his choice, but was ignorant, that in this life there was this deſtiny, the devouring of his own children, and other evils, and that afterwards, when he had conſidered it at leiſure, he wailed and lamented his choice, not having ob-

ſerved the admonitions of the prophet above mentioned. For that he did not accuſe himſelf, as the author of his misfortunes, but fortune, and the daemons, and every thing inſtead of himſelf. And that he was one of thoſe who came from heaven, who had in his former life lived in a regulated republic, and had been virtuous by cuſtom without philoſophy. And that in general among theſe, there were not a few found, who came from heaven, as being unexerciſed in trials. But that the moſt of thoſe who came from earth, as they had endured hardſhips themſelves, and had ſeen others in hardſhips, did not precipitantly make their choice. And hence, and through the fortune of the lot, to moſt ſouls there was an exchange of good and evil things. Since if one ſhould always, whenever he comes into this life, ſoundly philoſophize, and the lot of election ſhould not fall on him the very laſt, it would ſeem from what hath been told us from thence, that he ſhall be happy not only here, but when he goes hence, and his journey hither back again ſhall not be earthy, and rugged, but ſmooth and heavenly. This ſpectacle, he ſaid, was worthy to behold in what manner the ſeveral ſouls made choice of their life. For it was both pitiful and ridiculous and wonderful to behold: as each for the moſt part choſe, according to the habit of their former life. For he told that he ſaw the ſoul which was formerly the ſoul of Orpheus making choice of the life of a ſwan, through hatred of woman-kind, being unwilling to be born of woman on account of the death he ſuffered from

them. He ſaw, likewiſe, the ſoul of Thamyris, making choice of the life of a nightingale. And he ſaw likewiſe a ſwan turning to the choice of human life; and other muſical animals, in like manner, as is likely. And that he ſaw one ſoul, in making its choice, chuſing the life of a lyon; and that it was the ſoul of Telamonian Ajax, ſhunning to become a man, remembering the judgment given with reference to the armour. That next he ſaw the ſoul of Agamemnon, and that this one, in hatred alſo of the human kind, on account of his misfortunes, exchanged it for the life of an eagle. And that he ſaw the ſoul of Atalante chuſing her lot amidſt the reſt, and having attentively obſerved the great honours paid an athletic man was unable to paſs by, but took it. That after it, he ſaw the ſoul of Epaeus the Panopean, going into the nature of a ſkilful workwoman. And that far off, among the laſt, he ſaw the ſoul of the buffoon Therſites, aſſuming the ape. And that by chance, he ſaw the ſoul of Ulyſſes, who had drawn its lot laſt of all, going to make its choice: that in remembrance of its former toils, and tired of ambition, it went about a long time, ſeeking the life of a private man, of no buſineſs, and with difficulty found it lying ſome where, neglected by the reſt. And that when it ſaw it, it ſaid, that he would have made the ſame choice if he had gotten the firſt lot, and gladly made choice of it. And that in like manner the ſouls of wild beaſts went into men, and men again into beaſts. The unjuſt changing into wild beaſts, and the juſt into tame, and that they were blend-

ed by all ſorts of mixtures. That, after all the ſouls had choſen their lives according as they drew their lots, they went all in order to Lacheſis, and that ſhe gave to every one the daemon he choſe, and ſent him along to be the guardian of his life, and the accompliſher of what he had choſen: he firſt of all conducts it, to Clotho, to ratify under her hand and by the whirl of the vortex of her ſpindle, the deſtiny he had choſen by lot: and after being with her, he leads him back again to the ſpinning of Atropos, who maketh the deſtinies irreverſible. And that from hence they proceed directly under the throne of Neceſſity; and after he had paſſed by it, as all others paſſed, they marched all into the plain of Lethe amidſt dreadful heat, and ſcorching, for he ſaid that it is void of trees and every thing that the earth produceth. That when night came on, they encamped beſide the river Amelete, whoſe water no veſſel contains; a certain meaſure then of the water all of them muſt of neceſſity drink, and ſuch of them as are not preſerved by prudence, drink more than the meaſure, and that he who drinks, always forgets every thing. And that after they were laid aſleep, and it became midnight, there was thunder, and an earthquake, and they were thence on a ſudden carried upwards, ſome one way, and ſome another, approaching to generation, like ſtars. But that he himſelf was forbidden to drink of the water. Where however, and in what manner, he came into his body, he knew nothing, but ſuddenly looking up in the morning he ſaw himſelf already laid on the funeral pile. And this fable, Glauco!

hath been preſerved, and is not loſt, and it may preſerve us, if we obſerve it, and ſhall happily paſs over the river Lethe, and ſhall not contaminate the ſoul.

But if the company will be perſuaded by me; accounting the ſoul immortal, and able to bear all evil, and all good, we ſhall always hold the road which leads above; and juſtice with prudence we ſhall by all means purſue; in order that we may be friends both to ourſelves, and to the Gods, both whilſt we remain here, and when we receive its rewards, like victors aſſembled together; and, we ſhall both here, and in that thouſand years journey we have deſcribed, enjoy a happy life.

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